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PREFACE
Last year the Denver Law Journal published the first Tenth
Circuit Survey, a summary and analysis of decisions handed
down during the preceding 12-month period by the United States
Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit. Response to the first
Survey indicates that the Journal has succeeded in its goal of
providing a valuable resource and research tool for members of
the legal community. Therefore, the Denver Law Journal contin-
ues to devote one issue of each volume to the Tenth Circuit
'Survey. This second Survey covers opinions selected from those
filed from September 1, 1974, through August 31, 1975. It is div-
ided, as was the first Survey, into 11 major areas of law. Signifi-
cant cases within each area are analyzed in depth in individual
comments; where a trend or common element is observable in
several cases within an area, those cases are treated in a note.
Cases requiring only brief comment are discussed in the overview
or brief introduction to each section.
The Denver Law Journal extends its thanks to Chief Judge
David T. Lewis, Judge Oliver Seth, and the other Tenth Circuit
judges for their contributions and support; to Emory G. Hatcher,
Circuit Executive, for providing us with valuable information and
advice; to Howard K. Phillips, Clerk of Court, and Robert L.
Hoecker, Deputy Clerk of Court, and their staff for providing us
with copies of opinions and assisting us in numerous other ways;
to Robert B. Yegge, Dean of the College of Law, for his enthusias-
tic support of this project; and to our faculty advisor, Ved P.
Nanda, for his guidance and interest. The members of the
Journal who worked on the second Survey also wish to thank
those who produced the first, for establishing the procedures
which made this undertaking easier. We particularly wish to
thank Jean Stewart, Editor-in-Chief of the Denver Law Journal
in 1974, for her inspiration and hard work in making the annual
Tenth Circuit Survey a reality and for her contributions to this
Survey.
Board of Editors
Denver Law Journal
THE HONORABLE ALFRED P. MURRAH
DEDICATION
THE HONORABLE ALFRED P. MURRAH
By DAVID T. LEWIS*
The death of Judge Alfred Paul Murrah on October 30, 1975,
brought to a close a career of extraordinary service and high dis-
tinction. For the nearly 40 years that Judge Murrah served on the
federal bench, including 35 on this court, he was a dynamic pro-
ponent for the improvement of the administration of justice. To
the honor and memory of our friend and colleague, this issue of
the Denver Law Journal is most properly dedicated.
Judge Murrah was born October 27, 1904, in Indian Territory
(now the State of Oklahoma) and at an early age resolved to
complete a definitive education. This resolve culminated in his
graduation, with honors, from the University of Oklahoma School
of Law in 1928.
Judge Murrah practiced law in Seminole and later in Okla-
homa City. In 1937, he was appointed United States District
Judge for the three judicial districts in Oklahoma; at that time
he was the youngest United States district judge ever appointed.
During Judge Murrah's service as a trial judge, he was recognized
for his common sense approach and forthrightness.
In 1940, Judge Murrah was appointed United States Circuit
Judge, later to serve as Chief Judge of the Circuit from 1959 to
1970, when he took senior status. The year 1970 also marked a
new direction in Judge Murrah's service to the federal judiciary
when he became the Director of the Federal Judicial Center, a
position he held until 1974. Despite this additional demand on his
time and energy, he continued to participate actively in the work
of the court.
Judge Murrah had a reputation for accomplishment which
he modestly attributed to hard work and once said that he never
had time for a hobby or interest outside the law. It is true that
Judge Murrah paid no attention to the hours of the day, but his
hard work was recognized by all others as accompanied by great
ability not only in the law but in leadership directed to his church
* Chief Judge, United States Court of Appeals, Tenth Circuit.
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and to numerous charitable institutions. Many times he was ho-
nored for these efforts.
Judge Murrah was recognized nationally as a leading figure
in the area of judicial administration. In addition to his distin-
guished service as Director of the Federal Judicial Center, Judge
Murrah chaired the Pretrial Committee of the Judicial Confer-
ence of the United States, the National Council of Crime and
Delinquency, the National Committee for Traffic Safety, and the
Judicial Panel on Multi-District Litigation. Judge Murrah was
also active in many professional organizations including the
American Bar Association, serving as chairman of the Judicial
Section and of the Advisory Committee on Pretrial Procedure in
Criminal Cases.
FOREWORD
By JUDGE OLIVER SETH
As part of the publication of the second annual Tenth Circuit
Survey, the writers of the opinions so surveyed would like to
formally commend the Denver Law Journal for undertaking this
difficult task. We would also like to state that, in our view, the
first survey was prepared in a professional and scholarly manner.
It contained a sound analysis of a large quantity of diverse mate-
rial; thus, we have been looking forward to this publication.
Judge Lewis in the foreword to the first survey well described
the position of this court in the hierarchy of courts. The relation-
ship of our court with the other federal and state courts in the
analysis of decisions is well structured, but I often wonder
whether the opinions of this court during the past year are as
firmly fixed in relation to the litigants, the participating attor-
neys, and the scholars as they used to be. This query is prompted
by what appears to be the direction in which many of the opinions
of our court are now pointed. I am referring to the typical pub-
lished opinion in the civil and criminal cases which are argued
before panels of the court. These opinions are now for the most
part directed to, and written primarily as an explanation to, the
litigant and his attorney of the legal -decisional basis or reason for
the result reached by the panel. Therefore, in view of the press of
cases, they cannot be written for posterity or for law reviews; nor
can they meet more than basic literary standards, or serve as
detailed directions to the trial courts. It has become more impor-
tant to decide the case as promptly as possible and, also, to pro-
vide a written explanation to the litigant as to how the result was
reached, rather than to give full expression to the other factors.
Our court strongly feels that the parties and their attorneys
are entitled to have an expanded order, a per curiam opinion, or
an authored opinion as part of the disposition of their appeal or
petition. Thus, this court seeks to write in a greater percentage
of the cases than any other circuit. Since the primary aim is to
decide promptly and to write a sound explanation, it is not always
possible to attain the literary quality desired, nor perhaps to pro-
duce an opinion of scholarly appearance. Many of these opinions
are not routinely published. A compromise must be reached. This
court has thus determined to write on as many cases as possible.
It seems that this description of the basic approach of this
court is in order in connection with this second annual survey.
This is not an explanation, but it is at least a description of
methodology. It must also have added to the burden of those
undertaking the survey.
Again, let me on behalf of our court express our admiration
to the Denver Law Journal for undertaking such a difficult task,
which is just as skillfully done as was the first survey.

JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
CIRCUIT JUSTICE BYRON R. WHITE
The Chief Justice of the United States and the associate justices of
the Supreme Court shall from time to time be allotted as circuit
justices among the circuits by order of the Supreme Court.)
Associate Justice of the Supreme Court Byron R. White acts
as circuit justice for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals. In this
capacity, he provides guidance to Tenth Circuit judges through
his participation in events such as the Tenth Circuit Judicial
Conference.2 If the need should arise, he is empowered to sit on
the Tenth Circuit Court.3 Justice White's responsibilities also
require him to rule on the applications which must be made to
individual justices,' such as applications for extensions of time to
docket an appeal' or to petition for certiorari,' and applications
for stays of proceedings.' In keeping with the Denver Law
Journal's goal of providing useful information to practitioners in
the Tenth Circuit, it is appropriate to include a brief sketch of
the man who acts as their circuit justice.
Byron Raymond White was born in Fort Collins, Colorado,
on June 8, 1917, the son of Alpha Albert White and Maude Burger
White. He grew up nearby in the small rural community of Wel-
lington, Colorado. Money was not plentiful for the Whites in
those days, and by the time young Byron reached 7 or 8 years old,
he was working in the local sugar beet fields for a dollar or two a
28 U.S.C. § 42 (1970). The allotments among the Circuit Courts of Appeals are as
follows:
District of Columbia Circuit Warren E. Burger
First Circuit William J. Brennan, Jr.
Second Circuit Thurgood Marshall
Third Circuit William J. Brennan, Jr.
Fourth Circuit Warren E. Burger
Fifth Circuit Lewis F. Powell, Jr.
Sixth Circuit Potter Stewart
Seventh Circuit John Paul Stevens
Eighth Circuit Harry A. Blackmun
Ninth Circuit William H. Rehnquist
Tenth Circuit Byron R. White
' Id. § 333.
3Id. § 43.
For procedure when making applications to individual justices, see Supreme Court
Rule 50.
' Id. Rule 13.1.
' Id. Rule 22.4.
I d. Rule 51.
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day. When White graduated from high school, the University of
Colorado had a practice of awarding an academic scholarship to
the first place graduate of each school. He won the scholarship
and was able to fulfill his ambition of attending college.
At the University of Colorado, White excelled both scholasti-
cally and athletically. He was elected to Phi Beta Kappa in his
junior year, graduated as valedictorian of his class, and was
awarded a coveted Rhodes Scholarship for study at Oxford Uni-
versity. White also found time to win three varsity letters in foot-
ball, four in basketball, and three in baseball. In 1937, his junior
year, he led all major college backs in both scoring and rushing,
and was named a football All-American.
After graduating from the University of Colorado, White
played the 1938-39 professional football season, becoming the
first rookie to lead the National Football League in rushing. He
then traveled to Oxford for advanced study, but the outbreak of
war in Europe caused him to return to the United States in
September 1939. Back home, White entered Yale Law School,
where he received the Edgar Cullen Award for the highest grades
by a freshman. Convinced that he would be drafted into military
service before finishing his legal studies, White contracted to play
professional football with the Detroit Lions, and was, therefore,
unable to join his school's law review.
Pearl Harbor interrupted White's legal career and termi-
nated his football career. He volunteered for service in the U.S.
Navy and won two bronze stars while serving in the South Pacific
as a lieutenant in naval intelligence. When the war ended, he
returned to law school at Yale. Before graduating in November
1946, he married Marion Lloyd Stearns.
With his LL.B. degree magna cum laude, White went to
Washington D.C. to clerk for Chief Justice Fred Vinson for a year.
He then returned to Denver to enter the practice of law, becoming
a partner in the firm of Lewis, Grant, and Davis. During their
stay in Denver, the Whites became the parents of two children,
Charles Byron and Nancy Pitkin.
In January 1961, White was appointed Deputy Attorney
General of the United States. Then in April 1962, President John
F. Kennedy nominated him for the position of Associate Justice
of the Supreme Court. The Senate promptly confirmed, and Jus-
VOL. 53
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tice White took the oath of office on April 16, 1962. Justice
White's history of accomplishment demonstrates the aptness of
President Kennedy's statement about him: "He has excelled in
everything he has attempted."'
This quotation and other information in this biographical sketch were taken from
THE JUSTICES OF THE UNITED STATES SUPREME COURT, 1789-1969, THEIR LIVES AND MAJOR
OPINIONS 2951-61 (1969).

COMPUTERIZED LEGAL RESEARCH-THE
TENTH CIRCUIT'S EXPERIMENTATION WITH LEXIS
INTRODUCTION
Today's attorney must assimilate a rapidly mushrooming
volume of legal material. It has been estimated that 30,000 judi-
cial decisions and 15,000 statutes are added to the law each year.'
Administrative regulations and rulings are also increasing in
number. The Harvard Law Library, which already contains over
1 million volumes, must add 41/2 miles of shelf space to accommo-
date each year's acquisitions.'
The overwhelming quantity of legal writings has forced con-
scientious attorneys to search for more efficient methods of glean-
ing relevant materials from the many sources available. The Fed-
eral Judicial Center, the research and development arm of the
federal court system, has taken an active part in the search by
budgeting approximately $190,000 to determine if the computer
can provide the needed efficiency. The Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals, along with the Sixth Circuit and the District of Colum-
bia Circuit, has been selected to assay LEXIS, a computerized
legal research system developed by Mead Data Central.
3
For a 1-year period which began in September of 1975, an
objective study will compare LEXIS to conventional research
methods. During the study, participating federal judges will as-
sign the same legal issue to two law clerks or staff attorneys. One
researcher will use only traditional methods; the other will use
LEXIS, and may also use customary sources as a supplement.
Both will submit a memorandum on the issue, and the judge will
rate the memos without knowing which method of research was
used. The judges' ratings and a record of the time required for
each method will be forwarded to the Federal Judicial Center,
where, after factoring out variances caused by individual research
ability differences, statisticians will evaluate the speed, accuracy,
Cohen, Research Habits of Lawyers, 9 JURIMETRICS J. 183, 185 (1969).
Tapper, Research and Legal Information by Computer, 48 Cm. B. REc. 226, 228
(1967).
Numerous other systems of computerized legal research have been developed or are
in the process of being developed. See, e.g., Bigelow, The Use of Computers in the Law,
24 HASTINGS L.J. 707 (1973); Comment, Computer-Assisted Legal Research, 52 ORE. L.
REv. 665 (1972). The District of Columbia Circuit is simultaneously testing a system
developed by West Publishing Company which contains West headnotes.
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and thoroughness of computerized legal research. If the results
are positive, it is likely that LEXIS will be installed throughout
the federal court system.
THE FEATURES OF LEXIS
LEXIS provides a full-text approach to computer research.
The system contains, for example, all Supreme Court cases de-
cided since 1938. This means that every word of every opinion
since that time is in computer storage and available for reference.
The researcher interacts with the central computer via a
remote terminal connected by telephone lines. He types messages
on the terminal's keyboard and it replies on a video screen. The
computer is asked to search for certain words, numbers, phrases,
or combinations thereof. Through the use of connectors-the sim-
plest of which include "and," "or," and "but not"-the re-
searcher can expand or restrict his request. To illustrate, the
LEXIS user may ask the computer to retrieve all Tenth Circuit
cases in which the word "negligence" appears. Within seconds,
the number of cases using the word will be provided. Since there
will undoubtededly be an excessive number of such cases, the
request may be modified by adding "and automobile or vehicle."
The computer would then provide the number of cases which
contain both the word "negligence" and either "automobile" or
"vehicle." To further modify the request, the researcher may ask
for only those cases which also contain the word "comparative"
within the space of five words from "negligence."
When the attorney has arrived at a number of cases which
he considers manageable, several options are available. He may
simply jot down the citations for later use in a conventional li-
brary. He may read entire cases on the console screen, or scan
only the portions which contain the words used in the search
request. He may even tell the console's high speed printer to
provide a copy of certain cases. The same process is used when
dealing with statutes or administrative regulations.
Although the above illustration has been simplified, it dem-
onstrates that full-text research is quite different from traditional
methods. Instead of depending upon a compiled index, the re-
searcher actually constructs his own index, relying upon the facts
of the case and upon his knowledge of the words likely to be found
in cases, statutes, or rulings dealing with the subject of his re-
search. He may search by fact patterns, areas of law, or key
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words. Success varies with the skill of the researcher; a compre-
hensive knowledge of the field being researched greatly improves
the quality of information obtained, as does experience in using
the LEXIS console.
A. Current Data Base Available
The LEXIS federal library currently contains the United
States Code, Supreme Court decisions beginning in 1938, federal
courts of appeal decisions beginning in 1959, and district court
decisions since 1970. The system also contains an extensive fed-
eral tax library as well as a securities law library and a trade
regulation library.
Statutes and court decisions from the states of Ohio, New
York, Missouri, Texas, and Illinois have been entered to varying
degrees. Eventually, the laws of every state will be included.
States will be added as customer demand increases and as Mead
Data Central is able to enter into agreements with state bar asso-
ciations.
B. Cost of LEXIS
The approximate cost of LEXIS is $70 for each hour of con-
sole use. In addition there is a surcharge of $195 for each hour of
central computer time. Fees are computed to the nearest second.
Although the speed of computer research prevents such charges
from being excessive, the monthly minimum obligation of $2,500
may be prohibitive for many small firms and sole practitioners.
It is likely, however, that fees will be lowered as the number of
customers increases. It may also be possible for bar associations
to work out time-sharing arrangements. Currently, substantially
lower rates are offered to government users and to law school
libraries.4
CONCLUSION
LEXIS users, which include several large law and accounting
firms, indicate that it is a valuable research tool when used in
conjunction with, rather than as a replacement for, traditional
methods. Occasionally results have been dramatic. Tenth Circuit
users have found cases directly on point after a fruitless conven-
I Pricing information, as well as much of the information concerning LEXIS used in
this article was obtained from brochures published by Mead Data Central, 200 Park Ave.,
New York, New York 10017.
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tional search. The greatest value of the system, however, may be
its potential for diverse and creative uses. For instance, cases
decided by a particular judge or argued by a particular attorney
can be retrieved. The search may be limited to a certain time
period. It is possible to locate all cases citing a previous case, a
function now performed by Shepard's Citators. Additional
unique capabilities will certainly be found as the system contin-
ues to be used.
It is clear that the legal profession is in need of new, more
efficient research techniques. The information obtained by the
three circuit courts of appeal will provide valuable insight into
the potential of LEXIS, and of computerized legal research in
general.
Dennis E. House
TENTH CIRCUIT NOTES
In an effort to adapt the Annual Tenth Circuit Survey to the
interests of the practicing bar, the Board of Editors has added to
our annual survey this section of general interest items about the
circuit. We express our appreciation to Emory Hatcher, Circuit
Executive, and Richard Banta, Senior Staff Attorney for the
Tenth Circuit, for their cooperation and assistance in preparing
this section.
A. Local Rules
The Judicial Council for the Tenth Circuit amends the Rules
of Court for the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals' in response to
suggestions from the bench, bar, and staff and according to the
needs of the court. The most recent compilation of the local rules,
as amended to November 12, 1975, reflects changes in rules 9, 8,
7, and 10.2
Rule 9 provides for four calendar assignments, designated A,
B, C, and D. After reviewing the docketing statement, the court
assigns each case to one of the four calendars according to criteria
such as: Number, complexity, and novelty of issues presented;
length of the record; cross appeals and number of parties in-
volved; and applicability of recent Supreme Court decisions.
By amendment dated May 1, 1975, the Circuit Council in-
serted the following statement into rule 9:
The assignment of a case to a particular calendar is a procedural
classification only for the convenience of the court and does not
reflect an opinion by the court as to the importance or substantive
merit of the issues raised.
Additionally, rule 9(d) was amended to read:
(d) Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which notice
A complete copy of these rules, adopted November 13, 1972, and as amended
through October 24, 1974, appears at Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 421-35 (1975).
These rules are hereinafter cited as the local rules, and all citations to rules in this section
are to the local rules as amended to November 12, 1975, unless otherwise indicated.
Rule 10, Reproduction of the Record and Appendix to the Briefs, was amended by
the Circuit Council on May 20, 1975, to include the following provision:
Whenever, anywhere in these Rules, the requirement of an appendix is
dispensed with and the Clerk is required to mail the record to counsel so that
it may be duplicated, he shall tax a fee of $15.00 to cover the cost of clerical
time and postage expense.
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has been given pursuant to Rule 8(d) that the appeal will be consid-
ered without oral argument on the record of the proceedings in the
District Court. Within 15 days after receiving such notice the parties
may simultaneously file a memorandum in quadruplicate in support
of their respective positions. Counsel shall serve copies of any memo-
randum filed on all parties.'
Rule 7 establishes the criteria for the docketing statement
which must be filed within 30 days after filing the notice of appeal
in the district court. Paragraph (c) requires that the appellant
attach to each copy of the docketing statement a copy of the
docket sheet of the court from which the appeal is taken, a copy
of the judgment or order sought to be reviewed, a copy of any
opinion or findings, and a copy of the notice of appeal. On
November 12, 1975, the Circuit Council adopted the following
addition to rule 7:
(f) Failure to comply with paragraph (c) of this Rule may result
in dismissal of the appeal pursuant to Rule 14(a) of these Rules.
B. Index to Unpublished Opinions
Among the amendments to the local rules adopted during
1974 was the rule allowing unpublished opinions to be cited as
precedent. Rule 17(c) now provides, in pertinent part:
Previously, rule 9(d) provided:
(d) Calendar D cases shall consist of those cases in which a motion to
affirm or dismiss has been filed pursuant to Rule 8(a) of these Rules and
those in which notice has been given pursuant to Rule 8(d) of these Rules
that the court is considering summary action on its own motion.
(1) Within 15 days after receiving notice that the court is consid-
ering summary action pursuant to Rule 8(d) on its own motion, the
appellant may file in quadruplicate and serve on all parties to the
appeal a memorandum addressing the merits, opposing such sum-
mary action.
(2) The appellee may simultaneously file in quadruplicate and
serve on all parties to the appeal a memorandum addressing the mer-
its supporting summary action.
(3) The same procedure and form as the preceding two para-
graphs will be followed in those cases where manifest error is noted
by the court pursuant to Rule 8(d), except that the appellee may
oppose and the appellant may support summary action.
On November 12, 1975, the Circuit Council correspondingly amended rule 8(d) by deleting
the following language:
Whenever the court, after reviewing an appeal, concludes that mani-
fest error requires reversal or vacation of a judgment or order of the district
court, or remand for additional proceedings, the court may enter an appro-
priate order after notice to the parties.
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Unpublished opinions, although unreported and not uniformly
available to all of the parties, can nevertheless be cited, if relevant,
in proceedings before this or any other court. Counsel citing same
shall serve a copy of the unpublished opinion upon opposing coun-
sel.4
Rule 17(c) was adopted in response to concern from the
bench and practicing bar about the inability to cite unpublished
opinions. During the 12-month period covered by this annual
survey, the Tenth Circuit wrote 474 opinions. Approximately 55
percent of those opinions were not published.5 Opinions not se-
lected for publication are
(1) cases where the outcome depends on facts and presents no legal
issues not previously decided by the Tenth Circuit or by the Su-
preme Court of the United States; and (2) diversity cases where the
outcome depends on established state law.'
Nevertheless, the adoption of rules such as rule 17(c), permitting
Previously, this portion of rule 17(c) provided:
Unpublished opinions, since they are unreported and not uniformly available
to all parties, cannot be cited or otherwise used in any proceedings before
this or any other court, in unrelated cases.
PUBLISHED AND UNPUBLISHED OPINIONS
TENTH CIRCUIT
September 1, 1974 through August 31, 1975
REGULAR PER CURIAM TOTAL
OPINIONS OPINIONS OPINIONS
Pub- Unpub- Pub- Unpub- Pub- Unpub-
lished lished lished lished lished lished
Sept. 1974 23 7 8 23 15
Oct. 1974 18 10 3 21 21 31
Nov. 1974 12 6 1 2 13 8
Dec. 1974 26 14 13 26 27
Jan. 1975 19 10 2 10 21 20
Feb. 1975 18 8 4 8 22 16
March 1975 17 8 1 15 18 23
April 1975 17 4 8 17 12
May 1975 9 14 1 16 10 30
June 1975 18 2 1 17 19 19
July 1975 13 23 1 8 14 31
Aug. 1975 13 10 3 12 16 22
TOTALS 203 116 17 138 220 254
TOTAL OPINIONS
- 474
I Rule 17(e).
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counsel to cite unpublished opinions, has caused some to suggest
that it is inequitable for certain parties to have greater access to
the increasing number of unpublished opinions.7
Partially in response to this inequity, the central staff of the
Tenth Circuit is preparing an ongoing index of unpublished
Tenth Circuit opinions. The initial volume will index all unpub-
lished opinions issued from August 1972 through February 1975.
This compilation includes between 600 and 700 opinions. A sec-
ond volume will contain an index to all unpublished opinions
from March 1975 through December 1975. Thereafter, the index
will be supplemented each year by a quarterly index and by a
cumulative annual supplement. The index will be made available
within the circuit as soon as possible to all judges and magis-
trates, offices of the United States Attorneys and federal public
defenders, and all public and private law libraries. Each district
court clerk's office within the Tenth Circuit will have a complete
index for reference use. Additionally, copies of the index will be
available to the practicing bar at a minimal charge through the
Tenth Circuit clerk's office. Reprints of individual unpublished
opinions are available upon request from the clerk's office for $2
per opinion.
C. Practitioner's Guide to the Tenth Circuit
The staff attorney's office of the Tenth Circuit is presently
completing a final draft of a publication described as a practi-
tioner's guide to practice before the Tenth Circuit.' Similar
guides are available in other circuits, although most of these pub-
lications were prepared and distributed through local bar associa-
tions. Prepared in outline form, the practitioner's guide is de-
signed to provide a step-by-step procedural outline on how to
bring an appeal to the Tenth Circuit and will provide a basic
overview of internal processing of appeals.
The booklet will include the Federal Rules of Appellate Pro-
cedure and selected forms, and the local rules of the Tenth Cir-
cuit. For the novice, the staff has provided a convenient map of
' Talesnick, Understanding the United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit:
A Guide for the Practitioner, Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 375, 401 (1975);
COMMISSION ON REVISION OF THE FEDERAL COURT APPELLATE SYSTEM, STRUCTURE AND INTER-
NAL PROCEDURES: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR CHANGE 114 (June 1975) [hereinafter cited as
COMMISSION REPORT (June 1975)].
1 For another practitioner's guide, see Talesnick, supra note 7.
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downtown Denver, practical aids on how to prepare an appellate
brief and how to present oral argument, and charts and checklists
on "when to do what."
The Tenth Circuit's plan for implementation of the Criminal
Justice Act is described, along with practical pointers for ap-
pointed counsel.
The final draft will be circulated within the Tenth Circuit for
comment and revision before the guide is published and generally
available to the practicing bar.
The central staff has also drafted and distributed for com-
ment and revision a set of standard forms for use by pro se liti-
gants in civil rights suits and prisoner petition cases. The Circuit
Council is considering the advisability of requiring the use of such
forms as well as uniform rules and procedures for district court
disposition of these specific cases.
D. Central Staff
The Tenth Circuit presently has five staff attorneys.' The
utilization of central staffing, a relatively recent innovation, is
already in wide use, and every circuit but the First employs staff
attorneys to consider pro se motions and petitions.'0 The Commis-
sion on Revision of the Federal Court Appellate System has
recommended increased congressional funding to develop opti-
mal utilization of central staffs by the courts of appeals for re-
search, preparation of memoranda, and the management and
monitoring of appeals to assure that cases move toward disposi-
tion with minimum delay."
Several years ago the Judicial Conference of the United
States recommended to Congress that appropriation be made for
the position of Senior Staff Attorney in each circuit court of ap-
peals. In 1974 Congress created the position and in 1975 author-
ized the necessary appropriation.
The Tenth Circuit was among the first to act pursuant to this
congressional authorization when the Circuit Council appointed
Mr. Richard Banta to the position on November 12, 1975. The
I Staff attorneys for the Tenth Circuit are: Richard J. Banta, Esq.; Thomas D.
Carter, Esq.; John K. Kleinheksel, Esq.; Edward A. Lewkowski, Esq.; and Elizabeth D.
Page, Esq.
COMMISSION REPoFrr (June 1975) at 118.
Id. at 119-20.
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Circuit Council has also authorized appointment of one addi-
tional staff attorney for the circuit.
The Tenth Circuit is considering the assignment of a member
of the clerk's staff to the position of ombudsman to assist the
office of the Clerk of the Court and the Circuit Executive in
checking on problem areas in processing appeals to eliminate
unnecessary delays.
E. Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit
Pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 333,"2 the Tenth Circuit adopted
local rule 19 which provides for the establishment of an annual
judicial conference of the circuit. Although many circuits limit
participation in the judicial conference to bar association offi-
cials, selected law school personnel, and persons nominated by
circuit judges, membership in the Judicial Conference of the
Tenth Circuit is open to
[e]very member of the Bar of the Court of Appeals for the Tenth
Circuit who is in good standing and who shall declare in writing his
intention to become a member of the Conference . . . .
The mailing list for the Judicial Conference presently ex-
ceeds 900 members, including all judges within the circuit and
members of the state judiciaries.
Except for executive sessions [a]ll other meetings of the Con-
ference shall be open to all members of the Conference and shall be
devoted to a program designed to improve the administration of
justice in the Tenth Circuit. All members of the Conference may
participate in the discussions and deliberations. The Conference
may take appropriate action on any matter presented to it."
The 1975 Judicial Conference of the Tenth Circuit was held
July 24-26 in Santa Fe, New Mexico. The 1976 meeting, a com-
This statute provides for the establishment of a judicial conference for each circuit:
The chief judge of each circuit shall summon annually the circuit and
district judges of the circuit, in active service, to a conference at a time and
place that he designates, for the purpose of considering the business of the
courts and advising means of improving the administration of justice within
such circuit. He shall preside at such conference, which shall be known as
the Conference of the circuit.
The court of appeals for each circuit shall provide by its rules for repre-
sentation and active participation at such conference by members of the bar
of such circuit.
Rule 19(b)(2).
Rule 19(e).
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bined conference with the Eighth Circuit, will be held on June 27-
30 in Hot Springs, Arkansas.
F. Advisory Committee on Tenth Circuit Procedures
In 1972 Congress established the Commission on Revision of
the Federal Court Appellate System. 5 The Commission was given
two major assignments. Under section 1(a) of the Act the Com-
mission was
to study the present division of the United States into the several
judicial circuits and to report. . . its recommendations for changes
in the geographical boundaries of the circuits as may be most appro-
priate for the expeditious and effective disposition of judicial busi-
ness.
On December 18, 1973, the report pursuant to that mandate was
submitted.
Under section 1(b) of the Act, the Commission was
to study the structure and internal procedures of the Federal courts
of appeal system, and to report . . . its recommendations for such
additional changes in structure or internal procedure as may be
appropriate for the expeditious and effective disposition of the case-
load of the Federal courts of appeal, consistent with fundamental
concepts of fairness and due process.
In June 1975 the Commission presented its report on struc-
ture and internal procedures. Input for the Commission's report
came in part from testimony at hearings and from an extensive
survey of attorneys. In part the Commission concluded: (1) That
there is a value in permitting the several circuits to respond inde-
pendently to the needs of the bar with solutions tailored to their
own particular problems;" and (2) that the bar can play a crea-
tive and constructive role in fashioning circuit procedures. 7
These conclusions led the Commission to recommend "that each
circuit court of appeals institute a mechanism for formulating,
implementing, monitoring and revising circuit procedures."'"
Specifically, the Commission recommended creation of an
advisory committee within each circuit to provide input from the
28 U.S.C.A. § 41 (Supp. 1974).
COMMISSION REPORT (June 1975) at 96.
,I Id. at 97.
Id. at 98.
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bar and others who may be affected by procedural change. In
response to that recommendation the Tenth Circuit has already
established the Advisory Committee on Tenth Circuit Proce-
dures. The committee consists of Chief Judge David T. Lewis;
District Judge Frederick A. Daugherty; Emory Hatcher, Circuit
Executive; and one member of the practicing bar from each state
within the circuit. 9 Membership on the committee has recently
been finalized, and the group plans to begin organizational
meetings early in 1976.
G. Filing Statistics
The increase in appeals brought to the Tenth Circuit in the
past 5 years is reflected in the following table.
TENTH CIRCUIT
CALENDAR YEAR FILING STATISTICS
YEAR APPEALS FILED
1970 729
1971 783
1972 900
1973 977
1974 898
1975 1,002
" The members of the practicing bar from the six states are: William C. McClearn,
Esq. (Colorado); Leonard 0. Thomas, Esq. (Kansas); William A. Sloan, Esq. (New
Mexico); John W. Raley, Jr., Esq. (Oklahoma); Harold G. Christensen, Esq. (Utah); and
Henry A. Burgess, Esq. (Wyoming).
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ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
OVERVIEW
INTRODUCTION
Recent Tenth Circuit decisions add little of significance to
the field of administrative law, but several merit some discussion.
It is clear from the increasing number of decisions concerning this
area' that administrative agencies provide important avenues of
relief to individuals who have no other accessible remedy;2 it is
also clear that the courts hesitate to substitute their discretion for
that of the expert agency.3
I. SCOPE AND EXTENT OF JUDICIAL REVIEW
In Salone v. United States4 the Tenth Circuit denied de novo
review to federal employees appealing decisions of the Equal
Employment Opportunity Commission.' This result is consistent
with other decisions which limit review to the record where the
complainant is a federal employee.'
Other recent Tenth Circuit cases involved a review on the
There were 23 cases dealing with administrative law this year in the Tenth Circuit,
compared with 15 last year. The trend seems to be that increasing numbers of decisions
are being appealed; hence, it is concluded that more decisions are being made at the
administrative level also.
E.g., Bard v. Seamans, 507 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974). Note also that, where adminis-
trative agencies have been created, courts will frequently refuse relief to a complainant
until all administrative remedies have been exhausted.
, See United States v. Storer Broadcasting Co., 351 U.S. 192 (1956); St. Joseph
Stockyards Co. v. United States, 298 U.S. 38 (1936).
; 511 F.2d 902 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3684 (U.S. June 19,
1975) (No. 74-1600).
' The complaint in Salone was filed under the Equal Employment Opportunity Act,
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5, -16 (1970). An administrative hearing, resulting in a detailed record,
preceded the judicial action.
' Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). See also Tomlin v. United
States Air Force Medical Center, 369 F. Supp. 353 (S.D. Ohio 1974). These cases rely on
the fact that claims brought under the civil service statutes limit review to the administra-
tive record. Since all federal employees may seek relief pursuant to these sections, these
courts would not provide a more extensive review where relief is sought under the Equal
Employment Opportunity Act. This reasoning may, however, defeat the broad public
policy objective evidenced in the Act. But see Henderson v. Defense Contract Admin.
Serv. Region, 370 F. Supp. 180 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Thompson v. United States Dep't of
Justice, 360 F. Supp. 255 (N.D. Cal. 1973), rev'd, 372 F. Supp. 762 (N.D. Cal. 1974), in
light of Hackley v. Johnson, 360 F. Supp. 1247 (D.D.C. 1973). On the other hand, claim-
ants employed in private industry may have a trial de novo. Alexander v. Gardner-Denver
Co., 415 U.S. 36 (1974).
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record where appellants claimed the administrative determina-
tion was not supported by substantial evidence.' The Tenth Cir-
cuit found for the agencies in these decisions, which included two
cases where the court examined the relationship between the de-
termination of the administrative law judge (ALJ) and that of the
agency.'
II. JURISDICTIONAL AND STATUTORY INTERPRETATION ISSUES
The Tenth Circuit also based recent decisions on primary
jurisdiction, exhaustion of remedies, and res judicata. In
Oklahoma Publishing Co. v. Powell' the court, basing its reason-
ing on the doctrine of primary jurisdiction,'" deferred its decision
until the EEOC had completed administrative action.
In Bard v. Seamans" the appellate court applied the doctrine
of exhaustion of remedies 2 and refused relief because Bard had
failed to avail himself of the administrative machinery specifically
provided by Congress for the purpose of reviewing and correcting
military discharges. 3
Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Sage v. Wein-
berger, No. 74-1775 (10th Cir., Aug. 12, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Lowry v.
Richardson, No. 74-1081 (10th Cir., June 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Thiret
v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975); Mandrell v. Weinberger, 511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir.
1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975);
Coddens v. Weinberger, 505 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1974).
1 Thiret v. FTC, 512 F.2d 176 (10th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v.
Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975).
No. 74-1676 (10th Cir., Aug. 8, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
The doctrine of primary jurisdiction requires a complainant in court first
to seek relief in an administrative proceeding before a remedy will be sup-
plied by the courts even though the matter is properly presented to the court
in a matter within its jurisdiction.
2 AM. JUR. 2d Administrative Law § 788 (1962). The reasons frequently cited by courts
for this deferral are related to agency expertise, availability of informed investigative
agents, and the need for uniformity in ruling. See generally Pennsylvania R.R. v. Day,
360 U.S. 548 (1959); Federal Maritime Bd. v. Isbrandtsen Co., 356 U.S. 481 (1958); United
States v. Western Pac. R.R., 352 U.S. 59 (1956).
507 F.2d 765 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The doctrine of exhaustion of administrative remedies requires that where
a remedy before an administrative agency is provided, relief must be sought
by exhausting this remedy before courts will act.
2 AM. Jun. 2d Administrative Law § 595 (1962). Exhaustion of remedies is analogous, in
some respects, to the constitutional law principle of ripeness, in that it prevents judicial
review until the matter has been finally decided by the agency and a complete record
which will provide the basis for review has been compiled.
11 507 F.2d at 769.
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Similarly, in C. F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Morton 4 the court refused
judicial review of the correctness of a withdrawal order"5 where
the steel company had failed to seek administrative review of the
order.
Lack of jurisdiction based on res judicata determined
Neighbors v. Secretary of HEW. 1 There, Neighbors filed an ap-
plication for disability benefits substantially similar to one filed
earlier but disallowed. No appeal from the first decision had been
filed; the court would not review that decision under the guise of
reviewing the second application.
Judicial review of agency decisions may be sought where
there are alleged inconsistencies between decisions made by two
agencies empowered to make determinations in overlapping fields
of law. In two cases decided by the Tenth Circuit during 1975,' 7
decisions made by HEW were attacked. Appellants argued that
HEW's interpretation of words in its organic statute" should be
controlled by an interpretation of the same words previously
made by another agency. In both cases the court upheld HEW's
"inconsistent" interpretation of the contested phrase or word.
A similar question was presented in Cooley v. Weinberger.'"
There the court was asked to decide what effect, if any, should
be given by the Social Security Commission to a conviction for
murder imposed by an Iranian court. The Commission's regula-
tions preclude a convicted felon from receiving any benefits which
would ordinarily accrue to the surviving spouse of one covered by
Social Security.20 The court, in upholding the Commission's
" 516 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1975).
'5 A withdrawal order may be issued if the Interior Department finds that an "immi-
nent danger" exists in a coal mine. All persons are ordered withdrawn from the mine and
prohibited from entering. 30 U.S.C. § 814(a) (1970).
" 511 F.2d 80 (10th Cir. 1974). For a detailed discussion of res judicata as applied to
administrative agencies, see generally Comment, Administrative Law-Res Judi-
cata-Application of Res Judicata to Administrative Agencies with Parallel Jurisdiction,
Umberfield v. School District 11, 522 P.2d 730 (Colo. 1974), 52 DENVER L.J. 595 (1975).
" New Mexico v. Weinberger, 517 F.2d 989 (10th Cir. 1975); Mandrell v. Weinberger,
511 F.2d 1102 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 In Mandrell the dispute involved HEW's refusal to award the appellant full disabil-
ity benefits despite a determination by the Veterans Administration that he was "totally
disabled." In New Mexico the issue was whether the term "wages," as defined and used
by the IRS, should control a determination under the Social Security Act.
518 F.2d 1151 (10th Cir. 1975).
20 C.F.R. § 404.364 (1971).
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rejection of Doris Cooley's constitutional attacks on the Iranian
judgment, held that, since there was substantial evidence in the
record to support the AL's and Commission's findings, the claim
must be denied.2 It noted that the statute under which she was
convicted and the manner in which her trial was held were suffi-
ciently similar to the proceedings contemplated by the drafters
of this regulation to justify the decision to withhold benefits.2
An agency's interpretation of its own organic statute3 or its
internal operating rules and regulations24 may also provide a basis
for seeking judicial review. Five cases seeking review of determi-
nations by the Occupational Safety and Health Review Commis-
sion (OSHRC) were considered by the court during this term..2 1
Each of these related to a disputed interpretation by OSHRC of
its organic statute as applied to the appellant. In three of the
cases the court found the agency's interpretation controlling.'6 In
Brennan v. OSHR C,21 however, the court held that OSHRC's
interpretation of a time limitation established by a regulation
authorized by its statute,28 if upheld, would defeat the public
policy reflected in adoption of the Occupational Safety and
Health Act (OSHA). It overruled the Commission and held in
favor of the interpretation of the Secretary of Labor.
2518 F.2d at 1155.
22 But see Lennon v. INS, No. 74-2189 (2d Cir., Oct. 7, 1975). The Second Circuit
looked at the standards required for conviction under British law and found that they were
inconsistent with historic precedent in the United States which requires that liability be
predicated upon some knowledge. British law does not, according to the court, require that
the defendant possess "guilty knowledge" to be found guilty of possession of marijuana.
Thus, according to their interpretation, the Immigration and Naturalization Act, 8 U.S.C.
§ 1182(a)(23) (1970), does not, per se, bar a grant of permanent residency status to one so
convicted.
22 C.F. & I. Steel Corp. v. Morton, 516 F.2d 868 (10th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC,
513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975); Tennyson v. Gas Serv. Co., 506 F.2d 1135 (10th Cir. 1974);
Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
24 Hall v. Fry, 509 F.2d 1105 (10th Cir. 1975).
22 Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Transcon Lines
v. OSHRC, No. 74-1413 (10th Cir., April 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Brennan
v. OSHRC, 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975); Lee Way Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of
Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975); Brennan v. OSHRC, 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Frohlick Crane Serv., Inc. v. OSHRC, 521 F.2d 628 (10th Cir. 1975); Transcon Lines
v. OSHRC, No. 74-1413 (10th Cir., April 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Lee Way
Motor Freight, Inc. v. Secretary of Labor, 511 F.2d 864 (10th Cir. 1975).
27 513 F.2d 553 (10th Cir. 1975).
24 29 U.S.C. § 658(a) (1970). The regulation passed pursuant to this authorization set
the time for abatement at 15 days. 29 C.F.R. § 1903.14a (1975).
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In another case, also entitled Brennan v. OSHRC,2' the court
overruled a determination by the Commission that a standard,
enacted by the Secretary of Labor, was unenforceably vague.
The court noted that the case was an example of the continuing
conflict between the Secretary of Labor and OSHRC over their
respective roles in implementing the policy behind OSHA.3' It
found that, in the context in which the regulation was to be
applied, the term "near proximity" was not so vague that it could
not be applied to further the objective of the statute.
CONCLUSION
Although several of the cases decided by the Tenth Circuit
this year were interesting from a factual standpoint," no unusual
interpretations of administrative law were made. The court con-
sistently restricted its scope of review to that required by statute,
and only rarely did it find that an agency did not measure up to
the statutory standard. By limiting its interference with the
''agency process," the court furthers the basic principles which
justify the existence of administrative agencies.
Sandy Gail Nyholm
THE TENTH CIRCUIT VIEW OF TITLE VII DISCOVERY
EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296
(10th Cir. 1974); Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.,
522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
Through Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (the Act),'
Congress created the Equal Employment Opportunity Commis-
sion (EEOC), authorized to "prevent any person from engaging
in any unlawful employment practice" and empowered "to elimi-
29 505 F.2d 869 (10th Cir. 1974).
-" The court, citing the Act, held that its purpose is "to assure so far as possible every
working man and woman in the Nation safe and healthful working conditions." 29 U.S.C.
§ 651(b) (1970).
" Gaspar v. Burton, 513 F.2d 843 (10th Cir. 1975), involved a constitutional challenge
to the procedure utilized in dismissing the appellant from a publicly funded vocational
school. For a discussion of Cooley v. Weinberger, see text accompanying notes 19-22 supra.
For a discussion of Salone v. United States, see text accompanying notes 4-6 supra.
1 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-1 to -15 (1970).
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nate any such alleged unlawful employment practice by informal
methods of conference, conciliation, and persuasion." 2 A series of
political compromises, first by the House Judiciary Committee
and then by the Senate,3 left the EEOC with no enforcement
power of its own except the relatively inadequate ability to seek
judicial aid in securing obedience to EEOC investigatory de-
mands.4
The EEOC was created at a time of increasing public interest
in eliminating employment discrimination. The EEOC's relative
lack of power, coupled with this pressure to eliminate employ-
ment discrimination, meant that the EEOC's effectiveness de-
pended upon its power of investigation and the public exposure
gained through recourse to the judicial system. In such an atmos-
phere, courts generally enforced EEOC demands for information,5
the rationale being that
"it would be incongruous for Congress to create an administrative
agency to function in a new sensitive and socially and economically
important field", and at the same time curtail the agency's func-
tions in investigation and persuasion.'
In 1972 the Act was amended to enable the EEOC to initiate
civil actions in its own name in cases in which it was unable to
secure voluntary compliance.7 Although this amendment added
a powerful remedy, the EEOC still lacked the administrative
power of other agencies, 8 so the necessity for a broad scope of
discovery remained. Furthermore, a liberal interpretation of
EEOC discovery provisions, especially in the case of an EEOC-
instituted Title VII suit, would render them comparable to the
2 Id. § 2000e-5(a).
See generally Developments, Employment Discrimination and Title 1I of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 84 HARV. L. REv. 1109 (1971). The House Judiciary Committee took
away the EEOC's power of enforcement and substituted the power to bring court actions
in its own name; the Senate then eliminated the power to bring court actions.
I See 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-5(i), -9(b) (1970). The Attorny General also has the power
to bring a court action against a pattern or practice of discrimination under 42 U.S.C. §
2000e-6 (1970).
See cases cited note 10 infra.
Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055, 1059 (10th Cir. 1972), quoting
Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237, 242 (9th Cir. 1971).
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(f)(1) (Supp. II, 1972).
See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. §§ 41-46 (1970), for the powers of the Federal Trade Commis-
sion, which include the ability to hold hearings, issue cease and desist orders, obtain
judicial review and enforcement of actions, and the imposition of a civil penalty for
violations.
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discovery provisions of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.'
I. EARLY TENTH CIRCUIT CASES
In a series of cases decided since 1970, the Tenth Circuit has
outlined its position in regard to the permissible scope of EEOC
demands for information and, like other courts,' 0 has consistently
favored a broad scope to EEOC investigations of alleged Title VII
violations.
A. Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC, 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir.
1972)
In Sparton Southwest, Inc. v. EEOC"1 two corporations filed
petitions to set aside EEOC demands for the production of re-
cords, alleging that the charges filed by the EEOC were too gen-
eral and did not set forth the facts upon which they were based,
as required by section 2000e-5(a) of the Act. 2 The EEOC filed
cross-petitions for enforcement. In reversing the district court and
holding that the charges were sufficient to actuate the discovery
process, the Tenth Circuit discussed the discovery function of the
EEOC:
To require the charge to contain a specific bill of particulars would
necessarily limit the scope of the investigation to the particular
See FED. R. Civ. P. 26-37.
" See, e.g., the following cases which have upheld broad discovery in Title VII ac-
tions: Motorola v. McLain, 484 F.2d 1339 (7th Cir. 1973) (authority to require production
of relevant documents to be broadly construed); Parliament House Motor Hotel v. EEOC,
444 F.2d 1335 (5th Cir. 1971) (EEOC entitled to examine records on departments not
contained in charge); Graniteville Co. v. EEOC, 438 F.2d 32 (4th Cir. 1971) (no reasonable
cause prerequisite to enforcement of demand; EEOC investigatory powers at least as
broad as NLRB); Blue Bell Boots, Inc. v. EEOC, 418 F.2d 255 (6th Cir. 1969) (records on
other job classifications relevant); Manpower, Inc. v. EEOC, 346 F. Supp. 126 (D. Wis.
1972) (investigative powers extend to records of any person under investigation if relevant
to any unlawful employment practice); Chromcraft Corp. v. EEOC, 337 F. Supp. 653
(N.D. Miss. 1972) (no reasonable cause prerequisite to enforcement); Cameron Iron
Works, Inc. v. EEOC, 320 F. Supp. 1191 (S.D. Tex. 1970) (complaint by hourly employees
justified company-wide investigation); South Cent. Bell Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 314 F. Supp.
349 (E.D. La. 1970) (scope of investigation not limited to period 90-180 days prior to filing
charge). But see General Ins. Co. of America v. EEOC, 491 F.2d 133 (9th Cir. 1974)
(demand reaching back 8 years unduly broad; discovery not extended to discrimination
not alleged); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 295 F. Supp. 950 (W.D. Ga. 1968) (demand
does not compel compilation; demand limited to 5-year period prior to violation).
1 461 F.2d 1055 (10th Cir. 1972). This case was consolidated with United Nuclear-
Homestake Partners v. EEOC, since both involved identical issues.
2 The 1972 amendment to Title 42 renumbered this section to section 2000e-5(b) and
changed the requirement to read: "Charges shall ... contain such information and be in
such form as the Commission requires."
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transaction or transactions meticulously described, and at the same
time would curtail the discovery mission of the Commission,
whereby the function Congress charged it to carry out would surely
fail. 11
In subsequent decisions in which the sufficiency of EEOC
charges was treated by the Tenth Circuit, 4 the court followed its
decision in Sparton. It found that charges which contained gen-
eral statements of alleged employment discrimination would sup-
port the EEOC's demands for information. 5
B. Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973)
In a decision often cited for its effect on the scope of EEOC
investigatory demands, Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC,6 the
Tenth Circuit heard the allegation of an employee of Joslin's
downtown store that her termination was racially discriminatory.
As a part of its investigation, the EEOC requested information
on employees in all Joslin stores, including information on hiring
practices. 7 The district court had held, inter alia, that to supply
the requested information in regard to all of the Joslin stores
would be to require Joslin to compile information, a duty not
required by section 2000e-8 or section 2000e-9. 5 Additionally, it
held that the EEOC investigation could not extend to hiring prac-
tices, inasmuch as it could not be shown that the complainant
13 461 F.2d at 1060.
"* United States Steel Corp. v. United States, 477 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1973); Mountain
States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC, 466 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. EEOC,
464 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
" The charges in question generally followed 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a) (1970) in alleging
discriminatory failure and/or refusal to recruit and/or hire.
" 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973).
" Id. at 180-81. In paragraph 5 of its subpoena, the EEOC demanded "[any like or
related records retained in a different form from the documents heretofore enumerated,
but reflective of the substance of the evidence in the DEMAND." Id. at 181. The Tenth
Circuit "suggested" that this demand was too broad and too vague to be enforceable. Id.
at 184.
" See the decision of the district court at 336 F. Supp. 941 (D. Colo. 1971). The Act
states that:
In connection with any investigation of a charge filed under Section 2000e-5
of this title, the Commission or its designated representative shall at all
reasonable times have access to, for the purposes of examination, and the
right to copy any evidence of any person being investigated or proceeded
against that relates to unlawful employment practices covered by this sub-
chapter and is relevant to the charge under investigation.
42 U.S.C. § 20O0e-8(a) (1970). The 1972 amendment, id. § 2000e-9 (Supp. II, 1972),
incorporates section 161 of Title 29, which provides, in part, for the issuance of a court
order requiring obedience to an administrative subpoena.
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was injured by these practices and, therefore, the requirement of
reasonable cause was not met.'9
The Tenth Circuit ruled that the EEOC could investigate
hiring and termination policies, but limited the EEOC's investi-
gation to the store where the complainant had been employed.0
In effect, then, this decision broadened the possible scope of
EEOC discovery in regard to discriminatory practices, but lim-
ited the scope geographically.
C. Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Circle K Corp. v. EEOC,2 ' the Tenth Circuit further ex-
tended the scope of EEOC discovery. The charge in this case,
made by an unsuccessful job applicant, was of discrimination on
the basis of national origin. The EEOC wanted information on
company policy relating to polygraph testing; the company al-
leged that, since the complainant had not taken such a test, the
EEOC demand was not relevant and was too burdensome. The
EEOC appealed from the denial of enforcement, and the Tenth
Circuit reversed. In holding that the EEOC was entitled to this
information, the court determined that "[s]tanding may be up-
held absent any subjection to a discriminatory employment prac-
tice." 2 The Tenth Circuit also held that, if the charge is suffi-
cient and the information is relevant, the demand is proper and
enforceable, regardless of the potential burden to the employer.,,
The Tenth Circuit thereby extended the scope of EEOC discovery
to include discriminatory practices not mentioned in the original
charge, much as it had in Joslin. However, the Tenth Circuit was
more explicit in Circle K than it had been in Joslin when it
defined relevancy to include a suspected discriminatory practice
which may or may not have affected the complainant.24
" According to the Act:
If the Commission determines after such investigation that there is not rea-
sonable cause to believe that the charge is true, it shall dismiss the charge
42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5(b) (Supp. I, 1972). Furthermore, "[tihe Commission shall make its
determination on reasonable cause as promptly as possible. Id. These requirements
relate solely to post-discovery actions by the EEOC.
20 483 F.2d at 184.
21 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. at 1054.
" Id. at 1055.
Id. at 1054.
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Since the Circle K decision, the Tenth Circuit has attempted
to clarify and expand its position in regard to the scope of discov-
ery in Title VII actions in two cases, EEOC v. University of New
Mexico 25 and Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp.
2 8
II. EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir.
1974)
The Tenth Circuit's decision in EEOC v. University of New
Mexico2 17 is its most extensive statement to date regarding EEOC
discovery in Title VII actions. As articulated in this decision, the
policy of the Tenth Circuit is to give the broadest possible scope
to EEOC discovery, limited only by the indefinite requirements
of: (1) Lawful purpose, (2) relevancy, and (3) precise description.
A. Case Facts and History
The case involved an appeal taken by the University of New
Mexico from an order of the district court which required compli-
ance with an EEOC subpoena duces tecum. The complainant,
Dr. Jovan Djuric, an associate professor in the Department of
Electrical Engineering, charged that the University had termi-
nated him because of his national origin .2 The University sup-
plied the EEOC with, among other things, Djuric's personnel file
and copies of documents relating to employees terminated for the
same reason as Djuric. 9 The EEOC subpoena requested copies of
personnel files of faculty then employed by the department and
copies of personnel files of terminated employees for a period of
time which was longer than that covered by the information the
University had provided. 0
25 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
2S 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
- 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974).
2 Djuric's original complaint, filed with the New Mexico Human Rights Commission,
was based on discrimination in salary and promotion since 1966 because of national origin
(Yugoslav) and religious creed. The New Mexico Commission dismissed the complaint.
Subsequently, Djuric was terminated and filed a charge with the EEOC alleging discrimi-
nation because of national origin. The Tenth Circuit found that none of the causes of
termination, as set forth in a memorandum from the Chairman of the Engineering Depart-
ment to Djuric, was related to ancestry, national origin, or religious creed. See 504 F.2d
at 1299.
" The University also produced information relating to terminations within the Engi-
neering Department between September 1970 and the time of the action, and minutes of
meetings of the Engineering Department at which Djuric's termination was discussed.
3' The subpoena issued by the EEOC requested additional information, specifically,
copies of personnel files of College of Engineering faculty who were terminated between
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The University refused to comply with the subpoena. The
EEOC contended that the information sought was necessary to
the investigation, arguing that, if faculty members with similar
jobs and similar performance records were not similarly treated,
then Djuric's termination was not related to job performance.
B. Scope of Discovery
The Tenth Circuit's opinion in this case was concerned solely
with the scope of EEOC investigation, and the policy statement
it made appeared early in the decision:
The sole limitation imposed upon the discovery procedures of the
EEOC in the conduct of investigations triggered by charges filed
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-5 is whether the information sought is
"relevant" to or "relates to any matter" under investigation or in
question. '
1. Relevancy
The main argument propounded by the University was that
the EEOC subpoena was not relevant and was overbroad.3 2 Sec-
tion 2000e-8(a) of the Act gives broad investigatory powers to the
EEOC, limited only in that the information must be relevant to
investigation of a charge.Y In its decision, the court made it clear
that the investigation must be initiated by a Title VII charge of
employment discrimination. Thereafter, the scope of EEOC dis-
covery is virtually unlimited, because "relevancy" is defined in
terms of what is under investigation or in question. Such a broad,
circuitous definition does little to clarify the Tenth Circuit's posi-
January 1970 and May 14, 1973 (an extension of 9 months over the time period covered
by the information the University provided) and copies of all personnel files of College of
Engineering faculty as of May 14, 1973 (rather than lists of relevant information which
the University provided).
31 504 F.2d at 1301, citing 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8(a) (1970) and 29 U.S.C. § 161(1) (1970).
This statement by the Tenth Circuit paraphrased one made in Cudahy Packing Co. v.
NLRB, 117 F.2d 692 (10th Cir. 1941):
The only limitation upon the power of the Board to compel the production
of documentary or oral evidence is that it must relate to or touch the matter
under investigation or in question. The Board may not go beyond this limita-
tion and pry into the affairs of a business concern generally.
Id. at 694.
31 See 504 F.2d at 1298-99. The University argued that the EEOC had already ob-
tained documents showing that Djuric's termination was for poor job performance. These
documents included all memoranda to Djuric regarding poor job performance, including
one signed by all of the other faculty in the department and several from the head of the
department.
I See note 18 supra.
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tion, except perhaps to indicate that the court does not intend to
be bound by a restrictive definition.34
2. Subpoenas
In answer to the University's request for modification of the
subpoena, the Tenth Circuit discussed standards which must be
met by an administrative subpoena. Essentially, the information
sought is to be as precisely described as feasible, but "cannot be
so broadly stated as to constitute a 'fishing expedition.' ",35 How-
ever, the Tenth Circuit explained later, "administrative 'fishing
expeditions' are often permitted," and this requirement will be
"entitled to a flexible interpretation" analagous to that given the
statements in an EEOC charge .3 The Tenth Circuit, in fact, did
not define the scope of investigation, but added an elusive proce-
dural requirement. By not requiring a precise description of the
information requested from faculty personnel files, the Tenth Cir-
cuit impliedly rejected the University's arguments that the sub-
poena, as unmodified, would lead to public disclosure of confi-
dential information and a violation of fourth amendment rights.
37
3. Time Period
The argument by the University that some of the information
related to faculty personnel files and events prior to the 1972
amendment to the Act was given summary treatment by the
court. The Tenth Circuit stated that "while Title VII speaks to
the future, it necessarily embraces a backward glance in order to
11 In the Tenth Circuit's previous cases which concerned the scope of discovery, it
briefly, albeit unsatisfactorily, defined "relevancy." In Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d
1052 (10th Cir. 1974), the court stated:
The charge is sufficient to state the unlawful practice to be investigated, and
the information sought is relevant to the EEOC investigation; therefore the
Demand is proper.
Id. at 1055. In Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973), the court
noted that the question was more one of relevance than of standing: "The factual state-
ment of a wrongful discharge is enough to justify an investigation of employment practices
and policies, as to hiring as well as to firing." Id. at 184.
504 F.2d at 1301-02.
3, Id. at 1303-04. In support of its position that the requirement of specificity
will be flexibly interpreted, the Tenth Circuit analogized from previous cases construing
the sufficiency of charges filed by lay complainants or the EEOC: United States Steel
Corp. v. EEOC, 477 F.2d 925 (10th Cir. 1973); Mountain States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. EEOC,
466 F.2d 541 (10th Cir. 1972); Adolph Coors Co. v. EEOC, 464 F.2d 1270 (10th Cir. 1972),
cert. denied, 410 U.S. 929 (1973).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the faculty were protected from public disclosure of
confidential personnel information by 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-8 (1970), which makes such
disclosure a misdemeanor.
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determine whether present employment practices are perpetuat-
ing past discriminations."38
4. Probable Cause
The University had also argued that, since the EEOC al-
ready possessed sufficient information to show that Djuric was
terminated for poor job performance, the EEOC had no probable
cause to believe there had been discrimination. In response to this
argument, the Tenth Circuit cited cases dealing with other ad-
ministrative agencies to support its holding that an administra-
tive investigation need not be based upon a showing of probable
cause.
3 9
5. Probable Outcome
The University argued hypothetically that, even if the inves-
tigation proceeded to its conclusion and the EEOC found that
Djuric was lawfully terminated and that other faculty with
equally poor job performances had not been terminated, Djuric
would not be rehired. To answer this argument, the Tenth Circuit
adopted the EEOC's position that comparative data is necessary
and reiterated its liberal policy in regard to discovery. 0 The court
noted: "[Tihe 'broad sweep' of the Act dictates that such an
inquiry may be pursued. In any event, no relief or remedy can be
effected under the Act until the investigation is concluded. '"'
This policy statement followed the Tenth Circuit's earlier
decisions and gave a broad scope to EEOC discovery. However,
the decision in EEOC v. University of New Mexico went further
than previous cases, stating that discovery will not be limited by
11 504 F.2d at 1304. In support of this proposition, the Tenth Circuit cited previous
cases in which the scope of discovery extended backwards in time: Joslin Dry Goods Co.
v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1974) (hiring and termination practices included in
scope); Local 104, Sheet Metal Workers v. EEOC, 439 F.2d 237 (9th Cir. 1971) (access to
information not limited to effective date of the Act); Jones v. Lee Way Motor Freight,
Inc., 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970) (transfer policy discriminatory as to employees hired
prior to effective date of Act); Georgia Power Co. v. EEOC, 412 F.2d 462 (5th Cir. 1969)
(5-year period of investigation prior to alleged discrimination not overbroad for discovery,
although 8-year period was overbroad. See note 10 supra.)
" United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (IRS); United States v. Morton Salt
Co., 338 U.S. 632 (1949) (FTC); Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186
(1945) (Wage and Hour Administration). The Joslin decision also touched upon reasona-
ble cause. See text accompanying note 19 supra.
'* The Tenth Circuit reaffirmed the necessity for finding out whether "presumptively
valid reasons for his rejection were in fact a coverup for a racially discriminatory decision."
504 F.2d at 1306, quoting McDonnell Douglas v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 804-05 (1973).
1 504 F.2d at 1305.
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requirements of probable cause, availability of redress, confiden-
tiality, or procedure.
III. Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp., 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975)
In its most recent decision relating to scope of discovery in
Title VII actions, Rich v. Martin Marietta Corp. ,42 the Tenth
Circuit appeared to be less concerned with overall policy. This
may have been due, in part, to its extensive statements in the
EEOC v. University of New Mexico decision. However, because
of its concern for the particular fact situation before it, the Tenth
Circuit did clarify and expand its position in several significant
areas.
A. Case Facts and History
The action was originally a rule 23 class action brought by
seven employees4" of Martin Marietta's Waterton plant who al-
leged discrimination in promotion on behalf of all females, Ne-
groes, and Hispano-Americans who were employed or might be
employed at the plant. The district court effectively defeated the
class action aspect of the case by its definition of the classes,
sustained the defendant's objection to the plaintiffs' interrogato-
ries, and dismissed the matter because of the failure of the plain-
tiffs to prove a prima facie case."
The plaintiffs' requests for discovery depended upon their
definition of the plaintiff class. The district court reduced the
class to 40 employees,45 and held that the plaintiffs were to limit
their interrogatories to requests for information regarding em-
12 522 F.2d 333 (10th Cir. 1975).
13 Jewel Rich, Thomas Franklin, Lawrence Collier, John Craig, John Langley and
Bobby Chappell were blacks. Jose Tafoya was an Hispano-American.
11 The district court held that: Rich and Franklin were promoted according to ability
and qualifications; Langley,Collier, Craig, and Chappell failed to show that they were
qualified for higher positions; and Tafoya failed to meet the criteria set forth in McDonnell
Douglas which required the complainant to show: (1) That he was a member of a racial
minority, (2) who applied and qualified for the job, but (3) was rejected despite his
qualifications, and (4) that the position remained open and the employer sought other
applicants. See 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). However, the Tenth Circuit made it clear that
these criteria are not to be used as an approach to all Title VII cases. See 522 F.2d at 346-
47.
'3 The district court limited the class to those 40 persons in precisely the same em-
ployment situations as the plaintiffs. As a consequence, the class was limited to female
or Negro engineers, Negro Class B millwrights, Negro accountants, and Hispano-
American electrical engineers.
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ployees of Martin Marietta who could be specifically named."
The Tenth Circuit overturned the decision limiting the class as
"contrary to the decisions of the Supreme Court and other federal
courts."4 The court then discussed the scope of discovery in the
revised class, where the class would include all employees of the
Waterton plant who were discriminated against as a result of the
company's policies.
B. Scope of Discovery
1. Relevancy
The defendant had successfully argued at the district court
level that the compilation of plant-wide statistics requested in
plaintiffs' interrogatories would be too burdensome and expen-
sive. The Tenth Circuit responded to the company's argument
with a summary of its previous decisions in regard to the scope
of EEOC discovery, and concluded that "[ilt cannot be said...
that the policy of this court has been to narrowly circumscribe
discovery in EEOC cases."4 The court noted that the broad scope
given to EEOC discovery under Title VII is necessary, and espe-
cially where
immediate evidence and circumstances pertaining to the plaintiffs
are not sufficient to constitute a prima facie case, plant-wide statis-
tics and department statistics are of the highest relevance."
This statement by the Tenth Circuit is reminiscent of the
argument of plaintiff in EEOC v. University of New Mexico that
11 Through interrogatories, plaintiffs had requested information regarding the entire
Waterton plant, including information on hiring and promotion policies. After the class
was limited to four subgroups, the defendant objected that plant-wide statistics were no
longer relevant, and the district court sustained this objection. The plaintiffs, therefore,
were limited to statistical information already obtained from defenddnt showing promo-
tions of minorities and the reports that defendant had filed with the EEOC. The Tenth
Circuit noted that the reports required by the EEOC were not probative of defendant's
promotion policies.
', 522 F.2d at 340.
A' Id. at 344.
'Id. at 345. The Tenth Circuit's concern for the case as it will be tried on remand
apparently stems from what it felt to be the inequities of the trial at the district court
level. For example, the Tenth Circuit noted:
[lit was grossly unjust to allow the defendant company to utilize plant-wide
statistics involving large classes of people, plus statistics of other employers
in this five-county area, while at the same time restricting the plaintiffs to
the narrowest possible scope.
Id. at 343. See also note 50 infra.
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comparative data is needed,50 inasmuch as it "very likely would
prove crucial to the establishing or failure to establish a prima
facie case"'" and would be relevant to rebut any argument by
defendant of business necessity.,
Having already discussed the relevancy standard in EEOC
v. University of New Mexico, the Tenth Circuit did not accord it
further treatment, except tangentially in relation to the balanc-
ing test discussed below. However, it is clear from the decision
that "defendant's hiring, promotion and lay-off practices within
individual departments on a plant-wide level ' 53 were all relevant,
notwithstanding the fact that the plaintiff's complaint dealt only
with discrimination in promotion. The Tenth Circuit's position in
Martin Marietta was a logical application of its previous deci-
sions. 4
2. Private Actions
Perhaps one of the most important aspects of the opinion is
the Tenth Circuit's application of the policies, standards, and
requirements developed in EEOC-initiated actions to private ac-
tions under Title VII. The Tenth Circuit made it clear that, since
the elimination of employment discrimination is the objective of
1' In the Martin Marietta case, comparative data would be needed to determine the
meaning of "qualified" as it related to white, male employees and the plant-wide layoff
and promotion procedure.
S1 522 F.2d at 344. The Tenth Circuit devoted approximately one-fourth of its opinion
to the issue of the establishment of a prima facie case. The Tenth Circuit noted that the
district court's ruling that plaintiffs had failed to establish a prima facie case largely
depended upon a showing by defendant resulting from the use of statistics covering the
years 1966 to 1973. In the Tenth Circuit's view this period was excessive, inasmuch as the
EEOC complaint was filed in 1969 and much of the improvement in employment practices
on the part of the defendant occurred between 1969 and 1973. Id. at 346. Additionally,
the Tenth Circuit noted that the statistical information which Martin Marietta did pro-
vide the plaintiffs was not responsive to the issues, in that these statistics included Orien-
tals and American Indians in the classification of minorities; and, since Orientals were
heavily represented in the upper management, the statistics in regard to blacks, females
and Hispano-Americans were distorted.
52 In using the word "relevant" in regard to rebutting defendant's business necessity
argument, the Tenth Circuit defined it as "necessity." Previously it had defined "rele-
vancy" in connection with scope of investigations, but here the Tenth Circuit defined the
term in connection with proof of the case.
5 522 F.2d at 343.
5, EEOC v. University of New Mexico, 504 F.2d 1296 (10th Cir. 1974) (extended scope
to include personnel files of others); Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.
1974) (extended scope to test not required of complainant); Joslin Dry Goods Co. v.
EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973) (extended scope to hiring practices not a part of
complaint).
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both the EEOC and private court actions, "information relevant
in an EEOC inquiry is equally relevant in a private action."55 The
Tenth Circuit applied its policy in regard to the requirements and
limits of discovery expressed in previous cases to Title VIIactions
brought by private individuals.
3. Balancing Test
As to the scope of plaintiffs' interrogatories regarding plant-
wide policies, the Tenth Circuit stated:
It is plain that the scope of discovery through interrogatories
and requests for production of documents is limited only by relev-
ance and burdensomeness and in an EEOC case the discovery scope
is extensive. This is a factor which the court should balance on the
benefit side as against the burden of the defendant in answering the
interrogatories."'
In addressing itself to the question of the burden to the answering
party, the Tenth Circuit added another qualification to those set
out in EEOC v. University of New Mexico and considered a re-
striction it had only summarily treated in Circle K.17
The court retreated from its inflexible position in Circle K by
stating that a balancing test is involved. The burden to the defen-
dant is to be weighed against the circumstantial nature of the
evidence, the inability of the plaintiffs to obtain the information
elsewhere, its importance to the establishment of a prima facie
case, and its usefulness in rebutting a "business necessity" de-
fense.5 In the case of Martin Marietta, the Tenth Circuit noted
that the figures were, in all probability, already isolated and com-
puted. Hence, this relatively insignificant burden to the defen-
dant was to be balanced against the relevancy (or necessity) to
the plaintiffs' case.
4. Compilation
Perhaps most important from a practical standpoint is the
Tenth Circuit's position regarding the compilation of requested
information. The Act itself requires only that the EEOC have
access to evidence and the right to copy. 9 The district court's
5 522 F.2d at 344.
Id. at 343.
s The. Tenth Circuit had said in Circle K Corp. v. EEOC, 501 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir.
1974): "Nor can enforcement of the demand be defeated on Circle K's allegation that
compliance would be unduly burdensome." Id. at 1055.
:A 522 F.2d at 345.
' See note 18 supra.
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holding in Joslin, untouched by the Tenth Circuit, was that
"[tlhere is no way that the statute can be read to require an
employer to compile information.""0 This is consistent with the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.' The Tenth Circuit in Martin
Marietta initially took an equivocal position by stating "it is not
at all clear that a general invitation to inspect records satisfies
the defendant's obligations under the discovery rules."" It later
suggested, however, that Martin Marietta "ought to proceed
forthwith with compiling [the statistics] or at least compiling
information from which plaintiffs can prepare their evidentiary
tables of statistics.
'63
CONCLUSION
In both EEOC v. University of New Mexico and Martin
Marietta, the Tenth Circuit continued the trend, begun in earlier
Title VII cases,6" of giving a liberal interpretation to the scope of
discovery. In these decisions, however, the Tenth Circuit began
to speak more particularly of the factors to be considered in act-
ing on motions to compel discovery, defining them in such a way
that they do not restrict discovery. In EEOC v. University of New
Mexico the requirements of relevancy, lawful purpose, precision,
protection of confidentiality, and probable cause are defined so
that they do not limit discovery. Similarly, in Martin Marietta
the requirement of relevancy is broadly defined, and the burden
on the answering party is balanced against the necessity of the
information to the case. The Tenth Circuit moved in these cases
to define more clearly the scope of discovery in Title VII actions,
without limiting that scope.
Kristine A. Hoeltgen
60 Joslin Dry Goods Co. v. EEOC, 483 F.2d 178 (10th Cir. 1973), quoting the district
court, 336 F. Supp. 941, 947 (D. Colo. 1971).
" See FED. R. Cirv. P. 33.
62 522 F.2d at 343 n.5.
Id. at 345.
, See text accompanying notes 11-24 supra.
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In American Oil Co. v. McMullin, the Tenth Circuit consid-
ered whether a consignment contract was violative of the Sher-
man Act' and concluded that the particular contract was not.
Early in 1967, American Oil Co. (American) entered into a
contractual relationship with Lawrence McMullin whereby
McMullin was to operate a bulk distribution plant, a service
station, and a cafe owned by American.' He was designated in the
contract as an "employee-agent of American" in the operation of
the distribution plant and "was treated as an independent
dealer" with regard to the service station and cafe, for which he
paid a monthly rental.4 The parties continued in this relationship
for over 2 years, but McMullin was beset with financial difficul-
ties from the outset which ultimately left him unable to meet his
tax obligations and deeply in debt to American.5
American terminated the relationship and brought suit
against McMullin to recover from him the money he owed the
company.6 McMullin counterclaimed and alleged monopolization
- 508 F.2d 1345 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 15 U.S.C. §§ 1-7 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Sherman Act].
' 508 F.2d at 1347. McMullin was required to make an initial investment of $10,000,
and he assumed operation of the facilities after receiving training from American. McMul-
lin entered into a standard lease agreement with American by virtue of which he became
"the lessee of all of the Elko facilities, including the truck stop, the cafe, the bulk distribu-
tion point, and all buildings, tanks, pumps, and other fixtures." Id. The rental for this
was a charge on all gasoline sold and a percentage of the gross receipts from the restaurant
operation. Under the bulk sales arrangement, "McMullin was compensated by a commis-
sion on all bulk plant sales" and "American retained ownership and risk of loss as to all
products at the plant." Id. American retained the right to establish bulk plant prices and
limited the geographical area in which the products could be sold. McMullin, however,
was given the right to hire additional employees at his own expense and to extend credit
to other customers at his own risk.
The remaining contracts dealt with the service station, which was the only American
brand station in the area. While McMullin was "treated as an independent dealer with
the latitude to set his own retail prices," the physical arrangement was such that access
to the service station's fuel tanks was attainable only through the bulk distribution point.
Id. McMullin participated in a variety of programs with American and the initial financ-
ing was provided by the oil company.
'Id.
The financial difficulties were caused by McMullin's limited marketing position,
uncontrolled costs, and his being "badly undercapitalized." Id. at 1348.
' The various claims on which American recovered $121,407.38 included a tax lien it
paid for McMullin, money owed by McMullin for sales from the bulk plant to his own
facilities, credit sales, and expenses connected with an attachment proceeding. Id. at 1349-
50.
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by American in violation of the Sherman Act. The basis for his
claim was that the relationship between him and American was
a consignment contract similar to that condemned by the Su-
preme Court as violative of the Act' in Simpson v. Union Oil Co.'
In dismissing McMullin's counterclaim, the Tenth Circuit looked
at the substance rather than the form of the relationship between
the parties to conclude that "McMullin was an employee of
American and not an independent businessman."9 Thus, the ar-
rangement was not impermissible under Simpson, because in
that case independent businessmen were involved while in
McMullin the only person involved was an employee of the defen-
dant. The court was unable to find anything "in Simpson which
would prohibit a manufacturer from distributing its own products
and thereby controlling wholesale distribution prices."'"
In Beltronics, Inc. v. Eberline Instrument Corp. I Beltronics
had a 5-year renewable contract under which it was the exclusive
agent for the sale of capacitators made by Eberline Instrument
Corporation (Eberline). These capacitators were sold exclusively
to Western Electric Company (Western), and in 1969 Western
declined to have any further dealings with Eberline if it had to
do so through Beltronics. Consequently, Eberline did not renew
its contract with Beltronics and made other arrangements for the
sale of its capacitators. Beltronics then brought suit against
' The plaintiff alleged that sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act were violated by the
consignment contracts American had McMullin enter into. These sections, in part, pro-
vide that
[elvery contract, combination in the form of trust or otherwise, or conspir-
acy, in restraint of trade or commerce among the several States, or with
foreign nations, is declared to be illegal ....
Every person who shall monopolize, or attempt to monopolize, or com-
bine or conspire with any other person or persons, to monopolize any part of
the trade or commerce among the several States, or with foreign nations,
shall be deemed guilty of a misdemeanor ....
15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
9 377 U.S. 13 (1964).
' In looking at substance rather than form, the Tenth Circuit followed settled law in
determining whether "the scheme ... involved although on its face a bona fide lease and
consignment agreement is actually and in effect 'a resale price maintenance' or 'some
coercive arrangement.'" 2 R. CALLMANN, THE LAW OF UNFAIR COMPETITION, TRADEMARKS,
AND MONOPOLIES § 11.03 (3d ed. 1967) [hereinafter cited as CALLMANN], quoting Simpson
v. Union Oil Co., 377 U.S. 13, 17 (1964).
,0 508 F.2d at 1352.
11 509 F.2d 1316 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 1000 (1975).
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Western and Eberline, and alleged, among other things, a viola-
tion of the Sherman Act. 2
Beltronics alleged that the restrictions placed upon Eber-
line's contract with Western violated section 1 of the Sherman
Act within the meaning of United States v. Arnold, Schwinn &
Co. 3 Schwinn, which involved restrictions on the sale of bicycles
by distributors after the manufacturer had parted with dominion,
was held by the Tenth Circuit to be inapplicable because there
was no restriction on competition involved in Beltronics. The
court said, "Eberline purchased cable from Western, used the
cable in making capacitators, and sold the capacitators to West-
ern. In effect Western bought the cable back, albeit in a different
form. Schwinn has no application."' 4 Because all that was in-
volved was "elimination of a non-competing middleman" that
could not "be stretched into a claim of a § 1 . .. violation,""5 the
Tenth Circuit also rejected Beltronics' claim that it was the vic-
tim of a group boycott.
In Board of County Commissioners v. Wilshire Oil Co. " the
Tenth Circuit considered the validity of venue in an antitrust
action 7 brought in the Western District of Oklahoma against a
" Beltronics sued for breach of contract, tortious interference with contractual rela-
tions, and the antitrust violations discussed in the text accompanying notes 18-20 infra.
The district court, in an opinion reported at 369 F. Supp. 295 (D. Colo. 1973), held for
the defendant on all counts, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed both the findings of fact and
the conclusions of law reached by the lower court.
13 388 U.S. 365 (1967). In Schwinn the manufacturer of bicycles assigned specific
territories to each of its 22 distributors who were instructed to sell only to franchised
accounts in their own territories. The Court noted that the case involved "vertical restric-
tions as to territory and dealers." Id. at 372. In Beltronics there was no such vertical
relationship and the two cases are distinguishable on that basis. Spe 16H J. VON KALI-
NOWSKI, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS: ANTITRUST LAW AND TRADE REGULATIONS § 67.02[1]
(1972) [hereinafter cited as VON KALINOWSKI] where the author says that "vertical price
maintenance includes arrangements between the various persons in the chain of distribu-
tion .... "
1' 509 F.2d at 1320.
Is Id.
" 523 F.2d 125 (10th Cir. 1975).
'7 The sole question involved was whether venue was proper in the Western District
of Oklahoma "in view of the fact that the appellee .. .is a Kansas corporation having
its home office in ...Kansas." Id. at 126-27. The trial court initially held that the
evidence was insufficient to support a conclusion that venue was proper. It then held that
while the appellee had transacted business in the Northern District, "this was insufficient
to constitute venue in the Western District of Oklahoma where the suit had been filed."
Id. at 127.
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Kansas corporation which "made assiduous efforts to avoid any
appearance of doing business in Oklahoma."' 8 The trial court
granted the defendant's motion to dismiss the action on the
grounds that while the contacts may have been sufficient to jus-
tify venue in the Northern District of Oklahoma, they were insuf-
ficient to constitute transaction of business in the Western Dis-
trict of Oklahoma within the meaning of section 22 of the Clayton
Act." In reaching this conclusion, the district court held that the
general venue statutes" were inapplicable and did not supple-
ment the venue requirements of section 22.
In reversing the trial court, the Tenth Circuit first affirmed
the lower court's determination that the defendant's contacts
with the Northern District of Oklahoma were sufficient to consti-
tute transaction of business within the meaning of section 22.21
The court of appeals then applied settled lawn in holding that
"the provisions of the general venue statute supplement all other
special venue statutes. '23 If section 1392(a) were applicable to
this fact situation, then venue would be proper in the Western
Is Id.
Is Venue in antitrust actions is controlled by 15 U.S.C. § 22 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as section 22], which provides as follows:
Any suit, action, or proceeding under the antitrust laws against a corporation
may be brought not only in the judicial district whereof it is an inhabitant,
but also in any district wherein it may be found or transacts business; and
all process in such cases may be served in the district of which it is an
inhabitant, or wherever it may be found.
(Emphasis added).
" The pertinent section in Wilshire Oil is 28 U.S.C. § 1392(a) (1970) [hereinafter
cited as section 1392(a)], which provides as follows: "Any civil action, not of a local
nature, against defendants residing in different districts in the same State, may be
brought in any of such districts."
*" 523 F.2d at 129. In reaching this decision the Tenth Circuit relied on United States
v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948), which the appellate court said "holds that in
determining whether a corporation is transacting business within a district, practical
business conceptions are to be considered rather than hair-splitting legal technicalities."
523 F.2d at 128. Therefore, the fact that asphalt produced in Kansas was being regularly
sold and used in Kansas meant that the corporation was transacting business in Oklahoma
even though the transactions were technically completed in Kansas. See also B.J. Semel
Associates v. United Fireworks Mfg. Co., 355 F.2d 827 (D.C. Cir. 1965); McCrory Corp.
v. Cloth World, Inc., 378 F. Supp. 322 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Fashion Two Twenty, Inc. v.
Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971); Illinois v. Harper & Row Publishers, Inc.,
308 F. Supp. 1207 (N.D. 111. 1969); Crusader Marine Corp. v. Chrysler Corp., 281 F. Supp.
802 (E.D. Mich. 1968); United States v. Burlington Indus., Inc., 247 F. Supp. 185
(S.D.N.Y. 1965).
" See 523 F.2d at 129-30 nn.4-7.
n Id. at 130.
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District of Oklahoma because that section provides that venue is
proper in "one district if one defendant resides in that district and
another defendant resides in the same state but in another judi-
cial district." 4 The question to be determined, then, was whether
any of the defendants resided in either the Northern or Western
District of Oklahoma within the meaning of section 1392(a).
To determine this question, the appellate court looked at the
purpose of section 1392(a), which "is to prevent two law suits in
different districts within the same state where one suit would
suffice," 25 and the purpose of the Clayton Act, which is to "liber-
alize rather than restrict venue in antitrust actions as far as cor-
porations are concerned." 2 In accomplishing these dual purposes,
the Tenth Circuit held, in effect, that transacting business within
the meaning of section 22 is the functional equivalent of residing
in a district within the meaning of section 1392(a).21 Because one
of the defendants transacted business in the Western District and
two of the defendants transacted business in the Northern Dis-
trict, they resided in both of those districts for the purposes of
section 1392(a). Venue was, therefore, proper in the Western Dis-
trict. By so deciding, the Tenth Circuit has expanded the mean-
ing of the term "residing" in section 1392(a) by holding that the
24 Id.
" Id., citing C. WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS at 154 (1970). See also Hawks v.
Maryland & Pa. R.R., 90 F. Supp. 284 (E.D. Pa. 1950).
11 523 F.2d at 130, citing United States v. National City Lines, Inc., 334 U.S. 573
(1948); United States v. Scophony Corp., 333 U.S. 795 (1948); Eastman Kodak Co. v.
Southern Photo Material Co., 273 U.S. 359 (1927).
" The court did not deal with the question of whether "reside" was limited to the
three meanings of 28 U.S.C. § 1391(c) (1970) and, therefore, did not include "transact
business" within the meaning of section 22. Instead of resolving this issue, the court
simply acknowledged that some courts do recognize a difference between the two terms
and held as follows:
We are aware that some courts hold that there is a difference-that fewer
contacts are required in order to transact business than are required in order
to do business.
On the other hand, numerous decisions hold that the two terms are the
same. It is unnecessary, however, for this question to be determined within
the context of the present problem. It is sufficient to hold, which we do, that
§ 1392. . . supplements 15 US. C. § 22. We need not therefore agonize over
whether transacting business and doing business are identical.
523 F.2d at 131 (emphasis added) (footnotes omitted). Compare Friends of Animals, Inc.
v. American Veterinary Ass'n, 310 F. Supp. 620 (S.D.N.Y. 1970), (Ohio-Midland Light &
Power Co. v. Ohio Brass Co., 221 F. Supp. 405 (S.D. Ohio 1962), with Fashion Two
Twenty, Inc. v. Steinberg, 339 F. Supp. 836 (E.D.N.Y. 1971), City of Philadelphia v.
Morton Salt Co., 289 F. Supp. 723 (E.D. Pa. 1968), and cases cited in note 38 supra.
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term encompasses transacting business in a district as defined in
section 22.8 The court has achieved a liberal interpretation of
both venue sections by allowing section 1392(a) to supplement
section 22 and by making section 22 amplify the meaning of sec-
tion 1392(a).
In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp.9 the Tenth Circuit reversed a
$259.5 million judgment0 awarded to Telex by a federal district
court1.3 Telex based its claim on an alleged violation by IBM of
sections 1 and 2 of the Sherman Act" and section 2 of the Clayton
Act.3 3 Specifically, Telex charged IBM "with monopolization in
the manufacture, distribution, sale, and leasing of plug compati-
ble products which are attached to IBM central processing
units. '34 The district court first held that there was "a definable
market for all peripheral devices plug compatible with IBM pro-
cessing units" and "individual submarkets for each particular
type of peripheral product. 3 Because IBM was at first the only
manufacturer of peripheral products, it naturally had 100 percent
of the market; however, as other manufacturers entered the mar-
ket, IBM's share of this market eroded. In attempting to prevent
further erosion of its market share, IBM engaged in several acts
36
11 The court also considered the question of whether the fact that the appellee had
ceased doing business as of the filing of the complaint should remove venue from the
Western District of Oklahoma. 523 F.2d at 131. The court held that it did not because
"[the vast weight of authority supports the rule that the crucial time is when the cause
of action arose." It cited authority from the Fourth, Eighth, and Ninth Circuits, as well
as "an indication from the Tenth Circuit that the time when the action arises is
determinative. Id. (footnote omitted).
- 510 F.2d 894 (10th Cir. 1975). For a more extended analysis of this decision, see
Norgaard, Relevant Market in Computer Monopolization, 53 DENVER L.J. - (1976).
30 The particular elements of damage as found by the district court were as follows:
1. $70 million attributable to loss of market share which the court held
Telex would have retained had it not been for the illegal acts of IBM.
2. $39 million in loss of rental profits.
3. $8.5 million in loss of sales profits.
Id. at 908. These amounts were adjusted and then trebled. The district court awarded IBM
its counterclaim against Telex for misappropriation by Telex of IBM's trade secrets. This
counterclaim was reduced by the court of appeals to $17.5 million and was affirmed. Id.
at 933; see id. at 910-12, 928-33. See also Patents, Trademarks, Copyrights, and Unfair
Competition section of the Tenth Circuit Survey.
31 For a discussion of the procedural aspects of this case, see 510 F.2d at 898.
32 15 U.S.C. §§ 1, 2 (1970).
- Id. § 13.
11 510 F.2d at 898.
31 Id. at 899.
31 The specific acts found by the district court to be in violation of the antitrust laws
were as follows:
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which the district court concluded were contrary to section 2 of
the Sherman Act in that, by so acting, IBM exercised monopoly
power.
On appeal, IBM first challenged the district court's defini-
tion of what the relevant market included.37 The trial court lim-
ited this market "to peripheral products plug compatible with
IBM central processing units '3 8 while IBM sought a determina-
tion that the relevant product market should include peripheral
devices that are plug compatible with equipment marketed by
other systems manufacturers.39 The basis for the contention by
IBM was that
the "plug compatible" peripheral equipment marketed for use in
one system is the same as that marketed for use in another system,
except for a necessary charge in the "interface." IBM [claimed]
that the cost of modifying an interface so that it can be used with
another system amounts to less than 1% of the product's purchase
price. 0
The court of appeals relied on United States v. E. L du Pont de
Nemours & Co." for the proposition "that if one product may
substitute for another in the market it is 'reasonably interchange-
able.' "42 In Telex, the Tenth Circuit was of the opinion that the
peripheral products of the other manufacturers were reasonably
interchangeable with those manufactured by IBM.4 3 Thus, the
1. Announcement and institution of the 2319A disk storage facility in
September 1970.
2. The announcement of the 2319B disk storage facility in December
1970.
3. The announcement of the Fixed Term Plan long term leasing program
in May 1971.
4. The announcement and implementation of the Extended Term Plan,
which was also a leasing plan, in March 1972.
5. IBM's pricing policies with regard to its memory products during 1970
and 1971.
Id. at 900. For a more extended discussion of these acts, see Norgaard, supra note 29, and
510 F.2d at 900-09.
3 Id. at 912-14.
30 Id. at 914.
3' See id.
, Id. at 912 n.11.
41 351 U.S. 377 (1956).
,1 510 F.2d at 917.
41 The court cited United States v. Grinnell Corp., 384 U.S. 563, 571 (1966), and said
Grinnell Corp. "recognizes that substitute products are to be included within the defini-
tion of relevant market .... 510 F.2d at 919.
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district court erred in not including them in its definition of a
reasonable market and there could "be no ruling of monopoliza-
tion."4
Charles P. Leder
" Id. The court of appeals also rejected the district court's finding that IBM exercised
illegal monopoly power. The court of appeals noted from the facts presented in Telex that
"IBM did not use monopoly power even if it [were to be] assumed that it had such
power." Id. at 926.
COMMERCIAL LAW
By ROBERT E. OLSEN*
OVERVIEW
I. BANKS AND BANKING
American Bank v. Smith, 503 F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1974), held:
Where the organizers of a new national bank had close connexity
with a second national bank and its parent holding company and
apparently an effort had been made by the organizers to avoid the
appearance that the new bank was a subsidiary of the bank hold-
ing company, claim of an opponent of the new bank to that effect
and that Comptroller of Currency had no power to issue certifi-
cate of authority to do business without referring question to the
Federal Reserve Board was substantial; district and circuit courts
were without jurisdiction to adjudicate the matter, because it was
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the Federal Reserve Board;
under the Whitney Bank doctrine, the court of appeals had power
to stay issuance of certificate of authority pending motion for
remand of action to the Board.
Observation: The court noted the "curious" absence of legis-
lation requiring the Comptroller to notify the Federal Reserve
Board when the Board's authority to approve bank holding com-
pany acquisitions is in question.
Bank of Commerce v. Board of Governors, 513 F.2d 164 (10th
Cir. 1975), held: The opponent of a new bank, to be acquired by
a bank holding company, must exhaust its administrative reme-
dies (by attacking acquisition application before the Federal Re-
serve Board) before seeking judicial review; where the opponent
fails to give testimony before the Board, it is barred thereafter
from appealing the Board's decision approving the acquisition;
publication in the Federal Register of the Board's invitation to
comment on a proposed bank holding company acquisition, as
required by 12 C.F.R. § 262.3(g), is legally sufficient notice, be-
cause the Board's decision does not result in direct deprivation
of opponent's property; where the opponent is not a party directly
involved in the Board proceedings, it has a duty to inform itself
as to the state of the proceedings.
* Associate, Calkins, Kramer, Grimshaw & Harring, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1966,
Harvard University; M.A., 1967, University of Pennsylvania; J.D., 1975, University of
Denver.
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Bank of Commerce v. Smith, 513 F.2d 167 (10th Cir. 1975),
held: Under the Whitney Bank doctrine, where a bank holding
company must seek approval of charter and acquisition applica-
tions for a new bank from separate federal agencies, an opponent
of the acquisition must exhaust its administrative remedies (by
attacking acquisition application before the Federal Reserve
Board) before seeking judicial review; judicial review is possible
only in the federal court of appeals; and, where an opponent first
attacked approval of the charter application by bringing an ac-
tion in a federal district court against the Comptroller of Cur-
rency, the opponent failed to exhaust its administrative remedies,
and the district court was without jurisdiction to adjudicate the
matter.
II. BANKRUPTCY
Prisbey v. Noble, 505 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974), held: (1)
Circumstantial evidence of actual intent to defraud creditors is
sufficient for a determination of fraudulent transfer under section
67d(2)(d) of the Bankruptcy Act, and intrafamily transactions
are to be closely scrutinized; (2) an intent to prefer one creditor
over others is an important consideration in determining if an
intent to defraud exists; (3) a transferee's good faith is not appro-
priate to the determination of actual intent to defraud under
section 67d(2)(d); (4) a transfer, determined to be fraudulent
under section 67d, may not be preserved for the bankrupt's estate
if a bona fide purchaser has given present fair equivalent value
for the transfer; but, if the transfer was for an antecedent debt,
no present value was given, and the court may, therefore, pro-
perly order the transfer preserved; (5) a transfer, to be a voidable
preference under section 60a, need not occur at a time when the
creditor knew of the debtor's insolvency, but the trustee must
prove that the creditor had knowledge or notice of facts and cir-
cumstances which would incite a person of reasonable prudence
under similar circumstances to make inquiry if such inquiry
would lead to the development of the facts essential to a knowl-
edge of the insolvency; (6) an indemnitor's right of contribution,
contingent on liability being established, constitutes a pre-
existing claim against coindemnitor for the purpose of determin-
ing whether "value" is given for rights (construing Uniform Com-
mercial Code sections 1-201(44) and 8-302); (7) where the bank
released to the debtor collateral owned by him on the condition
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that the collateral would soon be returned, where debtor there-
upon transferred the collateral to a creditor who constituted a
bona fide purchaser in a transaction so as to meet the test of a
preference under section 60, and, where within 4 months there-
after the debtor was adjudicated a bankrupt, the trustee was held
to have succeeded to the ownership rights of the bona fide pur-
chaser, and the bank lost its status as a secured creditor; and (8)
equitable considerations do not permit a court to set aside the
applicable bankruptcy law.
Observation: Holding (7), although correct in its result, is
confused in its logic and its reading of section 60b of the Bank-
ruptcy Act; for the avoidance of such a transfer and recovery by
the trustee of the transferred property, it is immaterial whether
the debtor's transferee is a bona fide purchaser.
Wadell v. Fleming, 510 F.2d 4 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 422
U.S. 1007 (1975), held: (1) Where the bankrupt sought to have a
judgment lien on his property, obtained within 4 months of filing
petition in bankruptcy, declared null and void under section 67a
of the Bankruptcy Act, the burden was on him to establish his
insolvency at the time the lien was obtained; (2) a bankrupt's
equity in his property could be considered an asset for the purpose
of determining his solvency with respect to a section 67a applica-
tion to avoid a judgment lien thereon, even though such property
was exempt as a homestead under state law.
Nicholas v. Nicholas, 510 F.2d 160 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
421 U.S. 1012 (1975), held: Where a liability has been reduced
to judgment, the nature of the claim as revealed by the judg-
ment and a review of the record is decisive; in a subsequent
bankruptcy proceeding, the creditor will not be permitted to go
outside the record in an effort to show by extrinsic evidence that
the real nature of the claim would support a finding of nondis-
chargeability under the Bankruptcy Act.
Observation: In representing a creditor, if the debtor's bank-
ruptcy is imminent, counsel should frame pleadings in any civil
action to include claims that would support a complaint under
section 14 or section 17 of the Bankruptcy Act.
Goldstein, Samuelson, Inc. v. Danning, 517 F.2d 324 (10th
Cir. 1975), held: On an analysis of specific facts, the determina-
tion by the bankruptcy judge that a party in possession of certain
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funds was the agent of the bankrupt and not a constructive
trustee for third parties, or agent for both the bankrupt and
third parties, was not clearly erroneous; property of the bankrupt
in the hands of the bankrupt's agent when a petition in bank-
ruptcy is filed is subject to the summary jurisdiction of the bank-
ruptcy court, which may require that it be turned over to the
trustee; possession, and not title, is the test of summary jurisdic-
tion, and constructive possession is sufficient to establish posses-
sion; thus, the party in possession was not an adverse claimant,
and plenary jurisdiction was not required.
Observation: The fact situation here is similar to that in
Sherr v. Sierra Trading Corp., 492 F.2d 971 (10th Cir. 1974),
where the Tenth Circuit denied summary jurisdiction because the
party in possession, which it characterized as a "third-party,"
was not clearly the debtor's agent; this concept of agency as ap-
plied for purposes of a debtor-in-possession hearing is not a well-
developed area in bankruptcy law; see Tenth Circuit Survey, 52
DENVER L.J. 61 n.4 (1975).
Gulfco Investment Corp. v. Hogan, 520 F.2d 741 (10th Cir.
1975), held: The power of a trustee in bankruptcy to reject
executory contracts of a debtor reorganizing under Chapter X of
the Bankruptcy Act implies a like power to assume such con-
tracts; a trustee is entitled to a reasonable time to determine
whether to reject or assume executory contracts. During such
time, the bankruptcy court has summary jurisdiction to stay the
efforts to rescind a contract by a party contracting with the
debtor.
In re Kraft, No. 74-1281 (10th Cir., Jan. 3, 1975) (Not for
Routine Publication), held: The purpose of the Certificate of
Title Act is to protect the rights of third parties; however, as
between the parties to the sale of a new vehicle, which parties
include the buyer and a lien creditor, title passes (subject to the
lien) on delivery of the vehicle accompanied by a title document
showing the lien, notwithstanding noncompliance with a literal
reading of the Act.
In re Littlejohn, 519 F.2d 356 (10th Cir. 1975), held: The
giving of a bill of sale, which indicates to the buyer of a vehicle a
creditor's lien, places third parties on notice of the existence of
the lien notwithstanding noncompliance with the Certificate of
Title Act; the Uniform Commercial Code does not contemplate
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requiring a creditor to insure the issuance of a certificate of title,
and the lien creditor was, therefore, entitled to reclaim the vehi-
cle as against the buyer's trustee in bankruptcy.
Observation: This decision goes far beyond the simple logic
of In re Kraft, supra, and, in furtherance of an obscure rule of
Kansas law, effectively dispenses with the notice filing concept;
this result could encourage fraud.
In re Parker Square, Inc., No. 74-1502 (10th Cir., May 16,
1975) (Not for Routine Publication), cert. filed, 43 U.S.L.W. 3133
(U.S. Sept. 8, 1975) (No. 75-367), held: A corporate debtor's fail-
ure during an 8-month period of state foreclosure proceedings to
take any action which would support its claim of equity in the
property to be sold, and debtor's subsequent filing of a petition
under Chapter X of the Bankruptcy Act, indicates the debtor's
intent to delay state foreclosure. This constitutes an insufficient
showing of good faith in seeking the protection of the Bankruptcy
Act, and, therefore, the petition was properly dismissed.
Observation: Although the opinion has no precedential
value, it is of great significance in demonstrating shifting federal
court standards on the jurisdictional showing requisite to ap-
proval of a bankruptcy petition.
III. CORPORATIONS
Harman v. Wilbern, 520 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1975), held:
Where a controlling interest is sold, the controlling shareholders'
fiduciary duty to minority shareholders to be reasonably alert to
the intentions of purchasers to loot the corporation is determined
on the basis of the facts and circumstances existing at the time
of sale; corporate directors are not charged with knowledge of the
actions of corporate officers.
IV. UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
United States v. Ed Lusk Construction Co., 504 F.2d 328
(10th Cir. 1975), held: Where the assignee of construction con-
tract rights sought to perfect its security interest by filing a fi-
nancing statement in accordance with section 9-401 of the Uni-
form Commercial Code, but erred by filing locally instead of both
centrally and locally as required by state statute, and where the
United States subsequently filed a notice of tax liens locally in
accordance with section 6323 of the Internal Revenue Code, the
state statute provision that improper filing was effective "against
1976
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any person who has knowledge of the contents of such financing
statement" requires that such person have actual knowledge;
where there was no evidence that the United States had actual
knowledge of the contents of the local filing, assignee had an
unperfected security interest under state law, and the federal tax
lien was, therefore, prior in right.
Observation: As quoted supra UCC section 9-401 has been
adopted by all of the six states comprising the Tenth Circuit.
Transport Equipment Co. v. Guaranty State Bank, 518 F.2d
377 (10th Cir. 1975), held: (1) A transfer for security, in order to
constitute an exception to the bulk sale provisions of the Uniform
Commercial Code, need not be evidenced by a security agreement
denoted as such (construing UCC section 6-103(1)); (2) a financ-
ing statement does not constitute a security agreement absent
language of the debtor granting a security interest (construing
UCC section 9-203(1)(b)); (3) possession of goods, to demonstrate
ostensible ownership to other potential creditors, must be evi-
denced by unequivocal, absolute, notorious, and actual physical
control, and not by such a symbolic act as mere presence on the
debtor's property (construing UCC section 9-305); (4) a creditor's
possession of collateral presumably obviates the necessity of a
written security agreement, and, if the secured party gives value
and the debtor has rights in the collateral, a security interest
therein is created and attaches (dictum) (construing UCC section
9-303); (5) where a security interest is perfected by possession,
there is no relation back of priority to the date of the financing
statement filing to a time when the security interest did not exist
(construing UCC section 9-305); and (6) in assessing damages for
collateral unlawfully repossessed and sold, "fair market value" is
not the retail value of the collateral where, at the time of sale, the
collateral was not in a condition to be sold at retail; also, the
objecting party has the burden of establishing proper market
value (construing UCC section 9-507).
Observation: The dictum confuses the Code requirements for
creation and perfection of security interests.
V. INSURANCE
Gilmore v. Constitution Life Insurance Co., 502 F.2d 1344
(10th Cir. 1975), held: An insurance company which clothed its
agent with authority to sell insurance policies, deliver the cash
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value of the policies to insureds, use company letterhead, open a
checking account in the company's name, and draw upon that
account, assumed the duty to supervise its agent; where the com-
pany failed to supervise its agent who perpetrated a fraud on the
insured during and after the effective policy period, the agent had
apparent authority to perform the acts constituting fraud, and
the company was, therefore, responsible for the acts he commit-
ted.
Observation: Failure of the insurance company to establish
and maintain a program of effective supervision of its agents
seems to have been the key factor in the Tenth Circuit's decision
to uphold the lower court as to the fact of the agent's apparent
authority.
Markel v. Travelers Insurance Co., 510 F.2d 1202 (10th Cir.
1975), held: Where a life insurance contract was silent as to the
method of cancellation, renewal was at the option, and subject to
the consent, of insurer; consent to renewal was manifested by the
insurer's mailing of a renewal notice (invoice) to the general
agent, and a third-party creditor's payment to the general agent
sufficed as payment and, thereby, effected renewal; insured's in-
tent in fact to cancel was not determinative since cancellation
could only be effected by mutual consent; the general agent, who
knew of insured's intent to cancel prior to insured's death, was
authorized under state law only to sell insurance and was not
authorized by insurer to consent to cancellation; thus, where no-
tice of insured's intent to cancel was not received by the insurer
until after the insured's death, the insurance contract remained
in force.
Observation: This case illustrates the disproportionate risk
to insurance companies of selling insurance on credit where the
insurer is dependent on the computer billing and premium collec-
tion procedures of a third-party creditor.
Salco Corp. v. General Motors Corp., 517 F.2d 567 (10th Cir.
1975), held: An automobile franchisor's refusal to approve the site
to which an existing dealer wished to remove its business, and
franchisor's insistence that the dealer instead select a site within
one of two other areas proposed by the franchisor were acts in
''good faith" as required by the Automobile Dealers Franchise
Act.
Observation: This decision upholds the right of franchisors
to control market selection subject only to the antitrust laws.
1976
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RULE 23 AND THE TRUTH IN LENDING ACT
Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 511 F.2d 230
(10th Cir. 1975)
Since the landmark decision in Ratner v. Chemical Bank
N.Y. Trust Co., I the federal courts have waxed philosophical on
the subject of class action certification in Truth in Lending Act'
cases. The Tenth Circuit first faced a Truth in Lending Act class
action in Wilcox v. Commerce Bank,' where it denied certifica-
tion. Now it has again denied class action status in a case which
bristles with policy concerns. That the three-judge panel in
Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc.4 was forced to issue three
separate opinions perhaps suggests that the policy of the Tenth
Circuit on those concerns is far from definite. In addition to its
ruling on the class action issue, the court in Redhouse denied
liquidated damages where there was no showing of actual damage
and causation.
I. FACTS
In Redhouse two Navajo Indians purchased trucks from a
Utah automobile dealer. Because neither purchaser could read
English, friends executed the purchase contracts for them. Each
of the sales was apparently financed; therefore, disclosure state-
ments in compliance with the Truth in Lending Act, Regulation
Z' promulgated thereunder, and the Utah Uniform Consumer
Credit Code (UUCCC)1 were provided to the purchasers. Neither
purchaser could afford the full amount of the downpayment re-
quired. Nevertheless, the dealer permitted each buyer to take
possession of his vehicle by paying only a portion of the cash
downpayment indicated in the disclosure statement and by exe-
cuting and delivering to the dealer a short-term, interest-free,
single-payment note for the balance. There was no indication on
54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972). In Ratner the holder of a credit card brought an
action alleging a Truth in Lending violation for failure to include the "nominal annual
percentage rate" on a periodic statement reporting an outstanding principal balance but
no interest charge. The court held no class action could be maintained as there was no
affirmative need or justification shown and the allowance of thousands of minimus statu-
tory recoveries would carry the prescribed remedy to an absurd extreme.
2 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1601-66 (1970), as amended (Supp. Feb. 1975).
3 474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973).
511 F.2d 230 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 C.F.R. § 226 (1975).
UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 70B-1-101 to -11-105 (Supp. 1975).
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either disclosure statement that a portion of the downpayment
had been deferred.
The purchasers subsequently brought suit against the dealer
and its manager on behalf of themselves and a class of 80 or 90
other persons similarly situated, alleging: That full disclosure in
a single document is required by the Truth in Lending Act and
the UUCCC; that full disclosure includes an identification of any
portion of the cash downpayment which is deferred; and that, for
failure to make such disclosure in a single document, the dealer
was liable to the members of the class in accordance with the
liquidated damages provisions of the respective federal and state
statutes.
The trial court granted summary judgment for the individual
plaintiffs, determined that the case might proceed as a class ac-
tion, permitted recovery under the liability sections of both the
Truth in Lending Act and the UUCCC, held that the inclusion
in the downpayment figure of a deferred portion not so identified
on the federal disclosure statement violated the disclosure provi-
sions of both statutes, and held that the manager of the dealer-
ship was individually liable under both statutes.
II. HOLDING
A. Summary Judgment Issue
On appeal the Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's judg-
ment in every respect. The majority opinion found that there
existed a genuine issue as to a material fact; entry of summary
judgment, therefore, had been in error. Specifically, the court
questioned whether the vehicles had been purchased primarily for
a personal or a business purpose and, thus, whether the respective
consumer credit protection statutes were applicable. The concur-
ring opinion agreed but also expressed the view that the summary
judgment must be set aside because "the class action matter had
not then been fully acted upon."7 Presumably, by this reference
the concurring judge meant that a determination of class action
status had not been made in accordance with rule 23 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, had not been appealed for a
final adjudication, or that the class had not been certified. The
dissenting judge opined, as an evidentiary matter, that no genu-
ine factual issue existed.
1 511 F.2d at 239.
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B. Class Action Issue
The majority opinion denied class action status on the
sweeping and unprecedented grounds that a "class action is not
superior to other available procedures for the fair and efficient
adjudication of cases under the Truth in Lending Act."' The
majority opinion also concluded, with questionable authority,
that "class actions are not proper in cases such as the one at bar,
where the action is predominantly for monetary damages."9 The
concurring opinion agreed that the class action determination
should be set aside, but only so that the trial court might find the
required elements. The dissenting opinion argued that there was
"no persuasive reason why this cannot be treated as a class ac-
tion" since, contrary to the holding of the majority, "damages are
obtainable under a subsection (3) class action";10 nevertheless the
dissenting judge agreed with the concurring opinion that the
cause should be remanded for a determination as to whether the
rule 23" requirements had been met. Each opinion quoted from
Id. at 236.
Id.
" Id. at 240.
FED. R. Civ. P. 23. For an action to be maintained as a class action, the moving
party must meet all of the requirements of rule 23(a) and one of three alternative require-
ments of rule 23(b). The alternative requirements figure in the discussion that follows.
They are:
(1) the prosecution of separate actions by or against individual members of
the class would create a risk of
(A) inconsistent or varying adjudications with respect to individual members
of the class which would establish incompatible standards of conduct for the
party opposing the class, or
(B) adjudications with respect to individual members of the class which
would as a practical matter be dispositive of the interests of the other mem-
bers not parties to the adjudications or substantially impair or impede their
ability to protect their interests; or
(2) the party opposing the class has acted or refused to act on grounds
generally applicable to the class, thereby making appropriate final injunc-
tive relief or corresponding declaratory relief with respect to the class as a
whole; or
(3) the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to the members
of the class predominate over any questions affecting only individual mem-
bers, and that a class action is superior to other available methods for the
fair and efficient adjudication of the controversy. The matters pertinent to
the findings include:
(A) the interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prose-
cution or defense of separate actions; (B) the extent and nature of any litiga-
tion concerning the controversy already commenced by or against members
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or referred to Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin,2 which denied the
trial court "authority to conduct a preliminary inquiry into the
merits of a suit in order to determine whether it may be main-
tained as a class action.'
3
C. Damages Issue
In an extraordinary departure from existing law, the major-
ity opinion apparently held that, in the absence of a showing of
actual damages and causation, it was improper for the trial court
to award liquidated damages under either the federal or state
statute. The concurring and dissenting opinions argued that ac-
tual damages need not be proved since the statutory provision for
liquidated damages effectively dispenses with the necessity of
such proof.
D. Disclosure Violation Issue
As to the disclosure violation itself, the majority opinion,
declining to adopt the rule of law established in a Seventh Circuit
case, '4 created new law in holding that the deferred, short-term,
non-interest bearing portion of a downpayment is exempt from
disclosure under the Truth in Lending Act and under the state
statute, which incorporates by reference the federal statute as
well. The court analogized this holding to the rule in Umdenstock
v. American Mortgage & Investment Co. ' that non-interest bear-
ing escrow accounts were exempt from disclosure." The majority
opinion thereby avoided the trial court issue as to whether the use
of more than a single document might constitute effective disclo-
sure.
The concurring opinion argued that the purpose of the Truth
in Lending Act is to insure adequate disclosure of the cost of
of the class; (C) the desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litiga-
tion of the claims in the particular forum; (D) the difficulties likely to be
encountered in the management of a class action.
12 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
" Id. at 177.
" Gilbert v. Wood Acceptance Co., 486 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1973). The court held that
a statement in the installment purchase contract that the purchaser had paid a "cash
downpayment" of $350, when in fact he paid only $100 and was to pay the remaining in
weekly installments, violated the Truth in Lending Act by concealing an unpaid part of
the sales price in the category of a cash downpayment. Id. at 631.
495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974).
" The court failed to note that escrow accounts are specifically excepted from disclo-
sure under Reg. Z, 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(e)(2)(i) (1975).
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credit and that, since no such cost is involved in relation to a non-
interest bearing note, no disclosure violation had occurred. The
dissenting opinion would have affirmed the trial court determina-
tion that there had been no effective disclosure by means of a
single document. Even assuming that more than one document
was permissible, the dissenting opinion urged, there had been no
effective disclosure under Regulation Z since the deferred portion
of the downpayment constituted a balloon payment as to which
certain disclosures were required but not made. 7
E. Scope of Liability Issue
Finally, all three opinions, in a case of first impression, held
that the dealer's managing agent was not a "creditor" within the
meaning of the Truth in Lending Act i" and, therefore, could not
be held personally liable for disclosure violations of the dealer-
ship.
III. ANALYSIS
A. Summary Judgment
There is little question that the trial court failed to find, as
a matter of fact, that the respective plaintiffs had purchased their
trucks in a consumer credit transaction. Purchases primarily for
business use are not subject to the protection of the Truth in
Lending Act or UUCCC. Yet whether or not the evidence sup-
ported the entry of summary judgment is not particularly insight-
ful. More interesting is the issue, raised in the concurring opinion,
as to whether the entry of summary judgment in favor of certain
individual parties must await a final adjudication of class action
status or a certification of the class of which the individuals are
members. This question appears not to have been raised pre-
viously in precisely this form. 9
It is clear that the dictum in Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin'
is supported by ample authority to the effect that a determina-
'1 See 12 C.F.R. § 226.504(d) (1975). There is no indication in any opinion as to
whether the sidenote payments met the definition of balloon payments. Nor is there any
indication as to whether the disclosures as to balloon payments which are required by
Regulation Z were made in the sidenotes.
See 15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(f) (1974).
" See Federal Practice and Procedure section for a discussion of the Tenth Circuit's
treatment of class actions.
- 417 U.S. 156 (1974). See text accompanying notes 12-13 supra.
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tion on the merits is not a prerequisite to the maintenance of a
class action.2 It is not clear, however, that the inverse of that
proposition is equally true-that a final adjudication of class ac-
tion status or a certification of the class is a prerequisite to a
finding on the merits as to certain of the members of the class (in
the instant case, by way of summary judgment). Yet logic and
due process would seem to require such a conclusion. The plain-
tiffs in Redhouse based their class action petition on subdivision
(b)(3) of rule 23, which requires the court to find that common
questions of law and fact predominate over individual questions.
If the questions raised by the named plaintiffs were truly com-
mon, the avoidance of a multiplicity of actions, the essence of the
class action, should have dictated a certification of the class fol-
lowed by a trial on the merits and by one entry of judgment. If
they were not common, the individual plaintiffs should have been
segregated into a subclass2 or the class action petition should
have been dismissed. Without prejudice to the right of unnamed
members of the class to receive notice of the class action and to
determine whether or not to be bound by the judgment or to enter
an appearance, any judgment entered prior to class certification
could only bind the named plaintiffs, once again necessitating a
series of law suits.
2 3
B. Class Action Issue
While plaintiffs might not have met their burden of estab-
lishing that the requirements for a class action had been satisfied,
the court's blanket insistence that a class action is not superior
to other available procedures for Truth in Lending Act adjudica-
tions24 suggests a profound distrust of class actions. Certainly, the
cases cited in support of this rule are not in point.25 The dissenting
11 Kahan v. Rosenstiel, 424 F.2d 161 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 398 U.S. 950 (1970); Shaw
v. Mobil Oil Corp., 60 F.R.D. 566 (D.N.H. 1973); Haas v. Pittsburgh Nat'l Bank, 60
F.R.D. 604 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Cole v. Schenley Indus., Inc., 60 F.R.D. 81 (S.D.N.Y. 1973);
City of Philadelphia v. American Oil Co., 53 F.R.D. 45 (D.N.J. 1971). But see Milberg v.
Western Pac. R.R., 51 F.R.D. 280 (S.D.N.Y. 1970).
2 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(c)(4)(B).
23 See id. 23(c)(2), (3).
' 511 F.2d at 236.
Rodriguez v. Family Publications Serv., Inc., 57 F.R.D. 189 (C.D. Cal. 1972), was
expressly limited to its facts. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 54 F.R.D. 412
(S.D.N.Y. 1972), held a class action inappropriate in view of the immense civil liability
($13 million) to which the defendant bank would have been subjected.
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opinion is correct in its criticism of the majority opinion, which
concluded that "class actions are not proper in cases such as the
one at bar, where the action is predominantly for monetary dam-
ages." 6 The cases cited by the majority make clear that relying
only on subdivision (b)(2) of rule 23 is improper in actions for
monetary damages.27 Subdivision (b)(2), not at issue in this sub-
division (b) (3) case, is expressly limited to actions for injunctions
and declaratory judgments. However, subdivision (b)(3) class
actions have been held proper where the relief sought is mone-
tary.
2 8
In view of the court's apparent bias, Redhouse is a significant
departure from prior denials of class action status in consumer
credit protection cases. Ratner v. Chemical Bank N. Y Trust
Co."5 attracted wide attention because the representative member
of the class, who had suffered no actual damage as a result of
defendant bank's nondisclosure, represented 130,000 other mem-
bers and, thereby, subjected defendant to potential liability,
under the liquidated damages provision of the Truth in Lending
Act, of $13 million. The court in Ratner approved the cause of
action but denied class action status.
In Wilcox v. Commerce Bank 0 the Tenth Circuit similarly
denied class action status in a Truth in Lending Act case in which
180,000 class members subjected defendant bank to over $1 bil-
lion in civil liability. The ostensible basis for denial in Wilcox was
the fact that the representative members had alleged no actual
damage, but the court's concern for the consequences of a class
action determination was evident.3 1 The court was sensitive to the
criticism in the briefs filed to the effect that its denial of class
action status was in fact a policy decision. Despite this, the court
still decided on policy grounds:
" 511 F.2d at 236.
" Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413, 421 (E.D. Pa. 1974) (class was
in fact certified under rule 23(b)(3) and damages were sought); Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacque-
lin, 391 F.2d 555, 564 (2d Cir. 1968), rev'd on other grounds, 417 U.S. 156 (1974).
See, e.g., Richardson v. Hamilton Int'l Corp., 62 F.R.D. 413 (E.D. Pa. 1974).
54 F.R.D. 412 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
474 F.2d 336 (10th Cir. 1973).
' Wilcox was distinguished in Haynes v. Logan Furniture Mart, Inc., 503 F.2d 1161
(7th Cir. 1974), and class action status was granted on the basis that actual damages had
been alleged. It might have been more significant, however, that the class in Haynes
included only 2,500 purchasers.
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Indeed the Rule [23] generally may be at the crossroads, many
knowledgeable lawyers and some judges maintaining that it should
be completely scrapped; others that it should be substantially
revised or reformed; and still others that it should be even more
liberally administered to effectuate or promote societal objectives
bearing little relationship to economics or practicality.2
Thus, in the court's view, apparently the only practical alterna-
tives were to scrap, to revise, or to reform rule 23.
In Redhouse the proposed class was of only 80 to 90 members,
so that "realism and good sense ' 33 (i.e., the crushing conse-
quences of imposing class action liability) were no longer factors.
Since Wilcox, moreover, an amendment to the Truth in Lending
Act has limited class action recoveries to the lesser of $100,000 or
1 percent of the creditor's net worth.3 4 Yet the Tenth Circuit in
Redhouse has gone to great lengths, in terms unrelated to the
consequences of a class action determination, to express its dis-
satisfaction with consumer credit class actions.
C. Damages Issue
In requiring proof of actual damages and causation, the ma-
jority opinion strains at statutory construction and discounts the
plain meaning of the liquidated damages sections of the federal
and state statutes. Its reading of the purpose of the Truth in
Lending Act is inconsistent, and the cases cited are not on point.3
The purpose of the Truth in Lending Act, by its own terms, is
"to assure a meaningful disclosure of credit terms so that the
consumer will be able to compare more readily the various credit
terms available to him and avoid the uninformed use of credit.
' 3
Whether, by this statement of purpose, the Act is "remedial" or
''punitive" should have no bearing whatsoever on liability for
474 F.2d at 348-49 (emphasis added).
See id. at 346-47 for an intelligent commentary on the judicial application of "real-
ism and good sense" in weighing competing considerations in a class action determination.
34 15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (Supp. Feb. 1975), formerly ch. 41, § 1640(a), 82 Stat. 157
(1968).
" Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Inv. Co., 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974),
contained no reference to the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act. W.T. Grant Co. v.
Commissioner, 483 F.2d 1115, 1117 n.4 (2d Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 937 (1974),
contained such a reference only in dictum. Wachtel v. West, 476 F.2d 1062 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 414 U.S. 874 (1973), did not relate the Truth in Lending Act to cost disclosure,
but rather said that "the purpose of disclosure is clearly to give the borrower an opportun-
ity to do some comparative shopping for credit terms." Id. at 1064 (emphasis added).
31 15 U.S.C.A. § 1601 (1974) (emphasis added).
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only actual, as opposed to liquidated, damages. In fact, a recent
amendment to the Act has made it clear that actual damages
need not be alleged or proved although, if they are, recovery for
actual damages in addition to liquidated damages will be al-
lowed.37
Moreover, the phrase "credit terms" includes numerous non-
cost items of information which Congress intended to be disclosed
to consumers to prevent the uninformed use of credit.3" If credi-
tors may not be held liable for failure to disclose items which
ordinarily lead to no out-of-pocket loss to consumers, then por-
tions of the Truth in Lending Act and Regulation Z are merely
precatory. Such a result is untenable, and the court's actual dam-
ages theory should, therefore, be rejected."9
The court's uneasiness with imposing liability where neither
causation nor actual damages are shown 0 cannot be justified by
statutory construction. It probably comports, however, with an
accurate understanding of the relatively slight impact which the
Truth in Lending Act has had on consumer attitudes. One re-
search study has concluded, on the basis of research performed
15 months after the implementation of the federal statute, that:
The Truth-in-Lending Act held promise for dramatic changes in the
ways in which consumer credit was perceived and used by both
consumers and credit sources. . . . While some changes were ob-
served during the surveys of California consumers, it must be con-
15 U.S.C.A. § 1640(a) (Supp. Feb. 1975), formerly ch. 41, § 1640(a), 82 Stat. 157
(1968).
See, e.g., 12 C.F.R. § 226.8 (1975) which lists as disclosure items the method of
rebate calculation, the existence and description of any penalty charge, the existence and
description of any security interest, and the method of computation of any default or
delinquency charges. A broad construction of the purpose of the Truth in Lending Act as
compelling more than merely a disclosure of cost terms has been upheld. See, e.g., N.C.
Freed Co. v. Board of Governors, 473 F.2d 1210 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 827 (1973).
"1 Cf. Burgess v. Charlottesville Say. & Loan Ass'n, 477 F.2d 40 (4th Cir. 1973)
(dictum); White v. Arlen Realty & Dev. Corp., 374 F. Supp. 151 (D. Md. 1974) (dictum);
Ratner v. Chemical Bank N.Y. Trust Co., 329 F. Supp. 270 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
" The court in Redhouse goes so far as to note that the plaintiffs, who did not read
their contracts prior to execution by their friends, could not thereby have been affected
by any omission of information. 511 F.2d at 237. This argument, of course, would lead to
the wholly unreasonable conclusion that one who cannot read is not subject to the protec-
tion of the Truth in Lending Act. It is submitted that disclosure is good per se, and that
any rule of law which tends to minimize disclosure responsibilities (as well as to estop
consumers who, in contract law, would not be bound by a contract they could not read)
is bad policy.
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cluded that to date the higher hopes of the Truth-in-Lending Act
remain unfulfilled ...
Despite the rise in consumer knowledge, the effect of disclosure
on actual purchase behavior has been minimal."
The court's common sense approach in noting that "[n]o harm
arose from the [creditor's] technical violations" may, therefore,
be the first stirrings of judicial unrest on the damages issue, just
as Ratner was on the issue of in terrorem liability in class actions.
As usual, however, until the Truth in Lending Act is amended to
reflect the court's possible perception of the Act's limitations, the
concurring and dissenting opinions, which would have applied
the statutory liquidated damages provisions, would appear to be
the better view.2
D. Disclosure Violation Issue
There is no question that the giving of a sidenote, either to a
dealer or to a third-party lender, to obtain a portion of a required
downpayment (the "pickup payment") is a common practice in
the automobile industry.43 In recognition of this," the majority
opinion declined to follow Gilbert v. Wood Acceptance Co.,45
which apparently held that, since a promissory note is "property"
(and not cash) such as might be given in downpayment on a
consumer sale, it should be identified on the disclosure state-
ment. The court in Redhouse simply found the giving of a side-
note to be exempt from disclosure under the Truth in Lending Act
on the theory that "no harm was done . . . . '" Like the concur-
ring opinion, this erroneously assumes that disclosure is relevant
" Brandt & Day, Information Disclosure and Consumer Behavior, 7 U. MIcH. J.L.
REF. 297, 327 (1974).
42 The court failed to reach the issue, raised below, of whether the creditor, who was
alleged to have violated the disclosure provisions of both the Truth in Lending Act and
the UUCCC, should be held liable in damages under both statutes, so as to permit a
double recovery. There is no statute or judicial holding directly on point on this issue. It
might be noted, however, that under the new Equal Credit Opportunity amendments to
the Federal Consumer Credit Protection Act, proof of sex discrimination in the granting
of credit will permit a credit applicant to pursue either a state or a federal remedy, but
not both. 15 U.S.C.A. § 1591d(e) (Supp. Feb. 1975).
, For a regulation recognizing this practice, see 12 C.F.R. § 226.504(a) (1975).
511 F.2d at 238.
486 F.2d 627 (7th Cir. 1973).
511 F.2d at 238.
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only where actual damages, resulting from a failure to disclose
costs, are possible. 7
The court might have relied upon Regulation Z, which pro-
vides in part that no disclosure need be made of a required "de-
posit balance" where the balance is to be "wholly applied toward
satisfaction of the customer's obligation in the transaction."' 8
Although this language may have been intended to describe only
Morris Plan transactions, if a pickup payment can be character-
ized as a "deposit balance" the section would seem to cover par-
tial downpayments as well. The language quoted, it might also
be observed, is part of the same interpretation which may have
been relied upon in Umdenstock v. American Mortgage & Invest-
ment Co.4" to except escrow accounts from disclosure.50
Alternatively, the court might have held that the disclosure
as contained in the sidenote itself was adequate, and that disclo-
sure by means of more than one document is permissible. There
is no authority for the statements in the majority and dissenting
opinions that the Truth in Lending Act requires disclosure in a
"single document." 5' The Act is silent on the form of disclosure, 52
and Regulation Z merely provides that "[a]ll of the disclosures
shall be made together on . . . [o]ne side of a separate
statement which identifies the transaction. '53 It is not inconceiv-
able that a "separate statement" may consist of more than one
page. Certainly disclosures not required by the Truth in Lending
Act may be supplied to the consumer on a separate page. 5' In fact,
Regulation Z expressly provides that disclosure of the consumer's
right to rescind a credit transaction shall, under certain circum-
stances, be given by a separate document.5
On this point the court's common sense approach, which
causes it to ignore possible technical violations of the Act, is on
firmer ground than it is in regard to the damages issue. Human
beings are limited in their capability to perceive and act upon raw
, See text accompanying notes 36-37 supra.
48 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(e)(2)(ii) (1975).
11 495 F.2d 589 (10th Cir. 1974). See text accompanying notes 15-16 supra.
See 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(e)(2)(i) (1975).
11 511 F.2d at 233 (majority), 239 (dissent).
512 See 15 U.S.C.A. §§ 1631-66 (1974), as amended, (Supp. 1975).
M' 12 C.F.R. § 226.8(a) (1975) (emphasis added).
54 15 U.S.C.A. § 1632(b) (1974); 12 C.F.R. § 226.6(c) (1975).
w 12 C.F.R. § 226.9(b) (1975).
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information. The utility to the plaintiffs of having an itemized
description of the sidenotes included in their federal disclosure
statement is difficult to comprehend. Nondisclosure of a pickup
payment knowingly contracted for can only work to the detriment
of a major creditor, which may require a downpayment as evi-
dence of the debtor's payment capacity when in fact no such
capacity exists. For these reasons, if Congress or the Board of
Governors intends the concept of disclosure to extend this far, it
should expressly say so.
E. Scope of Liability Issue
Showing the only unanimity in the case, each opinion ab-
solved the dealership manager from liability as a "creditor"
under the Truth in Lending Act. The definitions contained in the
Act provide that the "term 'creditor' refers only to creditors who
regularly extend, or arrange for the extension of, credit . "56
As an "arranger" of credit, dealers have been held liable for dis-
closure violations. 7 Similarly, the connexity test has been
adopted to bind assignees as "creditors."5 That a dealer's agent
was not held liable as a "creditor" in this case of first impression
would appear consistent with the notion of respondeat superior.
BANKER'S BLANKET BOND
First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Continental
Insurance Co., 510 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1975)
The risk of doing business, as well as the dramatic increases
in the cost of insuring against bad business practices, which only
lately occupied the attention of doctors and lawyers, now con-
cerns the banking industry as well. Reliance on the standard
Banker's Blanket Bond to offset an extraordinary range of normal
losses has inspired a flurry of litigation as banks endeavor to pare
the definition of excluded risks.59
15 U.S.C.A. § 1602(0 (1974).
57 Starks v. Orleans Motors, Inc., 372 F. Supp. 928 (E.D. La.), aff'd, 500 F.2d 1182
(5th Cir. 1974). But cf. Manning v. Princeton Consumer Discount Co., 390 F. Supp. 320
(E.D. Pa. 1975).
Philbeck v. Timmers Chevrolet, Inc., 361 F. Supp. 1255 (E.D. Ga. 1973).
so See Definition of Dishonesty in Banker's Blanket Bond Differs by Court Jurisdic-
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In First National Bank & Trust Co. v. Continental Insurance
Co.60 plaintiff bank, incorporated in Oklahoma, issued a letter of
credit covering a depositor's checks. The depositor then appar-
ently embarked upon a check-kiting operation. The check-kiting
scheme broke down, but, because the bank believed it was liable
to a collecting bank on the letter of credit, several checks pre-
sented for payment were paid and the depositor's account was
permitted to become overdrawn. To cover the overdraft without
necessitating a charge to the profit and loss account, the bank
obtained signed notes from the depositor in an amount equal to
the overdraft. The depositor-borrower later defaulted on the
notes, and the bank ultimately incurred a loss of $121,324.38.
When normal collection efforts failed, the bank brought suit
against the insurance carrier and alleged that, under its standard
Banker's Blanket Bond, the insurer was liable for the loss. Al-
though the bond specifically excluded liability for loan losses,
losses of property through "false pretenses" were included in the
coverage. The bank argued that the loss had been caused by the
check-kiting scheme and, as such, represented a loss of property
through "false pretenses." In support of its position, the bank
pointed to the non-existence of certain collateral supposedly as-
signed to secure the notes. The non-existence of the collateral, the
bank contended, further evidenced the depositor-borrower's in-
tent to defraud.
The Tenth Circuit, in this case of first impression, rejected
the bank's argument. "False pretenses," for the purpose of deter-
mining liability under a Banker's Blanket Bond, the court stated,
has repeatedly been deemed to include a loss of money through a
check-kiting operation. Here, however, plaintiff bank suffered a
loan loss, the cause of which could be traced only indirectly to the
check-kiting scheme. That the loan might have been induced by
a pledge of non-existent collateral did not affect the character of
the loss as an excluded risk since the loan was still valid on its
face. The court suggested that when the bank discovered the
check-kiting operation, it made a calculated credit decision to
cover its loss with a note. The Tenth Circuit thus agrees in princi-
tion, Lawyers Say, AMERICAN BANKER, August 13, 1974 at 1; Walker of C & S Advises
Banks Widen Reliance on Risk Management, Reduce Use of Insurance, AMERICAN BANKER,
April 23, 1974 at 1.
60 510 F.2d 7 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
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ple with First National Bank v. Aetna Casualty & Surety Co."
in which the Sixth Circuit noted that "[lt was not intended by
the bond to provide credit insurance for the Bank . ".. -62
The court's decision comports with the equitable principles
which appear to govern the identification of excluded risks in
Banker's Blanket Bonds. 3 However, the opinion overstates and
tends to federalize the law on what constitutes "false pretenses."
The cases relied upon by the court, in concluding that a check-
kiting loss is a loss through "false pretenses," all make clear that
the question is one of state law. Whether an overdraft is deemed
a loan is a question of state law, 4 as is the question of intent to
defraud, which is generally held to be one of the elements of the
crime of false pretenses. 5 For example, in Illinois and Nebraska
the deceptive practices statutes contain a statutory presumption
of intent to defraud; check-kiting schemes are clearly within the
scope of the statutes.6 Similarly, a Missouri statute identifies
check-kiting as one of the offenses of false pretenses punishable
as a felony. 7 There is no question that "Louisiana's criminal law
prohibits the knowing issuance of worthless checks,"" and that
Alabama law regards the withdrawal of funds from an account to
which bogus drafts had previously been credited as a "false pre-
tense." 9 In Continental Insurance, however, the court gave no
consideration to the applicable Oklahoma law on either over-
309 F.2d 702, (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963).
R2 Id. at 705.
" See id., where the Sixth Circuit went so far as to characterize a bank's out-of-court
settlement with third parties as a loan loss, and thus an excluded risk, even though the
loan in question had been paid in full. The settlement had the effect of protecting the bank
from a claim of the borrower's trustee in bankruptcy, who, if successful in asserting the
claim, could have preserved for the bankrupt's estate the amount oi the repayment on
the loan.
"4 See First Nat'l Bank v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 424 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1970); Na-
tional Bank of Commerce v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 312 F. Supp. 71 (E.D. La. 1970), aff'd.,
437 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1971).
e See Reeves v. State, 68 Okla. Cr. 163, 96 P.2d 536 (1939).
" First Nat'l Bank v. Insurance Co. of N.A., 424 F.2d 312 (7th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Western Contracting Corp., 341 F.2d 383 (8th Cir. 1965).
11 Mo. ANN. STAT. § 561.450 (Vernon 1953). See Fidelity & Cas. Co. v. Bank of
Altenburg, 216 F.2d 294 (8th Cir. 1954); Hartford Acc. & Indem. Co. v. FDIC, 204 F.2d
933 (8th Cir. 1953).
" National Bank of Commerce v. Fidelity Cas. Co., 312 F. Supp. 71, 74 (E.D. La.
1970), aff'd, 437 F.2d 96 (5th Cir. 1971).
61 Shoals Nat'l Bank v. Home Indem. Co., 384 F. Supp. 49 (N.D. Ala. 1974).
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drafts or intent to defraud (or any other state law definition of
false pretenses). Instead the court suggested that, at least in the
Tenth Circuit, check-kiting is very nearly per se an act evidenc-
ing false pretenses.
Attorneys representing banks can learn several lessons from
Continental Insurance. First, because loan losses in the Tenth
Circuit are likely to be regarded henceforth as excluded risks
irrespective of the circumstances under which they arise, it is
absolutely essential that the rights of a bank against its insurer
be fully evaluated by counsel before the bank takes back a note
to evidence an indebtedness; otherwise any right under a
Banker's Blanket Bond may be deemed waived. In Continental
Insurance the bank's difficulties began when its lending officer
issued an unlimited letter of credit to a collecting bank "guar-
anteeing" payment of all the depositor's checks when presented
under specified conditions. Such an unrestricted letter of credit
is susceptible to any number of fraudulent practices and should
be avoided.
Second, if a meritorious claim against the insurer exists, the
bank should consider, as an alternative to taking back a note or
to allowing a debt to arise and then charging it against the profit
and loss account, the simple expedient of giving notice of the
claim and refusing to honor any contractual commitment at
stake. In Continental Insurance it would have been an easy mat-
ter for the plaintiff bank to dishonor the depositor's checks when
presented for payment, thus avoiding the overdraft in the first
instance. Although plaintiff might well have been obligated to the
collecting bank on its letter of credit, the better course of action
would have been to litigate the obligation and allow any such
liability to be reduced to judgment, because even then it could
have asserted its claim against the insurer. First National Bank
v. Maryland Casualty Co. 0 held that, if such a judgment is
binding and based upon a specific finding that the bank against
which judgment is entered incurred a loss as a result of a covered
act, the bank's consequent liability on the judgment is similarly
covered and the indemnitor is bound." Another district court, in
construing a Banker's Blanket Bond, has also held that:
0 354 F. Supp. 189 (S.D.W. Va. 1973).
7' Id. at 194-95.
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The payment of a legal liability caused by the dishonest act of the
employee is a "loss of money" to the same practical effect as it would
be if the employee actually took the money out of the till."
Third, in asserting a claim against its insurer for a loss
through "false pretenses," no bank in the Tenth Circuit should
rely on evidence of extrinsic fraud. On this point, the federal
courts speak in harmony.73 In adding its voice, the Tenth Circuit
implicitly adopts a construction of the term "false pretenses"
which is consistent with the concept of intrinsic fraud or fraud in
the execution. Only if a loan or other transaction is invalid on its
face-presumably by virtue of the documents employed, the sig-
natories to it, or otherwise-will the court consider allocating risk
for a loss arising from it to an insurer.
" Hooker v. New Amsterdam Cas. Co., 33 F. Supp. 672, 673 (W.D. Ky. 1940); cf
Imperial Ins., Inc. v. Employers Liab. Assurance Corp., 442 F.2d 1197 (D.C. Cir. 1970).
" See Roodhouse Nat'l Bank v. Fidelity & Deposit Co., 426 F.2d 1347 (7th Cir. 1970)
(falsification of retail installment contracts used by used-car dealer to obtain credit, even
though a forgery under Tennessee law, comes within exclusion); East Gadsen Bank v. U.S.
Fidelity & Guar. Co., 415 F.2d 357 (5th Cir. 1969) (inducement by extrinsic facts leading
to loan loss comes within exclusion); Capitol Bank v. Fidelity & Cas. Co., 414 F.2d 986
(7th Cir. 1969) (properly executed written instruments describing non-existent under-
lying transactions, not being forged or counterfeited under Illinois law when taken as
collateral to secure loan leading to loss, come within exclusion); First Nat'l Bank v. Aetna
Cas. & Sur. Co., 309 F.2d 702 (6th Cir. 1962), cert. denied, 372 U.S. 953 (1963) (warehouse
receipts describing non-existent soya beans, not being forged under Tennessee law, come
within exclusion); State Bank v. Maryland Cas. Co., 289 F.2d 544 (8th Cir. 1961) (induce-
ment by extrinsic facts leading to loan loss comes within exclusion); Community Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. General Cas. Co., 274 F.2d 620 (8th Cir. 1960) (false representations
inducing loan which leads to loss come within loan loss exclusion of Banker's Blanket
Bond).

CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
OVERVIEW
The term of the Tenth Circuit Court of Appeals covered by
this survey saw surprisingly little new ground broken in the field
of constitutional law; few cases of import reached the court for
consideration. This overview will highlight some of the more in-
teresting cases involving questions of constitutional law handed
down by the Tenth Circuit.
I. FIRST AMENDMENT
A. School Dress Codes: Hatch v. Goerke, 502 F.2d 1189 (10th
Cir. 1974)
Plaintiff parents brought a civil rights action under section
19831 to reverse a lower court holding that their son was rightfully
expelled from school for refusing to cut his hair in conformance
with the school's rules for student appearance. The mother of the
expelled child was an American Indian.
Rather than asserting the traditional free speech objection to
the expulsion of their child, the parents claimed that requiring
their son to cut his braided hair "violated their parental rights to
raise their children according to their own religious, cultural and
moral values in violation of the First, Fifth and Fourteenth
Amendments." 2 In addition, the parents claimed that the expul-
sion without a hearing denied their son due process under the
fourteenth amendment.'
Although in the instant case parental, not student, rights
were in issue, the court applied its reasoning from Freeman v.
Flake,4 holding that "the duty and responsibility of supervising
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970). The court stated the action was brought under 42 U.S.C.
§§ 1981-83, 2000d (1970). See 502 F.2d at 1190.
502 F.2d at 1191.
Two other claims unrelated to the appearance code were advanced by the plaintiffs:
(1) The compulsory attendance rules were vague and overbroad, and (2) permitting reli-
gious services to be conducted on school premises contravened the establishment and free
exercise clauses of the first amendment. Id. at 1193. While the court rejected the argument
of overbreadth, it held that the issue concerning religious services could not be dismissed,
as that issue raised a substantial question regarding the constitutional rights which plain-
tiffs were entitled to assert. Id. at 1194.
- 448 F.2d 258 (10th Cir. 1971).
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the length of a student's hair . . . is one for the states" and
should be handled through state procedures.5
The plaintiffs based their constitutional claim on the case of
Wisconsin v. Yoder.' The Tenth Circuit, however, distinguished
that case as having involved a state law which "contravenes the
basic religious tenets and practice of the Amish faith, both as to
the parent and the child."7 The issue of hair length in the present
case, said the court, did not reach the same level of significance.
Recognizing, however, that due process entitles one to at
least the "rudimentary elements of a hearing" before one can be
expelled,' the court found that the claim by the plaintiffs that
their son was denied due process could not, on its face, be dis-
missed. Denial of a hearing, stated the court, would deny the
child "the opportunity to appear and argue, at least, for leniency
or special consideration [which] could be of substantial value."9
B. Right to Picket: Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974)
Following inaction in the resolution of a dispute between
minority city employees and the mayor and members of the city
council, 0 the appellant employees decided to picket the resi-
dences of those city officials. In response to the residential picket-
ing that ensued," the city council passed an ordinance which
prohibited picketing the residence of any individual, on the
grounds that people should be free to enjoy, in the privacy of their
homes, a "feeling of well-being, tranquility, and privacy," and on
the further grounds that picketing in residential neighborhoods
constitutes a nuisance.
2
5 502 F.2d at 1192 (citation omitted).
- 406 U.S. 205 (1972). In Yoder an Amish family refused to send their children to high
school as required by the state. They contended that to do so was contrary to the Amish
beliefs, and that sending their children to high school would hold them up to censure by
the Amish community and endanger the salvation of themselves and their children. Id.
at 209.
Id. at 218.
502 F.2d at 1194.
* Id. at 1195.
10 The employees were protesting a refusal of the city council to recognize a particular
union as their bargaining agent and were also protesting against alleged racial discrimina-
tion in employment practices by the city. Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539, 541 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1967 (1975).
1 Evidence indicated that at one point 300 protesters picketed the mayor's home,
chanting slogans and upsetting his family. 507 F.2d at 541.
"1 Id. at 542.
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The appellants contended that this ordinance violated their
right to free speech in that: (1) Its enactment was not unrelated
to the suppression of free speech; (2) its absolute ban on residen-
tial picketing violated the first and fourteenth amendments be-
cause it did not further an important governmental interest; and
(3) it was overbroad in that less restrictive alternatives existed to
accomplish the same goals.'3
In upholding the district court's verdict against the appellant
employees, the Tenth Circuit applied a balancing test, balancing
the relationship between the picketing and the area-the residen-
tial neighborhoods-against the possible existence of "reasonably
effective alternative means of communications."' 4 Finding that
the conduct of picketing, as an exercise of free speech, is subject
to reasonable regulation and control under the police power and
that there existed alternative locations for staging protests, the
court held that the sanctity of the home deserved the protection
afforded it by the ordinance in question:
The balancing of competing rights generally has resulted in a deter-
mination that the privacy of the individual householder, even that
of a public official, is entitled to protection.'"
C. Obscenity: United States v. Harding, 507 F.2d 294 (10th Cir.
1974)
United States v. Harding'" involved a conviction for receiving
obscene matter transported in interstate commerce. Upon appeal
the Supreme Court remanded the case for consideration in light
of the Court's decision in Miller v. California. '7 The Tenth Circuit
then remanded to the trial court to consider the sole issue of
whether the materials were obscene under the standards set out
in Miller.
The principal issue at the trial court revolved around a stipu-
lation made by the defendant at his original trial that the materi-
als in question were obscene. On remand the defendant con-
tended that:
1. The tests set forth in Miller are substantially different from the
Roth-Memoirs standards ....
Id. at 542-43.
Id. at 543.
Id. at 544.
507 F.2d 294 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1437 (1975).
" 413 U.S. 15 (1973).
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2. Given the differences in the two tests, defendant would not have
stipulated to obscenity under the Miller case.
3. Failure to relieve defendant of his stipulation where the stan-
dards of obscenity have changed deprives him of his right to have
the jury decide the issue of obscenity. The trial court is not author-
ized to decide whether the material is obscene under Miller.IS
The trial court, after considering the arguments of defendants,
ruled that the materials were obscene under the Miller standards.
The Tenth Circuit, in affirming the district court's holding,
relied on the recent Supreme Court decision in Hamling v. United
States,9 wherein the issue was a pre-Miller obscenity conviction
which was reconsidered and upheld by the Ninth Circuit. 0 The
Tenth Circuit noted that the Supreme Court "did not require as
a constitutional matter" that courts substitute standards of a
smaller geographical area for uniform national standards. 1 Fur-
ther relying on Hamling, the court ruled that, by stipulating to
obscenity based on the "redeeming social value" test, the defen-
dant also stipulated to obscenity based on the less exacting
"without serious artistic or social merit" test enumerated in
Miller. 22
HI. EQUAL PROTECTION
Title VII: Muller v. United States Steel Corp., 509 F.2d 923 (10th
Cir. 1975)
At issue in Muller v. United States Steel Corp.23 was the
defendant's failure to promote the plaintiff, who was of Spanish
American origin, to a supervisory position. After serving 15 years
with defendant company without a promotion, plaintiff quit his
job and brought this suit under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act.
24
Alleging discrimination in the defendant's system of promotion,
plaintiff sought, inter alia, monetary damages for his alleged con-
structive discharge. Defendant Steel Corporation sought reversal
" 507 F.2d at 297.
418 U.S. 87 (1974).
The defendant in Hamling was convicted of using the mails to carry an obscene
book. The Supreme Court directed its attention to "what rules of law shall govern obscen-
ity convictions that occurred prior to . . . this Court's decision in Miller v. California
.... Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 98 (1973).
507 F.2d at 297, citing Hamling v. United States, 418 U.S. 87, 104 (1974).
" 507 F.2d at 297.
23 509 F.2d 923 (10th Cir. 1975).
21 Civil Rights Act of 1964 § 703, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a) (1970).
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of the trial court's finding of discrimination and of its award of
damages for plaintiff's constructive discharge.
While people of Spanish American origin were not, to any
significant degree, under-employed in defendant's plant, the
court found support for plaintiff's contention that defendant's
promotional practices were discriminatory.15 In addition, while
the court found that plaintiff was not lacking in credentials quali-
fying him for promotion, he was never, in his 15 years with the
defendant, selected by his superiors for the position of spell fore-
man 2'-a job considered to be a forerunner to possible promotion.
To rebut the allegations of defendant that evidence was in-
sufficient to establish discrimination against the plaintiff, the
court relied on two of its earlier decisions holding that no specific
intent to discriminate need be found: If the employer's conduct
results in discrimination, a violation of Title VII will occur." The
fact that discrimination did occur, coupled with evidence that
there were no "meaningful standards to guide the promotion deci-
sion,"2 8 led the court to conclude that the evidence of a Title VII
violation was sufficient to uphold the lower court's decision
against defendant.
Finally, the Tenth Circuit considered the lower court's ruling
that the plaintiff had been constructively discharged, and re-
viewed its decision to award monetary damages as a result of that
discharge. 9 On these points the Tenth Circuit reversed. The court
stated that a precondition to a constructive discharge is a con-
scious decision on the part of the employer to render the em-
ployee's job so intolerable as to force his resignation. ° The evi-
25 During 1968 and 1969, 20-25 persons were selected for the position of spell foreman;
all were of Anglo origin, and only 15 had more seniority than the plaintiff. 509 F.2d at
925.
28 Evidence showed that the plaintiff had had 5 years of previous welding experience,
had a high school degree, and had exercised community leadership. Id. at 925.
27 Id. at 927. See also Spurlock v. United Airlines, 475 F.2d 216 (10th Cir. 1972); Jones
v. Lee Way Motor Freight, 431 F.2d 245 (10th Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 954 (1970).
28 509 F.2d at 927-28. Defendant argued that everyone promoted was more qualified
than the plaintiff. The court answered by saying that "there is no basis for so concluding
where there is a palpable lack of objective standards." Id. at 929.
" The court also considered and rejected defendant's argument that a business ne-
cessity existed for its actions. Relying on Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971),
the Tenth Circuit ruled that to rebut a prima facie case by the business necessity rule,
the employer must show that "the maintenance of safety and efficiency requires the
practice which obtains." 507 F.2d at 928.
11 507 F.2d at 929.
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dence failed to support this precondition; the finding of construc-
tive discharge was reversed and the monetary award against the
defendant was vacated.
III. DUE PROCESS
A. State Action-Right to a Hearing: Teleco, Inc. v. Southwest-
ern Bell Telephone Co., 511 F.2d 949 (10th Cir. 1975)
Southwestern Bell Telephone, which supplies telephone
service in Oklahoma under tariffs filed with the state, suspended
service to plaintiff corporation after its continued violations of the
"foreign attachment" tariffs.' Teleco received no hearing prior to
the suspension of its service, and alleged that it was denied its
right to due process under the fourteenth amendment. The Tenth
Circuit upheld the lower court's finding that no such violation
had occurred-that the action taken by Southwestern Bell was
not state action. 2
Teleco apparently maintained that because the state re-
quired Southwestern Bell to file its tariffs with the state regula-
tory agency, and because those tariffs automatically became
effective if no timely objection were raised, state action became
an issue in any attempt to terminate service. A hearing thus
would be required under the fouteenth amendment before termi-
nation of service could occur.
In reaching its decision the Tenth Circuit relied on the recent
Supreme Court case, Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 33 in
which the Court ruled that the termination of service by a power
company, which was likewise subject to extensive state regula-
tion, did not have a sufficient nexus with the state so as to render
the power company's termination of customer service state ac-
tion. 34 Finding that the state involvement in the present
case-requirements of state approval of company policy-was the
same as that in Jackson, the Tenth Circuit ruled that no state
action was involved and, therefore, no violation of due process
", The tariff in question required that any direct electrical connection be made by a
coupler installed by the telephone company. 511 F.2d at 950 n.1 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 Other grounds for reversal were also advanced by Teleco, but the most significant,
and, therefore, the only one considered here, is the due process claim. See id. at 951.
419 U.S. 345 (1974).
511 F.2d at 951, citing Jackson v. Metropolitan Edison Co., 419 U.S. 345, 358-59
(1974).
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had occurred by denying plaintiff a hearing prior to terminating
its service.
B. Juvenile Court Proceedings: Radcliff v. Anderson, 509 F.2d
1093 (10th Cir. 1974)
At issue in Radcliff v. Anderson35 was the retroactivity of the
Tenth Circuit's decision in Lamb v. Brown,- wherein the court
ruled that an Oklahoma statute31 which afforded juvenile court
proceedings to females under the age of 18, yet limited these same
benefits to males who were under the age of 16, was unconstitu-
tional as a denial of equal protection under the fourteenth amend-
ment. Yet in Lamb the court concluded its decision with the
statement: "This ruling shall not apply retroactively. ' ' 1
Petitioners in the present case were, at the age of 17,
prosecuted as adults for various crimes they had committed.
They contended in their habeas petitions that they should have
been afforded, retroactively, the benefits of the court's ruling in
Lamb, and alleged that the statement therein regarding its re-
troactivity was mere dictum, and not binding on their claims.
The Tenth Circuit agreed.
While conceding that the denial to the petitioners of juvenile
court proceedings did not in any way affect the accuracy of the
fact finding process, the court concluded that to deny plaintiffs
these proceedings raised questions of "basic fairness and essential
justice. ' 39 The court found support for its position in a Fourth
Circuit case which also involved the retroactivity of a holding
that the different treatment of juveniles amounted to a violation
u 509 F.2d-1093 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 1667 (1975). The Tenth
Circuit's opinion in Radcliff, decided in June of 1974, did not appear in the Federal
Reporter until almost a year later. The court's denial of a rehearing is found immediately
following the court's decision. 509 F.2d 1093 (10th Cir. 1974).
38 456 F.2d 18 (10th Cir. 1972).
", Okla. Stat. Ann. tit. 10, § 1101(a) (Supp. 1969). The statute has since been
amended and now reads: "The term 'child' means any person under the age of eighteen
(18) years." Id. (Supp. 1974).
3' 456 F.2d at 20.
, Some of the benefits available to those prosecuted under the juvenile proceedings
which are not available to idults, are:
[T]he form of petition, custody, release to parents, temporary detention,
conduct of hearings, including a provision for privacy, and discretionary
certification for adult proceedings after a preliminary hearing.
509 F.2d at 1095 (citations omitted).
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of the fourteenth amendment.4" In that decision the Fourth Cir-
cuit stated that to deny to those in one municipality the same
proceedings available to those in all other areas of the state
''seems to us so fundamentally unfair as to impeach the validity
of the adult proceedings."4
As no question of retroactivity was raised in Lamb and be-
cause the court considered "basic fairness" and "essential jus-
tice" to be in issue, the Tenth Circuit ruled that, despite the
dictum in the case to the contrary, Lamb be given retroactive
effect.
IV. NINTH AMENDMENT
Deportation: Cervantes v. Immigration and Naturalization
Service, 510 F.2d 89 (10th Cir. 1975)
Petitioners Ramon and Ocana Cervantes, husband and wife,
faced deportation for being illegally in the United States.42 Peti-
tioners had married subsequent to their arrival in the United
States and, while in this country, Ocana gave birth to petitioner
Joe Alfred.
Petitioners relied on a novel argument in an effort to avoid
deportation. They claimed that "the deportation order contrav-
enes Joe Alfred's rights under the Ninth Amendment to the
United States Constitution." 43 Relying on Griswold v.
Connecticut44 and Roe v. Wade,45 petitioners asserted that under
the ninth amendment their son, a United States citizen, had a
right to the continued love and affection of his parents in the
country of his birth. 6
* Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49 (4th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 413 U.S. 922 (1973).
Yet Judge Seth, in a strong dissent in Radcliff, attacked the court's "complete reliance
on the rationale of Woodall v. Pettibone." 509 F.2d at 1097 (Seth, J., dissenting).
Woodall v. Pettibone, 465 F.2d 49, 52 (4th Cir. 1972).
42 Ramon had remained in the United States past the 6-month period he was author-
ized to stay. His wife had never presented herself for inspection upon entering the country,
510 F.2d at 89.
'3 Id. at 90. The ninth amendment states:
The enumeration in the constitution of certain rights shall not be construed
to deny or disparage others retained by the people.
U.S. CONST. amend. IX.
" 381 U.S. 479, 486 (1965) (Goldberg, J., concurring).
410 U.S. 113 (1973).
, In Griswold, Justice Goldberg argued that
[t]he language and the history of the Ninth Amendment reveal that the
Framers of the Constitution believed that there are additional fundamental
VOL. 53
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW
The court rejected the petitioners' argument. In a previous
Tenth Circuit case4" the fifth amendment formed the basis of the
plaintiff's claim that "the deportation would be unconstitutional
because a family would be divided and the children would be
deprived of their constitutional right to the family unit's contin-
uation. 48 The court there found that the incidental impact the
immigration laws had on the family unit was not so significant
as to raise constitutional problems.9
Ruling on petitioners' ninth amendment claim in the present
case, the court stated that the deportations threatened only an
"incidental impact" on the child, and concluded that:
We cannot agree with petitioners that the Ninth Amendment as
interpreted in a concurring opinion in Griswold and in Roe compels
a different result than we reached [after a consideration of the fifth
amendment claim] in Robles.1
Robert W. Drake
SCHOOL SEGREGATION NORTHERN STYLE IN DENVER,
COLORADO
Keyes v. School District No. 1, 521 F.2d 465 (10th
Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
In Keyes v. School District No. 1,1 plaintiffs alleged public
rights, protected from governmental infringement, which exist along side
those fundamental rights specifically mentioned in the first eight constitu-
tional amendments.
381 U.S. 479, 488 (1965) (concurring opinion).
,7 Robles v. Immigration & Naturalization Serv., 485 F.2d 100 (10th Cir. 1973).
' 510 F.2d at 89.
485 F.2d at 102.
c' 510 F.2d at 91-92.
Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1, 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo. 1969) (granting plaintiffs a
preliminary injunction), 313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970) (memorandum opinion following
trial on the merits), 313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970) (remedial desegregation order), afi'd
in part and rev'd in part, 445 F.2d 990 (10th Cir. 1971), aff'd in part and rev'd in part,
413 U.S. 189 (1973), on remand, 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973), aff'd in part and rev'd
in part, 521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399 (Jan. 13, 1976) (No.
75-701).
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schools in Denver, Colorado were segregated.2 Upon a finding of
de jure segregation in only one part of the school district, Park
Hill,3 the district court ordered district-wide desegregation.4 The
district court found the School Board had engaged in intention-
ally segregative acts in Park Hill but was unable to find the Board
had engaged in similar acts toward core city schools even though
these schools had high concentrations of black and Chicano stu-
dents. In ordering a remedy covering both Park Hill and the core
city schools, the district court consciously adopted a Plessy v.
Ferguson5 line of reasoning.
[S]eparate educational facilities (of the de facto variety) may be
maintained, but a fundamental and absolute requisite is that these
shall be equal. Once it is found that these separate facilities are
unequal in the quality of education provided, there arises a substan-
tial probability that a constitutional violation exists. This probabil-
ity becomes almost conclusive where minority groups are relegated
to inferior schools.'
Appeal was taken from the district court's finding and order to
the Tenth Circuit7 and was ultimately reviewed by the Supreme
Court.8 The Supreme Court focused on the district court's finding
of de jure segregation in only one geographic area within the
school district.
[A] finding of intentionally segregative school board action in a
meaningful portion of a school system, as in this case, creates a
presumption . . . . It establishes a prima facie case of unlawful
segregative design on the part of school authorities, and shifts to
those authorities the burden of proving that other segregated schools
within the system are not also the result of intentionally segregative
actions.'
2 At the outset of this litigation in 1969 plaintiffs were granted a preliminary injunc-
tion against the defendant School Board. The newly elected Board was enjoined from
implementing a resolution which would have rescinded resolutions passed by the previous
Board which were designed to mitigate or reduce segregation. 303 F. Supp. 279 (D. Colo.
1969).
313 F. Supp. 61 (D. Colo. 1970).
313 F. Supp. 90 (D. Colo. 1970).
163 U.S. 537 (1896).
313 F. Supp. at 83.
The Tenth Circuit reversed that part of the remedy ordering desegregation of core
city schools as to which no finding of de jure segregation had been made. 445 F.2d 990
(10th Cir. 1971).
413 U.S. 189 (1973). See also Comment, Keyes v. School Dist. No. 1: Unlocking the
Northern Schoolhouse Doors, 9 HARv. Civ. L.-Crv. RIGHTS L. REV. 124 (1974).
1 413 U.S. at 208. The Court refused to hold, as many civil rights advocates had hoped
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On remand the burden would be on the School Board to show that
its segregative acts in Park Hill "did not cause or contribute to
the current segregated condition of the core city schools."'" An
"allegedly logical, racially neutral explanation"" would not be
sufficient to rebut the presumption of system-wide segregative
design raised by proof of intentionally segregative action in one
part of the district.
The district court was ordered, on remand, first, to allow the
School Board to prove that Park Hill was isolated from the rest
of the district, so that actions by the School Board there would
not affect the rest of the district; second, if the School Board
failed to prove such isolation, the district court was ordered to
determine whether the Board's acts as to Park Hill made the
entire district a dual school system; and third, even if the district
court did not find such acts caused Denver to have a dual school
system, the School Board would still have the difficult task of
rebutting the presumption that the Board's intentional segrega-
tive acts in Park Hill did not create or contribute to the segrega-
tion in core city schools. 3
On remand the district court held the School Board had
failed to show Park Hill was an isolated area. Further, the district
court found the defendant School Board's acts made the entire
district a dual, de jure segregated school system. 4
it would, that de facto segregation amounts to a constitutional violation. To have held de
facto segregation was a constitutional violation would probably have resulted in a deluge
of school segregation suits from areas outside the southern states where, at the time of
Brown 1, 347 U.S. 483 (1954), school segregation had been mandated by state statute or
constitution. In Keyes, Justice Powell, with whom Justice Douglas agreed, criticized the
Court for adhering to the de facto-de jure distinction. He urged the Court to take a uniform
approach to school segregation unburdened by outmoded distinctions. Id. at 217-53 (Pow-
ell, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part). See also Fiss, Racial Imbalance in the
Public Schools: The Constitutional Concepts, 78 HARV. L. REV. 564 (1965); Goodman, De
Facto School Segregation: A Constitutional and Empirical Analysis, 60 CAL. L. REV. 275
(1972).
0 413 U.S. at 211.
Id. at 210.
" This is merely an application of the well-settled evidentiary principle that
"the prior doing of other similar acts, whether clearly a part of the scheme
or not, is useful as reducing the possiblity that the act in question was done
with innocent intent." 2 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE 200 (3d ed. 1940) .... Simi-
larly, a finding of illicit intent as to a meaningful portion of the item under
consideration has substantial probative value on the question of illicit intent
as to the remainder.
Id. at 207-08.
Id. at 213-15.
" 368 F. Supp. 207 (D. Colo. 1973). Because the district court found Denver had a
1976
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I. TENTH CIRCUIT-THE SECOND TIME AROUND
Three issues were reviewed by the Tenth Circuit: First,
whether the trial court had properly determined the entire dis-
trict was a dual school system; second, whether the student
reassignment and transportation plan was proper; and third,
whether the order requiring bilingual-bicultural education, fac-
ulty, and staff desegregation, and the combination of two high
schools was justified. 5
The School Board conceded that Park Hill was not isolated
geographically or otherwise from the rest of the district. Instead,
the Board offered evidence to show the absence of causal effect
between its proven segregative acts and current levels of segrega-
tion. The Tenth Circuit remonstrated the trial court's handling
of this evidence:
Although the trial court admitted and considered the Board's evi-
dence, it was of the view that proof of extraterritorial effect was
somewhat beside the point; the court viewed the principal issue on
remand as whether the Board's segregative intent with respect to the
entire district could be inferred from its Park Hill actions."6
The Board had offered the testimony of a statistician to show the
absence of extraterritorial effect from the Board's Park Hill acts
upon core city schools. 7 The trial court found this evidence was
"merely conclusory and lacking in substance.' 8 Reluctantly, the
Tenth Circuit affirmed, commenting that the trial court had mis-
understood the issues to be considered on remand. Nevertheless,
since a correct reading of the Supreme Court's decision would
have supported the trial court's ruling, that ruling could not be
reversed as it was not "clearly erroneous."1 9
dual school system, it was not necessary for the trial court to consider the third issue set
out by the Supreme Court-rebuttal of the presumption of system-wide effect from proof
of past intentionally segregative acts in a meaningful part of the system. Id. at 209.
521 F.2d 465 (10th Cir. 1975).
' Id. at 471.
" The statistician had studied percentage variations in the racial composition of the
student bodies in Denver schools between 1962 and 1968. He had also studied the racial
composition of schoolage children in Denver on a neighborhood basis between 1960 and
1970. From these studies he concluded that the Board's acts in Park Hill had no impact
on the racial composition of core city schools. Plaintiffs contested his testimony with three
experts of their own. Id. at 472.
18 521 F.2d at 472, quoting 368 F. Supp. at 210.
" Id. at 472. The court of appeals added, "An appellate court will affirm the rulings
of the lower court on any ground that finds support in the record, even where the lower
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Appeal was also taken by the School Board from the district
court's decision to exclude the testimony of the superintendent of
Denver schools."0 The trial court rejected this testimony because
it bore on conditions in Denver schools as of the time of remand
rather than as of the time of the original hearing in 1969.
Testimony by the superintendent sought to disprove the ex-
istence of a dual school system in Denver by the absence of the
usual, classic indicators attending statutorily enforced segrega-
tion." The superintendent's testimony was based on a misappre-
hension of the Supreme Court's prior decision in this same litiga-
tion. There, the Court held de jure segregation could as well result
from the intentional acts of the School Board as it could from a
statutory scheme." The superintendent's suggestion that the trial
court search for the classic indicators of statutorily enforced seg-
regation would obviously be fruitless where there was no such
statutory scheme. The superintendent's testimony had the aura
of a "straw man" argument. In upholding the trial court's ruling,
the court of appeals said:
[C]ourts must presume the existence of a dual school system from
school authorities' segregative acts, the burden then shifting to those
authorities to prove the absence of any causal relation between those
acts and current levels of racial segregation.Y
court reached its conclusions from a different or even erroneous course of reasoning." Id.
at 472-73.
The Tenth Circuit also affirmed the trial court's exclusion of evidence offered to show
that certain segregative acts occurring in 1964 had had no effect on school segregation
either inside or outside of Park Hill. The trial court had rejected this evidence on the
ground of remoteness. Id. at 473.
" The school superintendent offered to testify that, as of the time of remand, Denver
did not have a dual school system in the classic sense. Among the classic indicators are:
State enforced separation of the races; exclusion of students from certain schools on the
basis of race; designation of schools along racial lines by reference to faculty composition;
and differences in transportation services and extracurricular activities. These indicators,
however, arose in the context of segregation authorized or mandated by state statute or
constitution. Denver's segregation, and for that matter most northern school segregation,
is the result of more subtle, behind-the-scene manipulations of the School Board, an
agency of the state. Id. at 474.
" See note 20 supra.
"' We hold that the differentiating factor between de jure segregation
and so-called de facto segregation to which we referred in Swann is purpose
or intent to segregate.
413 U.S. at 208 (footnote omitted).
' 521 F.2d at 474 (footnote omitted). Although the superintendent's testimony was
not offered for such purpose, the Tenth Circuit suggested it would have been admissible
as probative of the proper remedy in this case. Id. at 475.
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The critical finding by the district court that Denver had a
dual school system was affirmed. Given the existence of a dual,
de jure segregated school system, did the trial court afford the
proper remedy? After considering and rejecting remedial plans
submitted by both the School Board and plaintiffs, 4 the trial
court proceeded under its equitable powers to fashion a remedy
of its own. 5
Under the district court's order, elementary schools were to
be desegregated in three ways: 24 schools would be rezoned; 23
schools would be rezoned and would receive students from satel-
lite attendance areas; and 37 schools were paired for the purpose
of reassigning students on a part-time basis only. Students in
schools of the last category would spend one-half of their time at
a segregated neighborhood school and the other half of their time
at an integrated receiving school.2" This plan was unacceptable to
the court of appeals as "part-time desegregation." 7 The rule that
the scope of the remedy is determined by the nature and extent
of the constitutional violation28 requires, and the Tenth Circuit so
held, that full-time segregation be remedied by full-time deseg-
regation. 9 This part of the district court's remedy was, there-
fore, reversed by the Tenth Circuit.
District-wide Anglo-minority enrollment ratios were utilized
by the trial court as guidelines in shaping the remedy. The School
Board appealed the use of this device, arguing that since its
1, Summaries of these two plans follow the opinion of Judge Lewis as Appendices A
and B. 521 F.2d at 485-87.
I5 E.g., Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970); Green v.
County School Bd., 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Educ., 349 U.S. 294 (1955).
' 521 F.2d at 475.
The [trial] court's principal justification for part-time pairing was the desir-
ability of anchoring students and parents to a neighborhood school, which
would continue to serve as the focus for student extracurricular activities and
community functions.
Id.
27 The court of appeals described the district court's order as "part-time desegrega-
tion." Relying, principally, upon two Fifth Circuit decisions, Arvizu v. Waco Indep.
School Dist., 495 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1974), and United States v. Texas, 467 F.2d 848 (5th
Cir. 1972), holding part-time desegregation an unacceptable substitute for dismantling a
dual school system, the Tenth Circuit was unwilling to accept a partial remedy.
11 Milliken v. Bradley, 418 U.S. 717 (1974); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Bd. of
Educ., 402 U.S. 1 (1970).
29 521 F.2d at 478-79. The district court's remedy would have left 13 of the 18 predomi-
nantly minority elementary schools desegregated only on a part-time basis. Id.
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proven intentionally segregative acts had occurred in only one
part of the school district, the remedy should be similarly re-
stricted. This suggestion would have forced plaintiffs to prove
segregation in every school in the district before a district-wide
remedy could be imposed. Such a suggestion flies directly in the
face of the Supreme Court's direction to the district court on
remand:
If the District Court determines that the Denver school system is a
dual school system, respondent School Board has the affirmative
duty to desegregate the entire system "root and branch.""3
In upholding the district court's use of district-wide enrollment
data, the court of appeals declined the School Board's invitation
to adopt different remedial standards for de jure segregation
caused by School Board acts rather than statutory scheme.' A
finding that the School Board's acts constituted the entire system
a dual system, as the trial court found was the case in Denver,
required the district court to order a plan to desegregate the entire
system "root and branch."3
The court of appeals balked at approving that part of the
order leaving five schools with minority enrollment between 78
percent and 88 percent. This was justified by the trial court on
the ground of inaccessability of the schools and to facilitate
bilingual -bicultural education. 3 In reversing, the court of appeals
held the bilingual-bicultural education component of the remedy
was unwarranted. No finding had been made that the curricula
or teaching methods offered in Denver schools discriminated
against minority students. 4 Since the scope of the remedy is de-
termined by the nature and extent of the violation, '- the district
30 413 U.S. at 213, quoted in 521 F.2d at 476.
31 521 F.2d at 476-77. Plaintiffs, on the other hand, appealed the transportation
aspect of the court's remedy because it imposed greater burdens on minority than non-
minority students. The court of appeals felt the district court's remedy was not an abuse
of discretion since the plan offered by plaintiffs, while allocating transportation burdens
more evenly among minority and non-minority students, would have required more overall
transportation. Minority students comprised 42 percent of the system's enrollment but
comprised 60 percent of all students bused under the court's order. No error was found in
the "balance" thus struck by the trial court. Id. at 479 n.13.
32 See note 30 supra. Judge Seth, concurring specially, felt it was error for the trial
court to adopt the use of district-wide enrollment ratios as guidelines. 521 F.2d at 488-89.
Id. at 479-80.
I, ld. at 481-82.
3 See note 28 supra.
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court's failure to find curricula discrimination precluded it from
ordering curricular remedies."
Remand was ordered to the district court for a determination
of what, if any, other reasons would justify leaving these five
schools with predominantly minority compositions. Unless it is
shown on remand that desegregation of these schools would be
impractical or unwise, or segregation in these schools was not the
result of past School Board discrimination, then the district
court's duty to eliminate segregation "root and branch" requires
the court to order these schools be desegregated.3 7
CONCLUSION
The Keyes case was before the Tenth Circuit for the second,
but maybe not the last time.3 While the larger, more abstract
questions of the case have been settled, 39 the practical and often
harder problems associated with actual desegregation remain
ahead. Over these issues the litigation continues."
Nancy A. Hopf
In so holding, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the case before it from the situation
in Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563 (1974), and a previous Tenth Circuit decision based on
Lau, Serna v. Portales Municipal Schools, 499 F.2d 1147 (10th Cir. 1974). In both of those
cases, curricula remedies were warranted because plaintiffs specifically proved curriculum
discrimination against non-English speaking students. Both of those cases, moreover, were
decided on statutory rather than constitutional bases. 521 F.2d at 483. Lau and Serna were
decided under section 601 of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. § 2000d (1970). See
Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 90 (1975).
In a belabored effort to discredit the bilingual -bicultural education component of the
district court's remedial order, the court of appeals went on to hold that the Constitution
does not require states to adopt educational plans "tailored to [minorities'] unique cul-
tural and developmental needs." 521 F.2d at 482. And by way of dictum, the court of
appeals said that such programs, even when justified, are "not a substitute for desegrega-
tion." Id. at 480. This statement appears to be overkill in the court of appeals' effort to
discredit the trial court's use of a bilingual-bicultural component in the remedy. School
pairing, rezoning of school boundary lines, student transportation, minority faculty re-
cruitment and reassignment, and bilingual-bicultural education are all desegregation
tools. Which of these tools a district court must use depends in each case upon the nature
and extent of the violation proved. See note 28 supra.
11 521 F.2d at 480. Ironically, the court of appeals vacated that part of the trial court's
order consolidating two high school campuses to achieve an overall Anglo enrollment of
55 percent. The Tenth Circuit found no support for this order in the record. Id. at 483-84.
That part of the court's order on faculty and staff desegregation was affirmed. Id. at 484-
85.
3' "All parties appeal with typical inflexibility of position . Id. at 468.
s' See notes and text accompanying notes 8-13 supra.
521 F.2d 465 (remanding issues to the trial court), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3399
(Jan. 13, 1976) (No. 75-701).
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TEACHERS' SPEECH AND FIRST AMENDMENT RIGHTS
Bertot v. School District No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th
Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
Mrs. Donna Bertot and Mrs. Martha Sweeny, teachers at
Laramie High School, brought suit under 42 U.S.C. § 1983' in the
United States District Court for the District of Wyoming after the
Albany School District Board of Trustees (the District) voted not
to renew their contracts.2 The plaintiffs claimed that the Dis-
trict's action was in retaliation for their exercise of first amend-
ment rights and that the procedures used by the board members
in making the decision denied them the right to procedural due
process. Plaintiffs sued the District and its board members, the
superintendent of schools, and the school principal, in their indi-
vidual and official capacities, asking for declaratory and
injunctive relief and damages.
The case was submitted to the jury on a charge covering the
first amendment claims and the defendants' assertions of im-
munity. The trial court refused to submit any factual claim on
the due process question, because, under Wyoming law, plain-
tiffs' contracts could be terminated without a hearing.3 The jury
answered two special interrogatories against the plaintiffs and
returned a general verdict for the defendants.'
42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970) [hereinafter cited as section 1983] provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute . . . subjects, or causes to be
subjected any citizen of the United States . . . to the deprivation of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall
be liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other
proper proceeding for redress.
Bertot v. School Dist. No. 1, 522 F.2d 1171 (10th Cir. 1975).
Wyoming law classifies teachers as either initial contract teachers or continuing
contract teachers. An initial contract teacher is one who has not achieved continuing
contract status. WYo. STAT. ANN. § 21.1-152(d) (Supp. 1975). Continuing contract teachers
are those who have been employed by the same school district for 3 consecutive years and
have had their contracts renewed for a fourth, or those teachers who have achieved con-
tinuing contract status in one district, have taught for 2 consecutive years without lapse
of time, and have had their contract renewed for a third in another school district. Id. §
21.1-152(b). Continuing contract teachers are employed on a continuing basis and are
entitled to a hearing before the board within 30 days after receiving a notice of termina-
tion. Id. §§ 21.1-154, 21.1-158. The Wyoming statutes do not provide for a hearing when
an initial contract teacher is not rehired.
I The special interrogatories were: (1) Whether the defendants acted in good faith in
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The Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit upheld the deci-
sion of the trial court regarding the due process issue and
Sweeny's first amendment claim. The court found, however,- that
Bertot was entitled to a judgment notwithstanding the verdict on
her first amendment claim. The court directed that Bertot be
granted declaratory and injunctive relief, but found that the de-
fendants were immune from damages in their individual capaci-
ties.' On remand, the district court was directed to determine the
liabilities of the District and the individual defendants in their
official capacities.6
I. ISSUES AND FACTS
In Bertot the Tenth Circuit was faced with three separate
issues. The first was whether initial-contract (or nontenured)
teachers are entitled to the protections of procedural due process
when they are not rehired.7 The second concerned the type of
failing to renew the plaintiffs' teaching contracts, and (2) whether the defendants acted
maliciously and for the purpose of retaliation in failing to renew the contracts. 522 F.2d
at 1175. (Lower court action not reported.)
Id. at 1177, 1184, 1185.
Id. at 1185.
In Bertot neither plaintiff received a hearing prior to the nonrenewal of her contract.
It is settled law that one has no interest in reemployment protected by procedural due
process, unless one can demonstrate that nonrenewal would deprive him of liberty or that
he has a property interest in continued employment. Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S.
564 (1972). Property interests are created and their dimensions defined by existing rules
or understandings that stem from sources independent of the Constitution, such as state
law or particular agreements. Id. at 577. One can acquire "de facto tenure" if there
are implied agreements to the effect that once a teacher has met certain criteria he can
count on continued employment. Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593 (1972). In
Sindermann the Court upheld plaintiff's claim to "de facto tenure" on the ground of an
understanding fostered by the college administration. Citing Roth the Court stated that
"a person's interest is a property interest for due process purposes if there are such rules
or mutually explicit understandings to support his claim of entitlement to the benefit."
Id. at 601. For a discussion of Roth and Sindermann, see Shulman, Employment of
Nontenured Faculty: Some Implications of Roth and Sindermann, 51 DENVER L.J. 215
(1974).
The Tenth Circuit found that neither Sweeny nor Bertot had statutory or contractual
tenure. 522 F.2d at 1176. Appellants were initial contract teachers. See note 2 supra. With
respect to initial contract teachers, the Wyoming Supreme Court has stated it is aware of
no statutory or contractual right to reemployment. O'Melia v. Sweetwater County School
Dist., 497 P.2d 540, 542 (Wyo. 1972). Nor did either Sweeny or Bertot present sufficient
evidence to put in issue the question of whether they had an implied property right to
continued employment. 522 F.2d at 1177. The court applied the rule that
when the evidence is such that without weighing the credibility of the wit-
nesses there can be but one reasonable conclusion as to the verdict, the court
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evidence necessary to show that a teacher's contract was not re-
newed because her employers objected to certain of her activities
protected by the first amendment.8 The third and most complex
issue involved the question of who could be held liable for dam-
ages when the nonrenewal of a teacher's contract was found un-
constitutional. This comment will discuss the court's treatment
of the issues decided and analyze the questions remanded.
Sweeny had appeared on a local radio program where she
took a position contrary to that of the board members concerning
the school dress code. Sweeny argued that this was a reason for
her not being rehired The court, however, pointed to the fact
that every member of the board testified that Sweeny's appear-
ance on the show had no bearing on their decision,' 0 and that the
criticism of her work included things unrelated to the radio pro-
gram." The court concluded that, with respect to Sweeny, the
jury's findings were supported by the record.
should determine the proceeding by non-suit, a directed verdict or otherwise
in accordance with the applicable practice without submission to the jury,
or by judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
Id. at 1176, citing Brady v. Southern Ry., 320 U.S. 476, 479-80 (1943). The court found
that evidence to support appellants' claim of "de facto tenure" was "wholly lacking." Id.
at 1177.
It is fundamental that teachers, even though nontenured, cannot be fired or fail to
have their contracts renewed for exercising constitutional rights. Perry v. Sindermann, 408
U.S. 593, 596-98 (1972); Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968); Adams v.
Campbell County School Dist., 511 F.2d 1242, 1246 (10th Cir. 1975); Rampey v. Allen,
501 F.2d 1090 (10th Cir. 1974). See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 85 (1975).
, The incident apparently upset the principal, and he brought the matter up with the
District when they were discussing her contract. In the written criticism of her work that
he later prepared, the principal referred to this incident as an example of "lack of judg-
ment."
I" Every board member flatly stated that Mrs. Sweeny's radio appearance did not
influence their decision. 522 F.2d at 1179. It has been said:
When a violation of First Amendment Rights is alleged, the reasons for
dismissal or nonrenewal of an employment contract must be examined to see
if the reasons given are only a cloak for activity or attitudes protected by the
Constitution.
Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 582 (1972) (Douglas, J., dissenting). The Tenth
Circuit, aware of the possibility of concealed motives on the part of the school board
members, stated that it was "important to consider the manner in which the board
reached its decision and the matters relied upon in the process, considering both the
recommendations to the [District] and any additional reasons for their action." 522 F.2d
at 1178.
" From the record, the "things" included lack of discipline in her classrooms, antago-
nism of students, utilization of class time for discussing material not related to the subject
of the class, and poor judgment. It would seem that the actions described are not constitu-
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As in the case of Sweeny, the principal prepared a written
criticism of Bertot's work after the District decided not to renew
her contract. 2 The principal criticized Bertot for: (1) Encourag-
ing the development of an "underground" student newspaper; (2)
not seeking his advice with respect to that newspaper; and (3)
after learning of his opposition to the newspaper, soliciting a non-
staff person to aid the students. The principal regarded Bertot's
actions and attitudes concerning the student paper as "insubordi-
nation." He also included under "lack of judgment" an incident
in which Bertot showed some students a film deemed not appro-
priate for sophomore classes. 3 He also cited her greeting of stu-
dents with a peace sign as an example of "immaturity."
When the concept of a student newspaper had come up in
Bertot's English class, she had told the students that, although
classtime could not be spent on it, she was willing to help them
after school hours. Dr. Ludwick learned of the proposed project
and voiced his disapproval. Bertot then withdrew from the pro-
ject, but the students continued alone and published one issue.
Shortly thereafter, the principal told Bertot that he thought she
should stop the students from publishing more issues.
The court found that, although some reference was made to
the film incident and peace signs, "it is an inescapable conclusion
from examining [the] record that Mrs. Bertot's actions con-
nected with the student newspaper were the paramount and re-
curring reason for non-renewal of her contract."' 4 The court also
concluded that first amendment protections extend to activities
in connection with the publication of a newspaper 5 and, there-
tionally protected on the theory of balancing the interest of the teacher in commenting
on matters of public concern with the interest of the state in promoting the efficiency of
its public services. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563, 568 (1968). Nor are they
protected under the material and substantial disruption test of Tinker v. Des Moines
Indep. Community School Dist., 393 U.S. 503, 513 (1969).
" The criticism is reproduced at 522 F.2d at 1180 n.3.
13 Later a disturbance was caused by a student who was given the film by Bertot for
his private viewing. The principal objected to the film about, black militancy because it
made the police look foolish. Record at 157, id. at 1171.
"1 Id. at 1182. In the case of Bertot, the testimony of the superintendent of schools,
who was also a member of the personnel committee, and the testimony of the board
members showed that they relied on the reasons presented by the principal in determining
not to renew her contract. Id.
11 Id. at 1183, citing Papish v. University of Mo. Curators, 410 U.S. 667 (1973);
Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968). See also Joyner v. Whiting, 477 F.2d
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fore, the district court was in error when it refused to grant Ber-
tot's motion for a judgment notwithstanding the verdict.
From the Tenth Circuit's treatment of Bertot and Sweeny,
some observations can be made. The method relied upon by the
court in reaching its decision was to examine carefully the Dis-
trict's proceedings as reflected in the trial record. If, as a result
of such scrutiny, it appears that the discharge was based upon
constitutionally protected behavior, the discharge cannot stand.
It must be clear to the court that the invalid reasons, although
discussed, played no part in the decision not to rehire. If the
invalid reasons played no part and the valid reasons are docu-
mented on the record, the decision will stand. 6 In Sweeny's case
the court clearly relied on the board members' testimony pertain-
ing to her radio appearance as showing that it was not a factor in
their decision. As the court saw it, the District's decision was
based entirely upon the "other (valid) reasons" that appeared on
the record. In Bertot's case the court apparently disregarded the
film incident, which might have provided a valid reason for non-
renewal. It is, therefore, reasonable to postulate that when an
invalid reason is given any weight, the decision will be over-
turned.'7
II. REMEDIES
Once a determination was made that the nonrenewal of Ber-
456 (4th Cir. 1973); Shanley v. Northeast Indep. School Dist., 462 F.2d 960 (5th Cir. 1972);
Fujishima v. Board of Educ., 460 F.2d 1355 (7th Cir. 1972); Eisner v. Stamford Bd. of
Educ., 440 F.2d 863 (8th Cir. 1971); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 425 F.2d 10 (7th Cir.),
cert. denied, 400 U.S. 826 (1970).
1 It is important to note that in neither Sweeny's nor Bertot's case did the court feel
it was presented with a situation where valid and invalid reasons were more or less equally
weighted in making the decision not to rehire. While finding in Sweeny's case that her
radio appearance played no part in the District's decision to terminate her employment,
the court concluded that, as to Bertot, the newspaper activities were the "paramount and
recurring" reasons for her nonrenewal. 522 F.2d at 1179, 1182.
,7 Appellants argued this position in their brief and cited cases standing for the
proposition that a dismissal is unconstitutional if motivated even partly by first amend-
ment activities. Brief for the Plaintiffs-Appellants at 15-16, id. at 1171. See Simard v.
Board of Educ., 473 F. 2d 988, 995 (2d Cir. 1973); Gieringer v. Center School Dist. 477
F.2d 1164, 1166 n.2 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 832 (1973); Langford v. City of
Texarkana, 478 F.2d 262, 268 (8th Cir. 1973); Cook County College Teachers Union v.
Byrd, 456 F.2d 882, 888 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 848 (1972); Fluker v. Alabama
State Bd. of Educ., 441 F.2d 201, 210 (5th Cir. 1971). The typical language refers to actions
based in part upon protected activities. Presumably "in part" includes "small part" but
the issue has not been discussed directly.
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tot's contract was the result of constitutionally protected activity,
the Tenth Circuit faced the issue of remedies. Although Bertot
was clearly injured by the action of the District, the question who
should bear the burden of that injury remained. The fact that
public officials, discharging their duties, were responsible for that
injury raised some competing policy considerations: While on the
one hand it is unjust to deny compensation to an injured party,
it is seldom contested that the public interest is better served
when officials can perform their duties without fear of personal
liability.
The defendants in Bertot were sued in both their individual
and official capacities. The court declared that Bertot was enti-
tled to declaratory and injunctive relief. With respect to her claim
for money damages and backpay, the court found the defendants
in their individual capacities immune." The case was remanded
to determine whether the Board and the defendants, as officials,
could also claim immunity. The district court was also directed
to determine whether the District was a "person" subject to suit
under section 1983 and whether the eleventh amendment barred
a damage claim against the District and its officials. For a more
complete understanding of Bertot, it is necessary to discuss the
court's basis for finding the defendants individually immune and,
also, the main issues to be considered on remand.
A. Good Faith Immunity of Individual Defendants
The rationale for extending personal immunity to public
servants for harm they may cause in performing their functions
is, primarily, that the public benefits when its servants are able
to act without concern over possible liability. If officials are not
personally immune they will be deterred from acting when speed
is necessary or the law unsettled. They will be hindered in making
difficult decisions required in a complex society.
In the Tenth Circuit the doctrine of good faith immunity was
first applied to school officials in Smith v. Losee.19 The court
there declared that the defense of immunity was established by
a showing that the decision not to renew an employment contract:
1 522 F.2d at 1185.
It 485 F.2d 334 (10th Cir. 1973). Smith sued the Utah State Board of Education and
various college officials, alleging deprivation of tenure and nonrenewal of his contract
because of activities protected by the first amendment.
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(1) Was a board action representing an exercise of the discretion
vested in it by state law, (2) was made in good faith, and (3) was
based on a valid reason evidenced in the record.20 The Tenth
Circuit, in Bertot, also relied on a recent Supreme Court case
which considered the status of a school board member's immun-
ity from damages in the context of a section 1983 action concern-
ing school discipline.
Wood v. Strickland" involved three girls who were expelled
for violating a school regulation against the use or possession of
intoxicating beverages at school activities. Two of the girls,
claiming a violation of section 1983 and their due process rights,
brought suit against the school board members, two administra-
tors, and the school district. They asked for compensatory and
punitive damages, and declaratory and injunctive relief. The
Court declared the test of immunity to be as follows:
[A] school board member is not immune from liability for damages
under § 1983 if he knew or reasonably should have known that the
action he took within the sphere of his official responsibility would
violate the constitutional rights of the student affected, or if he took
the action with the malicious intention to cause a deprivation of
constitutional rights or other injury to the student. . . . A compen-
satory award will be appropriate only if the school board member
has acted with such an impermissible motivation or with such disre-
gard of the student's clearly established constitutional rights that
his action cannot reasonably be characterized as being in good
faith."
,o Id. at 344.
21 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
11 Id. at 322 (citations omitted). The Supreme Court derived this test from three prior
cases dealing with the scope of official immunity. In Tenney v. Brandhove, 341 U.S. 367
(1951), the Court found that since section 1983 was silent with respect to immunities, there
was no cause for thinking that Congress intended to eliminate a legislator's traditional
immunity from civil liability for acts done within the scope of his duties.
Pierson v. Ray, 386 U.S. 547 (1967), involved the immunities of a judge and arresting
officers in a section 1983 suit. The Court found that a judge's immunity from damages
for acts committed within his judicial discretion was firmly entrenched in the common
law. Since the legislative record gave no clear indication that section 1983 was intended
to abolish common law immunities, the judge was found to be immune and the officers
were afforded the common law defense of good faith and probable cause in section 1983
actions. In Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974), the Court stated that the eleventh
amendment barred suit where one was seeking money damages from the public treasury,
but that it was clear from the doctrine of Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908), that the
amendment did not bar section 1983 suits against public officials who deprive others of
federal rights under the color of state law. Damages against individual defendants are
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The Court reasoned that if the school's decisionmakers were
held liable for damages every time an action is found to violate a
student's constitutional rights, it would unfairly impose upon
them liability for good faith mistakes made while exercising their
official discretion.
2 3
The Tenth Circuit was the first circuit to apply the immunity
test stated in Wood. The court found that the discretionary au-
thority the board members exercised over the employment con-
tracts in Bertot was analogous to the discretionary authority exer-
cised in Wood. Applying the Wood test, the court concluded that
the defendants, having acted in their official capacities, were
immune from damages individually.24 The record did not support
a finding of malice; furthermore, the jury had expressly found
that the defendants had acted in good faith in deciding not to
rehire the plaintiffs. In addition, the court found 25 that at the
time of the District's decision, the defendants could not have
known their action would violate Bertot's constitutional rights,
because the Tenth Circuit had earlier dismissed, for failure to
state a claim, a section 1983 suit that was brought on a very
similar set of facts.
26
Il. REMAND ISSUES
Bertot was remanded to the trial court for a determination
permissible in some circumstances notwithstanding the fact that they hold public office.
The Court described executive officers' immunity for official acts as being varied in scope,
depending upon the extent of their discretion, the responsibilities of the office, and all the
circumstances as they reasonably appeared at the time of the action.
It is the existence of reasonable grounds for the belief formed at the time and
in light of all the circumstances, coupled with good-faith belief, that affords
a basis for qualified immunity of executive officers for-acts performed in the
course of official conduct.
Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232, 247-48 (1974).
"Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308, 319-20 (1975). The Court reasoned that some
degree of immunity is necessary in order that the school officials will realize that actions
taken and decisions made in good faith in the performance of their duties will not be
punished. Even though the Court had stated that the Wood test was to be applied "in
the specific context of school discipline," id. at 322, 4 months after that decision the
Supreme Court remanded, for consideration in light of Wood, a case involving the liability
for damages of the superintendent of a state mental hospital. In O'Connor v. Donaldson,
422 U.S. 563 (1975), the plaintiff was wrongfully kept against his will in a state hospital
without receiving treatment.
11 522 F.2d at 1185.
2s Id.
20 Jones v. Hopper, 410 F.2d 1323 (10th Cir. 1969).
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of the issues concerning plaintiff's damage claim against the Dis-
trict and the individual defendants as officials. The district court
was also directed to consider what effect potential immunities
would have on the claim." A brief discussion of the issues in-
volved may help to clarify the ultimate outcome of the case.
A. Eleventh Amendment
A basic question in an action such as this is whether it consti-
tutes a suit against the state. The eleventh amendment prohibits
federal courts from taking jurisdiction over suits brought against
a state by a citizen of the state."s However, that amendment does
not bar a suit when the plaintiff is seeking prospective equitable
relief, such as enjoining a public official to act in accordance with
federal law.29 Recently, the Supreme Court, in Edelman v.
Jordan,30 reaffirmed the basic eleventh amendment test: If state
funds must ultimately be used to pay an award, the suit is re-
garded as being a suit against the state, whether or not the state
is a named party, and the suit is therefore barred by the amend-
ment.
The eleventh amendment, however, does not bar suits
against counties or municipal corporations. In Edelman the Court
stated:
A county does not occupy the same position as a state for purposes
of the Eleventh Amendment. [There is a] long established rule that
while a county action is generally a state action for purposes of the
'7 The district court was directed to determine whether the good faith immunity could
apply to the District as a corporate entity and to the other defendants in their official
capacities, whether the eleventh amendment would bar a damage action against the
district and its officials, and whether the school district was a "person" suable under
section 1983. 522 F.2d at 1185.
The eleventh amendment states:
The Judicial power of the United States shall not be construed to extend to
any suit in law or in equity, commenced or prosecuted against one of the
United States by Citizens of another State or by Citizens or Subjects of any
Foreign State.
The Supreme Court has often held that the amendment also bars suits against an uncon-
senting state by its own citizens. See Employees v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare,
411 U.S. 279 (1973); Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Great N. Life Ins. Co.
v. Read, 322 U.S. 47 (1944); Duhne v. New Jersey, 251 U.S. 311 (1920); Hans v. Louisiana,
134 U.S. 1 (1890).
Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
20 415 U.S. 651 (1974).
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Fourteenth Amendment, a county defendant is not necessarily a
state defendant for purposes of the Eleventh Amendment.3
In determining whether a suit is against the state or some
nonprotected corporation or political subdivision, the concept of
"alter ego" is often used.3" The term is used to denote two or more
entities, not separate and distinct, one of which is an
instrumentality of the other. In Harris v. Tooele County School
District,3 the Tenth Circuit ruled that the eleventh amendment
barred a tort claim against a Utah school district. The court
stated that whether a suit against a government subdivision is a
suit against the state depends on the pertinent state law. The
Utah Supreme Court had declared school districts to be agents
of the state. The court also applied the basic eleventh amend-
ment test of Edelman. The court concluded that the district was
not a separate and distinct entity from the state but was rather
its alter ego; therefore, the district was entitled to the state's
immunity from suit in a federal court.34 Court decisions are vir-
tually unanimous in ruling that, where a school board or school
district is sued and monetary damages rather than injunctive or
declaratory relief is requested, the suit will be barred by the elev-
enth amendment.
3 5
' Id. at 667 n.12. The leading case for the proposition that the eleventh amendment
does not bar suits against counties and municipal corporations is Lincoln County v.
Luning, 133 U.S. 529 (1890). That case was an action on county bonds and coupons.
Accord, Griffin v. School Bd., 377 U.S. 218 (1964). "It has long been established that
actions against a county can be maintained in United States courts in order to vindicate
federally guaranteed rights." Id. at 233.
32 E.g., George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st
Cir. 1974); Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Kansas
Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1960).
471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
Accord, George R. Whitten Jr., Inc. v. State Univ. Constr. Fund, 493 F.2d 177 (1st
Cir. 1974), where state funds used to finance state university buildings (the construction
of which was seen as a state function) were dependent on state appropriations for support;
therefore, the fund was an alter ego of the state and protected from suit by the eleventh
amendment. See Kansas Turnpike Authority v. Abramson, 275 F.2d 711 (10th Cir. 1960).
There, the turnpike authority was found not to be an alter ego of the state because it was
a public corporation, not under state or agency supervision. "In sum, it is a public corpora-
tion-a creature of the legislature empowered to perform designated proprietary functions
without any obligation on the part of the State." Id. at 713.
See Wihtol v. Crow, 309 F.2d 777 (8th Cir. 1962); De Levay v. Richmond County
School Bd., 284 F.2d 340 (4th Cir. 1960); O'Neill v. Early, 208 F.2d 286 (4th Cir. 1953);
Gainer v. School Bd., 135 F. Supp. 559 (N.D. Ala. 1955). Contra, Fabrizio & Martin, Inc.
v. Board of Educ., 290 F. Supp. 945 (S.D.N.Y. 1968). The "where would the money come
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On remand, the threshold question regarding Bertot's dam-
age claim is whether it will be considered a suit against the State
of Wyoming. Accordingly, the court must look to the source of the
funds that would be used to satisfy an award. If the funds would
ultimately come from the state, i.e., if the district is found to be
an alter ego of the state, then Bertot's claim will be barred."
Wyoming law will govern whether Bertot can bring a damage
claim against the District and board members in their official
capacities. Unlike the Utah court in Harris, the Wyoming Su-
preme Court has not yet determined the relationship of school
boards to the state, and thus Wyoming statutes must be ana-
lyzed."
B. Section 1983 Immunity
The language of section 1983 refers to "persons" who act
under the color of state law to deprive others of federal rights. The
leading Supreme Court decision on section 1983 immunity is
Monroe v. Pape," which concerned a suit brought against certain
police officers and the City of Chicago. The Supreme Court ana-
lyzed in depth the history of section 1983 and concluded that
there was a cause of action against the individual police officers
but none against the city.
The response of the Congress to the proposal to make municipalities
liable for certain actions being brought within federal purview by
from" test was used to find that the school district was not an alter ego of the state but a
separate corporation. The state would not suffer from a judgment against the district.
m A suit against the individual board members in their official capacities would have
to be considered a suit against the district that employs them.
37 The Wyoming Education Code of 1969, Wyo. STAT. ANN. §§ 21.1-1 to -289 (Supp.
1970) states that school districts are corporate entities which can sue or be sued through
the board. Id. §§ -17, -27(a). Financial support for the school districts may be derived
from diverse sources: Funds may be obtained locally, from the county, from the state and
federal governments, and from various building funds, reserve funds, and bond issues. Id.
§§ -213 to -289. All school district funds are raised directly or indirectly through taxes. In
theory a damage award could be paid out of funds derived solely at the local or county
level, but, arguably, even this may ultimately reduce state funds. School districts operate
on fairly strict budgets; thus, if an award was to deplete the amount of money raised lo-
cally, then that amount would have to be made up from another source. One likely source
is the state treasury.
"' 365 U.S. 167 (1961). This is the famous case involving 13 Chicago police officers
who broke into Monroe's home without a warrant and forced him and his wife to stand
naked in the living room while they ransacked the house. They took Monroe downtown
and held him for 10 hours without allowing him to call a lawyer and then released him
without charges.
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the Act of April 20, 1871, was so antagonistic that we cannot believe
that the word "person" was used in this particular Act to include
them.
3
The word "municipalities" has been held to include the state and
all its subdivisions of government including municipal corpora-
tions." Furthermore, where a school district, school board, or
state university has been sued for damages under section 1983,
the courts have consistently held that the suit could not be main-
tained.4
It seems, then, that in order to bring a successful damage suit
under section 1983 against the District, Bertot will have to show
that Wyoming school districts are not part of the municipal gov-
ernment. However, the courts generally view the activities in-
cluded in the term "municipal government" very broadly; almost
any damage action which would result in an award paid out of
public funds is considered outside the scope of section 1983.
C. Immunities
The eleventh amendment and section 1983 aside, there is one
further barrier standing between Bertot and recovery. The final
question is whether the defendant school officials and the corpo-
rate District are protected by some sort of common law executive
" Id. at 191. Although the holding of Monroe had been confined to actions where only
damages were being sought and equitable or declaratory relief against municipalities had
been considered permissible in section 1983 actions, a recent Supreme Court decision has
declared that a city is protected from suit under section 1983 even when only equitable
relief is sought. City of Kenosha v. Bruno, 412 U.S. 507, 512-13 (1973). There, the only
named defendants were cities; no individual officials were named either in their official
or individual capacities. Id. at 508.
41 For cases holding a state is not a person within section 1983, see Rothstein v.
Wyman, 467 F.2d 226 (2d Cir. 1972), Fear v. Pennsylvania, 413 F.2d 88 (3d Cir. 1969),
Williford v. California, 352 F.2d 474 (9th Cir. 1965). See also Sykes v. California, 497 F.2d
197 (9th Cir. 1974) (Department of Motor Vehicles not subject to suit under section 1983);
Hathaway v. Worcester City Hosp., 475 F.2d 701 (1st Cir. 1973) (hospital not within
section 1983); Barden v. University of Pittsburg, 497 F.2d 1 (3d Cir. 1973) (university not
within section 1983); Hampton v. City of Chicago, 484 F.2d 602 (7th Cir. 1973) (city
council not suable under section 1983); Ries v. Lynskey, 452 F.2d 172 (7th Cir. 1971) (city
not within section 1983).
1' E.g., Sterzing v. Fort Bend Indep. School Dist., 496 F.2d 92 (5th Cir. 1974); Hunt-
ley v. North Carolina Bd. of Educ., 493 F.2d 1016 (4th Cir. 1974); Williams v. Eaton, 443
F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Buhr v. Buffalo School Dist., 364 F. Supp. 1225 (D.N.D. 1973);
Jones v. Jefferson County Bd. of Educ., 359 F. Supp. 1081 (E.D. Tenn. 1972); Webb v.
Lake Mills Community School Dist., 344 F. Supp. 791 (N.D. Iowa 1972); Miller v. Parsons,
313 F. Supp. 1150 (M.D. Pa. 1970).
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immunity." The issue involved here is fairly narrow. Where ad-
ministrative officials, while performing their duties and exercis-
ing discretion, are found to have acted in good faith and without
malice, they are generally personally immune from damage
suits;4 3 the question remains as to whether this immunity also
applies to them in their official capacity and thus to the agency
that employs them. Practically, a suit against officials is a suit
against the employing agency that would have to pay the award.
Professor Davis argues against holding the public entity
immune wherever the employee is immune." He states that
when a person is harmed by official action it is unjust to make
the injured party bear the loss. The reason most often advanced
for an official's immunity is the public's interest in the fearless
administration of his task; possible personal liability would in-
hibit the official's actions. When only the agency's pocketbook is
involved, the official would not be deterred from fully exercising
his discretion. Since the public is the beneficiary of the agency's
actions, the public should bear the loss when the agency causes
injury. By making the agency liable, the loss is spread over the
general population rather than falling directly on one person.45
In a suit for damages by a school superintendent against a
school district, the California Supreme Court in Lipman v. Bris-
bane Elementary School District," said:
The immunity of the agency from liability for discretionary conduct
of its officials, however, is not coextensive with the immunity of the
officials in all instances .... It is unlikely that officials would be
as adversely affected in the performance of their duties by the fear
of liability on the part of their employing agency as by the fear of
personal liability. 7
42 The concept of executive immunity is based, in general, upon the idea that to allow
an unconsented suit against the government is inconsistent with its supreme executive
power. This immunity is extended to municipal corporations that perform a governmen-
tal, as opposed to a proprietary, function. The rationale for extending immunity to munic-
ipal corporations is that the particular function, which is a public benefit, could not be
carried out if money raised through taxes went instead to satisfy damage judgments. W.
PRossER, THE LAW OF TORTS § 131 (4th ed. 1971).
( Wood v. Strickland, 420 U.S. 308 (1975).
K. DAvIs, ADMINISrATIVE LAW TEATISE § 25.17, at 864-65 (Supp. 1970).
I5 d.
55 Cal. 2d 224, 359 P.2d 465, 11 Cal. Rptr. 97 (1961).
' Id. at 229-30, 359 P.2d at 467, 11 Cal. Rptr. at 99. In Lipman, however, the court
found that the acts complained of were discretionary and that:
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In finding the district immune, the California court considered
the importance to the public of the function involved, the extent
to which governmental liability might impair free exercise of the
function, and the availability to individuals of remedies other
than tort suits for damages. 8
A test of this type may be crucial in the Bertot remand.
Public policy considerations may foreclose any remedy available
to Bertot for the damages she sustained. Public education is one
of the most important functions performed by government, and
the possibility of damage awards against the District could cer-
tainly deter officials from freely exercising discretion in the per-
formance of their function.
CONCLUSION
On remand the principal issues concerning Bertot's damage
claim against the school district and the individual defendants in
their official capacities will be whether the eleventh amendment
bars the suit, whether the District can be sued under section 1983,
and whether the District and its officials can claim immunity
from damages. If the school district is considered to be an instru-
mentality of the state, or if a damage judgment against it would
ultimately reduce state funds, then the damage claim will proba-
bly be barred by the eleventh amendment. If the District is found
to be a part of the municipal government, then it will not be a
"person" suable under section 1983 for damages. Finally, if the
court determines that the threat of damage judgments against
school districts would deter school district officers from exercising
discretion in the performance of their duties, it is likely that
common law executive immunity would bar the damage suit.
Ward L. Van Scoyk
There is a vital public interest in securing free and independent judgment
of school trustees in dealing with personnel problems, and trustees, being
responsible for the fiscal well-being of their districts, would be especially
sensitive to the financial consequences of suits for damages against the dis-
tricts.
Id.
SId.
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OVERVIEW
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT: SEARCH AND SEIZURE
In Wing v. Anderson' the Tenth Circuit applied the criteria
for standing to contest a search and seizure which the Supreme
Court had announced in Brown v. United States.2 Wing, con-
victed of armed robbery, challenged the search of a vehicle be-
longing to a friend. The search was conducted while he was hiding
in some weeds several blocks away. The court pointed out that
Wing was not present at the search, that he had no possessory
interest in the vehicle, and that he was not charged with an
offense which included, as an essential element, possession of the
items seized (a traffic ticket issued to him, sunglasses with his
fingerprints on them, and fingerprints lifted from the vehicle's
interior).
It is undisputed that probable cause must exist prior to a
search or seizure of an automobile. Less clear is the question on
what basis a vehicle may be stopped and its driver questioned,
however briefly. The Tenth Circuit grappled with this question
in two cases, muddling the issue in the first but clarifying it in
the second. The two cases are United States v. McDevitt3 and
United States v. Jenkins.4
McDevitt was stopped by a New Mexico policeman who
wanted to see if the U-Haul truck McDevitt was driving carried
goods for hire. McDevitt's papers were in order, but the police-
man requested McDevitt to come to the police car. The police-
man radioed headquarters and, upon learning that McDevitt was
a Navy deserter, arrested him. Some time later the truck was
towed to headquarters and 800-900 pounds of marijuana was
found in it.'
No. 74-1056 (10th Cir., July 28, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
411 U.S. 223 (1973). There is no standing where the defendants: (1) Were not on
the premises at the time of the contested search and seizure; (2) alleged no proprietary or
possessory interest in the premises; and (3) were not charged with an offense that includes,
as an essential element of the offense charged, possession of the seized evidence at the
time of the contested search and seizure. Id. at 229.
508 F.2d 8 (10th Cir. 1974).
No. 74-1567 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1975).
The record before the court was not clear about all the circumstances occurring
between the arrival of the truck at headquarters and the discovery of the marijuana. There
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The court first reiterated the requirements necessary to jus-
tify the stop of an automobile:
In order for an officer to stop and search a vehicle there must
exist some basis for suspicion, at least, that the driver has violated
the law ....
Similarly, an automobile may be stopped for inspection without
probable cause, but the act of stopping may not be arbitrary. Thus,
our court has said that "even an investigatory detention must be
based on reasonable ground, if not probable cause."'
A few paragraphs later the court cited several of its earlier cases,7
including United States v. Lepinski,8 which held that a routine
stop to check driver's license and registration was reasonable and
proper.9 Then instead of focusing upon the lack of probable
cause I0 to detain McDevitt after his papers were found to be in
was no warrant for the search, but there might have been a voluntary admission by
McDevitt or a valid inventory search. The cause was remanded for further proceedings or
a new trial. 508 F.2d at 12-13.
1 508 F.2d at 10-11 (emphasis added). One of the several cases cited for the statement
on stop and search was Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968). For the latter proposition
regarding stopping for inspection, the court cited United States v. Fallon, 457 F.2d 15, 18
(10th Cir. 1972). Fallon involved a stop for a vehicle registration and driver's license check.
New Mexico law requires all operators of motor vehicles to show registration and license
upon demand of an officer. N.M. STAT. ANN. §§ 64-3-11, 64-13-49 (1953). The Fallon court
did, it is true, express some doubt about the statutes. The sentence quoted from Fallon
in McDevitt reads in full:
The fact that the occupants appeared to have been "hippies" in and of itself
did not justify even a preliminary investigation, and it is doubtful whether
the statute contemplates purely arbitrary stops, for even an investigatory
detention must be based on reasonable ground, if not probable cause.
457 F.2d at 18 (emphasis added). But in the preceding paragraph, the court made it clear
that the validity of the statutes was not in question: "We need not determine whether an
arbitrary arrest pursuant to this statute would be justified..."since there were articula-
ble facts making the stop and limited questioning reasonable. Id. (emphasis added).
' United States v. Bowman, 487 F.2d 1229 (10th Cir. 1973); United States v. McCor-
mick, 468 F.2d 68 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 410 U.S. 927 (1972); United States v. Fallon,
457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sheppard, 455 F.2d 1081 (10th Cir. 1972);
United States v. Granado, 453 F.2d 769 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Suldana, 453
F.2d 352 (10th Cir. 1972); United States v. Sanchez, 450 F.2d 525 (10th Cir. 1971); United
States v. Self, 410 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1969).
s 460 F.2d 234 (10th Cir. 1972).
The same New Mexico statutes as in Fallon were involved. See note 6 supra.
10 If there was no probable cause to detain McDevitt after his papers were found to
be in order, then the subsequent arrest for desertion and any inventory search of the
vehicle would be fatally tainted by the illegality of that detention. On the "fruit of the
poisonous tree" doctrine, see Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). This anal-
ysis would have obviated the need to discuss the validity of the original stop and would
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order, the court discussed the validity of the original stop itself
and in the process strained to distinguish Lepinski:
In Lepinski and the other cited cases the original stopping of the
vehicle and the temporary detention were not invalid. The present
case, however, stretches the Terry doctrine to the breaking point.
The Terry concept cannot apply to an arbitrary stopping of a vehicle
for the purpose of possible discovery of a law violation."
Yet, why is a "routine" stop for a check of license and registration
made, except for a possible discovery of a violation, viz., driving
without proper license or registration? 2 Perhaps the invalidity of
the stop in McDevitt is due to the lack of express delegation of
power to New Mexico policemen to stop and inspect vehicles
which are capable of carrying goods for hire; the power of officers
to stop vehicles for the purpose of license and registration checks
is clear. But if this is the real difference, the court should have
said so.
The defendant in United States v. Jenkins" sought a reversal
of his conviction for interstate transportation of a stolen vehicle,
asking the court to apply McDevitt to his case. Jenkins was
stopped by a New Mexico patrolman for a "routine registration
check." When he produced an expired driver's license and no
registration for his vehicle, the policeman asked Jenkins to follow
him to the station. On the way the officer learned from headquar-
ters that Jenkins' vehicle had been stolen in California. At the
station Jenkins was placed under arrest.
The sole issue in Jenkins was the validity of the original stop.
restrict the further proceedings upon remand to the question of a spontaneous and volun-
tary admission by McDevitt of marijuana possession.
A somewhat similar case last year involved a valid stop for routine, restricted pur-
poses. United States v. Newman, 490 F.2d 993 (10th Cir. 1974), discussed in Tenth Circuit
Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 185 (1975). When a search following the stop was conducted
without probable cause, the Tenth Circuit held the search was illegal and reversed the
conviction.
508 F.2d at 12.
0 To hold that license and registration checks must be based at least on reasonable
suspicion would take the teeth out of the laws: "A contrary holding would render unen-
forceable the [California] statute requiring that automobile drivers be licensed." Lipton
v. United States, 348 F.2d 591, 593 (9th Cir. 1965). See also United States v. Turner, 442
F.2d 1146, 1148 (8th Cir. 1971); Myricks v. United States, 370 F.2d 901, 904 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 386 U.S. 1015 (1967): "[Tlhe stopping for road checks is reasonable and
therefore acceptable" if not a "ruse."
'3 No. 74-1567 (10th Cir., Aug. 14, 1975).
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Jenkins' counsel relied heavily on United States v. Fallon4 and
McDevitt and asked that Lepinski be reexamined. Instead, the
court reaffirmed Lepinski and, while not overruling McDevitt,
read the language of McDevitt "in context" and found it inappos-
ite to Jenkins.5
The court also pointed approvingly to a footnote in United
States v. Brignoni-Ponce,5 a Supreme Court case decided be-
" 457 F.2d 15 (10th Cir. 1972). See note 6 supra.
" No. 74-1567 at 5-6. The court distinguished McDevitt from Lepinski and Jenkins
partly on what the routine check disclosed. In McDevitt the papers were found to be in
order, but in Lepinski and Jenkins the checks revealed immediately that the papers were
not in order. While this is a factual distinction, it is also an impermissible legal distinc-
tion. The result of an action does not determine whether the action was legal at its
inception. The Tenth Circuit itself made that point in relation to searches in Harris v.
United States, 151 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1945), aff'd, 331 U.S. 145 (1947). The reasoning in
Harris is valid as well here: "[A] search in violation of the constitution is not made lawful
by what it brings to light . Id. at 841, citing Byars v. United States, 273 U.S. 28,
29 (1927).
Is 422 U.S. 873 (1975). It was decided on the same day as the other "border patrol"
cases, Bowen v. United States, 422 U.S. 916 (1975), and United States v. Ortiz, 422 U.S.
891 (1975). These three cases and United States v. Peltier, 422 U.S. 531 (1975), dealt with
issues left unresolved by the landmark border search case, Almeida-Sanchez v. United
States, 413 U.S. 266 (1973). Both Peltier and Bowen held that Almeida-Sanchez was not
retroactive. Brignoni-Ponce held that officers on roving patrols near the border, but not
at the border or its "functional equivalent," must base a stop of a vehicle on "articulable
facts" and then must restrict their questions to citizenship and immigration status and
suspicious circumstances. Anything more requires consent or probable cause. Ortiz dealt
with searches at fixed traffic checkpoints and held that, consistent with Brignoni-Ponce,
searches not at the border must be based on consent or probable cause. Justice Rehnquist,
concurring in Ortiz, said on the matter of stops:
[T]he Court's opinion is confined to full searches, and does not extend to
fixed-checkpoint stops for the purpose of inquiring about citizenship. Such
stops involve only a modest intrusion, are not likely to be frightening or
significantly annoying, are regularized by the fixed situs, and effectively
serve the important national interest in controlling illegal entry. I do not
regard such stops as unreasonable under the Fourth Amendment, whether
or not accompanied by "reasonable suspicion" that a particular vehicle is
involved in immigration violations . ...
422 U.S. at 898-99. On the other hand, Justice White, in an opinion in which Justice
Blackmun also concurred, expressed doubt about Justice Rehnquist's views:
The Court purports to leave the question open, but it seems to me, my
Brother REHNQUIST notwithstanding, that under the Court's opinions
checkpoint investigative stops, without search, will be difficult to justify
under the Fourth Amendment absent probable cause or reasonable suspi-
cion.
Id. at 914-15.
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tween McDevitt and Jenkins. On state and local police powers,
the Court said in Brignoni-Ponce:
Our decision in this case takes into account the special function of
the Border Patrol . . . .Border Patrol agents have no part in enforc-
ing laws that regulate highway use, and their activities have nothing
to do with an inquiry whether motorists and their vehicles are enti-
tled, by virtue of compliance with laws governing highway usage, to
be upon the public highways. Our decision thus does not imply that
state and local enforcement agencies are without power to conduct
such limited stops as are necessary to enforce laws regarding drivers'
licenses, vehicle registration, truck weights, and similar matters. 7
The Tenth Circuit seized on this language to buttress its reason-
ing in Lepinski. Thus the Tenth Circuit in Jenkins returned to
the clear holding of Lepinski, that state and local police agencies
may stop vehicles on a purely random, arbitrary basis, without
probable cause or even reasonable suspicion, to check license and
registration papers."
The Tenth Circuit had a border patrol case of its own prior
to the three Supreme Court cases decided June 30, 1975.11 In
United States v. Martinez20 a border patrolman in New Mexico
was alerted by radio to watch for a car suspected of carrying
illegal aliens. The officer stopped the car, questioned the occu-
pants briefly about their citizenship, and then lifted a blanket
covering the space between the seats where illegal aliens could be
hidden. The officer found only suitcases and clothing. Suddenly
Martinez drove off and soon thereafter threw a bag out the win-
dow. The officer found marijuana in the bag and later caught and
arrested Martinez. The court held that the officer had the author-
ity to stop and make a limited investigation, and that Martinez'
flight and attempt to get rid of the marijuana were voluntary acts
which gave rise to probable cause.
422 U.S. at 833 n.8.
0 Justice Rehnquist indicated one possible legal basis for justifying arbitrary traffic
checks in his concurrence in Brignoni-Ponce:
[J]ust as travelers entering the country may be stopped and searched with-
out probable cause . . . a strong case may be made for those charged with
the enforcement of laws conditioning the right of vehicular use of a highway
to likewise stop motorists using highways in order to determine whether they
have met the qualifications prescribed by applicable law for such use.
422 U.S. at 887 (emphasis added).
" See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
20 507 F.2d 58 (10th Cir. 1974).
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
The timeliness of information contained in an affidavit for a
search warrant was the issue in United States v. Rahn.' Rahn, a
former Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms Bureau investigator, had
been convicted of theft of government property-weapons seized
by the Bureau, which Rahn and his supervisor certified they had
destroyed. The supervisor was interrogated in July of 1973 and
said that in 1971 he and Rahn had agreed to take several of the
seized weapons. One of Rahn's fellow officers, not involved in the
scheme, remembered seeing Rahn in the fall of 1971 with a shot-
gun which resembled one supposedly destroyed. Further investi-
gation disclosed that Rahn had not sold his weapons locally as
had his supervisor. Accordingly, the warrant to search Rahn's
residence was issued in July of 1973 and the weapons were found.
Rahn attacked the issuance because the information was over 18
months old2 and there was no probable cause to believe that he
still had the weapons at home. The court recounted the facts at
great length and found the magistrate was given sufficient proba-
ble cause to believe the weapons were at Rahn's residence. The
court expressed its policy in such cases as follows:
[W]e have given deference to the issuing magistrate's determina-
tion and have remembered that even doubtful cases are to be re-
solved largely by the preference to be given warrants.n
I. FIFTH AMENDMENT
A. Sufficiency of Indictment
The fifth amendment requires that a person charged with a
major crime be indicted by a grand jury. United States v. Curtis
24
dealt with the sufficiency of an indictment. The indictment al-
leged that Curtis had violated 18 U.S.C. § 134, the mail fraud
statute. The indictment was phrased almost entirely in the gen-
eral language of the statute. The court held that the wording was
conclusory and did not give "any fair indication of the nature or
character of the scheme or artifice relied upon .... , As the
21 511 F.2d 290 (10th Cir.), cert, denied, 96 S. Ct. 41 (1975).
2 On the issue of timeliness the court relied on Sgro v. United States, 287 U.S. 206
(1932), and two of its own cases: United States v. Holliday, 474 F.2d 320 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Johnson, 461 F.2d 285 (10th Cir. 1972).
" 511 F.2d at 294.
2, 506 F.2d 985 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 992. On the sufficiency and specificity needed in an indictment see Russell
v. United States, 369 U.S. 749 (1962).
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defendant was without sufficient knowledge of the specific offen-
ses charged, the court reversed the judgment and directed dis-
missal of the indictment."
B. Double Jeopardy
In United States v. Leeds the defendant, an Indian con-
victed of robbery in Indian country, alleged that his arrest for
disorderly conduct by a tribal policeman, where this charge arose
out of the same set of occurrences as did the robbery, placed him
twice in jeopardy. The Tenth Circuit held that the arrest by the
tribal policeman, who was not a federal officer, was "manifestly
tribal in character ' 28 and that the tribal and federal charges were
therefore sufficiently different from one another so as not to con-
stitute double jeopardy.
2 9
In United States v. Worth"0 the defendant sold an informer
an illegal weapon, dynamite, and cocaine. The United States
brought charges against Worth for sale of the weapon and explo-
sives, but Kansas charged him with the cocaine sale. Worth al-
leged that since the sales of dynamite and cocaine were contem-
poraneous, he was being tried twice for the same act. The court,
however, held the sales to be two acts, not one; therefore, each
sovereign could try one act without running afoul of the fifth
amendment.
3 1
C. Self-incrimination
A frequent ground for appeal is that an accused who wants
" The court added that no trial court instruction could have overcome the fatal
insufficiency of the indictment. 506 F.2d at 992. Form 3 in the Appendix of Forms of the
Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was mentioned favorably as providing a proper model
for an indictment. Id. at 987.
505 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 163 n.2. The court distinguished Leeds from United States v. Keeble, 459
F.2d 757 (8th Cir. 1972), rev'd on other grounds, 412 U.S. 205 (1973). In Keeble the officer
was both a federal officer and a tribal officer.
" The court also held that just as Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 5(a), which
requires federal suspects to be brought quickly before a magistrate, does not apply to
federal suspects already in state custody, neither does rule 5(a) apply to federal suspects
already in tribal custody. 505 F.2d at 163.
* 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974).
a' Id. at 1210. The fifth amendment is applicable to the states through the fourteenth
amendment. Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784 (1969). See also Waller v. Florida, 397 U.S.
387 (1970); Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436 (1970). Justice Brennan, concurring in Ashe,
expressed his preference for the "same transaction" test. Id. at 448. On the multiple-acts,
single-transaction issue in the Tenth Circuit, see Robinson v. United States, 366 F.2d 575,
579 (10th Cir. 1966), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 1009 (1967).
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to testify as to only one of several matters at trial is forced into a
dilemma: Either he remains completely silent, or he testifies and
opens all the other matters to cross-examination.
In the case just discussed, United States v. Worth,32 Worth's
defense to the federal charge of illegal sale of explosives was en-
trapment. If he testified on the entrapment issue, he would have
to admit the sale of explosives. This admission of a sale at a
certain time and place could be used against him in the later state
trial for sale of cocaine at the same time and place. The Tenth
Circuit held that the choice was his to make, but that it was not
impermissible to force him to choose.13 Further, the court said
that it was not essential for Worth to take the stand in order to
rely on the entrapment defense.
34
A similar dilemma confronted the defendant in United
States v. Philipps.3 5 Philipps was charged with a violation of 18
U.S.C. § 2114, assault with intent to rob a mail carrier. Because
he placed the mail carrier's life in jeopardy, he was given 25 years,
the stiffer penalty provided for in section 2114. First, Philipps
said that section 2114 actually creates two separate offenses. The
court held that the stiffer penalty for jeopardizing a mail carrier's
life (or wounding him) was not a separate offense, but only an
aggravating circumstance. Second, Philipps claimed that he
could not take the stand to testify concerning the aggravating
circumstance without subjecting himself to cross-examination on
the basic robbery offense; i.e., that he could not testify concerning
punishment without being forced to testify concerning guilt. The
court held that the choice was not constitutionally impermissi-
ble .
37
The validity of a confession made by an American citizen
3.2 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 1209-10.
Id. at 1209. This is consistent with an earlier holding this past year. On the entire
issue of entrapment see United States v. Hawke, 505 F.2d 817 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
denied, 420 U.S. 978 (1975). Hawke expanded upon an earlier Tenth Circuit analysis of
the thorny entrapment defense, Martinez v. United States, 373 F.2d 810 (10th Cir. 1967).
35 522 F.2d 606 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id. at 610.
3 Id. at 611. The court relied upon Kirk v. United States, 457 F.2d 400 (6th Cir.),
cert. denied, 409 U.S. 987 (1972), which relied upon Crampton v. Ohio, 402 U.S. 183
(1971). (Crampton was vacated by the Supreme Court, 408 U.S. 941 (1972), but only
insofar as the death penalty was concerned, because of Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238
(1972).)
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while in custody in a foreign country was questioned in two cases,
United States v. Mundt" and Cranford v. Rodriguez. 9 The court
joined several other circuits" by holding the confessions valid
where the trial courts had found the confessions to be voluntary.
In Mundt, although an American narcotics agent had been
involved in the investigation which culminated in Mundt's arrest
in Peru, the confession was made to a Peruvian officer. The Peru-
vian officer did not give Mundt the warnings required by Miranda
v. Arizona.4 The court agreed with the trial court that since the
Peruvian was not an agent of the American officer, there was
insufficient reason to exclude the confession.2
In Cranford the confession was made to a New Mexico officer
across the border in Juarez, Mexico. Cranford had been given
Miranda rights and a waiver form; the standard language had
been altered by crossing out the reference to appointment of an
attorney and inserting instead a reference to the accused's right
to talk to an American consular officer. The alteration was made
because Mexico law does not give a right to counsel at that stage
of the criminal process. The court found "a good faith effort to
comply with the Miranda doctrine"43 under the circumstances.
The test for admissibility in both Mundt and Cranford was
one of voluntariness; American participation did not in itself
taint the confessions fatally, even though the Miranda warnings
were not given as they would have been in the United States. The
issue of voluntariness was submitted to a full hearing at the trial
level in both cases. Cranford, whose original trial was in state
court, was denied an evidentiary hearing on his habeas corpus
action in federal court. The Tenth Circuit upheld the district
court's reviewing only the state court's transcript.44
38 508 F.2d 904 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 949 (1975).
31 512 F.2d 860 (10th Cir. 1975).
1o See, e.g., United States v. Welch, 455 F.2d 211 (2d Cir. 1972) (confession made in
the Bahamas); United States v. Chavarria, 443 F.2d 904 (9th Cir. 1971) (Mexico); United
States v. Dopf, 434 F.2d 205 (5th Cir. 1970) (Mexico); United States v. Nagelberg, 434
F.2d 585 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971) (Canada).
384 U.S. 436 (1966).
'2 508 F.2d at 906-07.
' 512 F.2d at 863. While the Tenth Circuit assumed that the Miranda doctrine still
applies outside the United States, the Second Circuit in United States v. Nagelberg, 434
F.2d 585, 587 n.1 (2d Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 401 U.S. 939 (1971), said that it did not.
Still, both courts found the admission of the incriminating statements valid.
" The Tenth Circuit noted that the trial court has the discretion to hold a new
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Voluntariness was also the issue in United States v.
Crocker." Crocker had confessed both orally and in writing to
passing counterfeit money, and had done so after twice waiving
in writing her right to have an attorney. She claimed that the
burden of proof was placed on her during the suppression hearing,
rather than on the government as Miranda mandates." The court
held that while the burden is on the government to prove that the
Miranda rights were waived voluntarily, knowingly, and intelli-
gently, there is also a burden on the accused:
Logic dictates that a pre-trial Motion to Suppress filed by an ac-
cused does in fact cast the burden upon the movant to present facts
necessary to sustain his position. 7
III. TRIAL MATTERS
A. Jury Selection
Randomness of jury selection was at issue in United States
v. Davis." When it came time to pick the 12th juror, only two
veniremen remained of the original courtroom pool. Davis
claimed that picking either one would not be "random." This
sophistic argument was quickly rejected by the Tenth Circuit,
which held that the "essence of randomness . . . is not number,
but the absence of any arbitrary attempt to exclude a class of
persons from the jury."49 The court stated the policy succinctly:
hearing, but is only compelled to grant one if "the constitutional issues had not been fully
tried in state court or [if] there existed relevant evidence which was not presented." 512
F.2d at 862. The court pointed to 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d) (1970) and two well-known Supreme
Court cases: Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391 (1963); Townsend v. Sain, 372 U.S. 293 (1963).
,5 510 F.2d 1129 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 384 U.S. at 475.
510 F.2d at 1135, citing Wilson v. United States, 218 F.2d 754 (10th Cir. 1955). The
measure for establishing voluntariness is preponderance of the evidence, not beyond a
reasonable doubt. Lego v. Twomey, 404 U.S. 477, 489 (1972).
Crocker also discussed whether the guidelines for determining voluntariness had to
be those in Miranda, or could also be those in 18 U.S.C. § 3501 (1970), passed after
Miranda in order to ameliorate the harm Congress thought Miranda had caused. 510 F.2d
at 1136-38. The court indicated that, although the Supreme Court had not passed ex-
pressly on the constitutionality of section 3501, it interpreted several recent Supreme
Court decisions to uphold impliedly section 3501. Id. In any event, the Tenth Circuit also
found the suppression hearing met the Miranda guidelines. Even if the section 3501
discussion is technically dictum, the Tenth Circuit position is clear: A confession meeting
the section 3501 guidelines on voluntariness can be validly admitted.
48 518 F.2d 81 (10th Cir. 1975). Randomness is required in federal juries by 28 U.S.C.
§§ 1861-74 (1970).
" 518 F.2d at 82, citing Sitarski v. New York, 358 F. Supp. 817, 820 (W.D.N.Y. 1973).
The Sitarski court cited Hoyt v. Florida, 368 U.S. 57 (1961). Hoyt said that an unreasona-
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"The selection of each of the jurors is guaranteed 'random' so long
as formation of the pool is nondiscriminatory."50
B. Trial Court Discretion
United States v. Stoker5 dealt with the number of subpoenas
available to an indigent defendant.52 Stoker applied for 16 sub-
poenas, in accordance with Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure
17(b),53 on the last day of the Government's case. The trial court
granted him only four. The Tenth Circuit limited its review of the
issue to the question of possible abuse of discretion by the trial
court and found none.
5 4
Another issue of discretion arose in United States v.
Connor.55 Connor was charged with interstate transportation of a
firearm after having been convicted of a felony. Of his several
prior felony convictions, the Government chose to prove a rape
conviction because it was recent and from the state where the
federal trial was being held. Connor offered to stipulate that he
had been previously convicted of a felony. The trial court allowed
proof of the rape conviction. The Tenth Circuit held that this was
a matter of discretion for the trial judge."
Sequestration of a rowdy defendant was the issue in United
ble exclusion of a particular group from jury service was improper, but also upheld a
Florida scheme which placed women on jury lists only if they so requested. That part of
Hoyt approving the exclusion or automatic exemption of women from jury service was
overruled in Taylor v. Louisiana, 419 U.S. 522 (1975). Taylor is not retroactive. Daniel v.
Louisiana, 420 U.S. 31 (1975).
518 F.2d at 82.
522 F.2d 576 (10th Cir. 1975).
The right to compulsory process is guaranteed by the sixth amendment.
The rule requires "a satisfactory showing that the defendant is financially unable
to pay the fees of the witness and that the presence of the witness is necessary to an
adequate defense."
11 The court cited several of its recent cases on trial court discretion. 522 F.2d at 578.
Abuse of the trial court's discretion has been the standard of review for over 80 years.
Crumpton v. United States, 138 U.S. 361 (1891).
No. 74-1385 (10th Cir., July 9, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
The court repeated the general rule that a party is not required to stipulate and
may insist upon proving its facts. However, it emphatically denied that the Government
had an "absolute right to refuse any offer by a defendant to stipulate to facts in a criminal
proceeding." Id. at 3. The court said that the trial judge, in his discretion, could direct
the Government to stipulate. Id. at 2.
The court also provided a practical pointer. The proper way to prove a conviction is
to introduce a certified copy of the conviction and have an official of the prison identify
in court the defendant as the one named in the conviction. Id. at 3. See United States v.
McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 449 (10th Cir. 1972).
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States v. Munn." Munn was ordered sequestered, during jury
selection, in the marshal's office where he could still hear the
proceedings. He was also given an opportunity to confer with his
counsel from time to time.
The trial judge kept Munn out until jury selection was over
and three minor witnesses had been called. Munn was gone only
about 1/4 hours. He contended that the Supreme Court's author-
itative statements on in-court discipline in Illinois v. Allen58 re-
quired his return to the courtroom immediately upon his giving
his promise to behave. The Court said in Allen:
Once lost, the right to be present can, of course, be reclaimed as soon
as the defendant is willing to conduct himself consistently with the
decorum and respect inherent in the concept of courts and judicial
proceedings.5'
The Tenth Circuit did not read the "as soon as" language to
require absolutely the return of the defendant to the courtroom
at the earliest possible time. Rather, the judge must be allowed
to exercise some discretion in deciding whether the defendant's
promise to behave is sincere. 0
C. Closing Arguments
Government prosecutors came under considerable fire for
prejudicial statements in their closing arguments. In United
States v. Ludwig6l the prosecutor vouched for the credibility of his
police witnesses. The court held that this was clear and prejudi-
cial error, and reversed and remanded the case.
62
The prosecutor in United States v. Worth 3 referred to a drug
sale for which the defendant would soon be on trial in state court
V 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975).
397 U.S. 337 (1970).
' d. at 343.
507 F.2d at 568. In Allen, a few paragraphs after the language quoted in the text,
the Supreme Court said the following about discretion:
We believe trial judges confronted with disruptive, contumacious, stub-
bornly defiant defendants must be given sufficient discretion to meet the
circumstances of each case.
397 U.S. at 343.
508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974).
62 Id. at 143. For a forceful statement of Tenth Circuit policy on vouching for the
credibility of witnesses, see United States v. Martinez, 487 F.2d 973, 977 (10th Cir. 1973).
See also 3 WHARTON'S CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 525 (12th ed. 1975).
63 505 F.2d 1206 (10th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of the double jeopardy and entrap-
ment issues in Worth, see notes 30-34 and accompanying text supra.
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and added about the drug itself: "And he transferred a vial of
cocaine, a hard narcotic. And I can't say enough bad about co-
caine and I can't say enough bad about people who would sell
it."4 The Tenth Circuit condemned the language, but also pro-
vided a lesson for defense counsel: Since there was no timely
objection to the inflammatory remarks, there was no reversal. 5
In United States v. Latimer" the prosecutor literally testified
in his closing argument that the reason the Government did not
introduce the film of a bank robbery was that the camera mal-
functioned. There had been testimony that the camera had been
activated, but nothing more. Defense counsel properly argued the
inference that the film did not identify the accused. The prosecu-
tor should have shown the film so that the jurors could have seen
the camera had malfunctioned, or simply allowed the inference
to stand. But, by going outside the record and expressing his
personal knowledge and beliefs, he overstepped the boundaries of
proper argument. Since there had been timely objection, the case
was reversed and remanded."
D. Principal and Accessory
The Tenth Circuit had the opportunity to discuss an element
of criminal law in United States v. Tokoph 5 Tokoph was accused
of aiding and abetting one Weil in misapplying bank funds by
receiving illegal loans. Tokoph contended that since Weil, the
principal, had not been convicted of the substantive offense, he
" 505 F.2d at 1211.
'5 Id. This lesson has been taught by the Tenth Circuit before. United States v.
Gilbert, 447 F.2d 883, 886 (10th Cir. 1971); McManaman v. United States, 327 F.2d 21,
24 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 945 (1964). Where there is no timely objection, the
only chance for a reversal lies in a finding of "plain error." Van Nattan v. United States,
357 F.2d 161, 163 (10th Cir. 1966). Accord, Isaacs v. United States, 301 F.2d 706, 736 (8th
Cir.), cert. denied, 371 U.S. 818 (1962); Paschen v. United States, 70 F.2d 491, 502 (7th
Cir. 1934).
511 F.2d 498 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 503. See also United States v. Peak, 498 F.2d 1337, 1338-39 (6th Cir. 1974);
Reichert v. United States, 359 F.2d 278, 281-82 (D.C. Cir. 1966); 6 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE
§§ 1806, 1807 (3d ed. 1940).
Latimer drew a rare dissent, this one by Judge Hill, who was of the opinion that under
the circumstances the error was trivial; that defense counsel knew why the camera mal-
functioned and took unfair advantage by arguing an inference he knew was logical but
factually untrue; and that Latimer had had a fair trial, although not a "perfect" one. 511
F.2d at 503-04.
514 F.2d 597 (10th Cir. 1975).
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(Tokoph) could not be convicted as an accessory. The Tenth Cir-
cuit correctly pointed out the distinction between proving the
principal's guilt and convicting him. 9 Although Weil had not yet
been tried, there was sufficient evidence to show that he had
committed the offense and that Tokoph had aided and abetted
him.
IV. JURY INSTRUCTIONS
A. Mental Competence
The issue in United States v. Munz 0 was the standard for a
jury's judging the defendant's mental competence. The trial
judge had repeatedly said that the difference between mental
competence and incompetence was whether the defendant was
acting voluntarily or was driven by an "insane delusion." The
Tenth Circuit rejected this "insane delusion" language and ex-
pressed a strong preference for the language used in one of its
earlier cases, United States v. Wion.'
" The defendant relied heavily on United States v. Stevison, 471 F.2d 143 (7th Cir.
1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 950 (1973). The Seventh Circuit said: "The presupposition
that an aider and abettor may be convicted . . . absent conviction of the principal is
invalid." Id. at 147-48 (emphasis added). The court then cited Giragosian v. United
States, 349 F.2d 166 (lst Cir. 1965), and United States v. Caplan, 123 F. Supp. 862 (W.D.
Pa. 1954), in support of its holding. However, a reading of the two cases discloses that
the Seventh Circuit erred in its interpretation of and reliance upon those cases.
Giragosian held:
In order to convict Giragosian of aiding and abetting it was necessary for the
Government to prove that [the principal] himself was guilty of the primary
offense ....
349 F.2d at 167 (emphasis added), citing Coffin v. United States, 162 U.S. 664 (1896). The
Tenth Circuit correctly noted the distinction between guilt of the principal (Giragosian)
and conviction of the principal (Stevison).
Caplan furnishes no support for Stevison either. In fact, the proof requirement is even
less in Caplan than in Giragosian and Tokoph: "The proof must establish that the offense
was committed by someone and that defendant aided and abetted in its commission." 123
F. Supp. at 865 (emphasis added). Proving an offense has been committed is much easier
than proving that a particular person, the principal, committed the offense.
The Seventh Circuit would have been right several centuries ago:
At common law an accessary cannot be tried without his consent before the
conviction or outlawry of the principal except where tried together with him;
the rule, however, has been changed by statute in many jurisdictions.
22 C.J.S. Criminal Law § 104 (1961) (emphasis added).
The current general rule, which is that applied by the Tenth Circuit, is stated as
follows: "Ordinarily, the guilt of the principal must be proved in order to convict an
accessary." Id. § 105 (emphasis added).
7- 504 F.2d 1203 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 325 F.2d 420 (10th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 377 U.S. 946 (1964).
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Wion adopted the A.L.I. standard on criminal responsibility,
which provided that the test of mental competence was whether
the accused lacked a "substantial capacity" to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act."2 The test used by the trial judge was
essentially whether the accused had no capacity to appreciate the
wrongfulness of his act. Because of the emphasis by the trial
judge on "insane delusions" and the possibility of seriously mis-
leading the jury due to the way some expert testimony was
phrased, the court found substantial prejudice to the defendant's
rights and reversed and remanded."
B. Reasonable Doubt
Within the last 2 years the Tenth Circuit has made clear its
preference for a particular definition of "reasonable doubt."' 4 The
question arose most recently in United States v. Leaphart.5 Once
again the circuit court approved the definition of "reasonable
doubt" as "the kind of doubt that would make a reasonable per-
son hesitate to act."8 And once again the court expressed its
displeasure with an instruction couched in positive rather than
negative terms. The criticized instruction read:
Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is established if the evidence is
such as a reasonably prudent man would be willing to rely and act
upon in the most important of his own affairs."
The "hesitate to act" language received the most authorita-
tive approval from the Supreme Court in Holland v. United
States."5 The Tenth Circuit has since followed Holland in United
States v. Smaldone" and United States v. Pepe.0 Although it has
not reversed a case using the "willing to act" instruction, because
72 ALI MODEL PENAL CODE § 4.0 (1962 Proposed Final Draft). For a short discussion
of the A.L.I. and other tests, see W. LAFAVE & A. Sco-r, HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW §
38 (1972). Almost all of the federal courts of appeals have accepted the A.L.I. test. Id.
§ 38, at 294 n.78.
7 504 F.2d at 1208-09.
7 United States v. Pepe, 501 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1974); United States v. Smaldone,
485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974). See discussion of
Smaldone and Pepe in Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 158-59 (1975).
7 513 F.2d 747 (10th Cir. 1975).
7' Id. at 750 n.1 (emphasis added).
71 Id. at 749 (emphasis added). This was part of the instruction used at Leaphart's
trial.
.' 348 U.S. 121, 140 (1954), aff'g 209 F.2d 516 (10th Cir. 1954).
79 485 F.2d 1333 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 416 U.S. 936 (1974).
- 501 F.2d 1142 (10th Cir. 1974).
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it is not seriously misleading to the jury, it is clear that the Tenth
Circuit expects a change in the trial courts:
The time has unquestionably arrived after Holland, Smaldone,
and Pepe for the trial courts to change this instruction and to couch
it in the terms prescribed by the Supreme Court of the United
States2
V. POST-TRIAL MATTERS
A. Sentencing
The doctrine of merger was applied in United States v.
Munn,8" where the defendant had been sentenced for both larceny
and robbery, each arising from the same episode. The Govern-
ment agreed that the larceny was merged into the robbery, and
the court vacated the sentence on the larceny conviction.u
The court in Mayfield v. United States4 joined several other
circuits 5 in holding that the imposition of a statutorily mandated
special 2-year parole term is an imposition of a sentence; there-
fore, the defendant is required to be present.8
Consistent with two decisions last year, 7 the Tenth Circuit
has held in Garcia v. United States88 that there is no need to
inform a defendant who pleads guilty that there is a possibility
of consecutive sentences, where the defendant actually knew of
that possibility. No special language about consecutive sentences
is absolutely required.
l 513 F.2d at 750.
2 507 F.2d 563 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 968 (1975). For a discussion of
sequestration in Munn, see text accompanying notes 57-60 supra.
" Id. at 569. See also Benton v. Maryland, 395 U.S. 784, 796-98 (1969); Prince v.
United States, 352 U.S. 322, 329 (1957); United States v. Leyba, 504 F.2d 441 (10th Cir.
1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S. 934 (1975); United States v. Von Roeder, 435 F.2d 1004 (10th
Cir. 1970).
' 504 F.2d 888 (10th Cir. 1974).
The court in Mayfield cited the following cases in support of its holding: Thompson
v. United States, 495 F.2d 1304, 1306-07 (1st Cir. 1974); Tanner v. United States, 493 F.2d
1350, 1351 (5th Cir. 1974); Caille v. United States, 487 F.2d 614, 616 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. McCray, 468 F.2d 446, 450-51 (10th Cir. 1972).
" FED. R. CRuM. P. 43. The one exception to the requirement of presence is when there
is a reduction in sentence. FED. R. CraM. P. 35.
"' Wall v. United States, 500 F.2d 38 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1025 (1975);
Williams v. United States, 500 F.2d 42 (10th Cir. 1974). For a discussion of consecutive
sentences and these cases, see Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 139-41 (1975).
No. 74-1428 (10th Cir., Dec. 10, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
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B. Time to Appeal-Extensions
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 4(b) requires that defen-
dants wishing to appeal in criminal cases must file a notice of
appeal within 10 days after entry of judgment. Upon a showing
of excusable neglect, that period can be extended 30 days. In
United States v. Connor9 the notice of appeal arrived in the mail
after the initial 10-day period, but within the additional 30-day
period which could have been granted. The trial judge held there
was no excusable neglect, even though the notice was mailed
within the initial 10-day period and took 5 days to be delivered
in Cheyenne, the same city where it was mailed. The Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the trial judge abused his discretion. The question
then became whether the trial court could enter an order after the
30-day period had expired, even though the notice arrived during
the 30-day period. The Tenth Circuit held that the trial court had
that power.9"
C. Expunction of Arrest Record
United States v. Linn9' faced squarely the issue whether the
fact of an acquittal by itself is enough to mandate expunction of
the defendant's arrest record. The court held that while courts do
have the power to expunge after acquittal, mere acquittal alone
is not sufficient to warrant an expunction." However, when ex-
treme circumstances warrant, expunction is proper and avail-
able .13
D. Prisoners' Rights
Following is a brief discussion of several cases brought by
" No. 74-1651 (10th Cir., May 12, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
" Accord, C-Thru Products, Inc. v. Uniflex, Inc., 397 F.2d 952, 954-55 (2d Cir. 1968).
The court also cited Johnson v. United States, 405 F.2d 1072, 1074 (D.C. Cir. 1968); Reed
v. Michigan, 398 F.2d 800, 801 (6th Cir. 1968); Evans v. Jones, 366 F.2d 772, 773 (4th Cir.
1966).
513 F.2d 925 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 63 (1975).
3 Accord, United States v. Seasholtz, 376 F. Supp. 1288 (N.D. Okla. 1974); United
States v. Dooley, 364 F. Supp. 75 (E.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Rosen, 343 F. Supp.
804 (S.D.N.Y. 1972).
'" See, e.g., United States v. McLeod, 385 F.2d 734, 749-50 (5th Cir. 1967); United
States v. Kalish, 271 F. Supp. 968, 970 (D.P.R. 1967). Linn noted that some of the cases
call for a "balancing" of the equities between the Government's need to
maintain extensive records in order to aid in general law enforcement and
the individual's right of privacy.
513 F.2d at 927.
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prisoners incarcerated in federal and state institutions. In the
wake of a recent Supreme Court case, Wolff v. McDonnell,94
which clarified what due process rights prisoners do and do not
have in prison disciplinary actions, inmates in the six-state area
encompassed by the Tenth Circuit challenged many existing
prison disciplinary procedures. In Shimabaku v. Britton" it was
held that in a disciplinary proceeding a prisoner who was charged
with an infraction which might also be a crime was entitled to
''use immunity" in any subsequent criminal action; there was
thus no constitutional dilemma involving self-incrimination if he
were forced to testify at the hearing." Several other cases," based
on due process rights protected in Wolff, failed because the Su-
preme Court specifically stated that its decision was not retroac-
tive .
In two cases prisoners had alleged that conditions within the
prison were so poor as to constitute cruel and unusual punish-
ment in violation of the eighth amendment. In Gregory v. Wyse 9
the court found that solitary confinement per se was not cruel and
unusual punishment, even with a hard bed, cramped quarters,
continuous light, and other restrictions. The second case,
Poindexter v. Woodson, °00 limited the remedies available to vic-
tims of cruel and unusual punishment: No money damages were
allowed where there was no showing of malice. 9 '
" 418 U.S. 539 (1974).
" 503 F.2d 38 (10th Cir. 1974).
" Id. at 44-45.
g Gregory v. Wyse, 512 F.2d 378, 381 (10th Cir. 1975), and five unpublished Tenth
Circuit opinions: Collingwood v. Meacham, No. 73-1749 (July 17, 1975); Foor v. Carlson,
No. 73-1804 (Dec. 10, 1974); Johnson v. Britton, No. 73-1672 (Dec. 9, 1974); Haas v.
Attorney General, No. 74-1130 (Oct. 30, 1974); Black v. Warden, No. 73-1586 (Oct. 30,
1974).
11 418 U.S. at 573-74.
512 F.2d 378 (10th Cir. 1975).
510 F.2d 464 (10th Cir. 1975).
'i" The cruel and unusual punishment was inflicted upon several alleged prison rioters
and included lengthy stays in "strip cells." Since these cells had been used in the past,
the court felt it unfair to hold current prison officials liable for what had just been
determined to be a constitutional violation. Thus, the officials were granted qualified
immunity; on this topic see Scheuer v. Rhodes, 416 U.S. 232 (1974).
Dissents in the Tenth Circuit are quite rare, but this case drew one from Judge Doyle.
He felt that the officials had not acted in good faith and that the violation was one which
shocked the conscience, and that, therefore, immunity should not be extended. 510 F.2d
at 467.
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Mail censorship was the issue in two unpublished opinions:
Kennedy v. State Department of Corrections'0 ° and Berry v.
Anderson.0 3 The court in Kennedy remanded to the Wyoming
district court for a determination as to whether a Wyoming rule
prohibiting inmates from writing articles for publication fur-
thered any substantial governmental interest. The district court
in Berry enjoined Oklahoma officials from refusing to mail
Berry's letters, but denied him monetary damages. The Tenth
Circuit affirmed, as no injury had been shown.'
There were several cases involving sentencing, probation,
and parole. The cases and their holdings, briefly stated, follow:
United States v. Giles:"°5 The Tenth Circuit will not review
a sentence if it is within statutory limits.
United States v. Johnson:06 Federal Rule of Criminal Proce-
dure 35 cannot be used to attack the validity of a conviction; rule
35 can only be used to reduce or correct a sentence.
United States v. Reynolds:0 7 The trial court was held to have
abused its discretion when it extended the length of probation
without informing the probationers of their alleged violations and
without making specific findings.
Patrick v. Britton:0 A probationer is entitled to a local revo-
cation hearing, in order to secure witnesses and present a proper
defense.
Sanchez-Hernandez v. Daggett:09 There is no set rule in the
Tenth Circuit requiring a meaningful parole hearing to be held
no later than one-third of the way through a sentence.
Mower v. Britton:"0 The Tenth Circuit joined the Seventh
Circuit"' in applying the Administrative Procedure Act"' to pa-
12 No. 74-1564 (10th Cir., Mar. 27, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
'13 No. 74-1491 (10th Cir., July 16, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
"I On the issue of mail censorship and prisons, see Procunier v. Martinez, 416 U.S.
396 (1974). Censorship is only one of many issues in a long, well-documented case involv-
ing the Oklahoma State Penitentiary. Battle v. Anderson, 376 F. Supp. 402, 424-25 (E.D.
Okla. 1974).
No. 74-1527 (10th Cir., Mar. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 75-1013 (10th Cir., July 8, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
07 No. 74-1753 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 74-1874 (10th Cir., May 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
No. 75-1120 (10th Cir., May 15, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
504 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1974).
King v. United States, 492 F.2d 1337 (7th Cir. 1974).
112 5 U.S.C. §§ 551-59 (1970).
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role hearings conducted by the United States Board of Parole.
This decision was expressly made non-retroactive.
Habeas corpus naturally was at issue in several cases, dis-
cussed briefly below:
Sanders v. Conine:"3 Habeas corpus is the proper remedy for
a prisoner challenging the validity of his extradition.
Jenkins v. Atkins:"4 That a state court did not deal with one
crucial issue in a case does not require repetitious exhaustion of
state remedies if the issue was tendered to the state court."'
United States v. Hereford:"' If an indigent prisoner is only
contemplating a federal habeas corpus"7 or other action but has
not yet filed, he is not entitled to a free transcript."'
Finally, the Tenth Circuit has held in Henderson v. Secre-
tary of Corrections"9 that a prisoner for whom corrective shoes
were prescribed but not furnished does not have a right of action
for damages:
We cannot say that the inadequacy of appellant's normal shoes or
the omission to provide the corrective shoes gives rise to a constitu-
tional deprivation sustaining a [42 U.S.C.] § 1983 claim nor that
appellant could elaborate this set of facts to support a claim which
would entitle him to relief.'1
VI. STATUTORY INTERPRETATION
A. 21 U. S.C. § 802(15)
This section defines marijuana as Cannabis sativa L. In two
cases, United States v. Ludwig'2' and United States v. Spann,'1
" 506 F.2d 530 (10th Cir. 1974).
'" 515 F.2d 1078 (10th Cir. 1975).
,, The court mentioned two Supreme Court cases involving exhaustion of adminis-
trative remedies: Roberts v. LaVallee, 389 U.S. 40 (1967); Brown v. Allen, 344 U.S. 443
(1953).
"I No. 75-1116 (10th Cir., May 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
17 28 U.S.C. § 2255 (1970).
Contra, MacCollom v. United States, 511 F.2d 1116 (9th Cir. 1974). The Ninth
Circuit made one practical point in its decision to grant transcripts to indigents prior to
their filing section 2255 actions: It often costs less to furnish the transcript than to go into
court and fight the prisoner's motion for a free transcript. Id. at 1123. For cases in accord
with the Tenth Circuit, see id. at 1118.
"' 518 F.2d 694 (10th Cir. 1975).
"" Id. at 695. On the issue of medical care for prisoners, the court has previously said:
"The prisoner's right is to medical care-not to the type or scope of medical care which
he personally desires." Id., quoting Coppinger v. Townsend, 398 F.2d 392 (10th Cir. 1968).
21 508 F.2d 140 (10th Cir. 1974).
515 F.2d 579 (10th Cir. 1975).
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the defendants claimed that marijuana consists of three distinct
species- Cannabis sativa L., Cannabis indica, and Cannabis
ruderalis. The Government proved only that "marijuana" was
found in both cases. Defendants argued that the Government's
case, therefore, had to fail, since there was no proof that the
marijuana seized was of the one type outlawed. The Tenth Cir-
cuit rejected the argument, as have most courts confronted with
it. 13 As far as the Tenth Circuit is concerned, marijuana is mari-
juana is marijuana.
B. 18 U.S.C. § 660
This statute reads in pertinent part as follows:
Whoever ... being an employee of [a corporation engaged in com-
merce as a] common carrier riding in or upon any railroad car,
motortruck, steamboat, vessel, aircraft or other vehicle of such car-
rier moving in interstate commerce, embezzles, steals, abstracts, or
willfully misapplies, any of the moneys. . . arising or accruing from
. . . such commerce . . . shall be fined not more than $5,000 or
imprisoned not more than ten years, or both.
In United States v. Tye"4 the court held that a person who
drove a truck wholly within the state of Kansas, where the truck
carried C.O.D. packages from outside Kansas, was within the
class of persons Congress intended to cover. A recent district
court case, on the other hand, held that where a vehicle was only
driven intrastate, the fact that it carried goods moving interstate
did not bring any misapplication of funds within section 660.125
It is unclear whether the expansive Tenth Circuit interpreta-
tion or the narrow district court interpretation is correct; the
statute is unfortunately ambiguous enough to support both inter-
pretations.
C. 18 US.C. §844(f)
This section, in pertinent part, provides:
'2 The cases are collected in United States v. Walton, 514 F.2d 201 (D.C. Cir. 1975);
those in accord with Ludwig and Spann are id. at 204 n.12, and those not in accord are
id. at 203 n.11. Walton itself is in accord; its reasoning is grounded on the interpretation
that, since all species of marijuana contain the active ingredient tetrahydrocannabinol
(THC), Congress meant to outlaw all species.
"' 519 F.2d 586 (10th Cir. 1975).
United States v. Reca, 355 F. Supp. 334 (D.P.R. 1973). Accord, Shaver v. United
States, 174 F.2d 618 (9th Cir. 1949). But cf. United States v. Kimball, 441 F.2d 505 (10th
Cir. 1971).
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Whoever maliciously damages or destroys, or attempts to damage
or destroy, by means of an explosive, any building, vehicle, or other
personal or real property in whole or in part owned, possessed, or
used by, or leased to, the United States, any department or agency
thereof, or any institution or organization receiving Federal financial
assistance shall be imprisoned for not more than ten years, or fined
not more than $10,000, or both ....
The defendant in United States v. Apodaca2 ' was convicted
under this statute for dynamiting a Fremont County, Wyoming,
sheriff's car. The sheriff's department received federal financial
assistance in the following manner: The Federal Law Enforce-
ment Assistance Administration provided funds to the state Gov-
ernor's Planning Committee on Criminal Administration, which
in turn passed on funds to Fremont County, which finally passed
on funds to the sheriff's department. The court held that the
intermediary agencies were mere conduits of federal funds and
not distributors of state funds. Since the dynamited car belonged
to the sheriffs department and the department was an organiza-
tion receiving federal funds, there was federal jurisdiction. That
the funds did not buy the property destroyed by the explosive was
no impediment; any property owned by the organization is cov-
ered. ' 7
Richard F. Currey
SEARCHES FOR DOCUMENTARY EVIDENCE AND THE
FIFTH AMENDMENT
Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175 (10th Cir. 1975)
By WILLIAM A. BIANco*
I. THE PROBLEM
At approximately 8:00 a.m. on Friday, October 22, 1971, six
"' 522 F.2d 568 (10th Cir. 1975).
"n This extremely broad view of federal jurisdiction under section 844(f) first ap-
peared in a district court case several months before Apodaca. United States v. Brown,
384 F. Supp. 1151 (E.D. Mich. 1974). The defendant was convicted of blowing up a
planned parenthood clinic which received Federal Health, Education, and Welfare funds
through the Southeast Michigan Family Project, a non-profit Michigan corporation.
Brown quoted from the legislative history of section 844 and concluded that Congress
intended that a broad meaning be given the term "Federal financial assistance." Id. at
1154.
* Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1967, New York
University; J.D., 1970, Columbia University.
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or eight agents of the Internal Revenue Service arrived at the
office of Dr. Wendell Shaffer, a Colorado Springs dentist in prac-
tice by himself. The agents served a search warrant on the doctor
and began a 7-hour examination of his office, including file cabi-
nets, desk drawers, and closets. The warrant authorized a search
for
certain property, namely fiscal records relating to the income and
expenses of Dr. Wendell L. Shaffer from his dental practice and
other sources from January 1, 1966 to December 31, 1970, including,
but not limited to, dental patient cards, appointment books, cash
receipt books, cash disbursement books, expense records, business
ledgers, log books, bank ledger sheets and statements, deposit tick-
ets, cancelled checks, purchase invoices, copies of receipts covering
payment of fees, copies of invoices and bills. . . . an approximately
51/2" by 7",-paper pad-allegedly, known as a "cheat book"....1
The agents emerged with some 18 cartons of records, which were
seized pursuant to the warrant.
Subsequent to the seizure, Dr. Shaffer and his wife filed an
action seeking the return of their property, the suppression of any
evidence, as well as injunctive relief and damages. The trial
court rejected the Shaffers' claim that their fourth and fifth
amendment rights had been violated, and granted summary
judgment for the Government, holding that the search and sei-
zure was proper and that the Shaffers were not entitled to dam-
ages.
On appeal to the Tenth Circuit, the Shaffers contended that:
(1) the seizure of the private papers of a dentist practising as a sole
practitioner violated his privilege against self-incrimination; and (2)
the search and seizure was unreasonable under the Fourth Amend-
ment.'
In an opinion by Judge Barrett, the Tenth Circuit held that the
warrant was properly issued and limited in scope to certain de-
scribed business records.' The court disposed of the Shaffers' fifth
amendment argument with the terse remark:
Shaffer v. Wilson, 523 F.2d 175, 180 (10th Cir.), petition for cert. filed, 44 U.S.L.W.
3249 (U.S. Oct. 21, 1975) (No. 75-601).
2 The action was filed pursuant to rule 41(e) Fed. R. Crim. P. and 28 U.S.C.A. § 1331.
523 F.2d at 177.
Id.
Id. at 179-80. The court also noted that the warrant was predicated upon the sup-
porting affidavits of three of the doctor's former employees to whom he had allegedly
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There is no violation of one's Fifth Amendment privilege against
self-incrimination by reason of the proper execution of a valid search
and seizure.5
In making this statement the court implicitly rejected the
thesis of an "intimate relation" between the fourth and fifth
amendments to the United States Constitution, a doctrine that
was born nearly a century ago in Boyd v. United States,' and
often cited since.
The court did not focus on historical or, for the most part,
policy arguments in its analysis of this question, but looked
primarily to the presence of "compulsion" in the production of
the Shaffers' documents. Though the "compulsion" test may be
no more than a shorthand method of considering whether fifth
amendment problems are raised, it is not the most useful or deci-
sive analytical approach.
Judge Seth, in a lengthy and vigorous dissent, argued that
the search was unreasonable and in violation of the fourth
amendment. He further asserted that the warrant permitting the
seizure of personal records compelled the Shaffers to become wit-
nesses against themselves in violation of the fifth amendment.7
Judge Seth, like the Shaffers, relied heavily on Hill v. Philpott,5
in which the Seventh Circuit held a search by the IRS for docu-
ments to be in violation of the fifth amendment.' Judge Seth's
bragged about his cheating on income tax returns. The former employees identified with
specificity at least some of the documents sought. Id.
The opinion of the court may arguably be construed to mean that the court would
find only warrantless searches unreasonable under the fourth amendment: "The Fourth
Amendment prohibits only an unreasonable search undertaken without a warrant." Id.
at 179. It is doubtful, however, that the court intended by this remark to approve without
more all searches made pursuant to warrants. Cf. In re Berry, 521 F.2d 179 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 276 (1975), where the court considered the requirements under the
fourth amendment for a reasonable subpoena duces tecum. Further, the court noted in
Shaffer: "We readily agree that a general search warrant does not afford 'carte blanche'
to seize all records, personal and business." Id. at 177.
523 F.2d at 179.
116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
523 F.2d at 184.
445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 991 (1971).
The Seventh Circuit, in Hill, was faced with a fact situation almost identical to that
in Shaffer. The Seventh Circuit did not reach the fourth amendment question but found
that the compulsory search for documentary evidence of tax evasion was indistin-
guishable, in legal and practical effect, from a subpoena to produce the same documents.
Such a subpoena, the Seventh Circuit noted, would have been expressly prohibited by
Boyd as a violation of the privilege against self-incrimination. 445 F.2d at 149. Cf. Vonder-
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position appears to be that the fourth and fifth amendments are
intertwined and that the very examination of certain documents
in the course of an otherwise valid search results in a violation of
both the fourth and fifth amendments. He reached this conclu-
sion in part by finding "compulsion" an implicit part of any
search pursuant to warrant. Judge Seth plainly reveals his dis-
tress at the extent and nature of the IRS search in Shaffer. His
opinion is an emotional reminder-or warning-that we ought
not forget the principles upon which this nation was founded.
That reminder should not go unheeded. Nor should it obscure an
analytical review of what those fundamentals were in the begin-
ning, or how they may have developed and been interpreted in
200 years. The dissenting opinion is not without support, as Boyd
and Hill demonstrate, but the arguments raised simply do not
justify an interpretation of the fifth amendment as protecting
most, if not all, documents from government scrutiny.
Because space here is limited and because questions of fact
must necessarily be involved, the fourth amendment question of
the reasonableness of the search of the Shaffer office and the
breadth of the warrant will not be discussed here. Rather, the
more troublesome (and more interesting) question of the relation-
ship of the fourth and fifth amendments, and any resulting exten-
sion of the privilege against self-incrimination to documents, will
be explored. That exploration will include a look at the Boyd case
and the validity of the "intimate relationship" doctrine; a consid-
eration of the policies behind the fifth amendment and how those
policies relate to documentary evidence; and, finally, a review of
the Supreme Court's approach to self-incrimination and the rela-
tionship of that approach to documentary evidence.
II. Boyd AND THE "INTIMATE RELATION" DoCTRINE'0
Boyd involved a suit by the Government to confiscate plate
glass allegedly imported in violation of the customs laws. To es-
tablish the Government's case, Boyd was ordered to produce an
Ahe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364 (9th Cir. 1974) (similar facts; search held unreasonable on
fourth amendment grounds only); United States v. Blank, 459 F.2d 383 (6th Cir.), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 887 (1972) (worksheets of gambler seized; held, no violation of fifth
amendment); United States v. Bennett, 409 F.2d 888 (2d Cir. 1969) (Friendly, J.) (seizure
of letter as evidence of defendant's participation in narcotics conspiracy; held, no violation
of the fifth amendment).
0 Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 633 (1886).
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invoice related to the importation of the glass. The order was
issued under a statute which specifically provided that subpoenas
could issue to develop the evidence necessary for prosecutions
pursuant to the customs laws." Were production refused, the
Government's allegations would be taken as confessed. 2 An ear-
lier statute had permitted the seizure of documents pursuant to
warrant rather than their production by subpoena.
3
The Supreme Court, in an opinion by Mr. Justice Bradley,
roundly condemned the order for production as a violation of both
the fourth and fifth amendments." The Court asserted that com-
pelled testimony and compelled examinations of private papers
were improper in light of the history of the fourth and fifth
amendments, which were intended to prevent invasions by the
government "of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies
of life."' 5 It was in this sense that the Court noted "the Fourth
and Fifth Amendments run almost into each other."'"
Although the question of a search of private papers pursuant
to a warrant was not before the Court, the majority's position on
that related question was clear:
Though the proceeding in question is divested of many of the aggra-
vating incidents of actual search and seizure, yet, as before said, it
contains their substance and essence, and effects their substantial
purpose. It may be that it is the obnoxious thing in its mildest and
least repulsive form; but illegitimate and unconstitutional practices
get their first footing in that way, namely by silent approaches and
slight deviations from legal modes of procedure."
Justice Bradley relied heavily on Lord Camden's decision in
Act To Amend The Customs Revenue Laws And To Repeal Moieties of 1874, ch.
391, 18 Stat. 186.
12 Id. ch. 391, § 5, 18 Stat. 187. For an excellent discussion of the Boyd case, see J.
LANDYNSKI, SEARCH AND SEIZURE AND THE SUPREME COURT 49-61 (1966).
" Act of March 2, 1867, ch. 188, § 2, 14 Stat. 547.
" The Court said:
[W]e are further of opinion that a compulsory production of the private
books and papers of the owner of goods sought to be forfeited in such a suit
is compelling him to be a witness against himself, within the meaning of the
Fifth Amendment to the Constitution, and is the equivalent of a search and
seizure-and an unreasonable search and seizure-within the meaning of the
Fourth Amendment.
116 U.S. at 634-35.
"5 Id. at 630.
I d.
" Id. at 635.
VOL. 53
CRIMINAL LA W AND PROCEDURE
the landmark English case, Entick v. Carrington."5 The Entick
case and the circumstances out of which it arose do, indeed, lie
at the heart of the American and English privileges against un-
reasonable search. It may not, however, mean all that the Court
in Boyd asserted.
John Entick, whose house had been searched and private
papers examined on the authority of a general warrant issued by
the Secretary of State in an attempt to discover libelous matter,
brought suit for damages against those who had conducted the
search. Lord Camden, considering the validity of the general
search warrant which had been used as a possible justification for
what would otherwise have been a trespass, held the warrant to
be unauthorized and condemned general searches for evidence of
the type permitted by the warrant:
In the criminal law, such a proceeding was never heard of; and yet
there are some crimes, such, for instance, as murder, rape, robbery,
and house-breaking, to say nothing of forgery and perjury, that are
more atrocious than libelling. But our law has provided no paper-
search in these cases to help forward the conviction. Whether this
proceedeth from the gentleness of the law towards criminals, or from
a consideration that such a power would be more pernicious to the
innocent than useful to the public, I will not say. It is very certain
that the law obligeth no man to accuse himself; because the neces-
sary means of compelling self-accusation, falling upon the innocent
as well as the guilty, would be both cruel and unjust; and it would
seem, that search for evidence is disallowed upon the same princi-
ple. Then, too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty."
The dictum of Lord Camden in Entick was ultimately incor-
porated into the dictum of Justice Bradley in Boyd. The Boyd
thesis that unreasonable searches often compelled self-
incrimination and that compulsory self-incrimination "throws
light on" the meaning of unreasonable search"0 was purportedly
derived directly from the quoted language in Entick. But a link
between the fourth and fifth amendments and the resulting inval-
idity of document searches was neither a necessary nor logical
conclusion from Entick. It has been suggested that Lord Camden
sought only to argue that innocent and guilty alike would be
harmed by unreasonable searches, just as they would be harmed
" 19 Howell St. Tr. 1029 (1765).
" 19 Howell St. Tr. at 1073, as quoted by Justice Bradley, 116 U.S. at 629.
116 U.S. at 633.
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by compulsory self-incrimination. It was a comparison of like
policy considerations, and no more.2'
Nor did the Court in Boyd recognize that Lord Camden's ire
was aroused by the unlawful issuance and general character of the
warrant and not from any compulsory incrimination. One com-
mentator has aptly noted:
Justice Bradley's reliance on Lord Camden's words in the En-
tick case to justify a doctrine of interrelationship between the two
amendments was not well placed, for the Entick opinion proves
nothing of the sort. In order to determine the existence of a trespass,
it was necessary for Lord Camden to establish the illegality of the
warrant authorizing the seizure of Entick's papers. Lord Camden
found that since the general warrant had received no recognition in
common law and Parliament had not authorized it, legal authority
for its issuance did not exist. The thrust of his opinion was directed
to the generality of the warrant, the fact that its issuance was
grounded in mere suspicion and not based on probable cause. It was
in this connection that Lord Camden stressed the self-incrimination
analogy. Compulsory self-incrimination was not permitted by law
because it would hurt "the innocent as well as the guilty ...
[S]earch for evidence is disallowed upon the same principle. Then,
too, the innocent would be confounded with the guilty . . . . [I]f
suspicion at large should be a ground of search . ..whose house
would be safe?"
Significantly, the paragraph in Entick containing the last quoted
sentence was omitted by Justice Bradley. The sentence clarifies
the analogy and places in doubt the underpinning of the pur-
ported relationship between the two amendments. 3
However this conflict may be resolved, the Entick case need
not and should not be read as broadly as Justice Bradley's dictum
in Boyd would suggest. Mr. Justice Miller, in a separate opinion,
concurred in by Mr. Chief Justice Waite, reached the same result
without having to interrelate the fourth and fifth amendments.
Justice Miller noted that the order, either to produce a document
or to have charges of a criminal nature taken as confessed, was
clearly prohibited by the fifth amendment, although it involved
neither a search nor a seizure.2" Limited in this way, Boyd has no
11 8 J. WIGMORE, EVIDENCE § 2264, at 382 n.4 (McNaughton rev. 1961).
" J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 12, at 59.
2 Id. Perhaps the Court indulged in writing " 'law office history,' which is merely a
function of ex parte advocacy." L. LEVY, JUDGMENTS: ESSAYS ON AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL
HISTORY 265 (1972).
2, 116 U.S. at 639-40.
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effect on document searches pursuant to a warrant, although it
continues to play an important role where documents are called
for by subpoena. The reason for the distinction has been ex-
pressed as follows:
For though the documents or chattels thus sought [by subpoena]
be not oral in form, and though they be already in existence and not
desired to be first written and created by a testimonial act or utter-
ance of the person in response to the process, still there is a testimo-
nial disclosure implicit in their production. It is the witnesses' assur-
ance, compelled as an incident of the process, that the articles pro-
duced are the ones demanded. No meaningful distinction can be
drawn between a communication necessarily implied by legally
compelled conduct and one authenticating the articles expressly
made under compulsion in court. Testimonial acts of this
sort-authenticating or vouching for pre-existing chattels-are not
typical of the sort of disclosures which are caught in the main cur-
rent of history and sentiments giving vitality to the privilege. Yet
they are within the borders of its protection.Y
Although Judge Seth criticized as artificial this distinction,
relied upon by the majority in Shaffer, it does have meaning in
light of the interests which the fifth amendment was intended to
protect as will be shown below. Moreover, an interpretation of the
fifth amendment which ignores its historical limitation to testi-
monial evidence" can, like the dictum in Boyd, serve to impro-
perly mingle two amendments which are basically different in
origin and character and can result in considerable confusion
about both. 7
History cannot alone determine the content of the privilege
against self-incrimination. Most constitutional provisions have
grown or evolved to some degree since the 18th century.8 The
legal concepts which may have been at the core of Entick or Boyd
must be reconsidered in light of policies today believed to be
fostered by the fourth and fifth amendments. 9
III. THE POLICY CONSIDERATIONS SUPPORTING THE PRIVILEGE
The court in Shaffer said very little about the policy consid-
2' 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 379-80.
26 Id. at 379.
11 J. LANDYNSKI, supra note 12, at 59.
See Friendly, The Fifth Amendment Tomorrow: The Case for Constitutional
Change, 37 U. CIN. L. REv. 671, 679 (1968).
" See Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
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erations supporting its decision. It noted that, if the Shaffers'
arguments were carried to a logical extreme, searches for all types
of evidence-even instrumentalities of crime-would be curtailed
and the ability of society to bring criminals to justice would be
hampered." Although this argument is vulnerable to the sugges-
tion that the fifth amendment was, indeed, intended to make it
somewhat more difficult to convict offenders,"' it serves to raise
the question of whether documents should be treated for purposes
of the fifth amendment privilege as fundamentally different from
other non-oral evidence.
Exhaustive analyses of the privilege and the policies behind
it have already been undertaken by Judge Friendly32 and by Pro-
fessor McNaughton,3 and cannot be improved upon here. Never-
theless, even a cursory review of these policies will serve to dem-
onstrate that most of them, whether articulated by the Supreme
Court or by commentators, are no more applicable to a search for
documents pursuant to warrant than they would be to other chat-
tels sought in the same manner.
34
A comprehensive list of the policies supporting the privilege
was presented for the Supreme Court by Mr. Justice Goldberg in
Murphy v. Waterfront Commission:
3 5
The privilege against self-incrimination "registers an important
advance in the development of our liberty-'one of the great land-
marks in man's struggle to make himself civilized.' " It reflects
many of our fundamental values and most noble aspirations: our
unwillingness to subject those suspected of crime to the cruel tri-
lemma of self-accusation, perjury or contempt; our preference for an
accusatorial rather than an inquisatorial system of criminal justice;
our fear that self-incriminating statements will be elicited by inhu-
mane treatment and abuses; our sense of fair play which dictates "a
fair state-individual balance by requiring the government to leave
the individual alone until good cause is shown for disturbing him
and by requiring the government in its contest with the individual
523 F.2d at 179.
1' Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144, 149-50 (7th Cir. 1971).
32 Friendly, supra note 28.
33 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, § 2251.
11 Judge Friendly has suggested that the privilege be entirely abolished with regard
to chattels, including documents, sought either by subpoena or other legal process.
Friendly, supra note 28, at 701-03 (1968). His analysis of the relevant policy considerations
would apply with even greater force where production is required by search warrant alone.
- 378 U.S. 52 (1964).
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to shoulder the entire load" . . . ; our respect for the inviolability
of the human personality and of the right of each individual "to a
private enclave where he may lead a private life" . . . ; our distrust
of self-deprecatory statements; and our realization that the privi-
lege, while sometimes "a shelter to the guilty," is often "a protection
to the innocent.
36
Almost all of the enumerated policies apply solely to a testimo-
nial privilege rather than a privilege from the production of preex-
isting documents. Some of the stated policies could conceivably
apply to documents and are briefly treated here for that reason.
First, the relationship of government and individual would
certainly be affected by an application of the privilege to docu-
ments. Although it is impossible to determine when a fair "state-
individual balance" has been achieved, it is arguable that the
fourth amendment requirements which all valid search warrants
must meet, whether documents or other chattels are sought, are
sufficient to preserve that proper balance. Fairness to the individ-
ual is no more compromised by a search for papers than by a
search for a gun, so long as the state observes the proper proce-
dural prerequisites.
The "protection to the innocent" argument could also plausi-
bly apply to searches for documents, as Boyd and Entick suggest.
This "policy," however, has largely been repudiated by the Su-
preme Court itself.37
More difficult to deal with is the "privacy" or "private en-
clave" theory which Mr. Justice Douglas recently developed at
length in his dissent in Couch v. United States.3" There can be
little question that a search of a person's documents and records,
however undertaken, is a compromise of his privacy. But freedom
from all compromises of privacy is not necessarily a fundamental
right. The imposition of controls on a valid search and, perhaps,
a limitation upon the type of documents subject to search may
properly define the limits of such a right, if it exists in this con-
text. The Supreme Court has suggested that there may be an area
or a category of documents or chattels so private that the govern-
378 U.S. at 55 (citations omitted).
37 Tehan v. United States ex rel. Shott, 382 U.S. 406 (1966). See also Friendly, supra
note 27, at 686-87; McKay, Self-Incrimination and the New Privacy, 1967 Sup. CT. REV.
193, 207-08.
- 409 U.S. 322, 338 (1973) (dissenting opinion).
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ment may make no inquiry into them.39 Since the Court has not
defined an area of absolute privilege it may be useful to consider
what documents, if not all documents, merit the application of
such a doctrine. The clearest case for the application of an abso-
lute privilege would be that of documents which embody ideas,
the expression of which is protected by the first amendment. If
these documents deserve protection, it is because of their content.
They arguably deserve no less protection than the oral expression
of the same thoughts. In this sense they are very different from
other chattels-whether communicative or non-communicative
in character. Financial records, business records, and documents
employed in the commission of crimes do not merit the same
constitutional favor.40
In terms of values to be protected by the fifth amendment,
the latter documents are really not different from items of real
evidence, which sometimes may also be of a very "personal" na-
ture but which, nevertheless, are not exempt from search or sei-
zure. Even if the state cannot inquire about certain documents,
it is arguable that the fifth amendment is not the proper source
of protection for the non-incriminating ideas expressed. A disin-
terested magistrate should, in accordance with the fourth amend-
ment, stand between the government and the individual whose
documents are to be examined. The government's ability to com-
promise the privacy of any documents should be tested at that
point.
The Court in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967), noted that:
This case thus does not require that we consider whether there are items of
evidential value whose very nature precludes them from being the object of
a reasonable search and seizure.
Id. at 303.
," See Friendly, supra note 28, at 687-90; 8 J. WIGMORE, supra note 21, at 318. Judge
Fairchild, dissenting in Hill v. Philpott, 445 F.2d 144 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S.
991 (1971), outlined some of the considerations which should be applied here:
Assuming, however, that there is a class of papers so intimately confidential
and so much a part of the personhood that they ought to enjoy a superlative
privacy and be protected from seizure upon an adequately grounded warrant,
it does not seem to me that the records in question here have the required
character. They appear to have been maintained for business and profes-
sional purposes, with the knowledge and assistance of employees, and the
manner in which they were allegedly kept and used, made them, in a sense,
instrumentalities of the tax evasion offense claim.
Id. at 150.
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Of course, neither the magistrate nor even the government
officials who are applying for a warrant may have any inkling that
documents enjoying the protection of the first amendment are to
be examined, and so, as Judge Seth argued in Shaffer, it is the
search itself which will offend privacy, and not the seizure of some
incriminating papers. However true this may be, it is important
to recall that not all searches, but only unreasonable searches, are
prohibited by the Constitution. 1 Further, the Constitution spe-
cifically foresaw that reasonable searches would be made of "pap-
ers and effects. ' 42 Some documents which express ideas may also,
for totally unrelated reasons, (e.g., because they bear a significant
date or because of handwriting appearing on them), incriminate
the author or owner. Such papers could be protected if the Su-
preme Court chooses to deliniate an absolute area of privacy.
Short of such a decision, there is arguably no reason why such
papers cannot be used in ways which would not in any way com-
promise first amendment freedoms.
The Tenth Circuit in Shaffer appropriately looked to the
fourth amendment as the bulwark against invasion of privacy by
the government. The behavior by the IRS which Judge Seth be-
lieved to be so offensive can be sufficiently tested by the fourth
amendment alone. The right of privacy is unquestionably vio-
lated by the invasion of a home upon mere suspicion, the indis-
criminate ransacking of belongings, and seizure of property. The
fifth amendment need not be called upon to curb such outrageous
behavior. Each amendment has its separate role to play in pro-
tecting the individual. They "are complimentary to, though not
dependent upon, each other."43
IV. DOCUMENTS AS PROTECTED "COMMUNICATIONS"
Both the majority and the dissent in Shaffer approached the
case as if the fifth amendment issue were primarily whether the
Shaffers were subject to "compulsion" by the Government to
incriminate themselves. The majority held that there was no
compulsion because the IRS agents searched for the documents
" Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616, 641 (1886) (concurring opinion); See, J.
LANDYNSKI, supra note 12, at 60. In Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), the
Supreme Court approved "searches" involving even oral communications, if proper safe-
guards are employed.
" U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
, L. LEVY, ORIGINS OF THE FIFrH AMENDMENT 394 (1968).
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themselves, and the dissent properly indicated that search war-
rants too are rather compelling process.44 Supreme Court deci-
sions since Boyd v. United States45 have defined the issue more
sharply and offer a solution which does not depend on that trou-
bling but not terribly helpful word "compulsion."
In Warden v. Hayden 6 the Supreme Court rejected the
"mere evidence" rule which had prohibited searches for evidence,
as opposed to instrumentalities of crime, fruits, or contraband.
Prior to Hayden, only the latter could be properly sought and
seized. The Court in Hayden based its departure from the old
rule47 and its decision to admit the evidence seized (articles of
clothing) upon the determination that the evidence was not
"'testimonial' or 'communicative' in nature, and [its] introduc-
tion therefore did not compel respondent to become a witness
against himself in violation of the fifth amendment."48 The em-
phasis was on the nature of the evidence and not on the compul-
sory nature of the process by which it was produced.
The Court in Hayden alluded to a distinction perhaps first
raised by Mr. Justice Holmes in Holt v. United States.4" The
defendant in Holt was compelled to put on a blouse in order to
determine whether it belonged to him. He objected on fifth
amendment grounds. Justice Holmes rated his contention as "an
extravagant extension of the Fifth Amendment,"50 because, al-
though the resulting evidence was incriminating, no "communi-
cation" was extorted from the accused.
51
Schmerber v. California52 again raised the same distinction.
Judge Ely dissenting in VonderAhe v. Howland, 508 F.2d 364, 373 (9th Cir. 1974),
noted that a person to whom a search warrant is directed refuses "production" at his peril:
One need ask only what would happen if the addressee of a warrant refused
to allow the search to be conducted to appreciate the magnitude of compul-
sion produced by a search warrant. Without the slightest hesitation his doors
would be broken down, he would be placed under arrest, and the desired
material would be seized. How the imminence of such force can be consid-
ered as anything other than compulsion escapes us.
,5 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
" 387 U.S. 294 (1967).
, The "mere evidence" rule was established in Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298
(1921).
" 387 U.S. at 302-03.
4' 218 U.S. 245 (1910).
" Id. at 252.
Id. at 253.
52 384 U.S. 757 (1966).
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There, a police officer compelled a driver of an automobile to
submit to the extraction from his body of a blood sample. The
sample was then analyzed for alcohol content and used as evi-
dence against the driver. Despite the obvious compulsion of the
defendant to assist the state in prosecuting him, the Court held
that the removal of the blood did not violate the privilege against
self-incrimination because "the privilege is a bar against compel-
ling 'communications' or 'testimony,' but [the] compulsion
which makes a suspect or accused the source of 'real or physical
evidence' does not violate it." 3
Assuming the propriety of the Holt-Hayden-Schmerber dis-
tinction as an analytical tool, how are letters, papers, and other
documents to be treated if sought by search warrant? Some argue
that documents sought in a search are the very type of communi-
cation which the Supreme Court had in mind in Schmerber and
similar cases, because documents are "communicative" in na-
ture.54 This analysis is fallacious. The term "communication" can
also be a catchword and, as such, no more helpful than the word
"compulsion." It is not the nature of items seized which is criti-
cal, but the nature of the acts required of the individual. Blood
samples, if analyzed, convey meaning; but the individual from
whom they are taken is not required to act in a way which in itself
conveys his own knowledge to the government, which may then
use it against him. Thus, if the state were to serve a defendant
with a subpoena to produce a weapon used in a particular crime,
the accused could invoke the privilege against self-incrimination
because his production of the weapon, as the one identified in the
subpoena, would amount to an admission of guilt. The subpoena
would require a communicative act rather than an item which in
itself could constitute a communication. On the other hand, a
lawful search of the person of a robbery suspect which reveals a
note saying "This is a Stickup" cannot reasonably be said to
Id. at 764. Similar distinctions were drawn in Gilbert v. California, 388 U.S. 263
(1967) (suspect required to give handwriting exemplars which were admitted in evidence
at trial); United States v. Wade, 388 U.S. 218 (1967) (accused required to appear in a
lineup). In the latter case the Court noted:
It is a compulsion of the accused to exhibit his physical characteristics, not
compulsion to disclose any knowledge he might have.
388 U.S. at 222 (emphasis added).
54 See, e.g., Comment, Use of the Summons, Intervention and Constitutional Rights,
2 HoFSTRA L. Rav. 135, 176 (1974).
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violate the fifth amendment. The individual should be in no bet-
ter position where the object found happens to be a writing than
he would be if a weapon were found.
Professor Zechariah Chafee, some fifty years ago, succinctly
defined the governing principle:
The privilege is violated when a man is compelled to do something 083
active, whereas he usually remains passive during an unreasonable 083
search and seizure.5
There is a real difference, in a fifth amendment sense, be-
tween a subpoena and a search warrant. The subpoena requires
an act which communicates, i.e., which divulges knowledge. The
search warrant requires an act too-but not one which reveals
knowledge or conveys information.
CONCLUSION
The court in Shaffer appears, then, to have reached the
proper result. Preexisting documents, despite some argument to
the contrary, were probably not protected from disclosure by the
early privilege against self-incrimination. Nor is their protection
required by the policies behind the privilege. They are logically
no different from other chattels sought by a proper warrant.
The confusion about the status of documentary evidence per-
haps results from the long asserted but somewhat cloudy "inti-
mate retationship" between the fourth and fifth amendments. To
say that these amendments are not interrelated robs neither one
of any meaning or effect. It only serves to clarify discussion of the
rights which flow from each. The Boyd case-and the fifth
amendment itself-have acquired an almost mystical signifi-
cance with time which makes it difficult to eliminate emotion
from any discussion of them. To some extent this is praiseworthy.
The fifth amendment is a symbol of certain national aspirations.5"
Nevertheless, its scope should not be broadened without carefully
questioning how the result coincides with those aspirations. Fi-
nally, it would be foolish to lose sight of the position that the
fourth amendment occupies in protecting the individual wholly
apart from any function of the fifth. The requirement that the
state measure up to definite standards and limitations before it
5 Chafee, The Progress of the Law, 1919-1922, 35 HAiv. L. REV. 673, 697-98 (1922).
5 E. GiuswoLD, TE Firm AMENDMENT TODAY (1955).
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may presume to compromise the person and property of the indi-
vidual is the appropriate safeguard against overzealous or oppres-
sive public officials.
JUVENILE LAW: JUVENILE DELINQUENCY AND YOUTH
CORRECTIONS
During the 1974-75 term the Tenth Circuit made notable rul-
ings in five criminal cases involving juveniles.
United States v. Watts' presented the question whether a
juvenile's right to due process was violated by the failure of the
police to give adequate notice of the charges against him to his
parents. Watts, a minor aged 17, was charged by information with
juvenile delinquency-manslaughter, arising from the stabbing
death of his brother. On appeal, Watts contended that his due
process rights were violated when his parents were not given ade-
quate notice. The court found that notice to a juvenile's parents
is not a due process right, but rather a procedural safeguard.
Therefore, failure to give notice to parents is not such a denial of
substantive due process as to require reversal.2
In re Gau lt, 3 cited by the appellant, set the standard for the
type of notice required by due process for juvenile delinquency
proceedings. The Supreme Court in Gault said that due process
requires that a hearing in which a youth's freedom and his par-
ents' right to custody are at stake cannot be held without giving
the parents timely notice.' Gault required that the child and his
parents be notified in writing of the charges and allegations at the
earliest practicable time and sufficiently in advance to permit
adequate preparation for the hearing.' In Gault the notice to the
juvenile's mother was found to be inadequate where she was in-
formed orally, on the day the juvenile was taken into custody,
that there would be a hearing the next day.
513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Id. at 8.
387 U.S. 1 (1967).
Id. at 33-34.
Id.
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The Tenth Circuit found6 the rights enumerated in Gault to
be based on constitutional protections and, thus, equally applica-
ble to a proceeding under the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act7
such as that in Watts. Section 5033 of that Act states:
Whenever a juvenile is taken into custody for an alleged act of juve-
nile delinquency, the arresting officer shall immediately advise such
juvenile of his legal rights. . . and shall immediately notify. . . the
juvenile's parents, guardian, or custodian of such custody.
The court's concern in Watts was whether violation of the
Gault standard per se constituted such a deprivation of the juve-
nile's right to due process as to require reversal. The court read
Gault loosely as requiring only "fair treatment"' and concluded
that Watts was not denied such fair treatment Notice to a juve-
nile's parents, the court said, is for a purpose similar to that of
insuring that the juvenile has the assistance of counsel and can
prepare an adequate defense." It was found that, in fact, Watts
had not been denied due process. Even though his parents were
not notified by the authorities, he was represented by competent
counsel, and his mother and stepfather were available to assist
him.
Finding that the failure to notify Watts' parents was not
willful and that the Government's case was not enhanced by
the failure to notify them," the court decided that reversal was
not necessary. It reasoned that only a prophylactic safeguard, and
not a basic due process right, was violated.'"
The court thus treated the question as whether Watts was in
fact denied fair treatment, rather than whether a due process
requirement of notice to parents was violated. It gave little sub-
stantive effect to the language in section 5033 of the Juvenile
513 F.2d at 6.
7 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. 1975).
1 In support of its loose reading of In re Gault, the court quoted the Supreme Court's
statement in Gault that the due process standards established there were to be "intelli-
gently and not ruthlessly administered." 387 U.S. at 21. The circuit court also cited Goss
v. Lopez, 419 U.S. 565, 578 (1975), in which the Supreme Court quoted Cafeteria Workers
v. McElroy, 367 U.S. 886, 895 (1961): "[D]ue process negates any concept of inflexible
procedures universally applicable to every imaginable situation." 513 F.2d at 7-8.
513 F.2d at 9.
Id. at 7, citing Holloway v. Wainwright, 451 F.2d 149 (5th Cir. 1971); Kempler v.
Maryland, 428 F.2d 169 (4th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 9.
Id. at 7, citing Michigan v. Tucker, 417 U.S. 433 (1974).
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Delinquency Act, which says notice shall be given to the juve-
nile's parents.
The Tenth Circuit expressed its agreement with a federal
district court in Florida, 3 which read Gault as establishing that
juveniles should be treated as adults in regard to certain constitu-
tional rights. However, the emphasis behind the Juvenile Delin-
quency Act has been to proceed against juveniles as juveniles and
to avoid prosecution as criminals;'4 the Tenth Circuit has noted
this particular purpose in at least two previous cases, 5 one of
which was handed down earlier this year. The specific procedural
standards set out in Gault and the congressional mandate regard-
ing notice in the Juvenile Delinquency Act'" likewise emphasize
special treatment of juveniles, and not the general "fair treat-
ment" standard which the court has applied in Watts.
The provisions of the Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act, as
amended in September 1974,'1 were made available to a juvenile
indicted before the effective date of the Act in United States v.
Mechem.'" The United States sought a writ of mandamus and
prohibition directing Judge Mechem to vacate his order that the
prosecution substitute an information for its indictment against
the 14-year-old respondent Chavez in connection with charges of
rape and murder. The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial judge
that the amendments to the Juvenile Delinquency Act, which
require that a juvenile under age 16 who is not surrendered to
state authorities be proceeded against under the juvenile stat-
ute, 9 should be applied to the subject juvenile who had been
arraigned 1 month before the effective date of the amendments.
The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act effective at the time
Chavez had been arraigned" excluded Chavez from treatment
because of the serious nature of the charges against him.2' The
11 Walker v. Florida, 328 F. Supp. 620 (S.D. Fla. 1971), aff'd, 466 F.2d 485 (5th Cir.
1972).
See, e.g., Fagerstrom v. United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963).
'5 United States v. Mechem, 509 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1975); Cotton v. United States,
355 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 18 U.S.C.A. § 5033 (Supp. 1975).
17 Id. §§ 5031-42.
' 509 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1975).
" 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp. 1975).
Ch. 645, §§ 5031-37, 62 Stat. 857 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. §§ 5031-42 (Supp.
1975).
11 The Federal Juvenile Delinquency Act defined "juvenile" as a person under 18 and
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trial court held, however, that the policy behind the 1974 amend-
ments was to control proceedings against juveniles and that the
amendments evidenced an intent to remove juveniles from the
ordinary criminal process. Contrary to its reasoning in Watts,"2
the circuit court agreed," implicitly recognizing that the purpose
of the Juvenile Delinquency Act is to avoid prosecution of
juveniles as criminals." The court was persuaded that Congress
did not intend the ordinary criminal process to continue, through
the saving statute, 5 to apply to juveniles not yet tried. The
court's ruling was based on policy considerations; although the
Juvenile Delinquency Act also deals with substantive offenses, its
policy and procedural features are much more important.
In Roddy v. United States26 the Tenth Circuit upheld an
adult sentence imposed on a 22-year-old found guilty of robbery,
even though the sentence was to be served consecutively with a
sentence previously imposed under the Youth Corrections Act.
27
The defendant Roddy was given an indeterminate sentence under
the Youth Act 28 by an Arizona court, which found affirmatively
that treatment under the Youth Corrections Act would be benefi-
cial.29 Subsequently, Roddy was convicted of an earlier robbery
"juvenile delinquency" as a violation of a law, by a juvenile, not punishable by death or
life imprisonment. Ch. 645, § 5031, 62 Stat. 857 (1948), as amended, 18 U.S.C.A. § 5031
(Supp. 1975).
2 513 F.2d 5 (10th Cir. 1975). See text accompanying notes 13-17 supra.
11 509 F.2d at 1195.
2' Accord, Cotton v. United States, 355 F.2d 480, 481 (10th Cir. 1966); Fagerstrom v.
United States, 311 F.2d 717, 720 (8th Cir. 1963).
1 U.S.C. § 109 (1970), which provides:
The repeal of any statute shall not have the effect to release or extinguish
any penalty, forfeiture, or liability incurred under such statute, unless the
repealing Act shall so expressly provide, and such statute shall be treated
as still remaining in force for the purpose of sustaining any proper action or
prosecution for the enforcement of such penalty, forfeiture, or liability.
25 509 F.2d 1145 (10th Cir. 1975).
' 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
2A Id. § 5010(b). This section provides that in the case of a youth offender whose
offense is punishable by imprisonment, the court may instead sentence the youth to the
custody of the Attorney General for treatment and supervision under the Act, until it is
determined by the Youth Correction Division of the Board of Parole that the youth should
be discharged.
- 18 U.S.C. § 4209 (1970), titled "Young Adult Offenders," provides that where a
defendant is age 22-26 at the time of conviction, a court may look at the defendant's prior
record, social background, mental and physical health, and other pertinent factors, and
it may sentence the young offender under the Federal Youth Corrections Act if the court
reasonably believes that the defendant will benefit from such treatment.
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in New Mexico, and received an adult sentence of 5 years to run
consecutively to the Arizona youth sentence. A concurrent sent-
ence was rejected by the New Mexico court because it found that
peoples' lives were endangered by the robbery.
Defendant argued that the consecutive sentence imposed in
New Mexico frustrated the rehabilitative purpose behind the
Youth Act sentence given by the Arizona court. While acknowl-
edging that the conjunction of the youth sentence and consecu-
tive adult sentence has a "deleterious effect on the rehabilitative
design of the Act,"30 the Tenth Circuit concluded, citing Nast v.
United States," that a youth sentence for one offense did not bar
a sentence under a different act for another prior or subsequent
offense. The court quoted the following language from Nast:
"[T]he problem raised by appellant is for such legislative con-
sideration as it might enlist, rather than one to be solved as
appellant presses upon this court.
3
Dorszynski v. United States was relied on to support the
court's interpretation of the Youth Act as enlarging, not restrict-
ing the sentencing options of courts, and, thus, keeping sentenc-
ing within the judge's discretion. The court stated that eligibility
for sentencing under the Act does not confer a right to be sent-
enced under it; a judge may decide not to apply the Act. 34 Also,
as in this case, there is discretion to apply the Act to a defendant
not otherwise eligible, if it is decided he will benefit from treat-
ment under the Act. Finally, the court noted, the Youth Act does
not provide that a sentence under the Act shall be preemptive. 3
The court reviewed its prior holding in Price v. United
States3 in which it was determined that an indeterminate sent-
ence imposed under the Youth Act for one of three counts could
not be increased by imposition of consecutive sentences on the
other two counts in the indictment. In Price it was pointed out
that cumulative or consecutive sentences would not fit the reha-
1* 509 F.2d at 1147.
31 415 F.2d 338 (10th Cir. 1969).
" Id. at 340.
418 U.S. 424, 437 (1974).
509 F.2d at 1147.
38 Id.
- 384 F.2d 650 (10th Cir. 1967).
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bilitative purpose of the indeterminate sentences imposed under
the Youth Act. 7
The Tenth Circuit decided, however, that Nast rather than
Price should be controlling where, as in this case, the sentences
are not in statutory or constitutional conflict and the second of-
fense arises under a different statute. The court failed to note,
however, its own finding in Nast that there was a rehabilitative
purpose behind the adult sentence imposed in that case as the
sentencing judge had provided for parole within a year." In the
present case judicial discretion was emphasized rather than the
rehabilitative purpose behind the Federal Youth Corrections
Act. 9
In Jackson v. United States0 the Tenth Circuit decided that
the Supreme Court ruling in Dorszynski v. United States4 need
not be given retroactive effect. That ruling required that an ex-
press finding be made on the record that a youth will not benefit
from treatment under the Federal Youth Corrections Act42 before
sentencing him as an adult.43
Jackson was sentenced to 18 years for bank robbery; he con-
tended on appeal that an express finding of "no benefit" was not
made. The court decided that the purpose of the new rule in
Dorszynski was to show clearly that the sentencing judge was
11 Id. at 652. The court said that the "elasticity" in the Youth Act was conducive to
rehabilitation. Section 5017(c) sets outer limits on the length of time a youth may be kept
under supervision, while section 5010(b) provides for release before those times when the
Correction Division determines.
415 F.2d at 340.
3' See H.R. REP. No. 2979, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 1 (1950):
The proposed legislation is designed to make available for the discretionary
use of the Federal judges a system for the sentencing and treatment of
[youth offenders] that will promote the rehabilitation of those who in the
opinion of the sentencing judge show promise of becoming useful citizens
See also Rogers v. United States, 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963), in which the court reviews
at length the rehabilitative purpose of the Federal Youth Corrections Act in support of
its conclusion that confinement under the Act is for corrective and preventive guidance
and rehabilitation and is not for punishment.
40 510 F.2d 1335 (10th Cir. 1975).
1 418 U.S. 424 (1974).
'z 18 U.S.C. §§ 5005-26 (1970).
'3 The express finding requirement in Dorszynski could be satisfied by any expression
that clearly showed that the sentencing judge considered the alternatives of sentencing
under the Federal Youth Corrections Act and decided that the youth offender would not
derive benefit from such treatment.
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aware of the sentencing options." The Tenth Circuit found that
in this case the district court was fully aware of the Youth Act
and of Jackson's eligibility under the Act at the time of sentenc-
ing. Therefore, the purpose of the Dorszynski rule was achieved
despite the absence of an express finding of no benefit.
The court, using the criteria for retroactivity set out in
Michigan v. Payne,4 5 found that reliance on the procedural stan-
dard in effect before Dorszynski and the effect of retroactivity on
the administration of justice both dictated against retroactive
application of the new rule." The court said that many courts had
relied justifiably on the prior procedural standard, and retroactiv-
ity would needlessly subject to question a substantial number of
properly imposed sentences. 7
In Suggs v. Daggett"5 the Tenth Circuit decided that the 6-
year maximum custody period established under the Federal
Youth Corrections Act4" requires that the youth must have been
in actual or constructive custody during the 6 years. In so doing,
1 The Supreme Court in Dorszynski said, "Once it is made clear that the sentencing
judge has considered the option of treatment under the Act and rejected it . no appel-
late review is warranted." 418 U.S. at 443.
5 412 U.S. 47 (1973). The criteria used to determine whether a newly announced rule
is to be given retrospective application are: (1) The purpose of the new rule, (2) the extent
of reliance on the old rule, and (3) the effect of retroactive application on the administra-
tion of justice.
" The court cited Holliday v. United States, 394 U.S. 831 (1969), in which strict
adherence to rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure was not required retroac-
tively. Holliday looked at the large number of convictions obtained through justified
reliance on the old standard and the disruptive effect their reversal would have. See also
Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 298 (1967), which held that "[tihe extent to which a
condemned practice infects the integrity of the truth-determining process . . . must ...
be weighed against the prior justified reliance upon the old standard and the impact of
retroactivity upon the administration of justice."
1 510 F.2d at 1337. See also Owens v. United States, 383 F. Supp. 780 (D. Pa. 1974),
in which Dorszynski was held not to be retroactive. The court in Owens found the
Dorszynski requirement to be prophylactic, not a substantive right, and decided that
retroactivity would seriously affect sentences imposed in several circuits where it had been
held, before Dorszynski, that a "no benefit" finding could be implied from the record. Id.
at 785. It would be impossible, the court noted, for judges to go back and offer affirmative
reasons for all the sentences meted out before Dorszynski.
" 522 F.2d 396 (10th Cir. 1975).
49 18 U.S.C. § 5005-26 (1970). Section 5017(c) of the Act provides:
A youth offender committed under section 5010(b) of this chapter shall be
released conditionally under supervision on or before the expiration of four
years from the date of his conviction and shall be discharged unconditionally
on or before six years from the date of his conviction.
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the court restated its previous holding that a sentence of impris-
onment is served by confinement in fact or by unrevoked parole.50
Petitioner Suggs instituted a habeas corpus proceeding, al-
leging his entitlement to release from custody under the Youth
Act on the ground that section 5017(c) of the Act makes release
at the end of 6 years mandatory. In fact, he was in an escape
status for 82 days during the 6-year period, and the 82 days were
not counted in computing the release date.
In reliance on Rogers v. United States,5' the district court
held that the 6-year period was mandatory, and, once the period
has expired, the youth must be released.5 2 The Tenth Circuit
reversed, holding that both section 5017(c) and the language in
Rogers which emphasized a 6-year maximum custody period53
assumed actual or constructive custody or parole:
To rule that escape time counts would be to disregard the object and
spirit of the Youth Corrections Act which contemplates commit-
ment for treatment looking to rehabilitation."
Loretta B. Huffine
r Postelwait v. Willingham, 365 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1966); Weathers v. Willingham,
356 F.2d 421 (10th Cir. 1966).
" 326 F.2d 56 (10th Cir. 1963). Rogers concerned a due process challenge to the 6-
year maximum period where the period of confinement under the Youth Corrections Act
was potentially longer than the maximum sentence provided for in the statute under
which the offender was charged. The court rejected the due process argument, saying that
the Youth Corrections Act allowed for an offender to be released earlier than the maxi-
mum, depending on the youth's response to corrective treatment. If the period of confine-
ment, up to 6 years, did turn out to be greater than the maximum sentence under the
statute violated, it was not for punishment, but for rehabilitation. See also 18 U.S.C. §
5006(g) (1970), which defines treatment under the Act as "corrective and preventive
guidance and training designed to protect the public by correcting the antisocial tenden-
cies of youth offenders."
2 522 F.2d at 396-97.
' 326 F.2d at 57.
' 522 F.2d at 397.
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OVERVIEW
I. ATTORNEY-CLIENT RELATIONSHIPS
In Hayes v. Eagle-Picher Industries, Inc.,I the Tenth Circuit
considered whether a settlement agreement was binding on dis-
senting members of a group of plaintiffs who had earlier "entered
into [an] . . . agreement that the majority rule would govern
acceptance of a settlement." 2 On the evening prior to the day the
trial was set, the attorneys for the plaintiffs entered into a settle-
ment agreement with the defendant. This agreement was ac-
cepted by 13 of the 18 plaintiffs and on the next day "an an-
nouncement was made in open court that the majority had agreed
to settle."3 When the trial judge asked if there were any objections
to the settlement, the dissenting members of the group failed to
respond; however, when the court reduced the settlement to a
judgment, two of the plaintiffs did object and subsequently
brought this appeal.
The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's acceptance of the
settlement by holding that an attorney cannot settle a case over
the "express objection of his clients."4 The court said that an
agreement to be bound by the decision of the majority was invalid
because it is
contrary to the plain duties owed by an attorney to a client. An
agreement such as the present one which allows a case to be settled
contrary to the wishes of the client and without his approving the
terms of the settlement is opposed to the basic fundamentals of the
attorney-client relationship.'
513 F.2d 892 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id.
Id. at 893. The two plaintiffs claimed that they did not hear the judge's question,
and he subsequently entered judgment on the basis that "there was no fraud,
misrepresentation or misconduct" in connection with the agreement. Id. at 893 n.1. The
defendants argued that the failure of the plaintiffs to speak when the court made its
inquiry barred them from later attempting to repudiate the agreement. The Tenth Circuit,
however, rejected this argument by applying for the first time in the Tenth Circuit the
well-established right of "litigants to set aside a compromise to which they do not agree."
Id. at 894, citing Harris v. Diamond Constr. Co., 184 Va. 711, 36 S.E.2d 573 (1946); Annot.,
30 A.L.R.2d 957 (1953).
513 F.2d at 894.
Id. While the agreement to be bound by the majority in a settlement was entered
into prior to the actual settlement, the court did not see how this would make the agree-
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The court questioned the propriety of such an agreement because
it placed the attorney in the posture of representing "both the
clients who favored the settlement and those who opposed it."'
In Fullmer v. Harper7 and Redd v. Shell Oil Co.,8 the court
of appeals considered the proper procedure for the disqualifica-
tion of an attorney. In Fullmer the defendants filed a verified
motion to disqualify one of the plaintiff's attorneys on the
grounds that a conflict of interests existed because of a prior
attorney-client relationship between the attorney and the defen-
dant. The motion was dismissed even though the "relationship
pertained to the general subject matter out of which the . . .
controversy had arisen," and the defendants appealed the dis-
missal While the Tenth Circuit was unable to decide whether a
conflict of interests existed because of the inadequacy of the re-
cord before the court, it did lay down the procedure it thought the
trial court should follow when presented with a motion to disqual-
ify:
In our view the verified motion to disqualify raises ethical ques-
tions that are conceivably of a serious nature. In such circumstance
a written response should be required. The trial court should then
hold a full evidentiary hearing on the issues posed by the motion to
disqualify and the response thereto, which hearing should include
the taking of testimony. A motion of this type should not be resolved
on the basis of mere colloquy between court and counsel. At the
conclusion of such hearing the trial court should then make specific
findings and conclusions, to the end that this court will then have a
ment effective because "the plaintiffs would [still] have the right to agree or refuse to
agree once the terms of the settlement were made known to them." Id.
I Id. The court felt that this might be a violation of ABA CODE OF PROFESSIONAL
RESPONSIBILITY Disciplinary Rule 5-106 (1971), which had been promulgated by the Kansas
Supreme Court; however, the Tenth Circuit acknowledged the good faith of the attorneys
and noted that its opinion was "not to be understood as criticizing the professional con-
duct of the trial attorney" for the plaintiffs. 513 F.2d at 895 n.3.
7 517 F.2d 20 (10th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). Fullmer was an action brought under the
Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act of 1959, codified in scattered sections
of Titles 28 and 29, for injunctive relief and monetary damages.
518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975). Redd was an appeal brought from an attorney-
disciplinary action that arose in connection with an antitrust suit in the United States
District Court for the District of Utah.
1 517 F.2d at 21. The court also considered whether an order of a trial court denying
a motion to disqualify an attorney is an appealable order within the meaning of 28 U.S.C.
§ 1291 (1970), which provides that "[t]he courts of appeal shall have jurisdiction of
appeals from all final decisions of the district courts of the United States ......
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record before it which will permit a meaningful review, should re-
view be sought.10
Less than 2 months later a similar problem arose in Redd v.
Shell Oil Co." The trial judge in Redd imposed a $5,000 fine on
defendant's attorney for filing what the trial court considered "a
meritless and untimely motion for disqualification of all of [the
plaintiff's] counsel."'" The basis for the motion was the fact that
an attorney who had previously worked for the firm representing
the defendant was employed by plaintiff's counsel and was in-
volved in the case at bar. While the defendant apparently knew
of this fact for several months prior to the actual filing of the
motion, it delayed "the filing of the motion until the Friday be-
fore the Monday on which the trial was to commence."' 3 Because
the attorney who had earlier worked for the defendant had never
done any work related to the present litigation and because the
motion to disqualify was delayed until the eve of the trial, the
district court held the filing of the motion "constituted a sham
and justified the imposition of sanctions" in the form of a $5,000
fine."
The court of appeals reversed the imposition of the fine on
the basis that it was "wholly unjustified" and because it "was not
a correct measure of the action."'" Instead, "it would have been
amply sufficient to strike the motion to disqualify and to have
reprimanded counsel for having filed it at the eleventh hour."' 6
517 F.2d at 20-21.
518 F.2d 311 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 518 F.2d at 312. A problem similar to that in Redd arose in Silver Chrysler Plym-
outh, Inc. v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 496 F.2d 800 (2d Cir. 1974) (en banc). In that case a
law clerk, employed in the litigation department of the attorneys for the defendant and
involved in work concerning the defendants, subsequently formed his own firm that then
became involved in litigation with the defendant. The trial court, in an opinion reported
at 370 F. Supp. 581 (E.D.N.Y. 1973), denied the motion to disqualify, and this decision
was affirmed by the Second Circuit in an opinion which primarily recognized the appeala-
bility of the denial of such motions. In its opinion the Second Circuit recognized the
likelihood that such problems would continue to arise because of changes in the "struc-
tures of large metropolitan law firms," and it predicted that "[c]harges of conflict of
interest and motions to disqualify will probably increase rather than abate." 496 F.2d at
803. In its opinion the Tenth Circuit noted that similar problems had recently arisen in
other cases in Arizona.
IS 518 F.2d at 314.
' Id. at 312.
' Id. at 314.
I /d.
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The court of appeals noted that "lawyer conflict of interest prob-
lems ought to be brought up long before the date of trial in an
atmosphere which does not cast a shadow over the trial itself, ' 7
and it reiterated the procedure it established for such problems
in Fuilmer.
II. JURISDIcTION
The Tenth Circuit in May v. Supreme Court'9 rejected for
lack of jurisdiction0 a class action challenging the imposition by
the Colorado State Supreme Court of an annual $20 fee.2 The
court held that the amount in controversy did not exceed the
jurisdictional amount of $10,000 required under section 1331 de-
spite the plaintiffs' contention that "the amount of controversy
is not the fee of $20 but the value of their right to practice law,"
which presumably did exceed $10,000.2 In rejecting this conten-
tion, the court of appeals relied on the 1934 Supreme Court deci-
sion of Healy v. Rattal3 in which the Court said that "[tihe
,7 Id. The court pointed out that the only issue it was deciding in Redd was whether
the disciplinary action against the attorney involved was justified by the facts and circum-
stances of the case.
'1 The court, at 518 F.2d at 316 n.3, quoted the language from Fullmer, appearing at
517 F.2d at 20-21 and quoted supra in the text accompanying note 10. This language
describes the proper procedure that should be followed when a motion to disqualify an
attorney is made.
19 508 F.2d 136 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 2631 (1975).
20 The plaintiffs claimed jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) [hereinafter cited
as section 1331], which gives district courts jurisdiction "of all civil actions wherein the
matter in controversy exceeds the sum or value of $10,000," and 28 U.S.C. § 1343(3) (1970)
[hereinafter cited as section 1343(3)], which gives district courts jurisdiction to "redress
the deprivation, under color of any State law, statute, ordinance, regulation, custom or
usage, of any right, privilege or immunity secured by the Constitution of the United
States."
21 COLO. R. Civ. P. 227 provides, in part, as follows:
(1) Every attorney admitted to practice in Colorado (including judges,
those admitted on a provisional or temporary basis and those admitted as
judge advocate) shall pay an annual fee of $20.00. . . .The fee shall be used
only to defray the costs of disciplinary administration and enforcement, the
costs incurred with respect to unauthorized practice matters, and the expen-
ses incurred in the administration of this Rule. ...
(2) Any attorney who fails to timely pay the fee required under para-
graph (1) above shall be summarily suspended . . ..
22 508 F.2d at 138. The basis for the plaintiffs' claim was that the plaintiffs would be
suspended under COLO. R. Civ. P. 227(2) if they did not pay the fee.
23 292 U.S. 263 (1934). In Healy an attack was made on an annual $50 fee for peddlers,
with a fine of $200 for failure to comply; the plaintiffs alleged that they met the jurisdic-
tional amount because the value of their business was worth more than that amount. The
Supreme Court, however, disagreed and held
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disputed tax is the matter in controversy, and its value, not that
of the penalty or loss which payment of the tax would avoid,
determines the jurisdiction."24 Because the jurisdictional amount
was not met, the Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's dis-
missal of the action.
In Richins v. Industrial Construction, Inc.25 the State Road
Commission of Utah argued that the eleventh amendment pre-
cluded an indemnity action brought against it, and the plaintiff
countered this by pointing to the existence of a Utah statute
waiving immunity for suits brought in the state court" and the
State's appearance in court." The Tenth Circuit agreed with the
road commission that the facts pointed to by the plaintiff did not
constitute an "implied waiver" of immunity and that the action
was therefore barred." In so ruling the court of appeals noted that
it had a marked "preference for an approach giving full effect to
the Eleventh Amendment absent some extraordinary waiver" of
immunity.2 By expressing this preference, the Tenth Circuit is
consonant both with its own precedent, 0 recent Supreme Court
that the total amount of the tax demanded, or which may be demanded...
is less than the jurisdictional amount . . . . [Therefore, the] decree will be
reversed, with instructions to the district court to dismiss the cause for want
of jurisdiction.
Id. at 272.
24 Id. at 269. This holding has been consistently followed by later courts considering
similar issues. See, e.g., Suther v. Mayfield, 358 F.2d 741 (5th Cir. 1966); Jacobs v. Tawes,
250 F.2d 611 (4th Cir. 1957); Thomas v. General Elec. Co., 207 F. Supp. 792 (W.D. Ky.
1962); Brown v. Graham, 169 F. Supp. 397 (D. Ore. 1959); Southern Fruit Co. v. Porter,
21 F. Supp. 1011 (W.D.S.C. 1937).
25 502 F.2d 1051 (10th Cir. 1974).
26 Utah Governmental Immunity Act, UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 63-30-1 to -34 (1953).
Section 63-30-16 provides for the waiver of immunity in state district courts and has been
previously interpreted by the Tenth Circuit as lacking the "clear intent" necessary to
waive immunity in the federal district courts. Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471
F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973).
" The Tenth Circuit, however, resolved the question of whether a waiver of the
immunity conferred by the eleventh amendment can be effected "by the attorney general
of the state entering an appearance and litigating in the case" by saying that "[wie are
of the opinion that it cannot be so waived." 502 F.2d at 1056. Accord, Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276-77 (1959); Murray v. Wilson Distilling Co.,
213 U.S. 151, 171 (1909).
2" 502 F.2d at 1056. But see Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184 (1964); Petty v.
Tennessee-Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275 (1959); Ladue Local Lines, Inc. v. Bi-
State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131 (8th Cir. 1970).
502 F.2d at 1056 (emphasis added), citing Williams v. Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th
Cir. 1971).
" Harris v. Tooele County School Dist., 471 F.2d 218 (10th Cir. 1973); Williams v.
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opinions," and a growing tendency among the circuits to find
against a waiver of immunity by a state.
32
In Dry Creek Lodge, Inc. v. United States33 the Tenth Circuit
reversed the district court's determination that it did not have
jurisdiction to decide a controversy under the Indian Civil Rights
Act.34 The plaintiff claimed a right of access to its property, upon
which it had built "a stopping off place for persons entering wil-
derness areas" from the main road.35 The access was a 31/2 mile
dirt road which crossed "Indian properties held in trust by the
United States for the benefit of individual Indians and the Shosh-
one and Arapahoe tribes. 38 When the lodge was built the plain-
tiff was aware that it did not have a right of access and it was
advised that it should obtain a formal right-of-way to insure its
right of ingress and egress. Apparently the plaintiff viewed the
lack of an assured right-of-way as "no problem"; however, on the
day the lodge was opened to the public, the individual Indians
owning the property as well as "members of the . . . Joint Busi-
ness Council of the tribes . . . erected a barricade across the road
and stopped traffic in both directions.
3
Eaton, 443 F.2d 422 (10th Cir. 1971); Hamilton Mfg. Co. v. Trustees of State Colleges,
356 F.2d 599 (10th Cir. 1966). See also Gallagher v. Continental Ins. Co., 502 F.2d 827
(10th Cir. 1974).
3, Compare Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S. 651, 671-74 (1974), and Employees of Dep't
of Pub. Health & Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 411 U.S. 279, 293-99
(1973), with Parden v. Terminal Ry., 377 U.S. 184, 195-96 (1964), and Petty v. Tennessee-
Missouri Bridge Comm'n, 359 U.S. 275, 276-77 (1959). See also the dissent of Justice
Frankfurter in Petty which evinces a reluctance to find a waiver of the immunity conferred
by the eleventh amendment similar to that shown by the Tenth Circuit in Richins.
32 See, e.g., Dawkins v. Craig, 483 F.2d 1191, 1193-96 (4th Cir. 1973); Daye v. Pennsyl-
vania, 483 F.2d 294, 297-98 (3d Cir. 1973); Employees of the Dep't of Pub. Health &
Welfare v. Department of Pub. Health & Welfare, 452 F.2d 820, 823 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd,
411 U.S. 279 (1973); McDonald v. Board of Regents, 371 F.2d 818, 819-20 (6th Cir. 1967);
Scott v. Board of Supervisors, 336 F.2d 557, 558 (5th Cir. 1964). Cf. Aerojet-General Corp.
v. Askew, 453 F.2d 819, 826-28 (5th Cir. 1971). Contra, Pennsylvania Environmental
Council, Inc. v. Bartlett, 454 F.2d 613, 625 (3d Cir. 1971) (dicta); Ladue Local Lines, Inc.
v. Bi-State Dev. Agency, 433 F.2d 131, 136 (8th Cir. 1970).
- 515 F.2d 926 (10th Cir. 1975).
34 25 U.S.C. § 1302 (1970) which, in pertinent part, provides as follows:
No Indian tribe in exercising powers of self-government shall-
(8) deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of its
laws or deprive any person of liberty or property without due process of law.
(Emphasis added).
11 515 F.2d at 929.
36 Id.
37 Id.
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The plaintiff filed a complaint in which it named as defen-
dants "the Secretary of the Interior, the area director of the Bu-
reau of Indian Affairs, the superintendent of the Reservation,
. . . the Indian tribes together with the Joint Business Council
of the tribes and its individual members," and the individual
Indians owning the property.38 The trial court initially issued an
order restraining maintenance of the barricade, but then "denied
the application for permanent injunction" and then "without fur-
ther notice . . . proceeded to dismiss the cause of action. ' 39 On
appeal, the plaintiff challenged the propriety of the trial court's
issuing "what amounted to a summary judgment without giving
the requisite notice" and the correctness of its determination that
it lacked jurisdiction. 0
The court of appeals first considered the trial court's dis-
missal of the United States and its officers as parties to the ac-
tion.4 Because the United States had "neither expressly nor im-
pliedly consented to the suit" it was not a proper party to the
action and its dismissal was correct. 2 The appeals court similarly
affirmed the district court's ruling that the claims brought
against the individual officers could not be sustained under sec-
tion 1983, 1 because there was no showing that the defendants had
acted under color of state law.44 The Tenth Circuit did, however,
reverse the trial court's determination that there was no jurisdic-
tion under section 1985, which prevents a denial of equal protec-
tion of the laws and does not require a showing of state action.45
The basis for the denial of equal protection and due process was
" Id. For a discussion of the propriety of the inclusion of the Government officials in
the action, see text accompanying notes 41-51 infra; for a discussion of the propriety of
the inclusion of the Indian tribes, see text accompanying notes 52-61 infra.
:9 515 F.2d at 929.
0 Id.
Id. at 930-32.
42 The court said, "The law is well settled that waiver of sovereign immunity is to be
strictly consirued, and it is plain that Congress did not give its consent to suits against it
by private individuals seeking private roads." Id. at 930.
,3 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1970).
" See, e.g., Native Am. Church v. Navajo Tribal Council, 272 F.2d 131 (10th Cir.
1959); Williams v. Sisseton-Wahpeton Sioux Tribal Council, 387 F. Supp. 1194 (D.S.D.
1975); Loncassion v. Leekity, 334 F. Supp. 370 (D.N.M. 1971); Dodge v. Nakai, 298 F.
Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968); Toledo v. Pueblo de Jemez, 119 F. Supp. 429 (D.N.M. 1954).
" 42 U.S.C. § 1985 (1970). The court said that in section 1985 actions "the presence
or absence of state action is not a factor, for this provision embraces private conspiracies."
515 F.2d at 931, citing Griffin v. Breckenridge, 403 U.S. 88 (1971).
1976
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
the plaintiff's allegation that it was made an "object of discrimi-
nation" as a result of the blockade. While "the complaint [did]
not detail the factual basis for the claim," there was a sufficient
basis in this allegation to have jurisdiction to consider the ques-
tion.47 There was, moreover, another basis for the trial court's
jurisdiction under Bivens v. Six Unknown Federal Agents.4"
Bivens established the "constitutional tort" doctrine," and the
Tenth Circuit held that both Bivens and Bell v. Hood0 "recognize
that the federal jurisdiction requirement is satisfied by allega-
tions in the complaint, even though not specific, which describe
the violation of constitutional rights."5' Thus, it was improper for
the trial court to dismiss the actions against the officers of the
United States because the claims did make sufficient allegations
to justify the court's exercise of jurisdiction.
The Tenth Circuit then considered whether the dismissal of
the claims against the tribes, the Joint Business Council, and its
agents was proper."2 To resolve this question, the Tenth Circuit
had to determine whether the Indian Civil Rights Act provided
jurisdiction which would enable the federal district court to con-
sider the instant case. The issue had been before the court earlier,
but had not been resolved because the plaintiffs in the other
actions had not presented sufficient jurisdictional facts53 or had
failed to exhaust tribal remedies. In Dry Creek Lodge the court
noted that "a decision on the question [was] unavoidable, be-
cause of the case's procedural posture"5 and held that:
[W]e are of the opinion that 25 U.S.C. § 1302 [the Indian Civil
Rights Act], which recognizes the right to be protected against dep-
,e 515 F.2d at 931. For the court's description of the adequacy of the claim presented
in this case, see text accompanying note 57 infra.
,1 515 F.2d at 931.
, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
' For a discussion of this doctrine, see Horlbeck & Harkness, Executive Immunity
and the Constitutional Tort, 51 DENVER L.J. 321 (1974).
10 327 U.S. 678 (1946).
515 F.2d at 931; see id. at 932 n.4.
" Id. at 932-36.
Slattery v. Arapahoe Tribal Council, 453 F.2d 278 (10th Cir. 1971); Groundhog v.
Keeler, 442 F.2d 674 (10th Cir. 1971).
McCurdy v. Steele, 506 F.2d 653 (10th Cir. 1974).
" 515 F.2d at 933 n.7. See also Meyers v. Bethlehem Shipbuilding Corp., 303 U.S.
41 (1938); see McKart v. United States, 395 U.S. 185 (1969); 3 K. DAVIS, ADMINISTRATIVE
LAW TREATISE § 20.02 (1970).
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rivation of due process and equal protection of the law furnishes a
jurisdictional basis which justifies the federal court's entertaining of
the case. . . . [In view of the legislative history [of the Indian
Civil Rights Act], it applies to non-Indians as well as Indians who
are under the jurisdiction of the tribe.5
Even though the instant case was "not the strongest case imagi-
nable under the Indian Civil Rights Act," the allegations were
sufficient to give the district court jurisdiction.57 The Tenth Cir-
cuit's opinion in Dry Creek Lodge seems a reasonable interpreta-
tion of the Indian Civil Rights Act. The legislative history indi-
cates, as the court pointed out, that the Act "was intended to
establish rights for all persons who may be subject to the jurisdic-
tion of tribal governments." 8 This interpretation, moreover, is
similar to that given to the Act by the Eighth Circuit"9 and by two
district courts 0 which have considered the question."
In Norvell v. Sangre de Cristo Development Co."2 the Tenth
Circuit reversed a district court's declaratory judgment on the
basis that no jurisdiction existed because no case or controversy
was present. The action was initiated by the State of New Mexico
and sought "a judgment declaring that the State has certain
jurisdiction over the Sangre de Cristo Development Company
and its activities under a 99-year lease granted it in 1970 by the
Pueblo de Tesuque, an Indian Tribe." 3 The district court granted
the judgment despite the contentions of the defendants that "the
State of New Mexico is without any jurisdiction whatsoever over
the property . . . inasmuch as the lease and/or subleases cover
lands owned by the Pueblo de Tesuque."1 The Tenth Circuit
reversed the judgment on the basis that no case or controversy
5' 515 F.2d at 933.
5 Id. at 934.
Id. at 934 n.8.
g Schantz v. White Lightning, 502 F.2d 67 (8th Cir. 1974).
" Hickey v. Crow Creek Housing Authority, 379 F. Supp. 1002 (D.S.D. 1974); Dodge
v. Nakai, 298 F. Supp. 17 (D. Ariz. 1968).
" The defendants also alleged that the Indian tribes and its members were protected
by the same governmental immunity which shielded the United States and its officers.
The court rejected this argument by holding that section 1302 of the Indian Civil Rights
Act is a "waiver by Congress of this immunity." 515 F.2d at 934.
62 519 F.2d 370 (10th Cir. 1975).
11 Id. at 371.
SI Id. at 375.
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presently existed. In an earlier decision, Davis v. Morton,5 which
applied to the same lease, the Tenth Circuit had held that "the
subject lease did involve major federal action requiring compli-
ance with the National Environmental Protection Act (NEPA)
mandates."" The subject lease had at the time of the decision not
conformed to the requirements of NEPA, and it was, therefore,
"speculative when or conceivably whether it shall meet NEPA
requirements." 7 The declaratory action was improper because
"ongoing activity [might] radically change the factual situa-
tion. 6 8 The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's declaratory
judgment and left the question as to the State of New Mexico's
jurisdiction over Indian lands within it to be decided at a later
time.
11. FEDERAL RULES OF CIVIL PROCEDURE
A. Rule 23 Class Actions
1. Sanderson v. Winner 9
Class plaintiffs brought an antitrust action against various
Nissan corporations and dealerships. A demand for production of
documents filed by defendants requested of the plaintiffs per-
sonal financial information reflecting their ability to finance the
expenses of a class action. Additionally, the defendants requested
plaintiffs' fee arrangements with their attorneys on the grounds
that attorneys' fees were requested in the action. The trial court
ruled that the documents were relevant to the appropriateness of
the class action and whether plaintiffs were worthy representa-
tives of the class. Interlocutory appeal was denied. The Tenth
Circuit held that a writ of mandamus was appropriate under the
circumstances" and that the trial court's decision allowing such
I5 469 F.2d 593 (10th Cir. 1972). The court in Norvell pointed out that this decision
had not been rendered at the time these proceedings were taking place before the district
court. 519 F.2d at 372.
l' 519 F.2d at 372.
Id. at 375.
I Id. at 378.
II 507 F.2d 477 (10th Cir. 1974).
70 The Tenth Circuit noted mandamus was not to be used as a substitute for an
appeal, but recognized it might be used in some instances to review an interlocutory order.
The court found the writ appropriate here because the case fell within the standards
recognized by other cases. Id. at 479.
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discovery was an unwarranted extension of Eisen v. Carlisle &
Jacquelin.7'
The Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a court must be satis-
fied that plaintiffs could pay the notice costs and that due process
required decent notice.7" However, the Tenth Circuit held that
there was nothing in Eisen which called for unlimited inquiry into
the financial capacity of the plaintiff in regard to the question as
to whether a class action was to be allowed.73 Additionally,
defendants did not have the right to inquire whether plaintiffs
would be able to pay their lawyers or a judgment for costs.74 Thus,
since the documents sought were irrelevant, the court did not
consider the question of privilege.75
2. Albertson's Inc. v. Amalgamated Sugar Co."8
The three plaintiffs were purchasers of beet sugar from
defendant-sellers. On appeal, plaintiffs challenged the propriety
of the lower court's order that, because of a lack of commonality
of interest and a conflict of interest within the class, the claims
based on a tying arrangement and price discrimination should
not be maintained as a class action.77 The pricing policy followed
11 417 U.S. 156 (1974). Eisen, which was a class action brought on behalf of odd-lot
traders against brokerage firms for alleged violations of antitrust and securities laws, held
that in a class action individual notice to identifiable class members cannot be waived or
reduced in a particular case. The Court further held that the plaintiff bringing the class
action must bear the cost of the notice and said as follows: "Where, as here, the relation-
ship between the parties is truly adversarial, the plaintiff must pay for the cost of notice
as part of the ordinary burden of financing his own suit." Id. at 178-79.
72 Lower court decisions have considered the plaintiff's ability to pay as relevant. See
P.D.Q. Inc. v. Nissan Motor Corp., 61 F.R.D. 372 (S.D. Fla. 1973); Ralston v. Volkswagen-
werk A.G., 61 F.R.D. 427 (W.D. Mo. 1973). The Tenth Circuit distinguished these cases
on the grounds that the plaintiffs in P.D.Q. Inc. and Ralston sought to represent a class
of all new car purchasers in the United States, and size and manageability of the class
were not problems in the instant case. 507 F.2d at 480.
11 507 F.2d at 479. Additionally the court noted that oppressive discovery should not
be used to discourage private litigation which may advance an important interest of the
government. Id. at 480.
", Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 69 [all references to rules in this section are to the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure unless otherwise indicated]. Rule 69 will provide an
opportunity for discovery if judgment is obtained. See Federal Savings & Loan Ins. Corp.
v. Krueger, 55 F.R.D. 512 (N.D. Ill. 1972); Gangemi v, Moor, 268 F. Supp. 19 (D. Del.
1967). These cases suggest that there is no right to discovery of assets until judgment is
obtained. 507 F.2d at 480.
" The court noted that the attorney-client fee arrangement may not be privileged.
The cases split depending on the facts. 507 F.2d at 480.
" 503 F.2d 459 (10th'Cir. 1974).
" Rule 23(a)(3), (b)(3).
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by defendant-sellers was to meet the price of cane sugar in any
locality. The formula used in arriving at the price charged for beet
sugar was based on: (1) The price charged by the cane sugar
refinery in California, and (2) the cost of shipping the cane sugar
from California to particular zones within the complaint area.
Plaintiffs argued that the cost of shipping in the beet sugar pric-
ing formula invariably exceeded the actual cost of transportation
from the beet sugar refinery to the buyer-plaintiff."
The Tenth Circuit upheld the reasoning of the trial court
that, if the plaintiffs were successful on these claims, defendants
would be enjoined from using their formula pricing method and
would have to give recognition to actual freight costs. The result
would be that a plaintiff closer to the beet plant would pay less
for beet sugar than a plaintiff further away. Thus, a conflict of
price paid would result between plaintiffs, and their competitive
positions would be disrupted.79 The Tenth Circuit stated that "a
plaintiff cannot maintain a class action when his interests are
antagonistic to, or in conflict with the interests of the persons he
would seek to represent."8 The Tenth Circuit recognized that
disparity in benefit will not preclude a class action; but in this
case the competitive positions would be changed among the
plaintiffs, thus producing the lack of the required commonality
of interest among the class members. However, the plaintiffs'
claims based on conspiracy and attempt to monopolize could
proceed as class actions because any relief would not affect the
pricing system of the defendants.8
3. Monarch Asphalt Sales Co. v. Wilshire Oil Co.1
2
On February 28, 1973 the trial court approved class status for
all Oklahoma public bodies and denied class status to the Okla-
homa private contractors in an antitrust suit against certain liq-
uid asphalt sellers. Between April 9th and 13th the private con-
tractors sought to intervene as co-plaintiffs, and the trial court
held that the intervention was barred by the statute of limita-
tions.
" 503 F.2d at 462.
I d. at 463-64.
Id. at 463, citing Hansberry v. Lee, 311 U.S. 32 (1940); Schy v. Susquehanna Corp.,
419 F.2d 1112 (7th Cir. 1970).
" 503 F.2d at 464.
.2 511 F.2d 1073 (10th Cir. 1975).
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The first issue facing the Tenth Circuit was the reviewability
of an order denying class status. The court noted the general rule
that "an order denying class status is interlocutory and not ap-
pealable. 8 3 When the trial court entered a final judgment against
the intervenors, the interlocutory order denying class status
merged into the final judgment and thus became reviewable.8 4
The intervenors further challenged the district court's denial of
certification. The appellate court noted that "[c]lass certifica-
tion is discretionary with the trial judge" and found no abuse of
discretion. 5 Because a class may be divided into subclasses," the
trial court was justified in its discretionary creation of two sub-
classes in that the interests of the public and private bodies were
divergent. 7
However, each subclass must meet the requirements of rule
23(a) and (b). The private contractors did not meet either the
requirements of numerosity5 or fair and adequate representa-
tion.89 There were 37 potential Oklahoma private contractors, and
joinder was held not to be impracticable.9 ° Secondly, the court
found that the class representative was not in the road construc-
tion business, had not purchased liquid asphalt for 4 years prior
to the suit, and, therefore, did not share a common interest with
the class members.9'
Next, the court considered the question of the bar of the
statute of limitations on the intervention of the private contrac-
tors as coplaintiffs. Private civil antitrust suits must be comm-
' Id. at 1076-77.
Id. at 1077, citing Atchison, T. & S.F. Ry. v. Jackson, 235 F.2d 390, 392 (10th Cir.
1956); Skirvin v. Mesta, 141 F.2d 668, 671-72 (10th Cir. 1944). The court noted that they
could find no cases specifically on the question of whether after denial of class status and
intervention, the class status denied could be raised as error on appeal from denial of
intervention. 511 F.2d at 1077.
" The same issue was raised in Redhouse v. Quality Ford Sales, Inc., 523 F.2d 1 (10th
Cir. 1975). The court in a rehearing en banc determined that although the trial judge had
expressed a conclusion that the case be considered a class action, the findings as to the
elements of a class action required by rule 23 were not made. Neither proper procedure
nor proper sequence was followed. The case was remanded to the trial court.
" Rule 23(c)(4)(B).
'7 511 F.2d at 1077.
' Rule 23(a)(1).
g Rule 23(a)(4).
'0 511 F.2d at 1077.
Id.
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enced within 4 years after the cause of action has accrued." If an
action is brought by the United States, the statute of limitations
for private antitrust actions is suspended during the pendency of
the federal suit and for 1 year thereafter. However, a private
action must be brought within the period of suspension plus 1
year or within 4 years after the cause of action accrued, or it will
be barred. 3
In resolving whether the private contractors could intervene
or were barred by the statute of limitations, the court relied upon
American Pipe & Construction Co. v. Utah.94 When American
Pipe was filed, 11 days remained of the suspension period. This
period was tolled during the time the court considered the ques-
tion of maintenance of the class action. Interventions filed 8 days
after the denial of class status were upheld in American Pipe;
however, in Monarch the suspension period resulting from the
federal action 5 ended on November 6, 1971. The original com-
plaint in this case was filed on October 12, 1971. The suspension
period was tolled during consideration of the class status of the
parties. When class status was denied the contractors on Febru-
ary 28, 1973, there were 26 days left in the suspension period. The
private contractors failed to file their petition to intervene until
April 9, 1973, and thus were barred by the statute of limitations.
Other arguments put forth by the private contractors were
rejected by the Tenth Circuit. Even though the February 28th
order allowed the contractors 45 days in which to intervene, the
Tenth Circuit held that it is necessary to adhere strictly to the
statute of limitations. The court did not allow motions for a new
trial, motions to amend the February 28th order under rule 59(a)
and (e), or an oral motion to amend the February 28th order to
toll the suspension period. 7 Finally, the court held that interven-
92 15 U.S.C. § 15b (1970).
" Id. § 16(b).
414 U.S. 538 (1974).
United States v. Wilshire Oil Co., 427 F.2d 969 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S.
829 (1970). Certiorari was denied on October 12, 1970. Under Supreme Court rule 58, the
petitioners had 25 days to file a petition for rehearing. Even if none were filed, the case
would remain pending in the Supreme Court for those 25 days. 511 F.2d at 1078.
" 511 F.2d at 1079, citing Kavanagh v. Nobel, 332 U.S. 535, 539 (1947).
" The Tenth Circuit noted that rule 59 applied to new trials and amendments of
judgments and the February 28th order was interlocutory and not appealable. The court
stated: "Although Rule 59 motions may extend the time for appeal from judgments and
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tion into a certified class action suit does not automatically relate
back to the date on which the original action was filed. 8
4. Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc."
Defendants appealed under 28 U.S.C. § 1291 from a judg-
ment certifying a class action in a federal securities fraud suit.00
The Tenth Circuit held the order was not appealable under sec-
tion 1291 and the order could only be reviewed upon final judg-
ment on the merits. The Tenth Circuit noted its reluctance to
review a denial or grant of class status because the order may be
amended as the trial proceeds.' The Tenth Circuit indicated its
approval of the Second and Third Circuits' post-Eisen three-
pronged tests for section 1291 appealability.' Considerations are
to be: (1) Whether the class action determination is fundamental
to the further disposition of the case and not merely a provisional
disposition of an issue; (2) whether review of the order is separa-
ble from the merits; and (3) whether rights would be irreparably
lost and irreparable harm, in terms of time and money, would be
caused if review were postponed until final disposition of the case.
Applying the above considerations to the instant case, the
Tenth Circuit denied review. Whether 4700 potential class mem-
bers were included or not, the plaintiffs could pursue the suit even
if class status were denied. Thus, no irreparable harm was done
to the defendants. The determination of the class was not collat-
eral to a final decision on the merits, and proof of due diligence
would be an integral part of the suit whether brought individually
or as a class.'03
appealable orders, see F.R.A.P. Rule 4(a), they do not stay interlocutory orders or toll the
running of a limitation period." 511 F.2d at 1079.
" The court noted that this had been allowed under the old rule 23 which did not
control in this case. 511 F.2d at 1079.
520 F.2d 795 (10th Cir. 1975).
The appellants argued that a standard of due diligence in discovering the fraud
should be required of each class member, thus making the class unmanageable. The trial
court held, however, that an objective standard of whether the reasonable investor would
have discovered the fraud was the test. Thus, common questions of law and fact predomi-
nated, and the class was manageable. Id. at 796.
" The Tenth Circuit relied upon Eisen v. Carlisle & Jacquelin, 417 U.S. 156 (1974),
which approved a grant of review when the matter concerned final disposition of a claimed
right but was not a review on the merits. In the instant case the issue sought to be reviewed
went to the merits-that is, whether the class was properly certified. 520 F.2d at 797.
'" 520 F.2d at 797-98, citing Rodgers v. United States Steel Corp., 508 F.2d 152, 159
(3d Cir. 1975); General Motors Corp. v. City of New York, 501 F.2d 639, 644 (2d Cir. 1974).
" 520 F.2d at 798.
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B. Appealability: R.D. Andersen Construction Co. v. Iron
Workers Local 101104
In this opinion the Tenth Circuit addressed the question of
a timely appeal. 0 5 The appellant argued that his appeal was
timely' because the trial court granted an extension of time,
until 15 days after receipt of the trial transcript, in which to file
post-trial motions. However, the Tenth Circuit held that because
there must be a definite point at which judgment is final, rule 6107
allowed no enlargement of time for the exercise of rights under
rules 50(b) °5 and 59(b). 0 1 Appellant also contended that his or-
ally made motion for a directed verdict did not need to be reduced
to writing within the 10-day limit of rule 50(b). However, the
Tenth Circuit interpreted rule 50(b) as requiring a written motion
within 10 days after judgment when the oral motion is not
granted."0
No. 75-1298 (10th Cir., July 1, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
IO5 The Tenth Circuit considered the timeliness of appeal in two other cases: Q-Panel
Co. v. Newfield, No. 74-1039 (10th Cir., Jan. 3, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication) and
Lovell v. Saxbe, No. 75-1167 (10th Cir., July 23, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication). In
Q-Panel an appeal from a bill of costs a month after the ruling by the clerk asserted that
the ruling dealt with "expenses" as distinguished from the costs portion. The Tenth
Circuit held that rule 54(d) requires that this review of the clerk's action must be re-
quested within 5 days and this review was, therefore, not timely. In Lovell the Tenth
Circuit held that rule 60(b) does not extend the time for taking an appeal and does not
affect the finality of a judgment.
'01 If there are no timely post-trial motions filed, appellant has 30 days to file a notice
of appeal as required by FED. R. App. P. 4. Gooch v. Skelly Oil Co., 493 F.2d 366 (10th
Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 95 S. Ct. 311 (1974). See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J.
227, 228 n.16 (1975).
101 Rule 6(b)(2) provides for enlargement "upon motion made after the expiration of
the specified period permit the act to be done where the failure to act was the result of
excusable neglect; but it may not extend the time" for rules 50(b) and 59(b).
"I' Rule 50(b) concerns motions for a directed verdict and for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. It provides that "[n]ot later than 10 days after entry of judgment, a party
who has moved for a directed verdict may move to have the verdict and any judgment
entered thereon set aside . See Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 227, 229-30
(1975).
101 Rule 59(b) provides: "A motion for a new trial shall be served not later than 10
days after the entry of the judgment . ... "
11* In Berry v. Cimmarron Ins. Co., No. 74-1129 (10th Cir., Dec. 20, 1974) (Not for
Routine Publication), the Tenth Circuit considered the effect of the failure to move for a
directed verdict. The court held that where a defendant fails to move for a directed verdict
at the close of all the evidence, he may not thereafter challenge the sufficiency of the
evidence on appeal, in a motion for a new trial, or in a motion for judgment notwithstand-
ing the verdict. As support for this, the court cited Continental Baking Co. v. Utah Pie
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C. Rule 13 Compulsory Counterclaims: Pipeliners Local 798 v.
Ellerd'"
Plaintiffs filed a civil rights action arising out of physical
violence at a construction site concerning the hiring of union
labor. Defendants answered, stating that plaintiffs violated the
Colorado Labor Peace Act, and counterclaimed alleging that
plaintiffs' actions had caused damage to the defendants including
expenses for the protection of labor and material, the replace-
ment of 12 workers frightened by the union's threats, and the loss
of 2 days' production at the site."' All parties agreed in open court
to a stipulation dismissing the complaint with prejudice and all
parties agreed that defendants' counterclaim survived.
Appellants contended that, because the complaint had been
dismissed and the counterclaim was permissive, the counterclaim
must fail for lack of an independent basis of jurisdiction. The
Tenth Circuit noted the standards used to determine the compul-
sory or permissive nature of a counterclaim:
1. Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counter-
claim largely the same? 2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit
on defendants' claim absent the compulsory counterclaims rule? 3.
Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiffs'
Co., 349 F.2d 122, 156 (10th Cir. 1965); Brown v. Poland, 325 F.2d 984 (10th Cir. 1963);
Southern Ry. v. Miller, 285 F.2d 202 (6th Cir. 1960).
503 F.2d 1193 (10th Cir. 1974).
1 Plaintiffs contended the trial court abused its discretion in admitting exhibits
relating to expenses incurred by defendants resulting from the encounter on the job site
as business records and, thus, an exception to the hearsay rule. The Tenth Circuit held
that these were records kept in the ordinary course of business and that they were within
the personal knowledge of the witness. Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Sparrow, 470 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1972), cert. denied, 411 U.S. 936 (1973).
503 F.2d at 1200-01.
Second, the appellants argued that, since the defendants relied on a violation of the
Colorado Labor Peace Act in their counterclaim, they must first exhaust administrative
remedies. The Tenth Circuit held that the defendants had a right to an independent
remedy, citing with approval, Denver Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. Shore, 132 Colo.
187, 287 P.2d 267 (1955), which reasoned that the damages as a result of an illegal act are
based in tort and, thus, a common law action for damages is valid. 503 F.2d at 1201. See
generally note 93 supra.
Third, plaintiffs objected to damages recovered for "loss of efficiency" on the job
because of the lack of substantive evidence on the point. However, the Tenth Circuit found
that the "loss of efficiency" was based on expert estimates of the damages in turn based
on facts established at trial, and recovery would not be denied because damages could not
be specifically measured. The court cited Hodgson v. Okada, 472 F.2d 965 (10th Cir. 1973);
A to Z Rental, Inc. v. Wilson, 413 F.2d 899 (10th Cir. 1969). 503 F.2d at 1201-02.
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claim as well as defendants' counterclaim? 4. Is there any logical
relation between the claim and the counterclaim?"
3
The court stated that the "logical relation test" was the most
important of the standards; 4 that is, the principal claim and the
counterclaim logically relate to each other because of their com-
mon origin. Rule 13(a) states that a claim is compulsory and must
be pleaded if it "arises out of the transaction or occurrence that
is the subject matter of the opposing party's claim.""' 5 The Tenth
Circuit noted that "transaction" and "occurrence" should be con-
strued liberally," 6 and held the defendants' counterclaim was
compulsory."7
Concerning jurisdiction, the court held a permissive counter-
claim not arising out of the same transaction or occurrence must
have its own base of jurisdiction. However, a compulsory counter-
claim derives its jurisdiction from the principal suit;"' thus, a
federal court may assert jurisdiction over the claim even though
it might not have jurisdiction if it were an independent proceed-
ing."' The Tenth Circuit stated that it was settled law that a
court has ancillary jurisdiction even if the plaintiff's claim is
dismissed as in the instant case.2 0
D. Rule 19 Indispensable Parties: State Farm Mutual Automo-
bile Insurance Co. v. Mid-Continent Casualty Co.''
Lance Garton rented a car from Budget-Rent-A-Car and sub-
sequently became involved in a traffic accident injuring a passen-
"' 503 F.2d at 1198.
"' Id. at 1199.
" But see rule 13(b).
... 503 F.2d at 1199.
"7 Judge Breitenstein, who wrote a concurring opinion, did not wish the majority's
opinion to be viewed as general approval of counterclaims in civil rights actions. Moreover,
the "transaction or occurrence" requirement of rule 13(a) should have been determined
by the trial court and not de novo by the court of appeals; however, in the instant case
plaintiffs failed to object to the counterclaim at the trial court level, and, therefore, Judge
Breitenstein concurred with the majority that the counterclaim should stand. Id. at 1202.
"I Id. at 1198, citing United States v. Acord, 209 F.2d 709 (10th Cir. 1954), and
quoting Inter-State Nat'l Bank v. Luther, 221 F.2d 382, 390 (10th Cir. 1955), cert. denied,
350 U.S. 944 (1956).
"' Aetna Ins. Co. v. Chicago, R.I. & P.R.R., 229 F.2d 584 (10th Cir. 1956).
", Moore v. New York Cotton Exch., 270 U.S. 593 (1926); Kirby v. American Soda
Fountain Co., 194 U.S. 141 (1904).
" 518 F.2d 292 (10th Cir. 1975).
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ger in another car, Carol Ammerman. Ammerman instituted a
tort suit, claiming $481,200 in damages. A dispute arose between
Budget's insurance carrier, Mid-Continent Casualty, and Gar-
ton's carrier, State Farm Mutual Automobile Insurance, as to
who was the primary carrier and thus had the responsibility of
defending the tort suit. In an action for declaratory judgment'22
the trial court determined that Mid-Continent was the primary
carrier.
Mid-Continent appealed,' 3 contending that the absence of
Garton as a party to the litigation was error'24 because he was an
indispensable party.'25 An indispensable litigant must first qual-
ify as a conditionally necessary party under one of the options of
19(a) before his indispensability can be determined under 19(b).
Concerning 19(a)(1),'16 complete declaratory relief was accorded
the parties and, thus, Garton was not a necessary party. Next, the
court concluded that Garton met the threshold requirement of
19(a)(2); that is, he possessed an interest relating to the subject
matter of the action. Because of the amount of the tort claim and
the existence of two insurance policies, Garton had an interest in
securing maximum coverage.'
27
'2 28 U.S.C. § 2201(b) (1970).
'2 Id. Section 2201 provides as follows: "Any such declaration shall have the force
and effect of a final judgment or decree and shall be reviewable as such."
,21 Rule 12(h)(2). The defense of failure to join an indispensable party may be made
at any time.
" Rule 19 provides as follows:
(a) Persons to Be Joined if Feasible. A person who is subject to service
of process and whose joinder will not deprive the court of jurisdiction over
the subject matter of the action shall be joined as a party in the action if (1)
in his absence complete relief cannot be accorded among those already par-
ties, or (2) he claims an interest relating to the subject of the action and is
so situated that the disposition of the action in his absence may (i) as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest or (ii)
leave any of the persons already parties subject to a substantial risk of
incurring double, multiple, or otherwise inconsistent obligations by reason
of his claimed interest.
(b) Determination by Court Whenever Joinder Not Feasible. If a person
as described in subdivision (a)(1)-(2) hereof cannot be made party, the court
shall determine whether in equity and good conscience the action should
proceed among the parties before it, or should be dismissed, the absent
person being thus regarded as indispensable.
The court noted that it did not concern itself with whether Garton was a proper party who
may be joined. 518 F.2d at 294. See also Tenth Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 227 (1974).
' See note 196 supra.
'12 The court did not recognize the interest of the insured in the right to the defense
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In addition, however, Garton had to meet the requirements
of 19(a)(2)(i) and 19(a)(2)(ii).15 The declaratory judgment was
not res judicata as to Garton, so 19(a)(2)(i) did -not make Garton
a necessary party as he could relitigate the matter on his own
behalf.2 9 Because there was no substantial risk of inconsistent
obligations arising from possible subsequent litigation,
19(a)(2)(ii) also required classifying Garton as a necessary
party. 3 The court reasoned that subsequent litigation could not
result in judgments against the insurance carriers beyond their
policy limits. Second, litigation on Garton's part after a determi-
nation of primary and excess coverage was unlikely. However, if
one company was held to provide all the coverage and the tort
claim was in excess of that, there was a possibility of litigation
by Garton against the other insurer with the possible result of
inconsistent obligations. However, the Tenth Circuit noted:
We, like the trial court, are required to look to "practical possibili-
ties more than theoretical possibilities" in considering possible prej-
udice to parties.' 31
The Tenth Circuit reasoned that Garton had shown no interest
in the litigation, and any tort judgment would likely be within the
sole insurer's limits.
Appellant further argued that the trial court should have
exercised its discretion and not granted declaratory relief. The
Tenth Circuit acknowledged that a declaratory judgment 3 2
remedy requires an actual controversy, the joinder of all inter-
he contracted for with his own insurer. This was not a case where the insured was attempt-
ing to have its uninsured defended by an unrelated insurance company. In the instant case
Garton had contracted with both companies. The court rejected the notion that the
insurers might be subjected to unequal duties to defend, reasoning that Garton had not
sought defense from either company. 518 F.2d at 296.
"' See note 125 supra.
121 518 F.2d at 295, citing Diamond Shamrock Corp. v. Lumbermen's Mut. Cas. Co.,
416 F.2d 707 (7th Cir. 1969). The court distinguished the two Seventh Circuit cases,
Traveler's Indem. Co. v. Standard Accident Ins. Co., 329 F.2d 329 (7th Cir. 1964) and
Diamond Shamrock, which held that without the insured or injured party a declaratory
judgment was only an advisory opinion. The Tenth Circuit noted that the above cases did
not consider the issue in terms of rule 19. The lack of res judicata is to be considered in a
rule 19(a)(2) and 19(b) analysis. 518 F.2d at 295-96.
"1 518 F.2d at 295.
131 Id. at 295, citing 3A J. MOORE, MOORE's FEDERAL PRACricE 19.07-2[1] at 2260
(2d ed. 1974).
132 28 U.S.C. § 2201 (1970).
VOL. 53
FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE
ested parties whenever possible,' 3 disposal of a controversy, and
must serve a useful purpose.' 34 However, the court had deter-
mined that all conditionally necessary and indispensable parties
were present.' 35 Moreover, even though subsequent controversies
might arise, the action disposed of the dispute as to which in-
surer was primary. '36 Thus, the trial court had not abused its
discretion.
3 7
Charles P. Leder
Mary M. Schwertz
POST-JUDGMENT RELIEF UNDER RULE 60(b)(6)
Pierce v. Cook & Co., 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975)
By ALAN M. LOEB*
In Pierce v. Cook & Co.' the Tenth Circuit rendered a deci-
sion dealing with post-judgment relief under rule 60(b) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure' which may have far-reaching
'1 Earlier in the opinion the court noted that "there are no special provisions detail-
ing parties needed for a just adjudication in declaratory actions; general principles of
joinder control." 518 F.2d at 294, citing, 6A J. MOORE, supra note 131, 57.25 at 57-253.
"1 518 F.2d at 296, citing Allstate Ins. Co. v. Thompson, 121 F. Supp. 696 (W.D. Ark.
1954).
' See text accompanying notes 125-31 supra.
'3' Both insurance policies contained escape (i.e., no liability) clauses. 518 F.2d at
297. The court noted that, where escape clauses are mutually repugnant, the loss will be
prorated. Id., citing 16 H. CoucH, CYCLOPEDIA OF INSURANCE LAW § 62.84 (Supp. 1974).
However, after the escape clauses cancelled each other's effectiveness, State Farm's policy
provided for excess coverage and Mid-Continent's policy provided for pro rata coverage.
The Tenth Circuit held that when one policy provides for pro rata coverage and the other
for excess coverage, the policy with the pro rata clause is the primary carrier up to the
limits of the policy, and the policy with the excess clause is liable for amounts over the
limits of the pro rata policy. 518 F.2d at 297-98, citing Thurston Nat'l Ins. Co. v. Zurich
Ins. Co., 296 F. Supp. 619 (D. Okla. 1969).
" 518 F.2d at 297.
*Associate, Davis, Graham & Stubbs, Denver, Colorado; A.B., 1968, Stanford Univer-
sity; J.D., 1971, University of Michigan.
518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975).
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b) provides:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for the
following reasons: (1) mistake, inadvertence, surprise, or excusable neglect;
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implications on the finality of all civil diversity judgments well
beyond the narrow factual setting of the Pierce case itself.
The facts in Pierce were as follows: Edwards, the owner and
driver of a tractor-trailer, was hauling wheat on an Oklahoma
highway for the defendant Cook & Co. (hereinafter Cook) when
the rig collided with a car driven by Mr. Pierce.' Pierce was killed
and two passengers in his car were injured. Pierce's wife brought
suit against Cook in an Oklahoma state court as surviving widow
of Mr. Pierce and for their minor children. Similar state court
actions were also brought against Cook by Ellenwood and Davis,
the passengers in the Pierce car. Cook removed all three cases to
the federal district court in Oklahoma on grounds of diversity of
citizenship.4 However, the Davis case was dismissed on the volun-
tary motion of the plaintiff and was later refiled in the Oklahoma
state court by coguardians of Davis, who was a minor. This proce-
dural maneuver destroyed diversity of citizenship and thus kept
the Davis case in the state court.
Applying Oklahoma law, the United States District Court for
the Western District of Oklahoma granted Cook summary judg-
ment against Pierce and Ellenwood on the ground that, under
the prior Oklahoma Supreme Court decision in Marion, Machine
Foundry & Supply Co. v. Duncan,' Cook was not liable for the
(2) newly discovered evidence which by due diligence could not have been
discovered in time to move for a new trial under Rule 59(b); (3) fraud
(whether heretofore denominated intrinsic or extrinsic), misrepresentation,
or other misconduct of an adverse party; (4) the judgment is void; (5) the
judgment has been satisfied, released, or discharged, or a prior judgment
upon which it is based has been reversed or otherwise vacated, or it is no
longer equitable that the judgment should have prospective application; or
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment. The
motion shall be made within a reasonable time, and for reasons (1), (2), and
(3) not more than one year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was
entered or taken. A motion under this subdivision (b) does not affect the
finality of a judgment or suspend its operation. This rule does not limit the
power of a court to entertain an independent action to relieve a party from
a judgment, order, or proceeding, or to grant relief to a defendant not ac-
tually personally notified as provided in Title 28, U.S.C. § 1655, or to set
aside a judgment for fraud upon the court. Writs of coram nobis, coram
vobis, audita querela, and bills of review and bills in the nature of a bill of
review, are abolished, and the procedure for obtaining any relief from a
judgment shall be by motion as prescribed in these rules or by an independ-
ent action.
The accident occurred on January 11, 1968.
28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970).
' 187 Okla. 160, 101 P.2d 813 (1940).
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tort of Edwards, who was an independent contractor. Pierce and
Ellenwood appealed, and the Tenth Circuit, concluding that
Oklahoma law controlled, affirmed.' This decision became final
in January 1971.
Similarly, in the Davis case, an Oklahoma state trial court
gave summary judgment for Cook on the basis of the Marion
decision. However, on appeal,7 the Oklahoma Supreme Court
specifically overruled Marion, holding that, under some circum-
stances, a shipper may be held liable for the torts of an indepen-
dent contractor motor carrier,8 and remanded the case for a jury
trial.' This decision became final in May 1974.
Several months after the decision of the Oklahoma Supreme
Court became final, Pierce and Ellenwood filed a motion under
rule 60(b) directly with the Tenth Circuit seeking relief as a mat-
ter of law from the prior judgment entered against them.
Sitting en banc, the Tenth Circuit, in an opinion by Judge
Breitenstein,10 first held that it was appropriate for the court of
appeals to hear the motion. The court then held that extraordi-
nary relief under rule 60(b)(6)1" appeared to be appropriate in this
case and, accordingly, vacated its prior judgment and remanded
' Pierce v. Cook & Co., 437 F.2d 1119 (10th Cir. 1970). On appeal, Pierce and Ellen-
wood conceded the effect of the Marion decision, but argued that federal common law
controlled as a result of the Motion Carrier Act, 49 U.S.C. §§ 301-27 (1970). The Tenth
Circuit rejected this argument.
Hudgens v. Cook Indus., Inc., 521 P.2d 813 (Okla. 1974).
The Oklahoma Supreme Court stated:
Where there is foreseeable risk of harm to others unless precautions are
taken, it is the duty of one who is regularly engaged in a commercial
enterprise which involves selection of motor carriers as an integral part of the
business, to exercise reasonable care to select a competent carrier. Failure
to exercise such care may create liability on the part of the employer for the
negligence of the carrier.
Id. at 816.
The Davis case was ultimately settled without a trial.
0C 518 F.2d 720 (10th Cir. 1975). There were three other opinions in addition to the
majority's. Judge Barrett wrote a separate opinion concurring in the result. Id. at 724.
Chief Judge Lewis (joined by Judge Seth) dissented. Id. at 725. And Judge Seth (joined
by Chief Judge Lewis) also wrote a dissenting opinion. Id.
FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6) provides in pertinent part:
On motion and upon such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party or
his legal representative from a final judgment, order, or proceeding for ..
(6) any other reason justifying relief from the operation of the judgment.
Apparently, neither party briefed or argued the impact of rule 60(b)(6) on the issues before
the Tenth Circuit. 518 F.2d at 723.
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the case to the trial court for consideration of the plaintiffs' argu-
ments in light of both its opinion and the recent decision of the
Oklahoma Supreme Court.
The first interesting question raised by the Pierce decision is
whether the Tenth Circuit should have even considered the mer-
its of the motion before it. Technically, motions under rule 60(b)
should be directed to the trial court, which then exercises its
discretion on whether or not to grant the motion on its merits.
There is no provision for a rule 60(b) motion to be filed with the
appellate court in the first instance. 3 At most, the appellate court
has the power to consider a motion for leave to file a rule 60(b)
motion in the trial court.'4 The majority opinion recognized that
the filing of a motion with the appellate court for leave to file a
rule 60(b) motion in the trial court may be unnecessary, and,
indeed, conceded that such a procedure had been previously
passed on by the Tenth Circuit in Wilkin v. Sunbeam Corp. 5
12 518 F.2d at 721. It is important to note that the Tenth Circuit did not set aside
the judgment of the trial court. Id. at 724. Rather, it invited the plaintiffs to file a motion
in the trial court under rule 60(b)(6), seeking relief from the summary judgment entered
against them, and directed the trial court to "consider the motion, and any response
thereto, in the light of the Hudgens opinion . . . and of this opinion and. . . make such
determination as it deems proper." Id. Chief Judge Lewis, dissenting, took the view that
the majority opinion "for all practical purposes" aborted the discretion of the trial court
through a "predecision . . . on the merits." Id. at 725.
13 An interesting sidelight is that the Colorado Supreme Court, in a case arising under
the Colorado Rules of Civil Procedure, specifically held that it could not and would not
pass upon the merits of a rule 60(b) motion in the first instance. Olmstead v. District
Court, 157 Colo. 326, 403 P.2d 442 (1965). The Colorado Supreme Court stated:
[Elven though it might well facilitate matters for this Court to step in and
pass on the merits of these two motions, such would short circuit the judicial
process to the end that this Court would then be acting as a trial court. This
Court does not grant or deny motions filed subsequent to entry of judgment
under Rule 59 or Rule 60, R.C.P. Colo. This is a function of the trial court.
Once a trial court has acted, however, this Court may in appropriate pro-
ceedings be called upon to review the propriety of the action thus taken by
it.
Id. at 331, 403 P.2d at 444.
"d This is the procedure suggested by Judge Seth in his dissenting opinion in Pierce.
518 F.2d at 725.
15 405 F.2d 165 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1126 (1973). The Court stated
in Wilkin:
We agree that the trial court is in a better position to pass upon the issues
presented in a motion pursuant to Rule 60(b). Accordingly, we hold that
there is no necessity that a preliminary petition requesting permission be
filed with the appellate court.
405 F.2d at 166.
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Nevertheless, the majority chose not to follow Wilkin but rather
to consider the motion before it in Pierce.
The reason espoused by the majority for considering the mo-
tion was that, because its judgment was final and mandate had
been issued, "the trial court could well believe that it is without
power to determine a legal question contrary to the decision of the
court of appeals."'" Yet, it can be questioned whether this reason
is sufficient to distinguish the court's previous comments in
Wilkin and to adopt the procedure utilized in Pierce. Indeed, the
majority itself recognized that there is no time limitation for fil-
ing motions under rule 60(b)(6) with the trial court 7 other than
that the motion must be made within a "reasonable time." As
such, a trial court could feel free to consider the merits of such a
motion and allow the parties to appeal its decision to the court
of appeals if there was dissatisfaction with it.
The second and more important aspect of the Pierce decision
is the majority's ruling and comments on the substantive issue
itself-i.e., whether the petitioners presented any "reason justify-
ing relief from the operation of the judgment."' 8 Citing Collins v.
City of Wichita,'9 the majority stated the applicable test to be
that "in extraordinary situations, relief from final judgments may
be had under Rule 60(b)(6), when such action is appropriate to
accomplish justice."" The issue, as defined by the majority, was
whether the Pierce case presented such an "extraordinary situa-
tion." The majority held that it did.
In the Collins case, the plaintiffs initially attacked the con-
stitutionality of a Kansas condemnation statute and lost."2 Over
a year later, in a case unrelated to Collins, the United States
Supreme Court held the same Kansas statute unconstitutional.23
The plaintiffs in Collins then sought relief from the trial court by
way of a motion under rule 60(b)(6). The motion was overruled
" 518 F.2d at 722.
'7 Motions pursuant to rule 60(b)(1), (2), and (3) must be made not more than 1
year after the judgment, order, or proceeding was entered or taken.
" FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b)(6).
" 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 839.
" 518 F.2d at 723.
2 Collins v. City of Wichita, 225 F.2d 132 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 886
(1955).
' Walker v. City of Hutchinson, 352 U.S. 112 (1956).
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and that decision was affirmed by the Tenth Circuit."4 In Collins,
the Tenth Circuit used strong language in holding that the
change in law involved there did not justify rule 60(b)(6) relief.
The court stated:
Litigation must end some time, and the fact that a court may have
made a mistake in the law when entering judgment, or that there
may have been a judicial change in the court's view of the law after
its entry, does not justify setting it aside.21
The majority in Pierce distinguished Collins by arguing that,
there the decisional change in the law came in an unrelated case,
whereas in Pierce it came in a case "arising out of the same
accident as that in which the plaintiffs now before us were in-
jured."2 6 It can be questioned whether this is a valid distinction.
Although Collins involved two unrelated pieces of litigation, the
constitutionality of the same Kansas statute was at issue in both.
This fact tied the two cases together just as the accident tied the
Pierce cases together.21 In the abstract, therefore, it is difficult to
accept the majority's distinction of Collins and its refusal to fol-
low that decision.
The real basis for the majority's decision in Pierce would
appear to be its acceptance of the argument that after the plain-
tiffs were forced into federal court by the removal procedure on
the basis of diversity jurisdiction, the federal forum gave them
''substantially different treatment than that received in state
court by another injured in the same accident. 2' This result,
according to the majority, violated the "outcome determination"
principle set forth in Erie Railroad Co. v. Tompkins .29 It was this
combination of events which led the Tenth Circuit to conclude
that Pierce presented an "extraordinary situation" justifying re-
lief under rule 60(b)(6).
Judges Lewis and Seth, in dissent, expressed concern that
the scope of the majority opinion was so broad that it could be
interpreted so as to create uncertainty as to the finality of any
2, 254 F.2d 837 (10th Cir. 1958).
Id. at 839.
518 F.2d at 723.
Judge Seth, in his dissent, went so far as to state that the majority opinion effec-
tively overruled Collins. Id. at 725.
Id. at 723.
2 304 U.S. 64, 74-75 (1938).
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final judgment in any diversity case. Chief Judge Lewis "as-
sumed" that the majority opinion was intended to be limited to
cases based on common disasters, but noted that the decision was
not precise on this point.3 0 Judge Seth opined that the "argument
advanced by the majority is equally applicable to any diversity
case." 3' In the abstract, the comments of the dissenters are well-
taken, for the finality of judgments is important, and consistency
in the law, while desirable, may not be required.32 It remains to
be seen, however, whether as a practical matter the Tenth Circuit
will utilize the Pierce decision continually to uphold post-
judgment relief under rule 60(b)(6) in all types of diversity cases.
In the final analysis, the Tenth Circuit's opinion in Pierce
may be just a further indication of the federal judiciary's growing
dissatisfaction with diversity jurisdiction and the problems it is
creating for the federal court system.3 Diversity jurisdiction and
the removal procedure for invoking such jurisdiction have been
criticized as a significant cause of the increasingly burdensome
caseload in the federal courts, and there have been recent expres-
sions that diversity jurisdiction should be abolished altogether.
3 4
To the extent that the Tenth Circuit's decision in Pierce can be
read as that court's opinion-however indirect-that substantive
state law questions should be decided by the state courts rather
than by the federal courts sitting with diversity jurisdiction, it
may serve as a warning to lawyers who practice in the Tenth
Circuit to analyze in greater detail the initial strategic decision
whether to litigate in the state or federal court systems.
518 F.2d at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
" Id. at 726 (Seth, J., dissenting).
31 Id. at 725 (Lewis, C.J., dissenting).
3 In this regard, Judge Barrett's concurring opinion in Pierce may be the most en-
lightening of all four of the written opinions. Concurring in the result, Judge Barrett stated
that rule 60(b)(6)
should always be applied in order to relieve a party who did not invoke the
jurisdiction of the federal court in a diversity suit from a judgment adverse
to that which would otherwise have been favorable in the state court forums.
One who invokes the jurisdiction of the federal court when the diversity
requirements are present should pay the consequences of that election. A
change in state law should not be cause for relief to one who has voluntarily
selected that forum. Such a litigant is not entitled to the proverbial "two
bites at the apple." Furthermore, such application should do much to pro-
mote and strengthen proper Federal-State court relations.
Id. at 724 (emphasis added),
11 See, e.g., Burger, Report on the Federal Judicial Branch, 59 A.B.A.J. 1125, 1126
(1973).
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LABOR LAW
OVERVIEW
The field of labor law produced a significant number of
Tenth Circuit decisions in the past year. Due to the breadth and
variety of the individual fact situations covered, the cases in this
overview are grouped according to the particular statute which
formed the basis of decision. The two most significant decisions
of the Tenth Circuit in the last year, Chief Freight Lines Co. v.
Teamsters Local 886,' and NLRB v. R. L. Sweet Lumber Co.,I are
the subjects of the case comments which follow this overview.
I. LABOR MANAGEMENT RELATIONS ACT-NATIONAL LABOR
RELATIONS ACT3
A. Unfair Labor Practices By Employers
A large number of unfair labor practice cases seeking injunc-
tive relief and enforcement of National Labor Relations Board
orders issued pursuant to section 10(e)' were decided in the past
year.
1. Refusal to Bargain'
The Tenth Circuit issued a mandate to enforce a NLRB
award requiring the employer to bargain with the union in NLRB
v. King Radio Corp.' After the union had filed an unfair labor
practice charge, the employer claimed an impasse in negotia-
tions, and, because of an increase in unit size and employee turn-
over, questioned the union's majority status. Although more than
1 year had in fact passed since the union's certification and no
contract had been successfully negotiated during that time, the
presumption of continued representative status could be rebutted
only by the employer's demonstration of a good faith, reasonable
doubt as to the majority status.' Employee turnover alone was
insufficient for such a showing! Because the factors relied on by
514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 393 (1975).
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-44, 151-67, 171-83, 185-87, 191-97, 557 (1970).
Id. § 160(e).
Id. §§ 158(a)(1), (5).
510 F.2d 1154 (10th Cir. 1975).
7 Id. at 1156, citing NLRB v. Frick Co., 423 F.2d 1327, 1330-31 (3d Cir. 1970).
510 F.2d at 1156, citing NLRB v. Little Rock Downtowner, Inc., 414 F.2d 1084, 1091
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the employer had existed for some time prior to his claim, the
Board was upheld in finding that the claim was spurious, since
no evidence had been shown as to employee opposition to the
union.'
The NLRB's determinaion that no impasse had in fact oc-
curred was also upheld by the court of appeals. As agreement on
many issues had been reached at the last negotiation meeting,
such findings were held to be "peculiarly within Board exper-
tise" 10 and were sustained because they were supported by the
record. The court, however, rejected the NLRB's argument that
failure to pay a prior backpay award precludes an employer from
questioning the majority status of the union."
In Jason/Empire Inc. v. NLRB12 the court upheld the
NLRB's discretion in refusing to consider the employer's conten-
tion that an election was invalid as justification for its refusal to
bargain. This contention was found to be untimely, although the
court in dicta stated that it did not "accept as an absolute the
contention that objections to the validity of an election must be
made within five days after such election."' 3
The employer in NLRB v. Glenn Spooner'4 refused to bargain
with a union recognized by the company's prior owner. Although
the fact of prior recognition was unknown to the successor e m*-
ployer, the Board found no adequate basis for a reasonable doubt
as to majority status, and the finding that the evidence as to
doubt was "flimsy" was upheld by the Tenth Circuit. This evi-
dence consisted of: (1) A statement by one employee that there
were employees who did not want the union; (2) the fact that only
three of the employees on a prior related picket line were still
employees at the time of sale; and (3) a refusal by the union to
show signed authorization cards to the defendant. The court held
that substantially more evidence than that shown is required to
form the basis of a good faith doubt of majority status."5
(8th Cir. 1969).
510 F.2d at 1157.
Id., citing NLRB v. J.H. Bonck Co., 424 F.2d 634, 638 (5th Cir. 1970).
510 F.2d at 1157.
1 518 F.2d 7 (10th Cir. 1975).
13 Id. at 8.
No. 74-1222 (10th Cir., Jan. 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. In determining the exact date of the refusal to bargain, the court held that the
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2. Discharge of Employees"
In NLRB v. Oklahoma Allied Telephone Co. 7 an employee
was discharged for concerted union activities protected by section
7 of the Act. The employee's complaints and his walking off the
job were in response to poor working conditions, such as excessive
heat due to an inoperative air conditioning system and paint
fumes. The court stated that "activity by an individual may be
concerted if it is intended for the mutual aid and protection of
all employees"; 8 however, it ruled that mere complaints about
conditions of employment are not protected per se by section 7.
The fact that any relief obtained in response to complaints might
benefit others is not controlling if the individual is in fact speak-
ing solely as an individual, rather than on behalf of other employ-
ees.
9
Two NLRB cases were combined in NLRB v. Dayton Tire &
Rubber Co. 0 In the first' the Board found that the employees'
discharges were the result of testimony they gave on behalf of the
NLRB's general counsel at a previous Board hearing. In contrast,
the reasons given by the employer for the discharges, which
ranged from stealing to absenteeism, were found to be frivolous
and mere pretext in light of the generally good work records and
substantial union activity of the discharged employees. The em-
ployees were ordered reinstated without penalty.2
In the second case23 an employee, active in union
organization, was discharged shortly after he was seen distribut-
ing union authorization cards. His discharge was found to be an
unfair labor practice. As the employer's no-solicitation rule had
never been previously invoked, its application in this instance
was found to be discriminatory and motivated by a desire to
test to be applied is the manifestation or indication of an intent not to negotiate. Such
intent was manifested when the defendant demanded a view of the union authorization
cards as proof of majority status, when it had no good faith doubt as to that status.
" 29 U.S.C. § 157 (1970).
'7 No. 74-1461 (10th Cir., May 2, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
I d.
I d.
503 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1974).
" No. 74-1019.
503 F.2d at 762.
No. 74-1020.
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discourage union activity.24 The court agreed with the NLRB's
argument that the mere existence of a proper ground for discharge
is not controlling as to the validity of the discharge when the
actual motivation is determined to be the employee's union activ-
ity.2
5
In NLRB v. Dolese Co. 26 the court ordered enforcement of the
Board's decree that an employee who had been involved in initial
union organization efforts was discharged for protected union ac-
tivity. The employee was fired 2 weeks after the employees as a
group voted in favor of union representation. The Tenth Circuit
found substantial evidence in the record to support the NLRB's
findings that the employer did in fact know of the employee's
union activity and that such knowledge was the motivation for his
discharge.
3. Interference with Union Activities
2 7
The evidence in Dayton Tire & Rubber28 was also held to
support findings of unlawful interference with protected union
activity. The first of the two cases considered 9 involved instances
of coercive interrogation of employees by supervisors as to the
employees' support of the union. 31 In the second case3' there was
evidence of harassment of employees carrying union authoriza-
tion cards and the firing of employees with the purpose and intent
to discourage union activity. 32 In both cases, statements were
made by supervisors which indicated that the employees' union
activities were under management surveillance, which interfered
with the employees' section 7 rights.33 In Dolese34 the court ac-
cepted the NLRB's conclusions that the employer had interfered
with protected union activity. There was evidence of interroga-
tions of employees, offers of pay increases, prohibitions of litera-
24 503 F.2d at 762.
11 Id. at 762, citing S.A. Healy Co. v. NLRB, 435 F.2d 314 (10th Cir. 1970); Betts
Baking Co. v. NLRB, 380 F.2d 199 (10th Cir. 1967).
24 No. 74-1512 (10th Cir., May 29, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
27 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1) (1970).
- 503 F.2d 759 (10th Cir. 1974).
No. 74-1019.
503 F.2d at 761.
No. 74-1020.
2 503 F.2d at 763.
Id. at 761, 762.
No. 74-1512 (10th Cir., May 29, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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ture dissemination, unprecedented solicitation of employee griev-
ances, and an employee discharge; all were intended to discour-
age union activity. 5
B. Unfair Labor Practices by Union
6
In Sperandeo v. Carpet Layers Local 41937 the court of ap-
peals upheld the trial court's denial of the NLRB's request for
injunctive relief pursuant to section 10(1) of the Act.3  A carpeting
company ceased installing its own carpets under the existing
collective bargaining agreement with the defendant, and began to
subcontract all installation work to other firms, some of which
employed non-union labor at substandard wages. The union pick-
eted both the original employer and the subcontractors in protest,
and some employees refused to cross the picket line. The em-
ployer, interpreting the picketing as an attempt to coerce it to
cease doing business with non-union subcontractors, filed an un-
fair labor practice charge. 9 A settlement was reached, but subse-
quent picketing at the store of the original employer resulted in
another such charge based on a claim of secondary boycott
activity. 0 The regional director then petitioned for injunctive re-
lief pursuant to section 10(1).11
In order to grant an injunction, the trial court had to find
cause to believe an unfair labor practice occurred or was occurring
and that the requested injunction was just and proper.2 Deter-
mining that the employer in this case was not neutral and would
suffer no loss or damage by the strike, the trial court denied the
requested injunction. 3 Although there was some question as to
the standards for review of the denial of an injunction, the court
of appeals concluded that either the grant or the denial of the
requested injunction should be reviewed under the same stan-
mId.
29 U.S.C. § 158(b) (1970).
11 No. 75-1135 (10th Cir., June 18, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
29 U.S.C. § 160(1) (1970).
"' Id. § 158(b)(4)(B).
40 Id. § 158(b)(4)(i)(ii)(B).
1 Id. § 160(1).
12 Id.
3 Sperandeo v. Carpet Layers Local 419, No. 75-1135 (10th Cir., June 18, 1975) (Not
for Routine Publication).
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dard-abuse of discretion." Since no abuse of discretion was
found, the judgment of the trial court was affirmed.
C. Injunctions
A mandatory injunction ordering arbitration was entered
pursuant to section 301(a)45 in Carpenters District Council v.
Brady Corp.4" The collective bargaining agreement in Brady
Corp. provided for arbitration of all but "jurisdictional dis-
putes."4 A grievance arose because the corporation assigned to a
non-union employee work which was to be covered by the agree-
ment unless "claimed" by another union or trade. While holding
that courts rather than arbitrators determine issues of "substan-
tive arbitrability,"45 the Tenth Circuit followed the rule that
where an exclusion-from-arbitration clause is vague, and the arbi-
tration clause is broad, only the most forceful evidence of a purpose
to exclude the claim from arbitration will deter a court from direct-
ing the dispute to arbitration.49
The court found that the dispute in question was not a jurisdic-
tional dispute, but was in fact a dispute as to interpretation of
the word "claimed" in the collective bargaining agreement. Thus,
the trial court was upheld in its finding that the dispute was
within the scope of the agreement's arbitration clause. 0
In C. F. & I. Steel Corp. v. UMW' the union appealed the
granting of a section 301 injunction forbidding it from
engaging in a strike, work stoppage, interruption of work, or picket-
ing. . . over disputes arising from employee suspensions, employee
discharges, and work assignments, during the remaining life of the
National Bituminous Coal Wage Agreement of 1971.52
After reviewing the evidence heard by the trial court, the Tenth
I d.
29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1970).
513 F.2d 1 (loth Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 2.
Id. at 3, citing Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local No. 1095, 422 F.2d 137
(10th Cir. 1970); UAW v. Folding Carrier Corp., 422 F.2d 47 (loth Cir. 1970).
1 513 F.2d at 3, citing United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363
U.S. 574 (1970), Locomotive Firemen Local 844 v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 388 F.2d 224
(10th Cir. 1964), and UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1962).
I' d. at 4.
51 507 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1974).
52 Id. at 171.
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Circuit concluded that the injunction as granted was not imper-
missibly vague or overbroad. 3 In view of the number of union
violations of the collective bargaining agreement, the granting of
the injunction was affirmed.54
Trustees of Colorado Laborers Health & Welfare Fund v.
Ritchie55 involved the dissolution of a partnership and its subse-
quent takeover by one of the original partners as sole proprietor.
The new owner sent checks to the health and welfare fund after
acquiring the operation, but later terminated payments. The
union's claim for amounts due the fund under the collective bar-
gaining agreement between the union and the partnership was
denied by the trial court. The court of appeals reversed, holding
that Ritchie's unilateral and subjective repudiation of the collec-
tive bargaining agreement was insufficient to relieve him of all
obligations thereunder. In reaching this result, the court men-
tioned Ritchie's continued membership in the Associated Build-
ing Contractors of Colorado which represented contractors, in-
cluding Ritchie, in bargaining with the union. In support of its
findings the Tenth Circuit also noted the continuity of the busi-
ness and its dealings.
5
D. Arbitration
In Retail Store Employees Local 782 v. Say-On Groceries"
the Tenth Circuit affirmed a district court's refusal to enforce an
arbitration award in favor of a union member. The employee
brought a grievance based on a reduction in her working hours,
because the hours of other workers with less seniority were not
similarly reduced. After finding that the employer had acted un-
fairly, the arbitrator granted backpay, and ordered the employer
not to assign work so as to reduce the complainant's hours or
eliminate her job. When the employer refused to pay the backpay
award and discharged the employee, the union sued.
The trial court accepted the company's argument that the
Id. at 173, citing International Longshoremen Local 1291 v. Marine Trade Ass'n,
389 U.S. 64 (1967).
Id. at 177. In reaching this conclusion, the Tenth Circuit particularly considered
Boys Markets, Inc. v. Retail Clerks Local 770, 398 U.S. 235 (1970). Id. at 173-76.
No. 74-1507 (10th Cir., Apr. 28, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
5 Id.
57 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir. 1975).
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arbitrator had no power to grant backpay, because the issue of
back wages had not been submitted to arbitration. The trial
court's finding that the arbitration award of back wages was null
and void was affirmed on appeal. 8 Appellant also challenged the
trial court's order submitting the issue of back wages to a separate
arbitrator, rather than remanding the issue to the original arbi-
trator for clarification. The Tenth Circuit found this contention
without merit, in light of its determination that the original arbi-
trator had no authority to award backpay. 5g
In a well-reasoned dissent, 0 Judge Doyle argued that the
issue of back wages, though not specifically submitted, was
within the authority of the original arbitrator. He noted that the
purpose of submission to arbitration was "not only to determine
the rightness or wrongness of the problem, but to achieve a mone-
tary result."'" He stated that the collective bargaining agreement
appeared to contemplate the possibility of a backpay award, and
held that the issue was "whether the award of money damages
was within the contemplation of the submission."62 Judge Doyle
also argued that the issue should be remanded to the original
arbitrator, because he felt the basic philosophy of all arbitration
would be frustrated by ordering rearbitration of an issue pre-
viously decided by another arbitrator.63
II. LABOR-MANAGEMENT REPORTING AND DISCLOSURE ACT64
Only one decision based on this Act, United States v. Bath,65
was handed down in the last year by the Tenth Circuit. The
defendant, president of Teamsters Local 961, was convicted by a
jury of knowingly reporting payments of union money to hired
non-union pickets as "strike benefits" to union members," and
I Id. at 503, citing Luggage Workers Local 66 v. Neevel Luggage Mfg. Co., 325 F.2d
992 (8th Cir. 1964).
59 Id.
Id. at 503-04.
" Id. at 504.
" Id., citing International Union of Electrical Workers v. Peerless Pressed Metal
Corp., 489 F.2d 768 (1st Cir. 1973), Kroger Co. v. Teamsters Local 661, 380 F.2d 728 (6th
Cir. 1967), Newark Wire Cloth Co. v. United Steelworkers, 339 F. Supp. 1207 (D.N.J.
1972), Electric Specialty Co. v. Electrical Workers Local 1069, 222 F. Supp. 314 (D. Conn.
1963).
6 Id. at 504.
29 U.S.C. §§ 401-531 (1970) [hereinafter cited as LMRDA].
504 F.2d 456 (10th Cir. 1974).
" In violation of 29 U.S.C. § 439(b) (1970).
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willfully making false entries in records required to verify and
clarify the local union's annual financial reports to the Secretary
of Labor. 7
The picket line at Centennial Turf Club was manned by
some 80 pickets, at least 31 of whom were not working at Cen-
tennial at the time, and for whom "out-of-work benefits" were
requested from the Teamsters International Office."' The court
upheld Bath's conviction, holding that his actions defeated the
purpose of the LMRDA, which is to insure that union officials
accurately report to union members the details of all disburse-
ments of union funds." The court rejected Bath's argument that
conviction under the LMRDA requires a finding that the sum
must have been reported in a category other than the one in which
it was reported, noting that such a technical reading would defeat
the purpose of the Act.70 The court also held that proof of willful
violation is not necessary for conviction under the Act; knowledge
of the false or inaccurate statement is all that is required.7'
The second count of Bath's conviction was not considered on
appeal, since reversal on that count would not alter the effect of
his two concurrent 18-month sentences.72 In a separate opinion,
Judge Holloway supported affirmation of the count one convic-
tion, but would have reversed the conviction on count two, noting
that a person convicted under the LMRDA is barred from serving
as a union official for 5 years after such conviction, unless permit-
ted to do so by the Board of Parole.73 The parole board's determi-
nation, it was argued, would be affected by the existence of two,
rather than one, convictions.7
III. FAIR LABOR STANDARDS AcT75
Sections of the FLSA formed the basis of four Tenth Circuit
", Violating id. § 439(c).
" The benefits requested were available to union members whose jobs were affected
by labor disputes.
:9 504 F.2d at 459.
7o Id.
71 Id.
72 Id. at 457.
,1 Id. at 460-61, citing 29 U.S.C. § 504 (1970).
" 504 F.2d at 461. Judge Holloway also argued that the LMRDA should not apply to
reports between the local and the international unions, in view of the fact that the local
had additional, accurate receipts of the payments in its records. Id. at 461-62.
75 29 U.S.C. §§ 201-19 (1970) [hereinafter referred to as FLSA].
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cases in the last year. In Brennan v. Metropolitan Trash, Inc. 6
the court upheld the trial court's determination that the defen-
dant was in fact subject to the provisions of the FLSA as an
employer whose employees were "engaged in commerce or in the
production of goods for commerce."" This finding was based on
evidence that 50 percent of defendant's customers were commer-
cial in nature, that 95 percent of defendant's income was derived
from customers engaged in the production of goods for commerce,
and that 80 percent of defendant's equipment and repair items
were manufactured outside of Colorado.
7 8
Finding that defendant's services were "a closely related pro-
cess or occupation directly essential to the production" of goods
for commerce, ' 9 the trial court ordered defendant to pay damages
of back wages at the rate of time and a half for all hours worked
in excess of 40 per week. This was correct in spite of the purely
local situs of the operation, because the defendant's activity was
an essential aspect and component of the manufacturing process
involved in interstate commerce, and not merely "isolated local
activity."'"
The Tenth Circuit stated that the established test under the
FLSA is whether an activity is closely related and directly essen-
tial to an instrumentality or facility of interstate commerce.2 It
found that evidence developed at trial clearly indicated the essen-
tial relationship of defendant, a local refuse hauling firm, to the
interstate manufacturers it served.83
Nease v. Associated Properties, Inc.84 involved a claim for
overtime compensation of an apartment house manager for hours
he actually worked in excess of the 40 hours stipulated in the
contract of employment. The granting of defendant's motion for
summary judgment, which was based on a denial of the applica-
,' 513 F.2d 1324 (10th Cir. 1975).
" Id. at 1324, citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
1' Id. at 1325.
7 Id., citing 29 U.S.C. § 203(j) (1970).
29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1970).
513 F.2d at 1326, citing Mitchell v. C.W. Vollmer & Co., 349 U.S. 427, 429 (1955).
K2 Id.
1 Id., citing Schultz v. Instant Handling, Inc., 418 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1969); Mitchell
v. Dooley Bros., 286 F.2d 40 (1st Cir. 1960), cert. denied, 366 U.S. 911 (1961).
' No. 74-1450 (10th Cir., June 9, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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bility of the Act, 5 was affirmed. In this case, the aggregate gross
compensation received by defendant from all the properties it
managed was less than the $250,000 annual minimum required
to bring an employer within the Act.8" The court relied upon a
Supreme Court decision 7 which had held that the relevant mea-
sure of dollar-volume collected by an enterprise rendering
professional management services is gross commissions rather
than gross rentals.
In another case involving failure to pay overtime, the court
in Brennan v. Brendell Manufacturing Co."8 affirmed the trial
court's injunction of future violations and its order requiring pay-
ment of back wages." The Tenth Circuit held that, for those
employed under contracts which provide for an annual salary and
require hours of work in excess of 40 per week, compliance of the
wage agreement with the FLSA would be tested in light of an
express agreement establishing the straight-time rate. Where no
such rate is agreed upon, and there exists no allocation of the
agreed salary between the statutory work week and overtime
hours, the straight-time rate will be determined by dividing the
total weekly compensation under the contract by the weekly
hours worked. 0 The case was remanded for further consideration
of the award, which limited recovery of back-overtime pay to
amounts which accrued to the time of filing of the complaint,
rather than to the time of trial. The Tenth Circuit questioned the
trial court's denial of its ability to award post-complaint relief."
95 29 U.S.C. § 203(s) (1970).
I d.
Falk v. Brennan, 414 U.S. 190 (1975).
Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id. The employer's actions were found to violate FLSA's requirements as to pay-
ment of overtime, 29 U.S.C. §§ 207, 215(a)(2) (1970), and as to making and preserving
records, id. §§ 211(c), 215(a)(5). Evidence was produced at trial showing that the defen-
dant had manipulated records of hourly wages paid so as to appear to pay time and a half,
while actually paying only straight time. Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974)
(Not for Routine Publication).
90 Nos. 73-1861, 73-1862 (10th Cir., Nov. 25, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication). This
formula was adopted over defendant's theory that the wage agreement would comply with
FLSA if the compensation set by the contract is at least equal to the minimum wage times
40 plus one and one-half the minimum wage times hours in excess of 40. Id.
11 Id. The court also held that it is proper for a trial court to delegate to the Secretary
of Labor the determination of the amount of the backpay award, so long as that determi-
nation is consistent with the evidence presented at trial. Id.
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In Brennan v. Peterson 2 the employer, found to have vio-
lated overtime, minimum wage, and child labor provisions of the
FLSA, agreed to comply with the Act. Thereafter, the employer
was found to have altered the records of actual hours worked by
his employees to avoid paying overtime. On appeal, the Tenth
Circuit considered the propriety of granting an injunction against
similar future violations. 3 The FLSA provides for the discretion-
ary granting of such injunctions to prevent future or existing vio-
lations,94 but not to impose a penalty or punishment. 5 The trial
court had refused to issue an injunction against future violations.
The Tenth Circuit found this refusal an abuse of discretion in
light of evidence of the employer's continued violations and re-
peatedly broken promises to comply with the FLSA. 6 The case
was reversed and remanded for issuance of an injunction against
continued violations of the Act.
IV. MISCELLANEOUS CASES
Under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act of 1967,11
an individual who claims a violation of the Act must give notice
to the Secretary of Labor within 180 days of any alleged occur-
rence. The Act also requires a 60-day period of notice to the
Secretary before suit is filed." In Law v. United Air Lines9 the
plaintiff alleged that his job application was rejected solely be-
cause of his age. However, he failed to file his notice of claim
within the 180-day period, and the Tenth Circuit affirmed the
trial court's dismissal of his suit.'00
Reemployment rights of veterans under the Military Selec-
tive Service Act'0 1 were considered in Jackson v. Beech Aircraft
Corp. 102 Plaintiffs sought to determine whether the time they
spent in military service was to be included in computing their
retirement income benefits, eligibility for longevity pay, length of
11 No. 74-1446 (10th Cir., May 7, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
93 Id,
29 U.S.C. § 217 (1970).
'5 No. 74-1446 (10th Cir., May 7, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
Id.
29 U.S.C. §§ 621-34 (1970).
" Id. § 626(d).
519 F.2d 170 (10th Cir. 1975).
o Id.
"' 50, App. U.S.C. §§ 451-73 (1970).
" 517 F.2d 1322 (10th Cir. 1975).
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vacations, and rate of accrual of sick leave credits. The trial
court's holding that none of the four listed benefits was to be
included under the statute as "seniority rights"''03 was affirmed.0 4
The Tenth Circuit agreed with the trial court that computation
of those benefits should be governed by rules and regulations
propounded by the employer. 05 The retirement plan and collec-
tive bargaining agreement from which these benefits were derived
were found to provide the four benefits on the basis of substantial
work for the employer, and not on seniority alone.'"'
Christopher M. Brandt
SECTION 10(b) REVISITED
NLRB v. R. L. Sweet Lumber Co., 515 F.2d 785
(10th Cir. 1975)
THOMAS B. BUESCHER*
INTRODUCTION
In 1974 the Tenth Circuit adopted a new approach to prob-
lems created by the 6-month statute of limitations contained in
section 10(b) of the National Labor Relations Act.' The court, in
NLRB v. Serv-All Co.,' had adopted the rationale of the Sixth
Circuit3 in holding that the proper approach to a section 10(b)
issue should be to look at the burdens on the defense.' The court
got a chance to apply its new rationale in NLRB v. R. L. Sweet
Lumber Co.5 The basic question in Sweet Lumber was whether
"0 50, App. U.S.C. § 459(b), (c) (1970).
517 F.2d at 1327.
I Id. at 1325.
I Id. at 1326.
* Associate, Law Offices of Walter C. Brauer III, Denver. Colorado, A.B., Duke
University, 1972; J.D., University of Denver, 1975.
1 29 U.S.C. § 160(b) (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Act].
2 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
3 NLRB v. McCready & Sons, Inc., 482 F.2d 872 (6th Cir. 1973).
' For a discussion of this approach and an analysis of the Serv-A I decision, see Tenth
Circuit Survey, 52 DENVER L.J. 279 (1975).
1 515 F.2d 785 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3305 (U.S. Nov. 18, 1975) (No.
75-321),
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charges of unfair labor practices, which the defendant alleged
were based on a collective bargaining agreement signed more
than 6 months prior to filing, were barred by the section 10(b)
limitation period.' Instead of using its "burden on the defense"
test, however, the court took a more traditional approach which
will be of greater aid in future cases. This comment will examine
that approach.
I. THE FACTS IN Sweet Lumber
In order to understand the court's decision, it is important
to look at the sequence of events which led to the filing of unfair
labor practice charges against Sweet Lumber and to recognize
that the crucial date is February 19, 1972. Any event occurring
before that date which may have constituted an unfair labor prac-
tice would be barred by the 6-month statute of limitations con-
tained in section 10(b).
Sweet Lumber was engaged in the wholesale and retail sale
of lumber and related products, and the manufacture of prefabri-
cated homes. The employees at Sweet Lumber were represented
by two different unions: The warehouse and yard employees were
represented by Teamsters Local 541 (Teamsters), while the em-
ployees engaged in the manufacturing process were represented
by Carpenters Local 1635 (Carpenters).' In June 1971 the board
of directors of Sweet Lumber decided to establish a separate com-
pany to produce prefabricated homes. This new company was to
be called Standard Homes and was to be located approximately
19 miles from the original Sweet Lumber site.8 Sweet Lumber
continued to manufacture prefabricated homes until February
29, 1972, at which time production began at Standard Homes.'
In early January 1972, preparations for 'occupying the Stan-
dard Homes facility had begun. Four employees had been hired
to handle lumber which had begun to arrive. One of these em-
ployees was a Teamsters member from the Sweet Lumber facility
and the other three were new employees. 0 On January 24, 1972,
The NLRB alleged that Sweet Lumber had violated sections 8(a)(1), (2), (3), and
(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §§ 158(a)(1), (2), (3), (5) (1970).
515 F.2d at 787.
Standard Homes Company was incorporated separately from Sweet Lumber on
October 31, 1971, but Mrs. Sweet, the president of Sweet Lumber, was also the president
of Standard Homes. Id. at 788.
g Id. at 792 n.8.
Id. at 788.
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the business agent of Teamsters obtained signed authorization
cards from the four employees then working at Standard Homes.
The business agent took these cards to the vice president and the
attorney for Sweet Lumber and demanded recognition. After veri-
fying the signatures on the cards, the president and attorney
agreed to bargain with the Teamsters, and on February 11, 1972,
a contract between the Teamsters and Standard was executed."
The contract covered "all production and maintenance employ-
ees at the Employer's Olathe, Kansas [Standard Homes] plant
including truck drivers."'" The contract also contained a union
security clause requiring employees of Standard Homes to be-
come members of the Teamsters within 31 days after beginning
employment. 3
In February 1972 the vice president of Standard Homes
began interviewing employees at Sweet Lumber to see if they
would be interested in accepting employment at Standard
Homes. Four men who were working in the prefabrication opera-
tion, all members of Carpenters, eventually accepted employ-
ment at Standard Homes.' During the interviews, they were told
by the vice president of Standard Homes that there would be only
one union at the company, the Teamsters. They began working
at Standard Homes on February 23, 1972.11
On February 20, 1972, a representative of the Carpenters
approached the vice president of Sweet Lumber to discuss the
transfer of employees from Sweet Lumber to Standard Homes.
The vice president stated that "there was nothing to discuss"
because Standard Homes was completely separate from Sweet
Lumber. 6 At that time the Carpenters' representative indicated
that he would file a grievance concerning the transfers.
The NLRB first found that Sweet Lumber and Standard
Homes were a single employer under the Act. 7 On the basis of
Id.
" Id. at 789.
13 Id.
1, Id. While these employees were originally offered a wage rate of $3.75 per hour, all
were eventually paid the "leadman" rate of $4.50 per hour under the Teamsters contract.
While at Sweet Lumber, they had all been making $5.065 per hour under the Carpenters
contract. Id. n.3.
11 Id. at 789.
16 Id.
17 29 U.S.C. § 152(2) (1970).
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this finding, the NLRB concluded that the prefabrication em-
ployees at Standard Homes were an accretion to the Carpenters'
bargaining unit at the Sweet Lumber facility"8 and that Sweet
Lumber had committed the following unfair labor practices:
1. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, rendered
unlawful assistance and support to the Teamsters in violation of §
8(a)(1) and (2).
2. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, enforced
the provisions of the union security agreement of the Teamster con-
tract against certain employees at Standard Homes' Olathe plant,
thereby encouraging membership in the Teamsters and discourag-
ing membership in the Carpenters, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (3).
3. Sweet Lumber, by and through Standard Homes, refused to
bargain collectively with the Carpenters as the exclusive representa-
tive of certain employees of Standard Homes' Olathe plant and
unilaterally changed the terms and conditions of employment of
said employees, in violation of § 8(a)(1) and (5)."1
These were the findings which Sweet Lumber appealed to the
Tenth Circuit, primarily on the basis that all of the alleged unfair
practice charges were barred by the section 10(b) statute of limi-
tations.
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT'S APPROACH
In challenging the NLRB's findings that the unfair labor
practices charged against it were not time-barred, Sweet Lumber
relied primarily on Serv-A11 0 and Machinists Local 1424 v.
NLRB. 1 Essentially, Sweet Lumber argued that all of the unfair
labor practice findings made by the NLRB were dependent upon
the legitimacy of the contract with the Teamsters at the Standard
Homes facility. Since this contract was executed on February 11,
1972, 6 months and 8 days prior to the filing of the charges, Sweet
Lumber argued that all charges must be barred by section 10(b).22
" While Sweet Lumber challenged both of these findings, neither will be discussed
here. The single employer determination "is essentially a factual one and will not be set
aside unless clearly erroneous." 515 F.2d at 793. The court found substantial evidence in
the whole record to support the NLRB's conclusion. The finding of an accretion is a
discretionary function of the NLRB and "should not be set aside unless the Board has
acted in an arbitrary and capricious manner." Id. at 794. There was no evidence to support
any allegations that the NLRB was arbitrary and capricious, and the court described the
record as "amply sustaining the accretion finding." Id.
1 Id. at 787.
20 491 F.2d 1273 (10th Cir. 1974).
2- 362 U.S. 411 (1960). This case is hereinafter referred to as the Bryan case.
12 515 F.2d at 790.
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Placed in terms of Serv-AU, Sweet Lumber claimed that its
defense to the charges would entail reliance on facts which oc-
curred outside the 6-month limitations period. This reliance, it
argued, would place too great a burden on the defense, the very
evil which Serv-AUI was intended to eliminate. However, the court
did not agree with that characterization of Serv-AU1. In Serv-All
an employer had repeatedly refused to sign a collective bargain-
ing agreement, with the first refusal occurring more than 6
months before charges were filed with the NLRB. The NLRB had
argued Serv-All on a recurring violation theory. The court did not
view Sweet Lumber as a recurring violation case; instead, it found
that the case presented "a problem whether conduct which itself
is the gravamen of the unfair labor practices charged occurred
within the section 10(b) period.
'2 3
Sweet Lumber's reliance on Bryan created a more difficult
problem for the court due to the close factual similarity of the two
cases. In Bryan the employer had entered into a collective bar-
gaining agreement with Machinists Local 1424 at a time when the
union did not represent the majority of the employees. 4 The con-
tract in Bryan, as in Sweet Lumber, contained a union security
clause requiring all employees to become members of the union
within 45 days of the commencement of their employment. This
contract was later renegotiated and reexecuted, and, finally, two
charges were filed against the union, 10 and 12 months after the
execution of the original agreement. The charges claimed that the
agreement was void in that it was executed at a time when the
union did not represent a majority of the employees.25
In holding that the charges in Bryan were barred by section
10(b), the Supreme Court discussed two different situations. The
first involved "occurrences within the six-month limitation pe-
riod [which] in and of themselves [constituted], as a substan-
tive matter, unfair labor practices. 2 8 In such a case any unfair
labor practices occurring outside of the 6-month time period
could be used as evidence "to shed light on the true character of
matters occurring within the limitations period." In the second
Id. at 792.
U 362 U.S. at 412.
, Id. at 412-14.
2 Id. at 416.
2 Id.
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situation, "conduct occurring within the limitations period
[could] be charged to be an unfair labor practice only through
the reliance on an earlier unfair labor practice." 8 In such a cir-
cumstance the earlier unfair labor practice served "to cloak with
illegality that which was otherwise lawful.""9
Sweet Lumber argued that its case fell directly within the
circumstances described in the second situation. It argued that
it could only be found to have committed an unfair labor practice
if the contract it signed with the Teamsters was invalid. Since
that contract had been signed prior to February 19, its validity
was beyond scrutiny. The Tenth Circuit, while noting that the
case was "not free from doubt," concluded that under the circum-
stances the contract execution date was not the controlling fac-
tor.3
0
In order to understand the correctness of the Tenth Circuit
holding, it is important to understand two things. First, one must
recognize the NLRB's finding, affirmed by the court, that the
Standard Homes' plant was an accretion to the Sweet Lumber
Company's original plant .3 Second, one must understand exactly
what conduct the NLRB found to be violative of the Act.32 Once
the NLRB had made its accretion finding, it then went on to hold
that Sweet Lumber: (1) Illegally assisted the Teamsters in viola-
tion of section 8(a)(2); (2) illegally discriminated against mem-
bers of the Carpenters in violation of section 8(a)(3); and (3)
refused to bargain with the Carpenters in violation of section
8(a) (5). The 8(a)(2) and (3) findings were based upon the applica-
tion of the union security agreement in the Teamsters contract
to employees who were members of the Carpenters unit at the
original Sweet Lumber plant. The administrative law judge,
whose opinion was adopted by the NLRB, said:
The application of a collective-bargaining agreement with one
labor organization (here Teamsters) and enforcement of that con-
Id. at 416-17.
Id. at 417.
515 F.2d at 792.
Without such a finding, the only possible unfair labor practice which could have
been proved against Sweet Lumber was a refusal-to-bargain charge based on the February
20 refusal to discuss the Standard Homes operations with the Carpenters' representative.
" While it is not altogether clear, it will be assumed that the 8(a)(1) interference
charge was derivative, i.e., that in violating other sections of the Act, Sweet Lumber
interfered with the exercise of its employees' section 7 rights.
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tract's union-security provisions to employees in a different unit
represented by a different labor organization (here Carpenters) is
violative of Section 8(a)(1), (2), and (3) of the Act even though the
contract thus applied and enforced was entered into prior to the
10(b) period.
33
This observation highlights an important distinction be-
tween Sweet Lumberand Bryan. In Bryan the charge was based
on the enforcement of a union security clause contained in an
agreement that had been illegally signed more than 6 months
before the filing of the charge. However, in Sweet Lumber the
NLRB was not condemning the enforcement of the union security
clause, but, rather, it was claiming that the enforcement of that
clause against certain members of an existing collective bargain-
ing unit was a violation of the Act. At this point the importance
of the NLRB's accretion conclusion is dramatically underscored,
for, if there had been no accretion in this case, the only thing the
NLRB could have argued was that the general enforcement of the
union security clause was violative of the Act. Such an argument
would have fallen directly within the second situation described
in Bryan, and the court would have had to conclude that the
charges were barred by section 10(b). However, because of the
accretion finding, the application of any agreement, besides the
Carpenters agreement, to the employees at the new Standard
Homes plant would have been a violation of the Act. Since the
union security clause did not come into operation until after Feb-
ruary 19, any unfair labor practice charge based on the enforce-
ment of that clause was within the 6-month limitations period.
Similarly, the 8(a)(5) refusal-to-bargain charge was based on
the application to the Carpenters of the contract, not just the
union security agreement. By applying the Teamsters contract to
the members of the Carpenters, Sweet Lumber unilaterally
changed the hours and working conditions of the Carpenters.
Again, it is irrelevant when the Teamsters contract was signed,
because, even if that contract was entirely legal, its application
to the members of the Carpenters could never have been legal,
given the accretion finding.
In reaching its conclusion, the Tenth Circuit relied in part on
Shumate v. NLRB.3 4 In Shumate the plaintiffs resigned from a
207 N.L.R.B. 529, 537 (1973) (footnote omitted); White Front Stores, Inc., 166
N.L.R.B. 175 (1967); Wolfer Printing Co., 145 N.L.R.B. 695 (1963).
34 452 F.2d 717 (4th Cir. 1971).
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union during a strike and crossed the picket line. The strike was
ended on October 9, 1967, and, later that month, the union filed
charges against the employees. The union then found the employ-
ees guilty in an internal union trial and fined them in November
1967. In April 1968 the union sent a letter to the employees de-
manding that the fine be paid and threatening legal action if it
was not. On May 21, 1968, the union filed a suit in state court to
collect the fine. Finally, in June 1968 the employees filed unfair
labor practice charges against the union.35 The NLRB found that
the charges were barred by section 10(b), but the Fourth Circuit
reversed, claiming that the case fell within the first situation
described in Bryan.35
The importance of Shumate is not so much that it supports
the Tenth Circuit's holding, but that its dissent sets out a rela-
tively easy-to-understand test for similar 10(b) problems. The
majority had found that the letter demanding payment and the
filing of the state court suit were, in and of themselves, unfair
labor practices. The dissent raised an interesting point by posing
the following question: "[H]ad this case proceeded to its merits,
would not the determinative premise have been the legality of the
expulsion and the levy?" ' 37 In Sweet Lumber that question be-
came: Was the determinative premise in the NLRB's finding of
a violation of the Act the legality of the Teamsters contract? The
answer to that question is obviously no. In finding violations of
section 8(a)(2), (3), and (5), it was totally irrelevant whether the
Teamsters contract was in fact legal. Even if one assumes that
the contract was legal, when it was applied to the members of the
Carpenters bargaining unit it changed the terms of their
employment without consulting their bargaining representative.
When the union security clause was enforced against the new
employees at Standard Homes, discrimination against the Car-
penters resulted because they were Carpenters, not merely be-
cause they were employees. The enforcement of that clause also
assisted the Teamsters, not in relation to the new employee who
was not a member of the Carpenters at the Sweet Lumber plant,
but with respect to the members of the Carpenters bargaining
unit at Sweet Lumber. Again, it can be seen that the NLRB's
This recitation of the facts is taken from the dissenting opinion. Id. at 721.
" Id. at 719.
Id. at 722.
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finding of an accretion was really the key factor in this case.
Without such a finding the answer to the question paraphrased
above would have to be in the affirmative.
CONCLUSION
In Sweet Lumber the Tenth Circuit found that in order to
correctly analyze a section 10(b) limitations question, it is neces-
sary to look beyond the burdens on the defense. Instead, the court
used an analytically correct, albeit more difficult, approach
which should be used in all future 10(b) cases. First, it is neces-
sary to understand the facts and the exact sequence of their oc-
currence. Then one must understand exactly what actions are
alleged to be unfair labor practices. Finally, one must determine
exactly why these alleged actions are unfair labor practices. If
they are unlawful only because of an activity which occurred
more than 6 months prior to the filing of a charge, then the charge
is barred by section 10(b) and the complaint must be dismissed.
However, if the activities are unlawful without reference to any
other acts outside the limitations period, section 10(b) does not
bar the charge. The use of such an approach should aid all those
who are faced with the horrors section 10(b) can cause.
Boys Markets RULE APPLIED
Chief Freight Lines Co. v. Teamsters Local 886,
514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975)
By CLAY R. SMITH*
The much disputed "narrow" holding of Boys Markets, Inc.
v. Retail Clerks Local 7701 was the focal point of the Tenth Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals' analysis in Chief Freight Lines Co. v.
Teamsters Local 886.2 Holding that the district court erred in
granting to an employer injunctive relief against a threatened
strike while simultaneously granting a stay of arbitration, the
* Associate of the Law Offices of John McKendree, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1970,
University of Virginia; J.D., 1975, University of Denver.
398 U.S. 235, 253 (1970).
2 514 F.2d 572 (10th Cir. 1975).
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Tenth Circuit revealed a predilection to view the Boys Markets
exception to the Norris-LaGuardia Act 3 as a limited
accommodation between the express terms of Norris-LaGuardia
and the federal policy favoring resolution of industrial strife by
arbitral resolution pursuant to section 301 of the Labor Manage-
ment Relations Act of 1947, as amended.' Before a discussion of
the unique facts and legal issues confronting the Tenth Circuit in
Chief Freight Lines, a brief review of Boys Markets, those deci-
sions leading up to it, and the federal policies at issue is useful
in placing Chief Freight Lines in its proper perspective.
I. Boys Markets: AN OVERVIEW
As part of the 1947 Taft-Hartley amendments to the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act, Congress added section 301(a), which
provided for, inter alia, "[sluits for violation of contracts be-
tween an employer and a labor organization representing employ-
ees in an industry affecting commerce. without respect to the
amount in controversy or without regard to the citizenship of the
parties.'' s
In Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama,' the
United States Supreme Court held that section 301(a) consti-
tuted not only a simple grant of federal jurisdiction, but also a
mandate for courts7 to fashion a body of federal substantive law
to effectuate the purposes and policies of the Act.8 Lincoln Mills
identified maintenance of industrial peace as a prime, if not the
prime, purpose of the Act, and the Court determined that specific
performance of contractual undertakings served that purpose.' Of
particular relevance instantly was the fact that the contractual
3 29 U.S.C. §§ 101-15 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Norris-LaGuardia]. Generally
speaking, Norris-LaGuardia proscribes federal courts from issuing injunctions in a case
growing out of a "labor dispute," as defined in section 4 thereof. Id. § 104. Section 4(a) of
Norris-LaGuardia specifically provides that no federal court shall have jurisdiction to
issue injunctive relief to restrain individuals from "[cleasing or refusing to perform any
work or to remain in any relation of employment ... " Id. § 104(a).
I Id. § 185. The Labor Management Relations Act will hereinafter be referred to as
the Act.
I Id. § 185(a).
6 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
1 Charles Dowd Box Co. v. Courtney, 368 U.S. 502 (1962), established that section
301(a) jurisdiction was concurrent between state and federal courts.
353 U.S. at 456-57.
Id. at 455. See Retail Clerks Local 128 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962);
cf. Smith v. UMW, 493 F.2d 1241 (10th Cir. 1974).
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undertaking sought to be specifically enforced in Lincoln Mills
was an agreement to arbitrate disputes. 0 To order specific per-
formance of an arbitration clause, however, the Court was re-
quired to overcome two significant hurdles-the common law rule
against enforcing executory agreements to arbitrate and the anti-
injunction provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act." As to the
first hurdle, the Court relied on legislative history to determine
that Congress, by enacting section 301, intended to abrogate the
common law rule. 2 As to the Norris-LaGuardia Act, the Court
stated:
Though a literal reading might bring the dispute within the terms
of the [Norris-LaGuardia] Act . . . we see no justification in policy
for restricting § 301(a) to damage suits, leaving specific performance
of a contract to arbitrate grievance disputes to the inapposite proce-
dural requirements of that Act . . . . The congressional policy in
favor of the enforcement of agreements to arbitrate grievance dis-
putes being clear, there is no reason to submit them to the require-
ments of § 7 of the Norris-LaGuardia Act.
3
Lincoln Mills, finally, established firmly the notion that the
promise by an employer to arbitrate disputes was the quid pro
quo for an agreement not to strike by the labor organization." The
federal policy favoring arbitration of disputes espoused in Lincoln
Mills was to become the cornerstone of the federal substantive
law flowing from judicial construction of section 301.11
353 U.S. at 449.
A third hurdle-the constitutionality of section 301 if regarded as a grant of power
to develop a substantive body of federal law-was discussed at length in Justice
Frankfurter's dissent. 353 U.S. at 460.
' Id. at 456.
" Id. at 458-59 (footnotes and citations omitted). Section 7 of Norris-LaGuardia
provides for the issuance of injunctions in labor disputes under limited circumstances and
under stringent procedural requirements.
" Id. at 455.
" Gateway Coal Co. v. UMW, 414 U.S. 368 (1974); Operating Eng'r Local 150 v. Flair
Builders, Inc., 406 U.S. 487 (1972); Carey v. Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 375 U.S. 261
(1964); John Wiley & Sons, Inc. v. Livingston, 376 U.S. 543 (1964); Teamsters Local 174
v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95 (1962); Drake Bakeries, Inc. v. Bakery Workers Local
50, 370 U.S. 254 (1962); United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 363 U.S.
593 (1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Navigation Co., 363 U.S. 574 (1960);
United Steelworkers v. American Mfg. Co., 363 U.S. 564 (1960); Carpenters Dist. Council
v. Brady Corp., 513 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1975); UAW v. Folding Carrier Corp., 422 F.2d 47
(10th Cir. 1970); Johnson Builders, Inc. v. Carpenters Local 1095, 422 F.2d 137 (10th Cir.
1970); Locomotive Firemen Local 844 v. Kennecott Copper Corp., 338 F.2d 224 (10th Cir.
1964); UAW v. Cardwell Mfg. Co., 304 F.2d 801 (10th Cir. 1962); Machinists Local 1912
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While the Supreme Court was willing in Lincoln Mills to
accommodate the express provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
to permit the specific performance of an arbitration provision, it
was unwilling in Sinclair Refining Co. v. Atkinson"6 to enjoin
employees from engaging in work stoppages over disputes suscep-
tible of resolution through mandatory grievance and arbitration
procedures. Speaking for a five-justice majority, Justice Black
rejected the idea that section 301 sanctions piecemeal judicial
repeal of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. 7 He based his rejection on
the failure of Congress to repeal explicitly the anti-injunction
provisions of Norris-LaGuardia as to section 301 actions along
with an analysis of legislative history. This analysis showed, inter
alia, that a House-passed repeal of Norris-LaGuardia anti-
injunction provisions as to section 301 actions had been deleted
in the House-Senate Conference Committee. 9 Lincoln Mills was
distinguished because it did not enjoin any conduct falling within
one of the specific anti-injunction prohibitions of the Norris-
LaGuardia Act."0
Mr. Justice Brennan, along with Justices Douglas and Har-
lan, dissented in Sinclair, and his dissent was, for all practical
purposes, to become the majority opinion 8 years later in Boys
Markets. Justice Brennan argued that section 301 and the Norris-
LaGuardia Act should be read in pari materia and that, if the
policy of securing peaceful resolution of industrial disputes un-
derlying section 301 could be effected without substantial preju-
dice to the underlying purpose of Norris-LaGuardia, section 301
should prevail.' Noting that Norris-LaGuardia was enacted in
response to abuses by the federal judiciary in enjoining lawful
concerted activity by workers, the dissent contended that the
majority's decision ignored the fact that the union's work stop-
pages were in direct contravention of a no-strike pledge and
applicable grievance and arbitration procedures." The majority
v. United States Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959), cert. denied, 363 U.S. 845
(1960).
" 370 U.S. 195 (1962).
" Id. at 209.
S Id. at 205.
" Id. at 206-07.
Id. at 212.
11 Id. at 225.
Id. at 228. The applicable Sinclair arbitration provisions are reported in the appen-
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decision, rather, dealt a "crippling blow" to the arbitral process,
because, it was said, unions could resort to self-help measures to
resolve disputes properly relegated to the grievance and arbitra-
tion procedure. The dissent posited as a necessary consequence
of an employer's inability to enjoin such self-help measures a
future reluctance on the part of employers to commit themselves
"to obligations enforceable against them but not against their
unions. 2 3 "Accommodation [between section 301 and the
Norris-LaGuardia Act]," Justice Brennan stated, "requires only
that the anti-injunction policy of Norris-LaGuardia not intrude
into areas, not vital to its ends, where injunctive relief is vital to
a purpose of § 301 ... ."24 In lieu of the majority decision, the
dissent offered the following formula for effecting "accommoda-
tion" between section 301 and the Norris-LaGuardia Act:
A District Court entertaining an action under § 301 may not
grant injunctive relief against concerted activity unless and until it
decides that the case is one in which an injunction would be appro-
priate despite the Norris-LaGuardia Act. When a strike is sought to
be enjoined because it is over a grievance which both parties are
contractually bound to arbitrate, the District Court may issue no
injunctive order until it holds that the contract does have that ef-
fect; and the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition
of his obtaining an injunction against the strike. Beyond this, the
District Court must, of course, consider whether issuance of an in-
junction would be warranted under ordinary principles of eq-
uity-whether breaches are occurring and will continue, or have
been threatened and will be committed; whether they have caused
or will cause irreparable injury to the employer; and whether the
employer will suffer more from the denial of an injunction than will
the union from its issuance."
The above would later become the "narrow" holding of Boys
Markets.26
The Norris-LaGuardia Act does not affect jurisdiction of
state courts to issue injunctive relief in "labor disputes." Avco v.
Machinists Aero Lodge 735,2 however, held that an employer's
state court action to enjoin a work stoppage in breach of a no-
dix to the companion case of Atkinson v. Sinclair Refining Co. Id. at 250. The no-strike
provision is quoted in Atkinson. Id. at 241 n.1.
" Id. at 227.
" Id. at 225.
2 Id. at 228.
398 U.S. at 254.
390 U.S. 557 (1968).
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strike clause and over grievances subject to a mandatory arbitra-
tion procedure could be removed to federal court where the state
court injunction could be dissolved." Thus, Avco foreclosed the
issuance of meaningful injunctive relief against breaches of no-
strike clauses occurring because of or over otherwise grievable or
arbitrable disputes.
Two years after Avco, the Supreme Court decided Boys
Markets. Like Avco and Sinclair, Boys Markets involved a work
stoppage by employees over a dispute which was subject to a
binding grievance and arbitration clause.29 Noting that the
"practical effect" of Avco was to oust state courts of section
301(a) jurisdiction in suits seeking injunctive relief for breach of
no-strike obligations and to encourage "rampant forum shop-
ping, ' 30 the Court chose to overrule explicitly the Sinclair
decision. The Court reasoned that the "devastating implications
for the enforceability of arbitration agreements and their accom-
panying no-strike obligations if equitable remedies were not
available" militated against extension of the Sinclair holding to
state courts, and then stated:
[Tihe very purpose of arbitration procedures is to provide a mecha-
nism for the expeditious settlement of industrial disputes without
resort to strikes, lockouts, or other self-help measures. This basic
purpose is obviously largely undercut if there is no immediate, effec-
tive remedy for those very tactics that arbitration is designed to
obviate.31'
The remainder of the Boys Markets decision reiterated and spe-
cifically adopted the "accommodation" reasoning of the Sinclair
dissent and balanced the "literal terms" of the Norris-LaGuardia
Act against the strong federal policy favoring "administrative
techniques for the peaceful resolution of industrial disputes" de-
veloped under section 301.32 The Court then concluded by stating:
Our holding in the present case is a narrow one. We do not under-
mine the vitality of the Norris-LaGuardia Act. We deal only with
Id. at 560-61. Removal procedures are set forth in 28 U.S.C. § 1441 (1970). Avco
further held that section 4 of Norris-LaGuardia, 29 U.S.C. § 104 (1970), was merely a
restriction on the equity powers of a federal court and not a plenary withdrawal of subject
matter jurisdiction in actions where injunctive relief was sought in a labor dispute. 390
U.S. at 561.
398 U.S. at 238-39.
Id. at 244-46.
, Id. at 249.
32 Id. at 251.
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the situation in which a collective-bargaining contract contains a
mandatory grievance adjustment or arbitration procedure. Nor does
it follow from what we have said that injunctive relief is appropriate
as a matter of course in every case of a strike over an arbitrable
grievance . . ..
The Court then specifically adopted the Sinclair dissent's princi-
ples for the issuance of injunctive relief.
The Boys Markets decision was the product of a lengthy
gestation. Indeed, to place Boys Markets in its proper perspective
it has been necessary to trace its somewhat tortuous development
from Lincoln Mills because of the unique nature of the "accom-
modation" of the express provisions of the Norris-LaGuardia Act
with the powerful federal policy derived from decisional law
under section 301 favoring arbitration of disputes. Nonetheless,
the "accommodation" reached in Boys Markets was an uneasy
one, and its holding narrowed to protecting the integrity of the
arbitral process.
II. Chief Freight Lines: Boys Markets APPLIED
Chief Freight Lines involved a unique and somewhat com-
plex fact pattern. The Chief Freight Lines Company (Chief
Freight) was signatory to the 1970-1973 National Master Freight
Agreement (NMFA) and the Local Freight Forwarding Pickup
and Delivery Supplemental Agreement (Supplemental Agree-
ment) with Teamster Local 886. The NMFA and the Supplemen-
tal Agreement functioned together as a single collective bargain-
ing agreement between Chief Freight and Local 886, and both
agreements contained articles providing for the mandatory ad-
justment of grievances . 3 Both agreements also proscribed work
stoppages pending the exhaustion of these grievance/arbitration
procedures .3 Article 2, section 3 of the NMFA further provided:
[Wihen a majority of the eligible employees performing work cov-
ered by an Agreement designated by the National Negotiating Com-
mittee to be Supplemental to the National Master Freight Agree-
ment (to which their Employer is a prior signator), execute a card
authorizing a signatory Local Union to represent them as their
collective bargaining agent at the terminal location, then, such em-
Id. at 253.
' 514 F.2d at 580.
" Id
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ployees shall automatically be covered by this Agreement and the
applicable Supplemental Agreements .3
On June 8, 1973, representatives of Local 886 presented to
Chief Freight a sufficient number of signed authorization cards
which, if the company were a "prior signator" under article 2,
section 3, would have entitled the local to represent Chief
Freight's Oklahoma City office employees. However, the com-
pany contended that it was not a "prior signator," arguing that
"prior signator" meant previous execution of the Supplemental
Agreement covering office employees, to which Chief Freight was
not a signator. Because of the company's refusal to recognize
Local 886 as the representative of the Oklahoma City office em-
ployees, that local and other Teamster locals established pickets
at certain of Chief Freight's terminals. Employees governed by
the NMFA and Supplemental Agreements refused to cross the
pickets. As a consequence, Chief Freight obtained a temporary
restraining order pursuant to Boys Markets, and a hearing, ap-
parently on the company's motion for preliminary injunction
followed. However, during the hearing, the parties entered into a
settlement stipulation under which Chief Freight's civil action
was to be dismissed and the representational dispute was to be
resolved pursuant to the provisions of the NMFA and the Supple-
mental Agreement. Upon execution of the settlement stipulation,
the action was dismissed without prejudice.
Following the dismissal, the grievance was submitted to the
Southern Area Multi-State Grievance Committee which dead-
locked and referred the dispute to the next arbitral step, the
Southern Area Conference Grievance Committee (Area Commit-
tee). The Area Committee determined that Local 886 was to pres-
ent to Chief Freight authorization cards for verification. "If Local
Union 886 represents a majority of the affected employees that
were employed as of 6-8-73," the company was to apply the
NMFA and the office employees Supplemental Agreement to the
Oklahoma City office employees.
37
" Id. at 574 n.1.
'7 Id. at 575. Authorization cards constitute one method of showing that a labor union
has been selected as the collective bargaining representative of a majority of employees
within an appropriate bargaining unit. However, an employer under prevailing NLRB
procedures can demand an election to be conducted by the NLRB pursuant to Section 9
of the Act, 29 U.S.C. § 159 (1970), and, if the employer so demands, no statutory duty to
bargain will attach before the conduct of such election absent independent unfair labor
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After the Area Committee's decision, Local 886 contended
that final and binding arbitration of the dispute, as contemplated
by the settlement stipulation, had been effected and that no fur-
ther processing of the grievance was required. Chief Freight, how-
ever, argued that article 8 of the NMFA, which provided for sub-
mission to the National Grievance Committee of disputes involv-
ing the interpretation of the NMFA, had not been exhausted and
that, in any event, the Area Committee's award was ambiguous
and unenforceable. Local 886 then threatened to strike, and Chief
Freight obtained another temporary restraining order after per-
suading the district court to reopen the previously dismissed case.
Moreover, upon the company's application, the temporary re-
straining order further provided for a stay of arbitration pending
the outcome of NLRB action on a representation petition filed for
the Oklahoma City office employees by a union rival to Local 886,
the Fifth Wheel Employees' Association (Fifth Wheel).
An initial hearing on Chief's motion for preliminary injunc-
tion was held on February 27, 1975, by which time the NLRB had
intervened. The NLRB also requested a stay of arbitration pend-
ing resolution of both the question of representation and certain
unfair labor practice charges filed by Fifth Wheel against both
Chief Freight and Local 886. At the conclusion of the February
27th hearing, the district court issued oral findings of fact and law
but refused to enter a preliminary injunction until it was pre-
pared in writing. The temporary restraining order and stay of
arbitration was continued in effect. At a subsequent formal hear-
ing, the district court found, as a matter of fact, that the company
had been inadvertently misled in the settlement stipulation as to
the specific arbitration provisions under the NMFA applicable to
the representational dispute and that both it and Local 886 had
failed to agree to the submission to arbitration of the "prior signa-
tor" question under the settlement stipulation. The court further
found that the Area Committee's decision was interlocutory in
nature and that it was ambiguous and unenforceable. The formal
preliminary injunction enjoined Local 886 from striking or picket-
ing, or threatening to strike or picket. More important, the pre-
liminary injunction stayed arbitral proceedings pending determi-
practices by the employer. NLRB v. Gissel Packing Co., 395 U.S. 575, 594-97 (1969). Thus,
article 2, section 3 of the NMFA, and the Area Committee's award, imposed obligations
upon Chief Freight not otherwise present under prevailing law.
1976
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nation of the question concerning representation of the Oklahoma
City clerical employees by the NLRB.
After disposing of various procedural objections by Local
886,'3 the Tenth Circuit turned to the first of the local's conten-
tions concerning the inapplicability of Boys Markets relief-that
the Area Committee's award was final and binding and hence a
Boys Markets injunction was improper. The court noted, "[i]f
[Local 886's] position is correct, of course there is no basis for
an injunction to forestall a strike while arbitration proceeds as
provided for by the collective bargaining agreement. '3 9 Nonethe-
less, the court found Local 886's position vis-a-vis the Area Com-
mittee's decision to be incorrect and sustained, as not clearly
erroneous, the district court's finding of fact concerning the set-
tlement stipulation and the ambiguity of the Area Committee's
award.4" The effect of sustaining the district court's findings was
that the Area Committee's decision was not "final and binding"
and, as a consequence, the Area Committee award itself did not
render the Boys Markets injunction improper.4
The heart of the Chief Freight Lines decision is concerned
with the propriety of Boys Markets injunctive relief when joined
with a stay of arbitration. The court noted that the "essential
requirements" for Boys Markets relief were present: (1) A collec-
tive bargaining agreement with mandatory grievance or arbitra-
1, Id. at 576-78. This note will not discuss the procedural aspects of the Chief Freight
Lines decision dealing with the propriety of the district court's reopening of the case
pursuant to FED. R. Civ. P. 60(b), nor the jurisdiction of the district court to proceed with
the hearing after Local 886 had filed its notice of appeal from the district court's oral
preliminary injunction.
3, Id. at 578.
, Id. at 579-80. That portion of the Chief Freight Lines decision dealing with the
ineffectiveness of the settlement stipulation involved a unique problem since, ordinarily,
the issue is whether the arbitrator exceeded his authority under a given stipulation. See,
e.g., Retail Store Employees Local 782 v. Sav-On Groceries, 508 F.2d 500 (10th Cir.
1975). In Chief Freight Lines, however, the issue appears to be a lack of mutuality of
understanding as to, inter alia, the issue submitted to arbitration, which lack of mutuality.
vitiated the validity of the entire settlement stipulation.
" The clear thrust of this portion of the Chief Freight Lines decision is that, had the
decision been "final and binding," Boys Markets relief would have been improper. Such
a holding would be in concert with existing authorities. See generally Narragansett Im-
provement Co. v. Teamsters Local 251, 390 F. Supp. 647 (D.R.I. 1974), vacated and rev'd
per curiarn, 506 F.2d 715 (lst Cir. 1974); Associated Gen. Contractors v. Teamsters Union,
454 F.2d 1324 (7th Cir. 1972); Pilot Freight Carriers, Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 353 F. Supp.
869 (M.D.N.C. 1972).
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tion provisions, and (2) a duty not to strike. 2 Chief Freight and
the NLRB argued, moreover, that injunctive relief was proper
even with the concomitant stay of arbitration. The company re-
lied primarily on Southern Conference of Teamsters v. Red Ball
Motor Freight, Inc. ,13 for its contention that arbitration of the
dispute would cause a breach of its duty of neutrality toward
Local 886 and the Fifth Wheel until the question concerning rep-
resentation had been decided by the NLRB. The NLRB, in con-
trast, argued that notions of comity required that arbitration be
stayed until it resolved the unfair labor practice charges and the
representational question, since its determination as to both
would be controlling.
As to the propriety of the stay itself and apart from the Boys
Markets issue, the Tenth Circuit rejected Chief Freight's conten-
tion that the possibility of a neutrality violation justified a stay
of the duty to arbitrate. It distinguished Red Ball because it did
not involve arbitration of a representational issue, nor did it in-
volve an application for Boys Markets injunctive relief." The
court found the NLRB's comity argument equally unpersuasive,
relying largely on Carey v. Westinghouse Electric Corp." While
the possibility of conflict between an arbitrator's award and the
NLRB determination existed, the Tenth Circuit construed Carey
to hold that such a possible conflict could not "bar a § 301 suit
to compel arbitration of the representation issue if mandated
under the collective bargaining contract.""
" 514 F.2d at 580.
13 374 F.2d 932 (5th Cir. 1967).
" The specific issue in Red Ball was whether a particular collective bargaining agree-
ment survived as a matter of law the merger of two employee units, each represented by
different local organizations. The Fifth Circuit held that the agreement whose arbitration
clause was sought to be enforced was suspended upon the merger, because neither labor
organization, after the merger, was the exclusive bargaining representative of the com-
bined employee group. As a consequence, the court held that compelling arbitration would
require the employer to bargain with a union which was not the bargaining representative
of its employees and, thus, to cause a violation of section 8(a)(5) of the Act, 29 U.S.C. §
158(a) (1970). Unlike the Tenth Circuit in Chief Freight Lines, the Fifth Circuit felt,
"[tihere is positively no doubt that there exists a very real question with respect to
representation." 374 F.2d at 938. Compare United States Gypsum Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 384 F.2d 38 (5th Cir. 1967). The Tenth Circuit in Chief Freight Lines
indicated strongly that it did not believe a question concerning representation existed. 514
F.2d at 581 n.11.
375 U.S. 261 (1964).
514 F.2d at 582.
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While the Chief Freight Lines court clearly indicated that it
did not believe a stay was required under the facts presented, it
specifically held that a Boys Markets injunction could not issue
if accompanied by a stay:
We are convinced that an injunction enforcing a no-strike provi-
sion but staying arbitration is improper under Boys Markets. While
the Court in Boys Markets was able to accommodate § 4 of the
Norris-LaGuardia Act, 29 USCA § 104, with § 301 of the NLRA to
allow an employer to enjoin a union strike in violation of a no-strike
clause, the Court emphasized that its holding was narrow. . . . It
premised such an injunction on its necessity to enforce the manda-
tory arbitration provision that had been bargained for between the
employer and the union. Since, as the Court stated, a no-strike
clause is the employer's quid pro quo for undertaking the obligation
to arbitrate, the Court felt that the employer was entitled to an
expeditious procedure for enforcing the union's promise not to
strike. The Court pointed to the illogic of "the unavailability of
equitable relief in the arbitration context. . . ." However, before
any injunction may issue, the district court must hold that the dis-
pute is over a grievance that both parties are contractually bound
to arbitrate. And the principles adopted include the proviso that
"the employer should be ordered to arbitrate, as a condition of his
obtaining an injunction against the strike ..
Even assuming that continued arbitration would be a violation
of [neutrality] . . . we cannot accept Chief's stay argument that
this is sufficient justification to serve as another exception to the
Norris-LaGuardia policy. Neither the neutrality point nor the com-
ity consideration demonstrate, as did Boys Markets, that there is
another statutory policy whose full execution necessarily calls for
relief such as the stay and an injunction against striking.7
Thus, the Tenth Circuit recognized that Boys Markets was calcu-
lated to further the policy of peaceful resolution of disputes
through the arbitral process and that, where such resolution could
not be achieved through the arbitral process, Boys Markets relief
was inappropriate. The court further recognized that any exten-
sion of Boys Markets would necessarily rest upon the same kind
of policy "accommodation" which underlay the Supreme Court's
decision. Most significant, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the
Boys Markets "accommodation" arose from the quid pro quo
relationship between the employer's promise to arbitrate and the
union's promise not to strike, and that such "accommodation"
" Id. at 580-82. (citations and footnotes omitted).
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would not be served by enforcing the no-strike clause without
enforcing the arbitration provision. There was, therefore, a care-
ful attempt on the part of the Tenth Circuit to adhere to the
fundamental purpose of Boys Markets: The preservation of the
integrity of the arbitral process.
CONCLUSION
There is presently a significant dispute between several cir-
cuit courts of appeals as to the "narrowness" of Boys Markets.
Specifically, this dispute has crystallized the issue of whether
injunctive relief may be obtained in instances wherein members
of a bargaining unit, which is governed by a collective bargaining
agreement with mandatory grievance or arbitration procedures
and an express or implied no-strike pledge and which has no
underlying dispute with its own employer, may honor the picket
line of another local or labor organization." The court in Chief
Freight Lines approached this factual situation but, because of
the unique facts and contractual language, did not squarely con-
front the issue of sympathetic strikes and Boys Markets relief.
Clearly, in Chief Freight Lines the arbitral process would have
resolved the underlying dispute. Nonetheless, the Tenth Circuit's
reasoning indicates that in its view the Boys Markets holding is
a narrow one, limited to those instances in which the arbitral
process can expeditiously settle the dispute. However, regardless
of which direction the Tenth Circuit will take if confronted with
" The Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits have held that injunctive relief is not avail-
able in sympathetic strike situations since there is no "underlying dispute" resolvable
through the grievance or arbitration provisions. Plain Dealer Publishing Co. v. Cleveland
Typographical Local 53, 520 F.2d 1220 (6th Cir. 1975); Buffalo Forge Co. v. United
Steelworkers, 517 F.2d 1207 (2d Cir. 1975), cert. granted, 96 S. Ct. 214 (1975); Amstar
Corp. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters, 468 F.2d 1372 (5th Cir. 1972). The Seventh Circuit
has recently swung towards the Second, Fifth, and Sixth Circuits in Hyster Co. v. Inde-
pendent Towing & Lifting Mach. Ass'n., 519 F.2d 89 (7th Cir. 1975). Compare Gary
Hobart Water Corp. v. NLRB, 511 F.2d 284 (7th Cir. 1975), with Inland Steel Co. v. UMW
Local 1545, 505 F.2d 293 (7th Cir. 1974). The Third, Fourth, and Eighth Circuits have,
under similar circumstances, found injunctive relief available in sympathetic strike situa-
tions. Associated Gen. Contractors v. Construction Laborers Local 563, 519 F.2d 269 (8th
Cir. 1975); Valmac Indus., Inc. v. Amalgamated Meat Cutters Local 425, 519 F.2d 263 (8th
Cir. 1975); Island Creek Coal Co. v. UMW, 507 F.2d 650 (3d Cir. 1975); Armco Steel Corp.
v. UMW, 505 F.2d 1129 (4th Cir. 1974); NAPA Pittsburg, Inc. v. Automobile Chauffeurs
Local 926, 502 F.2d 321 (3d Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1049 (1974); Pilot Freight Carriers,
Inc. v. Teamsters Union, 497 F.2d 311 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 869 (1974);
Monongahela Power Co. v. IBEW Local 2332, 484 F.2d 1209 (4th Cir. 1973); Wilmington
Shipping Co. v. Longshoremen Local 1426, 86 LRRM 2846 (4th Cir. 1974).
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the litmus test of a sympathetic strike, the Chief Freight Lines
decision constitutes a recognition that Boys Markets relief is in-
tended not simply as a means of specifically enforcing a no-strike
obligation, but as a method of furthering the present federal pol-
icy favoring arbitration and peaceful resolution of disputes. The
issuance of a stay, while simultaneously enjoining work stoppages
or the threat thereof, does not comport with the "narrow" holding
of Boys Markets, and in Chief Freight Lines the Tenth Circuit so
held.
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
OVERVIEW
This section of the annual Tenth Circuit survey encompasses
the interrelated areas of property, public lands, natural resources,
and the environment. The Tenth Circuit considered 12 cases
dealing with land and natural resources issues, and, as in recent
years, the greater number of cases concerned environmental prob-
lems. On the whole, the court clarified legal principles in several
areas, reversing the district courts in one-half of the cases. Of
particular concern, three of the four cases within the general area
of condemnation and compensation were reversed on the merits.
I. PROPERTY, PUBLIC LANDS, AND NATURAL RESOURCES:
SOME GENERAL PROPOSITIONS
A. United States v. Reimann, 504 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Reimann' dealt with which of two govern-
ment land surveys controlled as to the boundary between defen-
dant's property and surrounding national forest land. Reimann
was the successor in title to land patented subsequent to two
government surveys (the Ferron survey of 1894 and the Hanson
survey of 1903) but prior to a third survey (the Miller survey of
1926) which essentially reestablished the boundaries set by the
Ferron survey. The purpose of the Miller survey was to correct
serious defects in the Hanson survey, while also making the nec-
essary tract segregations to preserve vested interests in land al-
ready patented. The failure of Miller to accommodate his re-
survey to vested interests resulted in the loss of approximately 56
acres to the patented land and led to the present controversy.
The Government thought and the trial court found the gen-
eral rule to be that "where the lines of senior [Ferron] and junior
[Hanson] surveys conflict the lines of the senior survey con-
trol."2 In reversing, the Tenth Circuit distinguished the present
controversy from one in which the patent was based on the senior
survey and issued prior to the junior,3 and where the conflict did
504 F.2d 135 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 138.
Id., citing Cragin v. Powell, 128 U.S. 691 (1888).
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not center on overlapping survey lines.4 The court specifically
found the federal district court decision in United States v.
Macmillan' to have been founded on authority in which the facts
were clearly distinguishable: "none of which [authority] in-
volved a conflict between two officially approved government sur-
veys, both of which were conducted prior to title passing from the
government."'
The Tenth Circuit held the controlling rule to be that when
the lines of senior and junior surveys conflict "the government is
bound by the last official survey accepted prior to its divestment
of title."' Although the Government retains the right to resurvey
and reestablish boundaries, "[tihe government retains no power
to nullify a patent, nor the survey upon which it is based, once
patent has issued," 8 even if such survey was grossly defective.
B. McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885 (10th Cir. 1975)
McTiernan filed for noncompetitive oil and gas leases, argu-
ing that the sale of certain tracts to the United States by Roger
Mills County, Oklahoma with a reservation of all mineral rights
in favor of the county for 50 years was void since the county had
both acquired and resold the tracts as part of a delinquent tax
process, which under Oklahoma law automatically passed title in
fee simple absolute to the United States.' The Board of Land
Appeals rejected the noncompetitive oil and gas lease offer be-
cause of "uncertain title."'" Plaintiff's suit against the Acting
Secretary of Interior, Franklin, requesting reversal of the Board's
decision and later that title be quieted in the United States, was
dismissed by the trial court.
Although plaintiff's allegation that title resided in the
United States was not without merit, the Tenth Circuit affirmed,
holding that "[b]ecause the reservations may be valid, and the
minerals therefore not subject to the Secretary's disposition, the
I Id., citing United States v. Weyerhaeuser Co., 392 F.2d 448 (9th Cir. 1967), cert.
denied, 393 U.S. 836 (1968).
331 F. Supp. 435 (D.C. Nev. 1971).
504 F.2d at 138.
Id. at 139 (emphasis added). The Tenth Circuit found it inequitable of the govern-
ment to record a survey "with knowledge that it would be relied upon by patentees, and
then grant the government the right to later correct its error, ex parte . Id. at 140.
Id. at 139.
McTiernan v. Franklin, 508 F.2d 885, 886 (10th Cir. 1975).
I d.
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decision refusing McTiernan's offers was proper."" The United
States could not be forced into asserting title to the land, and
since a mere offer does not confer a vested property right, McTier-
nan lacked standing to bring a quiet title action.
C. United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150 (10th Cir. 1975)
Zweifel, through his claim-staking service, filed several thou-
sand location certificates for claims on public lands in Wyoming
which the United States argued clouded its title, alleging that no
valid mining locations were made pursuant to federal and Wyo-
ming law. Two issues were presented to the Tenth Circuit: (1)
Whether the district court lacked jurisdiction since the statutory
regulations provided for an exception to district court jurisdiction
by "authorizing the government to initiate administrative pro-
ceedings to invalidate mining claims;" and (2) whether the min-
ing claims were of "good faith" quality.
Addressing the jurisdictional issue, the court acknowledged
that when the Secretary of Interior
initiated an administrative contest, the jurisdiction of the court is
withdrawn as respects suits filed by private claimants either to halt
the administrative proceedings or to substitute the court's determi-
nation of claim validity for that of the Interior Department.'3
However, the court argued that the statutory regulation did not
have the effect of constituting an exception to federal court juris-
diction, nor did case law "foreclose the government's entering
federal court to vindicate its title to public lands."" To interpret
either statute or case law as requiring administrative determina-
tion prior to judicial review "would needlessly prolong the period
during which qualified locators would forbear from discovery
work on the clouded lands."'" The Tenth Circuit held that when
the United States was initiating procedures to clear title to public
lands it had the right to elect whether to proceed administratively
or within the federal district court. Even though normally the
trial court should defer to a specialized administrative body,
where the agency with specialization is, as in this case, part of the
Id. at 887-88 (emphasis added).
, United States v. Zweifel, 508 F.2d 1150, 1154 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 96 S. Ct. 47
(1975), citing 43 C.F.R. § 4.451.1 (1975).
11 Id. at 1155.
1Id.
i Id.
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litigation, "and the agency's position with respect to the claims
[is] clear,"'" there is no reason for the trial court to defer. More-
over, the trial court need not defer where the factual issue, here
the good faith intent of the locator, is within the conventional
experience of judges and of a type considered routinely by them.
Defendants did not contest whether the Government had
met the requirement under which it had to establish a prima
facie invalidity of the claims before the burden shifted to claim-
ants, but requested reexamination of the prima facie standard. 7
The court held the standard, which had previously been found
applicable in administrative contest proceedings before the In-
terior Department, to be similarly applicable in quiet title actions
such as this.'"
II. CONDEMNATION AND COMPENSATION
A. United States v. 46,672.96 Acres of Land, 521 F.2d 13 (10th
Cir. 1975)
On appeal, the Government challenged awards made by
commissioners and later adopted by the District Court of New
Mexico in three condemnation actions connected with the White
Sands Missile Range. In its supplemental report explaining the
basis of the awards, the Commission acknowledged that it had
"found the highest and best use of the land was for overflight,
launching and impact of missiles and similar type uses,"' 9 and
that it had accepted as comparables the appraisals furnished by
the landowners' expert based on co-use leases negotiated by the
government with other landowners. As no one but the Govern-
ment could use the land for a missile range and as the lands
subject to these condemnation awards were too small for missile
range use unless combined with other property acquired by the
Government for this purpose, the court concluded that the Com-
mission must have considered prior and future use in its determi-
nation that a missile range was the highest and best use of the
land. 0 In reversing, the Tenth Circuit held the general rule to be
that "[w]here, however, a market for a particular use is created
I d. at 1156.
Id. at 1157.
"Id.
" United States v. 46,672.96 Acres of Land, 521 F.2d 13 (10th Cir. 1975).
Id.
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solely as a result of the project for which the land is condemned,
value based on that use must be excluded."" The Tenth Circuit
found the co-use leases noncomparable because they were for
substantially larger properties with improvements and because
"evidence of prices paid by the government for the purchase,
through private negotiations, of lands in connection with the pro-
ject for which land is being condemned cannot be received.""
Moreover, neither payments in the nature of a compromise nor
sale prices to a condemnor are evidentiary as to what constitutes
fair market value. Recognizing the difficulty of establishing a
price for land which has little market value, the court directed
that a different method be utilized as the award under the com-
mission's method was grossly excessive in this case."
B. United States v. City of Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821 (10th Cir.
1974)
This was an action for damages in the amount of over
$200,000 brought by the United States as trustee for the Osage
Indian Tribe of Oklahoma against the City of Pawhuska. De-
fendant city had brought a condemnation action against the sur-
face owners and later made a settlement with the tribal lessees
of the mineral rights for the purpose of constructing a municipal
reservoir. 4 The tribe, which had retained a royalty interest of 16
2/3 percent on the mineral rights received no compensation.
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded for a new trial,
holding that two findings of the trial court lacked sufficient evi-
dence. First, the trial court's holding that the oil and gas underly-
ing the reservoir was being adequately drained by other produc-
ing wells was strongly contradicted by the Government's wit-
nesses, while testimony supporting the ruling was "only by ten-
uous inferences from unsatisfactory evidence.""5
Alternatively, the trial court found "that the underlying oil
21 Id.
22 Id.
23 Id.
" Separate interests in surface and mineral rights had been created by the
Government, the latter being reserved in trust for the tribe. United States v. City of
Pawhuska, 502 F.2d 821, 823 (10th Cir. 1974).
21 Id. One government witness "testified that considerable space under the reservoir
could not be drained from on-shore locations." Id. The estimated royalty loss to the tribe
was over $219,000.
.219
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could not be profitably extracted 'even if no lack were present.' "26
The Tenth Circuit examined and rejected this finding on four
grounds. First, even if there were adequate off-shore drainage,
such a finding would be immaterial to whether or not profitable
extraction existed prior to the inundation of the surface by the
reservoir. Second, the court found the city's testimony on this
subject inadequately developed and contradictory. 7 Third, the
failure of the tribe to "demand to drill would have been futile
because drilling was incompatible with City's use of the land.
'2 8
And, finally, the court rejected the city's defense of the "prudent
operator rule." The city could not base its economic infeasibility
argument on any type of drilling operation necessitated by the
reservoir.21
C. Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336
(10th Cir. 1975)
The issue on appeal was whether the district court's dis-
missal of an action for compensatory damages brought by plain-
tiff tribe for the destruction of trees by defendant, who entered
upon the tribe's reservation without permission, was proper. The
Tenth Circuit reversed relying upon the United States Supreme
Court's holding in Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida0
to the effect that "federal law now protects, and has continuously
protected . . . possessory right to tribal lands, wholly apart from
the application of state law principles which normally and sepa-
rately protect a valid right of possession." 3' The court found that
the possessory right in Oneida, ejectment, was not distinguisha-
ble from the trespass action in this case, and that the "scope of
matters arising 'under the Constitution, laws, or treaties of the
I' Id.
It would appear that the Tenth Circuit found the settlement figures with the lessees
of the tribal mineral rights irreconcilable with the unprofitable extraction argument. Id.
11 Id. at 824. The city had raised the defense that notice was required in order to
sustain an action for lease forfeiture for failure to develop. The Tenth Circuit found the
Oklahoma exception applicable: Notice need not be given if it would be useless.
" The prudent operator rule would be applicable to the situation before the city
acted, not after. The court noted that, prior to the reservoir being constructed, a tribal
lessee had attempted to drill on the land but was forcibly ejected by the city.
414 U.S. 661 (1974).
Mescalero Apache Tribe v. Burgett Floral Co., 503 F.2d 336, 338 (10th Cir. 1974),
quoting Oneida Indian Nation v. County of Oneida, 414 U.S. 661, 677 (1974).
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United States' should be at least as broad under § 1362 as under
§ 1331."32
D. Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Nos. 73-1997 to
-1999 (10th Cir., Jan. 27, 1975) (petition for rehearing outstand-
ing):
In the Consolidated Helium Cases33 the problem of reasona-
ble compensation due to natural gas producers for helium ex-
tracted by pipeline companies was remanded to the trial court for
determination. The contract entered into between Phillips Petro-
leum Co. and the Bureau of Mines provided that due to the
inability of ascertaining the identity of the thousands of owners
who would be entitled to compensation, the United States would
pay Phillips the amounts "that Seller shall pay subsequent to the
date of this contract . . . to parties other than itself . . . for the
acquisition of helium in the natural gas . . .or for any interest
therein."34 The Tenth Circuit found it within the trial court's
discretion to reject the market value evidence submitted by de-
fendants because of the lack of a free competitive market in hel-
ium and because the transactions introduced were not compara-
ble, and in its place to select the "value less expense" method. 5
Urging the condemnation doctrine, the Government argued
that the helium values were created by its own purchase program.
The Tenth Circuit found that
The issue here is the determination of value of a commodity which
was purchased and sold by the Government and by private concerns.
This cannot be equated to the cases where the condemnation or the
reason for condemnation increases the value of the land taken. The
helium has value by reason of its nature and usefulness. The Gov-
ernment may have made this helium available but did not create
its valuel
32 503 F.2d at 338. In Mescalero jurisdiction had been asserted under section 1362
which gave the district courts original jurisdiction "of all civil actions, brought by any
Indian tribe . .. wherein the matter in controversy arises under the Constitution, laws,
or treaties of the United States." 28 U.S.C. § 1362 (1970) (emphasis added). In Oneida,
jurisdiction was based on 28 U.S.C. § 1331 (1970) which deals with general federal-
question jurisdiction.
" Northern Natural Gas Co. v. Grounds, 441 F.2d 704 (10th Cir. 1971).
" Ashland Oil, Inc. v. Phillips Petroleum Co., Nos. 73-1997 to -1999 (10th Cir., Jan.
27, 1975) (petition for rehearing outstanding). The contract formula provided that Phillips
would pay the first $3.00 per Mcf and the United States would pay any additional amount.
3 Id.
Id. at 11 (emphasis added).
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and affirmed the findings of the trial court as to the value figure.
The court also sustained the trial court's determination that
federal law should be applied even though plaintiff was not di-
rectly seeking relief against the United States. The Government
had entered the case asserting a substantial interest and the ex-
istence of an actual controversy between it and plaintiff. The
Clearfield doctrine was held applicable, to wit:
[Wihen the United States seeks to litigate or seek a remedy arising
from transactions it has entered into in the ordinary commercial
world to carry out its program, it has been held that federal law may
be applied. 7
The Tenth Circuit concluded that "[iun the face of the multi-
tude of claimants, the variations in state law, and the Clearfield
doctrine, the trial court was correct in not applying Erie v.
Tompkins."
38
III. ENVIRONMENTAL LAW
A. Sierra Club v. Stamm, 507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974)
In Sierra Club v. Stamm four nonprofit environmental cor-
porations brought an action seeking declaratory judgment and
injunctive relief against the Secretary of the Interior and the Bu-
reau of Reclamation alleging failure to file a final environmental
impact statement. The complaint was dismissed with prejudice
on a finding by the trial court that the impact statement filed met
the statutory requirements. The Tenth Circuit found the state-
ment sufficient in its discussion of alternatives and cost-benefit
ratio. 0 The primary issue addressed was the extent to which a
final impact statement could be filed for what constituted only a
sub-unit of a major federal project. The statement filed was in-
tended to be final as to the Strawberry Aqueduct and Collection
System, which was only one of six units of the Bonneville Unit,
"' Id. at 17. See Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). The
district court had improperly based federal jurisdiction on the conclusion that there were
elements of condemnation by the United States involved. This argument was rejected in
the Consolidated Helium Cases.
I Nos. 73-1997 to -1999 at 19. The Tenth Circuit reversed the trial court's division of
interest equally between lessors and lessees and directed that the division be in accordance
with the terms of the leases. The court also reversed the award of attorney's fees by the
district court, finding no statutory provision or any rule of practice to sustain the award.
507 F.2d 788 (10th Cir. 1974).
,0 Id. at 793-94.
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itself constituting only one of six units of the Central Utah Pro-
ject. The Central Utah Project is "on-going," completion not ex-
pected until sometime in the next century. The plaintiffs argued
that the statement was too narrow in scope and "should include
the cumulative and collective environmental impact of the entire
Central Utah Project,"'" and, collaterally and in the alternative,
as a final statement it should minimally "encompass all incre-
ments of the Bonneville Unit."4" The Tenth Circuit sustained the
district court's finding that the Strawberry system qualified as an
independent major federal action both in light of prior cases deal-
ing with similar factual circumstances, 3 and, since this specific
project "has an independent utility of its own as a collection and
conveyance system of waters . . . . [s]uch system can operate
and function separately from the remaining unconstructed sys-
tems of the Bonneville Unit or other units of the Central Utah
Project.""
B. Scenic Rivers Association v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240 (10th Cir.
1975)
The district court enjoined HUD and the Office of Interstate
Land Sales Registration (OILSR) from approving a filing by Flint
Ridge Development Company, codefendant-appellant, required
under the Interstate Land Sales Act prior to the sale of lots in
interstate commerce, pending the preparation of an environmen-
tal impact statement by HUD. On appeal, the defendants raised
four issues: Was the filing under the Interstate Land Sales Act a
major federal action; was there an irreconcilable conflict between
NEPA and the Interstate Land Sales Act; did the district court
have jurisdiction; and was a public hearing required on the im-
pact statement?4 5
The Tenth Circuit sustained the finding that a major federal
action was involved since the filing provided for federal approval,
which, if given, would lead to substantial environmental conse-
1' Id. at 790.
2 Id.
"1 See the discussion by the court of Sierra Club v. Calloway, 499 F.2d 982 (5th Cir.
1974), and Environmental Defense Fund, Inc. v. Armstrong, 352 F. Supp. 50 (N.D. Cal.
1972), supplemental opinion, 356 F. Supp. 131 (N.D. Cal.), aff'd, 487 F.2d 814 (9th Cir.
1973), dealing with similar unit-projects. Id. at 792.
" Id. at 791.
" Scenic Rivers Ass'n v. Lynn, 520 F.2d 240, 242 (10th Cir. 1975).
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quences. The court noted a number of similar situations in which
analogous filings requiring federal approval had been made sub-
ject to environmental impact statements." The court rejected
various arguments made by defendants in an attempt to establish
inconsistency between NEPA and filings under OILSR, and held
that the purpose of both was to provide the public with informa-
tion, such information being complementary rather than incom-
patible.47 Similarly, the court found that jurisdiction attached
since compliance with the NEPA requirement presented a sub-
stantive federal question, and it was consistent with Congres-
sional intent that NEPA be given broad application to all federal
agencies." As the public nature of a hearing on an environmental
impact statement is within the agency's discretion, the court re-
versed the district court's order that there be a public hearing on
HUD's environmental impact statement once prepared.49
C. Vivant v. Trans-Delta Oil and Gas Co., Nos. 74-1115, -1116
(10th Cir., Nov. 27, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication)
Declaratory and injunctive relief were requested by plaintiffs
against defendants for failure to prepare an environmental im-
pact statement regarding road-building in portions of Capitol
Reef National Park and drilling of an oil well in Glen Canyon
National Recreation Area. The district court granted a prelimi-
nary injunction enjoining construction, improvement, and use of
the road and the proposed drilling, finding irreparable injury to
plaintiffs' aesthetic and recreational interests. Trans-Delta ap-
pealed on the grounds that an environmental impact statement
was not required as there was no major federal action involved
significantly affecting the environment. Although this had been
argued also by the federal defendants at the hearing before the
district court, the Park Service decided to prepare a full environ-
mental impact statement, and based its appeal on mootness.
The Tenth Circuit restricted its inquiry to whether: (1) There
was a reasonable probability of plaintiffs' prevailing on the mer-
its, (2) there was a showing irreparable injury would result if relief
were not granted, and (3) the interlocutory relief granted was an
48 See the court's discussion id. at 243-44.
Id. at 245.
49 Id. at 245-46.
41 Id. at 247.
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abuse of discretion. The court held that the district court's find-
ings and conclusions were sufficient to support the interlocutory
order; that there was substantial evidence that the enjoined ac-
tivities would have a significant impact on the aesthetic and rec-
reational value of the area; that irreparable injury could be found
under the environmental statutes; that the district court pos-
sessed jurisdiction under the Administrative Procedure Act; and
that plaintiffs' standing was adequately demonstrated by the
possible and significant effect the enjoined actions would have on
their aesthetic and recreational interests. Although upholding the
preliminary injunction, the Tenth Circuit remanded to the dis-
trict court for modification or dissolution on the new grounds
asserted by the federal defendants.
Cile 0. Pace
WATER LAW: A REPUDIATION OF ABSTENTION
United States v. Akin, 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974)
United States v. Akin' presented two questions regarding
federal procedure where water rights are in issue. The first is
whether the federal courts have jurisdiction to adjudicate water
rights claimed by the United States in its own right and as trustee
for Indian tribes where the United States is the plaintiff. Second,
if jurisdiction exists, should the action be dismissed on grounds
of abstention and comity?
These questions stem from an action brought in November
1972 by the federal government in the United States District
Court for the District of Colorado.' The purpose was to determine
federal and Indian water rights in that part of the San Juan Basin
situated in Colorado. Adjudication of water rights in the San
Juan Basin had been in process in Colorado state courts for some
time, but the United States was not joined in the state action
until January 1973.1 The district court assumed jurisdiction, but
dismissed the action on the grounds of abstention and comity.
The Tenth Circuit reversed.'
504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 421 U.S. 946 (1975).
Id. at 116. The district court opinion was not published.
Id. at 117.
504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Although the circuit court recognized that "the primary issue
is whether the trial court erred in its decision to abstain,"' the
appellate court concentrated on the threshold jurisdictional issue.
Its opinion firmly rejected appellee's contention that the McCar-
ran Amendment' precludes federal jurisdiction where the adjudi-
cation of water rights to a river system is in issue. The Tenth
Circuit held that state jurisdiction was not exclusive.'
Unfortunately, the court dwelt on the McCarran Amend-
ment at the expense of abstention and comity. For example, the
Tenth Circuit recognized the lower court's dismissal was based in
part upon comity,' but nowhere in the appellate court's opinion
is there a discussion of comity; nowhere is there any indication
why comity was not an appropriate ground for the district court's
dismissal. It would seem, therefore, that in regard to comity the
appellate court arbitrarily substituted its discretion for that of
the district court.
Almost as abruptly, the Tenth Circuit rejected certain of
appellee's contentions regarding abstention and, in so doing, dis-
tinguished several key precedents without substantial explana-
tion. Perhaps the most closely analogous case in regard to the
abstention problem is Burford v. Sun Oil Co.9 where the Supreme
Court, in favoring abstention, noted the importance to the state
Id. at 117.
43 U.S.C. § 666 (1970). The McCarran Amendment gives permission to join the
United States as a defendant in certain water rights adjudications. The amendment
provides, in part:
(a) Joinder of United States as defendant; costs.
Consent is given to join the United States as a defendant in any suit (1)
for the adjudication of rights to the use of water of a river system or other
source, or (2) for the administration of such rights, where it appears that the
United States is the owner of or is in the process of acquiring water rights
by appropriation under State law, by purchase, by exchange, or otherwise,
and the United States is a necessary party to such suit. The United States,
when a party to any such suit, shall (1) be deemed to have waived any right
to plead that the State laws are inapplicable or that the United States is not
amenable thereto by reason of its sovereignty, and (2) shall be subject to the
judgments, orders, and decrees of the court having jurisdiction, and may
obtain review thereof, in the same manner and to the same extent as a
private individual under like circumstances: Provided, That no judgment for
costs shall be entered against the United States in any such suit.
7 504 F.2d 115 (10th Cir. 1974).
Id. at 117.
319 U.S. 315 (1943).
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of the natural resources involved, the complexity of the legal
issues, the capabilities of the state adjudication system, the value
in a unified method of determining cases, and the avoidance of a
federal-state conflict. All of these factors appear to be present and
substantial in Akin, but the Tenth Circuit distinguished Burford
by simply saying:
Here the federal court is not short-circuiting or interfering with
efforts of a state administrative regulatory system, where the
Burford rule could operate."
This cryptic conclusion indicates a very narrow reading of
Burford, but beyond that it teaches us little about the differences
between Burford and Akin. I"
Other key cases were distinguished without the benefit of
more than a cursory explanation." In stating conclusions with
little or no reasoning, the appellate court has not made clear why
it substituted its discretion for the district court's. 3 And, of per-
haps even greater importance, the court did not define the limits
of the federal jurisdiction to be exercised under its holding. It did
not define the extent to which two parallel systems of water rights
adjudication-federal and state-might develop; it did not at-
tempt to limit potential federal-state conflict in this area.'
Stanley L. Grazis
504 F.2d at 120.
See also Comment, Adjudication of Indian and Federal Water Rights in the Federal
Courts, 46 CoLO. L. REv. 555 (1975), for a discussion of possible interpretations of this
statement.
2 E.g., United States v. District Court, 401 U.S. 520 (1971); Kaiser Steel Corp. v.
W.S. Ranch Co., 391 U.S. 593 (1968); Railroad Comm'n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496
(1941).
'1 Whether to abstain "involves a discretionary exercise of a court's equity powers."
Baggett v. Bullitt, 377 U.S. 360, 375 (1964). Accord, Burford, where the U.S. Supreme
Court stated that a federal court could abstain "in its sound discretion." 319 U.S. at 317.
1, For an analysis of the potential ramifications of this broad holding, see Comment,
supra note 11.
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POWER PLAY IN THE NUCLEAR ARENA
Colorado Public Interest Group, Inc. v. Train, 507
F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974)
This suit' began as a citizen suit2 against the Environmental
Protection Agency for refusal to regulate radioactive effluents
discharged into navigable waters by the Atomic Energy Commis-
sion's Rocky Flats Plant and by the Public Service Company of
Colorado's Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Station.' On appeal from the
district court's summary judgment in favor of the EPA,' Colorado
Public Interest Group, Inc. (COPIRG) contended, pursuant to
the definition of "pollutant" as set forth in the Federal Water
Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972,1 that it is a nondis-
cretionary duty of the EPA to regulate the discharge of all radio-
active wastes into navigable waters. The EPA argued that only
those radioactive materials not subject to regulation under the
Atomic Energy Act of 1954 were encompassed by the 1972
Amendments.
The Tenth Circuit, reversing, held that the term "radioactive
materials," as found in the 1972 Amendments, meant all radioac-
tive materials. In so deciding, the Tenth Circuit determined the
respective roles of two major federal agencies, the AEC7 and the
Colorado Public Interest Group v. Train, 373 F. Supp. 991 (D. Colo.), rev'd, 507 F.2d
743 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 2393 (1975) [hereinafter COPIRG v. Train].
Citizen suits are authorized by the Federal Water Pollution Control Act Amend-
ments of 1972, 33 U.S.C. §§ 1251-1375 (Supp. 1973) [hereinafter referred to as the 1972
Amendments].
The Rocky Flats Plant, owned by the AEC, is managed by Rockwell International,
Inc. The plant is a plutonium processing facility which manufactures components of
atomic weapons. Radioactive discharges from the plant include plutonium, americium,
tritium, and strontium. The Fort St. Vrain Nuclear Generating Station is the first
commercial-sized, high-temperature, gas-cooled nuclear reactor. It will have a capacity
of 330,000 kilowatts of power. Liquid wastes from the plant, which will include radioactive
effluents, will eventually be released into the South Platte River.
I The district court granted the defendants' motion for summary judgment on the
following grounds: First, legislative history supported the defendants; second, dual control
by the AEC and EPA would result in duplication of effort, confusion, and possible danger
to the public; third, the nuclear field is a potentially dangerous area and Congress in-
tended the AEC to have exclusive control; fourth, the energy crisis. 373 F. Supp. 994-95.
See 1972 Amendments § 1362(6).
507 F.2d at 747.
Since the Tenth Circuit decision, the AEC has been abolished. Its regulatory func-
tions have been transferred to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) and the AEC's
authority over the operation of the Government's nuclear facilities has been assumed
by the Energy Research and Development Administration (ERDA). See Energy Reorgani-
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EPA, in the regulation of radioactive effluent discharges into
water from nuclear facilities.' Although the EPA has yet to set
more stringent effluent standards than those of the AEC, the
impact of the case on the predicted growth of nuclear energy9 may
reflect the difference between technological advancement which
occurs without adequate consideration of its environmental
effect,' 0 and technological advancement which is influenced by a
greater concern for the interaction between man's tools and the
human environment in which he works."
I. STATUTORY BACKGROUND
The Atomic Energy Act of 1954 delegated to the AEC broad
powers to control development and growth in the nuclear field. 2
The AEC was entrusted with managing the government's mili-
tary use of atomic energy" and with encouraging the development
and use of atomic energy by private enterprise.'4 It is in respect
to this latter role that the AEC's duties have seemed inconsist-
ent'l-promotion of the maximum development and use of at-
zation Act of 1974, 42 U.S.C.A. §§ 5801-91 (Supp. Feb. 1975). To avoid confusion, this
article shall refer to the AEC.
See text accompanying notes 70-74 infra.
It has been predicted that nuclear reactors, now supplying approximately 7 percent
of the nation's electricity, will provide over 60 percent by the year 2000. Address by AEC
Commissioner Doub, Feb. 26, 1974, reprinted in 5 USAEC News Release, No. 11 (March
13, 1974), as cited in Palfrey, Energy and the Environment: The Special Case of Nuclear
Power, 74 COLUM. L. REV. 1375 (1974); Note, Harnessing the Atomic Juggernaut: The
Need for Multi-Lateral Input in Nuclear Energy Decision-Making, 14 NATURAL RESOURCE
J. 411 (1974), citing LEWIS, THE NUCLEAR POWER REBELLION 20 (1972).
10 Gofman & Tamplin, Nuclear Power, Technology, and Environmental Law, 2
ENVIRON. LAW 57 (1971); Moore, The Environmentalist and Radioactive Waste, 49 CHI.-
KENT L. REV. 55 (1972); Note, Harnessing the Atomic Juggernaut: The Need for Multi-
Lateral Input in Nuclear Energy Decision-Making, supra note 9; Comment, Radioactive
Waste: A Failure in Governmental Regulation, 37 ALB. L. REv. 97 (1972).
1 Palfrey, supra note 9, at 1384, citing NATIONAL ACADEMY OF SCIENCES REPORT ON
TECHNOLOGY: PROCESSES OF ASSESSMENT AND CHOICE 54-55 (1969).
"1 Atomic Energy Act of 1954, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2011-296 (1970) (hereinafter referred to
as Atomic Energy Act].
" See id. § 2013(c).
" Private development and use of atomic energy is to be encouraged "to the maxi-
mum extent consistent with the common defense and security and with the health and
safety of the public." See id. §§ 2013(a), (e).
" Seemingly, the inconsistency in AEC duties was alleviated with the Energy Reorg-
anization Act of 1974, which replaced the AEC with the NRC and ERDA. See note 7
supra. NRC is now responsible for the regulation of the nuclear industry, and ERDA is
responsible for the promotion and development of the Government's nuclear facilities.
However, as all AEC personnel were simply transferred to NRC and ERDA, it is question-
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omic energy in the private sector while also regulating such use
under its licensing authority to protect the "health and safety of
the public."'"
The Presidential Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970,'1 creat-
ing the EPA, brought control of many of the country's environ-
mental concerns under this one agency." Thereafter, the EPA
proposed comprehensive standards for radioactive effluents for
the entire uranium cycle along with an accompanying Draft
Statement of Considerations'
The promulgation and issuance of these effluent standards
led to a jurisdictional dispute between the AEC and the EPA.
The Office of Management and Budget (OMB) settled this dis-
pute by ruling that the proposed Uranium Fuel Cycle Standards
were beyond EPA's authority, 0 and the EPA was deemed to have
authority to establish ambient standards only. Authority over
effluent standards for radioactive materials remained in the
AEC. Settlement of this dispute also resulted in an inter-agency
agreement on the respective EPA-AEC roles in controlling radio-
active effluents under the 1972 Amendments.2
able whether the split in agencies has resulted in a total split in philosophies.
11 The various licensing provisions include the Atomic Energy Act §§ 2073, 2093, 2099,
2111, 2131, 2133, and 2139. With no further statutory guide than the protection of the
public health and safety, the AEC promulgated regulations defining various permissible
levels of radiation exposure for persons working in nuclear plants, minors working in
restricted areas, and the average citizen. 10 C.F.R. §§ 20.103-.105 (1975). The AEC also
set permissible effluent limitation standards for radioactive materials discharged into
water. Id. § 20.106, app. B. The plans for every proposed nuclear project were required to
comply with these standards in order to obtain a construction license and, later, an
operation license from the AEC. Id. §§ 50.40(a), 50.50.
11 Reorganization Plan No. 3 of 1970, Exec. Order No. 11,752, 35 Fed. Reg. 15623,
42 U.S.C. § 4321 (1970) [hereinafter cited as Reorganization Plan].
" Among the various functions that were transferred to the EPA were: (1) Those of
the Federal Radiation Council; and (2) those of the AEC "to the extent that such functions
of the Commission consist of establishing generally applicable environmental standards
for the protection of the general environment from radioactive material." Reorganization
Plan §§ 2(a)(6), (7).
"1 EPA, DRAFT STATEMENT OF CONSIDERATIONS-ENVIRONMENTAL RADIATION STANDARDS
FOR THE URANIUM FuEL CycLE (Sept. 1973) (report on file with Appellant) [hereinafter
cited as Draft Statement of Considerations]. A final Statement of Considerations was
issued in 1975.
" Memorandum from Ash, Director, Office of Management and Budget, to Adminis-
trator Train (EPA) and Chairman Ray (AEC), Dec. 7, 1973 (memorandum on file with
the Denver Law Journal).
11 See text accompanying notes 34-37 infra.
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The 1972 Amendments provided a comprehensive scheme, to
be administered by the EPA,22 for the regulation and ultimate
elimination of water pollution. Under an express objective to
"restore and maintain the chemical, physical, and biological in-
tegrity of the Nation's waters," 4 the 1972 Amendments man-
dated the promulgation of ambient and effluent standards for all
pollutants.2 1 In part for these reasons the 1972 Amendments are
considered landmark legislation in the area of water pollution
control.
26
The 1972 Amendment's "no right to pollute" concept27 was
effectuated by making it unlawful for any person to discharge any
pollutant except in compliance with certain provisions of the
Act.28 In an attempt to avoid litigable issues,' the 1972 Amend-
ments for the first time defined the term "pollutant" as
dredged spoil, solid waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage,
" 1972 Amendments § 1251(d).
Id. § 1251(a)(1).
:4 Id. § 1251(a).
' For general articles on the federal water pollution control legislation, see Barry, The
Evolution of Enforcement Provisions of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act: A Study
of the Difficulty in Developing Effective Legislation, Symposium: Control of Environmen-
tal Hazards, 68 MIcH. L. REv. 1103 (1970); McThenia, An Examination of the Federal
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 30 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 195 (1973);
Note, Clearing Muddy Waters: The Evolving Federalization of Water Pollution Control,
60 GEo. L.J. 742 (1972); Note, Water Quality Control: Federal Water Pollution Control
Act Amendments of 1972, 7 NATURAL REsOURcEs LAw. 223 (1974).
' While all pre-1972 water pollution control legislation made use only of the ambient
standard, the 1972 Amendments have made use of effluent limitation standards as well.
Implicit in the earlier legislation was the theory that one had a right to pollute as long as
the established water quality level for that body of water was not violated. Now, under
the Amendments' added effluent limitation system, the predominant theory, as aptly
expressed in the Senate Report, is that "no one has the right to pollute-that pollution
continues because of technological limits, not because of any inherent right to use the
nation's waterways for the purpose of disposing of wastes." 2 A Legislative History of the
Water Pollution Control Act Amendments of 1972, 93d Cong., 1st Sess., at 1460 (1973)
[hereinafter Leg. Hist.].
27 Id.
, 1972 Amendments § 1311(a).
" The Senate Committee on Public Works stated in its report accompanying S. 2770:
For the first time the Committee would add to the law a definition of the
term pollutant. In order to trigger the control requirements over addition of
materials to the navigable water, waters of the contiguous zone and the
ocean, it is necessary to define such materials so that litigable issues are
avoided over the question of whether the addition of a particular material is
subject to control requirements.
2 Leg. Hist., at 1494.
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sewage sludge, munitions, chemical wastes, biological materials,
radioactive materials, heat, wrecked or discarded equipment, rock,
sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal, and agricultural waste
discharged into water. This term does not mean (A) "sewage from
vessels" . . . or (B) water, gas, or other material which is injected
into a well to facilitate production of oil or gas .... 11
In a step-by-step approach to eliminate pollutant discharges
into water by point sources,3' the EPA was required to set effluent
limitations standards, targeted toward two specific dates, for all
pollutants.2 Any point source must obtain a permit from the EPA
under the National Pollutant Discharge Elimination System
(NPDES) in order to lawfully discharge any pollutant."
As "radioactive materials" are expressly defined as a "pollu-
tant" under the 1972 Amendments, nuclear facilities would ap-
pear to be subject to the NPDES license requirement and radio-
active effluent limitations as established by the EPA." Yet, as a
result of the AEC-EPA agreement, 35 the EPA would establish
effluent limitations for only those radioactive materials not under
AEC control.0
1o 1972 Amendments § 1362(6) (emphasis added). The term "pollution" is also de-
fined as "the man-made or man-induced alteration of the chemical, biological, and radiol-
ogical integrity of water." Id. § 1362(19).
" Section 1362 provides:
The term "point source" means any discernible, confined and discrete con-
veyance, including but not limited to any pipe, ditch, channel, tunnel, con-
duit, well, discrete fissure, container, rolling stock, concentrated animal
feeding operation, or vessel or other floating craft, from which pollutants are
or may be discharged.
Id. § 1362(14).
" By July 1, 1977, effluent limitations are to be set requiring the application of the
"best practicable" control technology currently available to point sources. Id. §
1311(b)(1)(A). By July 1, 1983, effluent limitations are to require the "best available"
technology economically achievable for such category or class of point sources. Id. §
1311(b)(2)(A). In determining what constitutes "best practicable" and "best available"
technology, the EPA is guided by statutory criteria. See id. §§ 1314(b)(1)(B), (b)(2)(B).
" Id. § 1342(a). A license will be issued, after opportunity for public hearing, only
upon the condition that the effluent standards established for that point source will be
met. Id. Any unlicensed discharge of pollutants or any pollutant discharge not in compli-
ance with the license requirements subjects the responsible party to a possible civil action.
Id. §§ 1319, 1365.
3, Nuclear reactors would fall within the definition of "point sources" in the 1972
Amendments. See note 31 supra.
' See text accompanying notes 18-20 supra.
" Examples of radioactive materials not under AEC control are radium and
accelerator-produced isotopes. 40 C.F.R. § 125 (1975).
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The EPA-AEC agreement appears to have thwarted Con-
gressional intent.37 The AEC, pursuant to the Atomic Energy Act,
in the past has regulated the discharge of radioactive effluents
from nuclear facilities; however, the 1972 Amendments, as a later
expression of legislative intent, appear to mandate regulation by
the EPA of all radioactive materials.
II. COPIRG v. Train
A. Analysis of the Tenth Circuit Decision
The essence of the Tenth Circuit holding, in reversing the
district court, is that "radioactive materials" means all radioac-
tive materials. To support its decision, the Tenth Circuit relied
on various rules of statutory construction and the similarity of
this case to Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v.
Callaway."5
Perhaps one of the most accepted rules of statutory construc-
tion is that a court, attempting to determine legislative intent,
will look first to the plain meaning of the statute. 9 Where the
purpose may be ascertained and the language is clear and unam-
biguous, a court will not resort to other rules of construction to
determine the meaning of the statute.
In applying this rule to the facts of the case, the Tenth Cir-
cuit felt the purpose of the 1972 Amendments was to eliminate
7 As stated in 40 C.F.R. § 125.1(X) (1975):
Comment-The legislative history of the Act reflects that the term "radioac-
tive materials" as included within the definition of "pollutant" in section 502
of the Act covers only radioactive materials which are not encompassed in
the definition of source, byproduct, or special nuclear materials as defined
by the Atomic Energy Act of 1954, as amended, and regulated pursuant to
the latter Act. Examples of radioactive materials not covered by the Atomic
Energy Act and, therefore, included within the term "pollutant" are radium
and accelerator produced isotopes.
Id. (citations omitted). The Draft Statement of Considerations also stated:
This decision was made at AEC's request to avoid duplication of ongoing
AEC plant licensing activities, in spite of the rather clear mandate of
FWPCA for [EPA regulation of all] radioactive materials. It was made
based on EPA's plans to issue these standards for the uranium fuel cycle
under authority separate from the FWPCA [the Reorganization Plan].
Draft Statement of Considerations, supra note 19, at 41. This comment was deleted from
the final Statement of Considerations issued in 1975.
370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y. 1973), aff'd, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974).
"' The Tenth Circuit relied on the following cases: United States v. Ray, 488 F.2d 15
(10th Cir. 1973); United States v. Western Pac. R.R., 385 F.2d 161 (10th Cir. 1967).
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all pollution through a comprehensive legislative scheme. The
court then considered the language of the 1972 Amendments and
found the language to be clear and unambiguous in its plain
meaning. "Pollution" is there defined as the "man-made or man-
induced alteration of the . . .radiological integrity of water."
Further, "pollutant" is defined to include "radioactive materi-
als." Faced with a reasonable and broad purpose, as well as the
plain meaning of the definitions, the court concluded that the
term "radioactive materials" in fact means all radioactive
materials."
The court's analysis of the 1972 Amendments under the plain
meaning rule is correct-the statute when considered as an iso-
lated entity is clear and unambiguous on its face. Yet the plain
meaning analysis appears to have been too narrow in scope-it
ignores an apparent conflict between the Atomic Energy Act and
the 1972 Amendments. The inconsistency lies in the fact that
under the Atomic Energy Act, the AEC set effluent limitation
standards for the majority of radioactive materials-source, by-
product, and special nuclear material. Yet the 1972 Amend-
ments, as interpreted by the Tenth Circuit, require the EPA to
set effluent limitation standards for all radioactive materials.
The Tenth Circuit quickly dismissed EPA's contention that
the court should attempt to "juxtapose" the 1972 Amendments
and the Atomic Energy Act so as to make them consistent. The
consistency interpretation advanced by the EPA was equated by
the court with the interpretation found in the EPA regulation.
The court held that an administrative interpretation could not be
used to thwart the express statutory intent of the 1972 Amend-
ments." While the EPA regulation may be pertinent to the deter-
mination of the meaning of the 1972 Amendments (had the court
not used the plain meaning rule), it is not pertinent to the issue
of inter-statutory inconsistencies. The court then briefly con-
cluded that the two Acts are inconsistent.
An appropriate test to be used in determining consistency or
inconsistency between statutes is based on "reasonableness"' 2 -
,0 507 F.2d at 747.
" Id. at 748.
, See Stevens v. Biddle, 298 F. 209 (8th Cir. 1924); Yellen v. Hickel, 335 F. Supp.
200 (S.D. Cal. 1971); Golanda Lead Mines v. Neill, 82 Idaho 96, 350 P.2d 221 (1960).
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can the two statutes be reasonably construed to give effect to
both? In this case, according to the EPA, the only construction
of the Atomic Energy Act and the 1972 Amendments which would
make the two acts consistent is the view taken by the EPA in its
regulation43 that the AEC alone is responsible for setting effluent
limitations on by-product, source, and special nuclear material,
and that the EPA is responsible for setting effluent limitations for
radium and accelerator-produced isotopes. Although this inter-
pretation may be a reasonable construction of the Atomic Energy
Act, it is a highly unreasonable construction of the 1972 Amend-
ments: First, it would require a very narrow reading of the latter
statute; and second, the 1972 Amendments would become inter-
nally inconsistent."
Another perspective on the inconsistency problem was dealt
with in Scenic Hudson. There the inconsistency existed between
one statute's provision for the discretionary exercise of power by
one agency and a later statute's provision for the mandatory exer-
cise of power by a different agency over the same subject matter."
13 See note 37 supra.
" The 1972 Amendments are of such a broad and comprehensive scope that to narrow
the meaning of "radioactive materials" to include only radium and accelerator-produced
isotopes-which elements comprise only a small percentage of all radioactive materi-
als-would cause blatant inconsistency. Not only would this narrowing of the definition
of "radioactive materials" be inconsistent with the purpose of the 1972 Amendments, it
is generally inconsistent with the tendency of courts to construe broadly water pollution
control legislation. See United States v. Standard Oil Co., 384 U.S. 224 (1966); United
States v. Republic Steel Corp., 362 U.S. 482 (1960). The definition of "pollution" as "man-
made or man-induced alteration of the. . . radiological integrity of water" would become
meaningless, for the vast majority of man-made radioactive materials which alter the
"integrity of water" would be exempted from the statute's coverage. See note 30 supra.
Another provision of the 1972 Amendments provides "[n]otwithstanding any other
provision of this chapter, it shall be unlawful to discharge any. . . high-level radioactive
waste into the navigable waters." 1972 Amendments § 1311(f). The term "high-level
radioactive waste" refers to specific concentrations of radioactive materials and refers only
to radioactive materials which are subject to AEC control under the Atomic Energy Act.
Brief for Respondent at 9, Train v. COPIRG, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. granted,
95 S. Ct. 2393 (1975) (brief on file with the Denver Law Journal). If the basic provisions
of the 1972 Amendments were not to apply to all radioactive wastes, including those under
AEC regulation, it would be meaningless for this provision to contain the clause "notwith-
standing any other provision of this chapter."
" Scenic Hudson considered a provision of the 1972 Amendments which requires that
permits be obtained from the Corps of Engineers, with the approval of the EPA, to
discharge dredged or fill material. Consolidated Edison, whose hydroelectric plant was in
a phase of construction requiring dredging, claimed that the 1972 Amendments' provisions
could not have been intended to apply to hydroelectric power plants "because of the
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To the extent the statutes overlapped in the potential exercise of
powers, the statute with the mandatory duties controlled.
The Atomic Energy Act and the 1972 Amendments may be
deemed inconsistent by use of the Scenic Hudson mandatory-
discretionary distinction. The AEC, under the Atomic Energy
Act, has in its discretion set effluent limitation standards for
radioactive materials. The EPA, pursuant to the 1972 Amend-
ments, is under a mandatory duty to set effluent limitation stan-
dards for all "pollutants," including "radioactive materials."46
As a result of this inconsistency, AEC control over the setting
of effluent limitation standards for radioactive materials is extin-
guished by the 1972 Amendments, which state "[t]his chapter
shall not be construed as . . . limiting the authority or functions
of any officer or agency of the United States under any other law
or regulation not inconsistent with this chapter . . . . "1 The
EPA now possesses sole responsibility for the setting of effluent
limitation standards pursuant to the 1972 Amendments.
There is much judicial authority supporting the rule of statu-
tory construction that when a statute includes express excep-
comprehensive regulatory power under which the Federal Power Act is to be wielded by
the FPC." 370 F. Supp. at 170. The district court rejected the contention that the FPC
had exclusive control over hydroelectric power plants. It held the 1972 Amendments
controlled with respect to dredging and filling. The inconsistency between the Acts was
simply that, under the Federal Power Act, demands for compliance with dredge and fill
requirements would result from a discretionary exercise of power. by the FPC. However,
under the 1972 Amendments, demands for compliance with such requirements result from
a mandatory exercise of power by the Corps and EPA. Id.
46 The EPA, in setting effluent limitation standards, is guided by statutory criteria
and must target those standards to the date deadlines set forth in the 1972 Amendments,
the final goal being no discharge of pollutants by 1985. See 1972 Amendments §§
1311(b)(1)(A), (2)(A), 1251(a)(1). The EPA thus is under a mandatory duty both to
set effluent limitation standards in accordance with statutory guidelines and target dates,
and to ensure that a point source will be able to meet those standards before issuance of
a permit. See id. §§ 1342(a)(1), (2).
No provision of the Atomic Energy Act specifically requires the AEC to set effluent
limitation standards for the discharge of radioactive wastes. In its discretion, the AEC has
chosen to promulgate such standards under the statute's general mandate requiring the
AEC to establish minimal licensing criteria to protect the "health and safety of the
public." See, e.g., Atomic Energy Act §§ 2073(b), 2093(b). The AEC is neither guided by
statutory criteria in determining appropriate effluent standards, nor subject to the target
dates found in the 1972 Amendments. Perhaps most importantly, the AEC is not subject
to the 1985 "no discharge" goal. The AEC in its discretion could enforce standards to meet
the 1972 Amendments' target dates and "no discharge" goal. It is, however, under no duty
to do so.
' 1972 Amendments § 1371(a)(1) (emphasis added).
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tions, the courts will refuse to imply any other exceptions." The
Tenth Circuit, in finding that the 1972 Amendments' definition
of "pollutant" contained two express exceptions, neither of which
related to radioactive material,49 refused to imply that Congress
intended to exclude radioactive materials heretofore regulated by
the AEC.5
After determining that the 1972 Amendments were clear and
unambiguous, the Tenth Circuit refused to deal extensively with
the legislative history. The court relied on the rule of statutory
construction that "legislative history of a statute cannot be used
to change the meaning of a clear and unambiguous statute."',
The court noted, however, that it viewed the legislative history
of the 1972 Amendments as "conflicting and inconclusive. '52
The 1972 Amendments originated as Senate Bill 2770
' The Tenth Circuit relied on the following: Knapczyk v. Ribicoff, 201 F. Supp. 283
(N.D. Ill. 1962); In re Monks Club, Inc., 64 Wash. 2d 845, 394 P.2d 804 (1964); 2A C.
SANDS, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUcTION §§ 47.07, 47.11 (4th ed. 1973). See also
Addison v. Holly Hill Fruit Prods., Inc., 322 U.S. 607 (1944); Bend v. Hoyt, 38 U.S. (13
Pet.) 263 (1839); Board of Medical Examiners v. Warren Hosp., 102 N.J. Super. 407, 246
A.2d 78 (1968).
, See text accompanying note 30 supra.
50 507 F.2d at 747-48.
" 507 F.2d at 747. The Tenth Circuit relied on the following cases to support this rule
of statutory construction: United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S. 643 (1961); Ex parte Collett,
337 U.S. 55 (1949); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244 (1945); United States v. Zions
Say. & Loan Ass'n, 313 F.2d 331 (10th Cir. 1963); Haskell v. United States, 241 F.2d 790
(10th Cir. 1957). See also United States v. Shreveport Grain & Elevator Co., 287 U.S. 77
(1932); Railroad Comm'n v. Chicago, B. & Q.R.R., 257 U.S. 563 (1922); Duplex Printing
Press Co. v. Deering, 254 U.S. 443 (1921).
11 507 F.2d at 748. There are many reasons why the Tenth Circuit, having commented
on the legislative history of the 1972 Amendments, should have probed more deeply into
the subject. The district court, although not discussing the legislative history, relied on it
in granting summary judgment for the EPA. 373 F. Supp. at 994. Both parties dealt
extensively with legislative history in their briefs. Brief for Appellants at 21-32; Brief for
Appellees at 20-26; Reply Brief for Appellants at 7-10, COPIRG v. Train, 507 F.2d 743
(10th Cir. 1974) (briefs on file with the Denver Law Journal). There is authority for the
proposition that legislative history, when available, should always be used in determining
legislative intent. See United States v. American Trucking Ass'ns, 310 U.S. 534 (1940);
Boston Sand & Gravel Co. v. United States, 278 U.S. 41 (1928); Friends of the Earth v.
Armstrong, 485 F.2d 1 (10th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 1171 (1974); Litchfield Sec.
Corp. v. United States, 325 F.2d 667 (2d Cir. 1963). The Supreme Court, even when citing
the same rule relied on by the Tenth Circuit, has often looked into the legislative history
(since certiorari has been granted in this case, the Supreme Court probably will look
extensively at pertinent legislative history). See, e.g., United States v. Oregon, 366 U.S.
643 (1961); Ex parte Collett, 337 U.S. 55 (1949); Gemsco, Inc. v. Walling, 324 U.S. 244
(1945).
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(S.2770). The definition of "pollutant," as found in S.2770, was
very similar to that finally enacted. It included "radioactive ma-
terials" as a "pollutant" and the two express exceptions found in
the final conference draft of the 1972 Amendments. 3
The definition of "pollutant" in the House version of the
proposed bill, H.R. 11896, is identical to that found in S.2770,54
except that it contains two express exceptions not found in
S.2770,15 neither of which limits the term "radioactive materials."
Yet, the House Committee Report excluded radioactive materials
under AEC control from the term "radioactive materials" in the
definition of pollutant.
Section 502(f) of S.2770 stated:
The term "pollutant" means, but is not limited to, dredged spoil, solid
waste, incinerator residue, sewage, garbage, sewage sludge, munitions,
chemical wastes, biological materials, radioactive materials, heat, wrecked
or discarded equipment, rock, sand, cellar dirt, and industrial, municipal,
agricultural, and other waste introduced into water: Provided, it does not
mean (1) "sewage from vessels" within the meaning of section 312 of this Act;
or (2) water, gas, or other material which is injected into a well to facilitate
production of oil or gas, or water derived in association with oil or gas produc-
tion and disposed of in a well, if the well used either to facilitate production
or for disposal purposes is approved by the authority of the State in which
the well is located.
2 Leg. Hist., at 1697-98 (emphasis added).
"' See id.
" The two additional exceptions are found in section 502(6) of H.R. 11896, which
stated:
This term [pollutant] does not mean . . . (C) thermal discharges in accord-
ance with regulations issued pursuant to section 316 of this Act; or (D)
organic fish wastes.
1 Leg. Hist., at 1068.
" The Report of the House Committee on Public Works accompanying H.R. 11896
contains the following statement:
[T]he term "pollutant" as defined in the bill includes "radioactive materi-
als." These materials are those not encompassed in the definition of source,
byproduct, or special nuclear materials as defined by the Atomic Energy Act
of 1954, as amended, and regulated pursuant to that Act.
Id. at 818. Representative Frenzel was the most vocal of the House members in opposition
to the interpretation given the meaning of "radioactive materials" in H.R. 11896 by the
House Committee. He continually insisted that the plain meaning of the bill con-
trolled-there were only four express exceptions; therefore, "radioactive materials" meant
all radioactive material. See, e.g., id. at 547, 745-46.
Confusion reigned in the House as to the proper interpretation of the term "radioac-
tive materials" in the H.R. 11896 definition of "pollutant." A prime example is found in
the House debate over an amendment proposed by Representatives Wolff and Frenzel to
ensure the right of the states under the bill to impose and enforce effluent standards for
the discharge of radioactive and thermal wastes equal to or more stringent than those
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When the final draft of the 1972 Amendments came out of
the Conference Committee, a House committeeman consoled
concerned representatives that the House Committee interpreta-
tion of the term "radioactive materials" had prevailed. 51 Yet, the
Conference Committee Report contained no statement, like that
found in the House Committee Report, which excluded radioac-
tive material under AEC control from the bill. The Conference
Committee's substitute definition of "pollutant" again included
the term "radioactive materials" and two express exceptions, nei-
ther of which limited that term.5" Meanwhile, the Senate
proceeded to adopt a portion of the unofficial Conference Re-
port,59 which contained a discussion of the impact of clause
511(c)(2)(B)'" to the effect that all agencies, such as AEC, must
accept as dispositive EPA effluent limitation standards."
established under the Act. See id. at 542. Wolff appeared to have accepted the House
Committee statement and sponsored the inclusion of the amendment because the bill
failed to prohibit routine discharge of radioactive wastes into water. See id. at 544. Fren-
zel, however, sponsored the amendment simply to clarify the intent of the bill. Id. at 547.
Of those who opposed the amendment, the basic attitude expressed was that it was an
attempt to amend the Atomic Energy Act. They, therefore, assumed H.R. 11896 had
not modified AEC control over the discharge of radioactive wastes.
' The discussion was between Representative Anderson and House Committeeman
Harsha.
" See id. at 226. The Conference definition included the following changes: First, it
omitted the House and Senate provision that the term "pollutant" means, "but is not
limited to" the various materials; second, it omitted the phrase "other wastes"; and third,
it dropped the last two exceptions in the House definition. See id. at 326-27.
' Id. at 166-184.
n' Section 511(c)(2) states:
Nothing in the National Environmental Policy Act of 1969 shall be deemed
to .. .(B) authorize any such agency to impose, as a condition precedent
to the issuance of any license or permit, any effluent limitation other than
any such limitation established pursuant to this Act.
2 Leg. Hist., at 80.
" See id. at 183. There are three possible types of pollutants which may be discharged
by the nuclear plants under AEC control: High-level radioactive wastes; low-level radioac-
tive wastes; and heat. It would be helpful to determine which of these three pollutants
the Conference had in mind when making the AEC an example of an agency which must
"bow" to the EPA determination of effluent standards. The Conference Committee could
not have been considering high-level radioactive wastes because no effluent limitation
standards will be set for them-they are absolutely prohibited from being discharged
under the 1972 Amendments. See 1972 Amendments § 1311(f). Additionally, it is unlikely
that the Conference Committee was considering thermal discharges, as the AEC has
continually refused to exercise jurisdiction over thermal discharges and has never set
standards for such discharges. See Calvert Cliffs' Coordinating Comm., Inc. v. AEC, 449
F.2d 1109 (D.C. Cir. 1971). The only remaining and logical possibility is that the commit-
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In neither of the two original bills nor the final conference bill
did a limitation on the term "radioactive materials" reach the
status of "legislation.""2 If the Conference Committee intended to
limit that term, it chose a completely inadequate means to do so.
As aptly stated by the Supreme Court in a recent case, Train v.
New York, 3 "[L]egislative intention, without more, is not legis-
lation." 4 In these circumstances, the Tenth Circuit could only
conclude, as it ultimately did, that the term "radioactive materi-
als" means all radioactive materials.
Scenic Hudson,5 decided in 1973, has particular relevance to
COPIRG v. Train."6 That case held that, despite the exclusive
control the Federal Power Commission had traditionally exer-
cised over the hydroelectric industry prior to the 1972 Amend-
ments, that industry was not exempt from the scope of the 1972
Amendments. 7 The Tenth Circuit relied on the similarity of
these cases as a basis for determining that in accordance with the
1972 Amendments, the EPA, not the AEC, is responsible for the
regulation of radioactive materials discharged into water. 8
tee was referring to low-level radioactive wastes. The importance of the Conference Com-
mittee statement would, therefore, be that the AEC must accept as dispositive the effluent
limitation standards set by the EPA for these radioactive wastes. If this is true, the term
"radioactive materials" in the 1972 Amendments means all radioactive materials.
" See Brief for Respondent at 55-56, Train v. COPIRG, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974),
cert. granted, 95 S. Ct. 2393 (1975) (brief on file with the Denver Law Journal).
63 Train v. New York, 420 U.S. 35 (1975).
Id. at 45.
a' Scenic Hudson Preservation Conference v. Callaway, 370 F. Supp. 162 (S.D.N.Y.
1973), afl'd, 499 F.2d 127 (2d Cir. 1974).
u See note 45 supra for the facts of Scenic Hudson.
'7 In Scenic Hudson the Federal Power Act and the 1972 Amendments were deemed
inconsistent by use of the mandatory-discretionary distinction. See note 45 supra. In the
alternative, Consolidated Edison argued that the 1972 Amendments were simply not
intended to apply to the hydroelectric industry "because of the comprehensive regulatory
power which, under the Federal Power Act, is to be wielded solely by the FPC." 370 F.
Supp. at 169. In response, the New York federal district court stated:
The argument [that FPC-regulated industry is exempt from the 1972
Amendments] is persuasive at first blush, but even more plausible is plain-
tiff's unmentioned contention that Congress would not design an Act which
on its face is all-inclusive, but for specifically enumerated exceptions, and
yet intend to establish an exception of the scale suggested here. Without any
indication that Con Ed's reading of the Congressional will is accurate, the
carving out of so major an exception would be improper. If this was Congress'
intention and the omission is mere oversight, the remedy rests in Congress'
hands. . ..
Id. at 170.
'8 See 507 F.2d at 748-49. Analogies between Scenic Hudson and this case are easily
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In the 1972 Amendments, Congress passed an "all-inclusive"
piece of legislation. The AEC and FPC, highly protective of their
broad powers, apparently refused to believe that the 1972 Amend-
ments meant to include them among those who had to yield to
the 1972 Amendments' commands. The fact remains that, pur-
suant to the 1972 Amendments, the right to pollute no longer
exists. The AEC and FPC have no power to insulate the nuclear
and hydroelectric industries from the reaches of the 1972 Amend-
ments, as the Tenth Circuit and federal district court in New
York recognized. If Congressional intent has been misconstrued,
the remedy lies with Congress."
III. IMPLICATIONS
With the Tenth Circuit holding that the term "radioactive
materials" means all radioactive materials, the control over the
promulgation of effluent limitation standards for radioactive dis-
charges into water has been taken from the AEC and placed
exclusively in the EPA. The significance of this new division of
agency authority cannot be fully understood without considera-
tion of the AEC's past performance when it was responsible for
the establishment of effluent limitation standards for radioactive
materials.
Prior to COPIRG v. Train, the AEC had promulgated regula-
tions establishing permissible radiation and effluent standards .1
Although these standards were established to protect the public
health and safety, their adequacy was under continuous attack.7'
drawn. The AEC has for many years exercised broad control over the nuclear industry
similar to the power the FPC has maintained over hydroelectric plants. The AEC had not
expressly claimed an exemption from the entire coverage of the 1972 Amendments as
Consolidated Edison had claimed in Scenic Hudson. Rather, the AEC contended only that
those radioactive materials which have been subject to its control-source, by-product,
and special nuclear material-were exempt from the definition of "pollutant." Yet, the
effect of such a contention is the same. By excluding these radioactive materials from the
definition of "pollutant," they would be exempted from any other provision of the 1972
Amendments. Almost all radioactive wastes would thus be excepted, despite the rather
clear language in the 1972 Amendments to the contrary. Id.; 370 F. Supp. at 170.
As the Tenth Circuit observed:
"[Bly-product material," "source material," and "special nuclear materi-
als" constitute virtually all of the radioactive materials that are of significant
concern to water quality . . ...
507 F.2d at 749.
507 F.2d at 749; 370 F. Supp. at 170.
7' See note 16 supra.
7, See authorities cited in note 10 supra.
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Despite new data concerning the biological effects of radiation at
very low dose rates and the environmental buildup of long-lived
radionuclides,72 the AEC had not modified any of its standards
since 1957.1
3
In analyzing the AEC's standards, it appears that the protec-
tion of the environment and the American public was second in
priority to the AEC's promotional concerns.74 The Tenth Circuit's
decision may ultimately promote greater protection for the Amer-
ican public and environment, for the EPA has no such dual con-
cerns. As the EPA establishes effluent limitation standards for
radioactive material, the potentially adverse impact of the AEC
priorities will be alleviated. This new division of authority be-
tween the AEC and EPA will help ensure that, as our nation
works towards energy independence, it does so with a firm com-
mitment to the protection of our environment.
Northern States Power Co. v. Minnesota" held that the regu-
lation of radioactive discharges into water had been preempted
by the federal government (AEC) under the Atomic Energy Act.
As a result of the interpretation of the 1972 Amendments in
COPIRG, a transfer of authority from the AEC to the EPA has
occurred with respect to the establishment of radioactive effluent
limitation standards.7" Questions, therefore, arise as to the cur-
72 Id.
11 Thus, a proposed nuclear project had to comply only with 1957 standards in order
to obtain an AEC license. As a result of these inadequate and outdated standards, the
AEC has been accused of permitting the nuclear industry to conduct "its research and
development 'in the field,' with the American public participating as guinea pigs in a
gigantic experiment." Gofman & Tamplin, supra note 10, at 72.
7' See note 15 supra.
320 F. Supp. 172 (D. Minn. 1970), aff'd, 477 F.2d 1143 (8th Cir. 1971), aff'd, 405
U.S. 1035 (1972).
11 In its opinion the Tenth Circuit considered the Northern States case. It did so in
response to the trial court's reliance on the case in granting summary judgment for the
defendants and in response to the AEC's concern over the possible impact of this case on
Northern States. Yet, the Tenth Circuit recognized that the Northern States decision is
not relevant to the disposition of this case. See 507 F.2d at 749.
In Northern States the State of Minnesota had attempted, as a condition to granting
a permit, to impose upon the Monticello nuclear plant radioactive discharge requirements
more stringent than those of the AEC. 320 F. Supp. at 173. The power company sought a
declaratory judgment on the issue of whether the AEC's authority to regulate radioactive
releases by nuclear power plants was exclusive, thereby preempting any state action. The
district court held, under the Atomic Energy Act, that the states were precluded from
concurrent regulation of radioactive discharges into water. Northern States is not relevant
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rent applicability of Northern States, which considered state-
federal preemption solely in the context of the Atomic Energy
Act.
As a result of the 1972 Amendments, the states are no longer
preempted from establishing their own effluent limitation stan-
dards for the discharge of radioactive wastes into water.77 The
1972 Amendments provide two means by which the states may
enforce more stringent standards than those set by the EPA.
First, prior to the granting of any Federal permit or license under
section 1341 of the 1972 Amendments, applicants who intend to
construct or operate facilities which are likely to result in any
discharge into navigable waters must provide the licensing
agency with certification from the state in which the discharge
will originate." A second way the states may assert the authority
granted them in the 1972 Amendments is to gain control over the
NPDES permit program established in that Act.
79
However, each state permit program is subject to the over-
view of the EPA.80 The EPA may withdraw its approval of a state
to the issue of whether a federal agency, the EPA, may acquire by congressional mandate
control over the regulation of radioactive discharges which was once exclusively held by
another agency, the AEC.
" Section 1370 of the 1972 Amendments provides that nothing in the Act shall pre-
clude the states from adopting and enforcing their own effluent limitation standards for
the discharge of pollutants. The only limitation is that, to the extent an effluent limitation
standard is in effect under the Act, the states may not adopt a standard less stringent
than that in force. Thus the states may adopt effluent limitation standards for radioactive
materials more stringent than those promulgated by the EPA. See 1972 Amendments §
1370.
"' Id. § 1341(a)(1). A state in granting certification must set forth effluent limitations
to ensure that the applicant will comply with applicable effluent limitations under the
1972 Amendments as well as "any other appropriate requirements of State law." Id. §
1341(d) (emphasis added). The limitations set forth in such a certification then become a
condition of any federal license or permit. Id. If a state should determine that the appli-
cant cannot "reasonably assure" compliance with the terms of certification, that certifica-
tion will be denied and a license or permit may not be issued. Id. § 1341(a)(1).
"' Another provision of the 1972 Amendments allows a governor of a state to submit
to the EPA the proposed state program for administering permits for discharges into
navigable waters within its jurisdiction, accompanied by a statement from the appropriate
state official to the effect that the state laws provide adequate authority for the described
program. Each state program must conform with the guidelines promulgated by the EPA.
Id. § 1342(b)-(c).
" The EPA must receive notice of each application and of every action related to the
state's consideration of the permit application. Id. § 1342(d)(1). The EPA may veto the
issuance of a permit by the state under two conditions. First, EPA may object to the
issuance of the permit after notification of the "permitting" state's failure to accept
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program if, after a public hearing in which it is determined that
the state is not administering its program in accordance with the
established guidelines and statutory requirements, the state fails
to take corrective action."'
By transferring control over the discharge of radioactive ma-
terials into water from the AEC to the EPA, the 1972 Amend-
ments, as interpreted in this case, do not overrule Northern
States. The issue of whether the field of regulation of the dis-
charge of radioactive materials is preempted by the Atomic En-
ergy Act is moot; that "field" is now controlled by the EPA under
the 1972 Amendments. Pursuant to the 1972 Amendments, states
may establish and enforce their own effluent limitation standards
for the discharge of radioactive materials. The 1972 Amendments
stand as a later expression of Congressional intent. As such, the
field of regulation over the discharge of radioactive materials is
no longer preempted from concurrent state control.2
The Tenth Circuit decision also has important ramifications
for the development of the nuclear industry: First, the EPA might
promulgate more stringent effluent limitation standards for the
discharge of radioactive materials than those of the AEC and
require compliance with those standards as a condition to the
issuance of a NPDES permit; second, the states might promul-
gate even stricter effluent limitation standards for the discharge
of radioactive materials and require compliance with those stan-
dards as a condition of certification or a NPDES permit; and,
third, the nuclear industry will stand on the same ground as all
other energy sources.
As the EPA will probably set new, more stringent effluent
limitation standards for radioactive materials, such standards
must be met by the nuclear industry as a condition precedent to
receiving an EPA license. A probable effect of these more strin-
gent standards will be to stimulate technological advancement to
enable the nuclear industry to meet them. 3
recommendations submitted by a state whose waters may be affected. Second, it may
object to the issuance of a permit as being outside the guidelines and requirements of the
Act. Id. § 1342(d)(2).
Id. § 1342(c)(3).
M2 As was recognized in Northern States, "The United States Congress has the power
to preempt a field of activity within its constitutional authority . . . . It also has the
power to relinquish that authority to the states." 320 F. Supp. at 179.
91 A member of the Senate Committee on Public Works said:
VOL. 53
LANDS AND NATURAL RESOURCES
Despite the possibility that the EPA may establish effluent
limitation standards more stringent than those of the AEC, it
must be kept in mind that the 1972 Amendments have "created
a phased approach [by] setting deadlines far in advance for
achieving gradually more stringent control requirements."84 In
consideration of the time leeways set out in the Act, there should
be no reason why the nuclear industry should not be able to meet
the deadlines with whatever technological development is neces-
sary. If the industry responds sufficiently to the "psychology"
behind the 1972 Amendments, in light of the time granted for
such a response, there should be no significant lag in the growth
of the nuclear industry.
Perhaps the greatest concern of the nuclear industry, as a
result of this decision, is that it may be subject to varying effluent
limitation standards from state to state. Since, however, the in-
dustry is already subject to such regulation with respect to ther-
mal and chemical releases, the Tenth Circuit's addition of radio-
active materials to the list merely imposes a uniform lack of
uniformity.85
Overall, the Tenth Circuit decision places the nuclear indus-
try on the same grounds as all other energy sources. The nuclear
industry has learned the same lesson in COPIRG v. Train that
the hydroelectric industry learned in Scenic Hudson: It is not
exempt from the reaches of the 1972 Amendments.
Our legislation contains an important principle of psychology: Men seldom
draw the best from themselves unless pressed by circumstances and dead-
lines. This bill contains deadlines and it imposes rather tough standards on
industry, municipalities, and all other sources of pollution. Only under such
conditions are we likely to press the technological threshold of invention into
new and imaginative developments that will allow us to meet the objectives
stated in our bill.
2 Leg. Hist., at 1278.
14 Brief for Respondents at 15, Train v. COPIRG, 507 F.2d 743 (10th Cir. 1974), cert.
granted, 95 S. Ct. 2393 (1975) (brief on file with the Denver Law Journal). See also note
32 supra.
" The EPA may be able to hinder the states' enforcement of more stringent effluent
limitation standards with respect to the state permit program. Pursuant to section
1314(h), the agency is to establish guidelines for minimum procedural and other elements
of any state program. It is conceivable that in establishing these guidelines, the EPA
would set an upper limit on the "appropriate stringency" for state standards as a requisite
for an approvable program. However, the states would still retain unlimited ability to set
as stringent effluent limitation standards for radioactive materials as they desire under
the state certification program.
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CONCLUSION
The federal district court in COPIRG v. Train refused to be
responsible for the hindrance of nuclear growth during our na-
tion's energy crisis."6 The Tenth Circuit accepted that responsi-
bility. By placing control over the establishment of effluent limi-
tation standards for radioactive materials in the EPA, the Tenth
Circuit promoted maximum protection for the American public
and environment.
Congress must now determine whether the true hallmark of
the maintenence of the American way of life is the quality of our
environment and the health of the American people or whether
it should be our ability to reach energy independence rapidly. The
nuclear industry is subject to a multiplicity of standards set by
the various states. The option remains open for Congress to mo-
dify state certification and state permit programs. If Congress
chooses to exercise this option, it will destroy the purpose and
intent of the 1972 Amendments-to restore and maintain our
nation's waters through a joint federal-state effort. Hopefully,
such goals are not so easily forgotten.
In light of its prior attempts to gain control over the radioac-
tive effluent limitation standards, the EPA has finally "won" by
"losing" in COPIRG v. Train.
Marilyn G. Alkire
' 373 F. Supp. at 995.
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PATENTS, TRADEMARKS, COPYRIGHTS,
AND UNFAIR COMPETITION
OVERVIEW
By ROBERT DORR,* DONALD M. DuFf,** and CHERYL HODGSON
The Tenth Circuit considered five cases on appeal this term
involving patents, copyrights, and unfair competition. There
were no cases involving trademarks. First, in Eggenhofer v.
Koury,' the court remanded Eggenhofer's appeal from the denial
of a preliminary injunction to the district court for a written
statement of findings of fact and conclusions of law. Eggenhofer,
a well-known western artist, sought to enjoin the appellees from
advertising and publishing a book entitled Eggenhofer: The Pulp
Years. The district court found from the evidence presented that
Eggenhofer suffered no irreparable harm. The Tenth Circuit in-
quired why Eggenhofer did not argue infringement of his common
law copyright rights, which, once established, requires no showing
of irreparable harm in order to warrant injunctive relief. Rather,
Eggenhofer had argued a contractual breach in the publishing
contract and a tortious compromise of his name. Unfortunately,
the district court had not written an opinion, and, because the
record presented no means of ascertaining the true basis of the
district court's denial of injunctive relief, the Tenth Circuit re-
manded.
In Maloney-Crawford Tank Corp. v. Sauder Tank Co.,2 the
Tenth Circuit refused to disturb the trial court's award of dam-
ages, interest from the date of judgment, and denial of an award
of attorney's fees. The Tenth Circuit reiterated its position that
attorney's fees are awarded in patent cases only in "exceptional
cases" and not as a "matter of law."
* Associate, Burton, Crandell & Polumbus, Patent, Trademark, and Copyright Firm;
B.S., 1968, Milwaukee School of Engineering; M.S., 1970, Northwestern University; J.D.,
1974, University of Denver.
** Patent Attorney, Boulder, Colorado; B.S., 1949, Illinois Institute of Technology;
LL.B., 1953, New York University; LL.M., 1971, New York University.
*** B.A., 1972, Louisiana Tech University; J.D., 1976, University of Denver.
No. 73-1926 (10th Cir., Sept. 24, 1974) (Not for Routine Publication).
511 F.2d 10, 185 U.S.P.Q. 80 (10th Cir. 1975).
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In Telex Corp. v. IBM Corp. the Tenth Circuit, in a lengthy
opinion, upheld IBM's counterclaim of trade secret theft. Telex
was found to have lured key employees from IBM. Telex was,
thus, able immediately to penetrate the marketplace with a com-
peting product, completely bypassing the research and develop-
ment stage. The Tenth Circuit upheld the award to IBM of (1)
$4.5 million representing lost IBM monthly rentals, (2) $3 million
representing replaced IBM units, and (3) $10 million representing
the savings to Telex from bypassing the research and develop-
ment stage. The Tenth Circuit, however, found the following
awards to IBM to be too speculative: (1) $3 million for increased
security costs and (2) $400,000 for increased manufacturing costs.
The further award to IBM of $1 million in punitive damages was
upheld. Both sides have now settled this case, with no damages
being due to either side.
Finally, since last term's decision in Moore v. Schultz,I the
Tenth Circuit has had occasion to reaffirm its position on the
non-obviousness requirements of patentability in Price v. Lake
Sales Supply R. M., Inc.5 and Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical
Co.6 The following comment examines the sequence of events
since Moore in light of the firm stance to which the Tenth Circuit
has adhered regarding non-obviousness determinations despite a
strong dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas in the Supreme Court's
denial of certiorari in Moore.7
3 510 F.2d 894, 184 U.S.P.Q. 521 (10th Cir. 1975). For an extended analysis of this
case, see Norgaard, Relevant Market in Computer Monopolization, 53 DENVER L.J. -
(1976).
1 491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
385 (1974).
5 510 F.2d 388, 183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
9 514 F.2d 377, 185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975).
7 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1974).
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PATENT LAW-NON-OBIOUSNESS-QUESTION OF LAW
OR QUESTION OF FACT?
Moore v. Schultz, 491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 584
(10th Cir. 1974)
Halliburton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co., 514 F.2d
377, 185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975)
INTRODUCTION
The culmination of a recent scenario of three cases dealing
with the question of non-obviousness (one of three requirements
for granting a patent) leaves the Tenth Circuit standing alone in
its view that the question of non-obviousness includes factual
determinations which may be made by a jury, with the court
deciding as a matter of law whether or not non-obviousness is
present.
The importance of this position becomes critical as, under
rule 52(a) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, such fac-
factual findings by the jury will not be overturned unless "clearly
erroneous." The prevailing view in other circuits deems the ele-
ments of non-obviousness a question of law in toto, effectuating
a de novo standard upon appellate review. Despite its unique
position, the Tenth Circuit has adopted a view of patent law more
consistent with the traditional role of a jury in the American
system of justice.
The trio of cases began in January 1974 with Moore v.
Schultz,' wherein the court reaffirmed its position that "within
the Tenth Circuit, novelty, utility and non-obviousness are held
to require factual determinations." 9 Schultz applied to the
United States Supreme Court for a writ of certiorari. Pending the
Court's decision as to whether certiorari should be granted in
Moore, the Tenth Circuit reiterated its position in Price v. Lake
Sales Supply R. M., Inc., ,0 although no jury was involved there.
Shortly thereafter, the Supreme Court denied certiorari for
Moore, but Mr. Justice Douglas rendered a scathing dissenting
opinion in complete derogation of the Tenth Circuit position.
491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
385 (1974).
Id. at 300, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 552.
" 510 F.2d 388, 183 U.S.P.Q. 519 (10th Cir. 1974).
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Despite Mr. Justice Douglas' dissent, the Tenth Circuit once
again adhered to its position regarding non-obviousness in Halli-
burton Co. v. Dow Chemical Co." It seems that the Tenth Circuit
presents the better view on non-obviousness, contrary to Justice
Douglas' views and the weight of other federal circuits. In order
to best understand the current importance of non-obviousness in
the role of patent validity, however, a brief background discussion
is necessary.
I. THE THREE HURDLES TO A VALID PATIENT
An inventor of a successful product is often frustrated to find
that he has three hurdles to overcome in receiving a truly valid
and enforceable patent. The first hurdle occurs in the Patent and
Trademark Office where, for a period often greater than 2 years,
an inventor vies with an examiner, who determines whether or
not the invention is entitled to a patent. The examiner is an
expert in the area of art in which the invention lies; although he
exercises discretion, he must adhere to certain statutory require-
ment set forth in the Patent Act." These requirements embrace
the following three areas: (1) Novelty;' 3 (2) usefulness; 4 and (3)
non-obviousness. '5
A patent cannot be obtained if the submission lacks novelty,
i.e., if it is identical to a prior art. "Prior art" may be defined as
certain statutorily defined categories, or types, of knowledge or
acts which predate the invention or the application. Such prior
art categories include patents of any country, printed publica-
tions throughout the world, and a public use or sale in this coun-
try by anyone, including the inventor, more than 1 year prior to
the application filing date.
Additionally, the item patented must serve some useful func-
tion. Finally, the Patent Act mandates that a patent may not be
obtained if
the differences between the subject matter sought to.be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would
514 F.2d 377, 185 U.S.P.Q. 769 (10th Cir. 1975).
12 35 U.S.C. §§ 1-293 (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Patent Act].
13 Id. § 102.
" Id. § 101.
I5 Id. § 103.
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have been obvious at the time the invention was made to a person
having ordinary skill in the art to which said subject matter
pertains. "1
The elements necessary for a finding of non-obviousness are, in
other words, that the invention (1) was not obvious, (2) at the
time of the invention, (3) to one having ordinary skill in the art.
In addition to applying this test of non-obviousness, the courts
have asked the following questions: (1) Was a long-felt demand
for the subject matter satisfied? 7 (2) Did the marketplace make
rapid use of the subject matter? 8 (3) Did the commercial success
of the invention stem from the nature of the device itself or did
it result from such factors as low price or extensive advertising? 9
In Graham v. John Deere Co., 2 the Supreme Court held that
the existence of non-obviousness is a question of fact, and that
section 103 permits a practical test of patentability that is func-
tional in approach to questions of invention.2' The Court held
that the examiner must be persuaded during the prosecution of
the application that the submission is not merely an obvious
improvement to the prior art. The examiner must evaluate the
prior art, not at the time of the prosecution of the application, but
rather at the time the invention was made.
If the examiner is persuaded, the inventor receives a patent
which, in effect, provides a constitutionally protected monopoly
for 17 years. This presumably prevents others from making,
using, or selling his device. If the inventor is more fortunate than
most and has a commercially successful product, he will often be
faced with a second hurdle: He will be required to defend the
validity of his patent when a competitor copies his invention and
exploits it commercially. At this juncture, the inventor may sue
for infringement of his patent, or, after receiving a letter from the
inventor threatening to sue, the competitor may effectuate an
action for declaratory judgment to have the patent declared in-
valid.
' Id. (emphasis added).
" Otto v. Koppers Co., 246 F.2d 789, 114 U.S.P.Q. 188 (4th Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
355 U.S. 939, 116 U.S.P.Q. 602 (1958).
" Eibel Process Co. v. Minnesota & Ontario Paper Co., 261 U.S. 45 (1923).
Ling-Temco-Vought, Inc. v. Kollsman Inst. Corp., 372 F.2d 263, 152 U.S.P.Q. 446
(2d Cir. 1967).
20 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966).
21 Id. at 17, 148 U.S.P.Q. at 466-67.
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It is by no means certain that the inventor can successfully
overcome the second hurdle. During the 20-year period from 1953
to 1972, 15,127 patent cases were commenced, of which 2,131
reached trial." In these cases, 38.2 percent of the patents were
held valid, 53.3 percent were held invalid, and in 8.5 percent the
validity of the patent was not decided. During that same 20-year
period, 1,074,538 patents were issued. Thus, just over 0.2 percent
were adjudicated in the district courts.
An inventor who overcomes the second hurdle and is success-
ful in the district court encounters a third hurdle upon appeal by
the infringer to the circuit court. During the same 20-year span,
decisions involving 1,232 patents, or just over 0.1 percent of all
patents issued during that 20-year period, were appealed. The
circuit courts have held 34.6 percent of these appealed patents
valid with 65.4 percent being held invalid.
Most findings of patent invalidity in both the district court
and the circuit court are based on non-obviousness. Using the
non-obviousness standard, the courts have consistently held in-
valid approximately 60 percent of all patents litigated.
3
Clearly, the non-obviousness standard is a most difficult test
for the inventor to overcome. A heavy burden is placed on the
inventor, as he must prove the level of skill or knowledge of a
fictitious "ordinary person skilled in the art," who is presumed
by law to have knowledge of all prior art. Without doubt, this
ordinary person is quite an exceptional non-ordinary person.
24
22 The following patent statistics utilized in this and following paragraphs were taken
from Gloria K. Koenig's excellent treatise, PATENT INVALIDITY (1974). For the analysis of
patents over the past 20 years, see id. § 4.02, Table 17 at 4-32.
23 See Horn & Epstein, The Federal Courts' View of Patents-a Different View, 55 J.
PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 134, 139 (1973).
24 See Leonard, The Man Skilled in the Art-or-Goodness Gracious, A Ghost!, 56
J. PAT. OFF. Soc'Y 599 (1974).
The lithe and ageless phantom of the "man skilled in the art" makes it
quite difficult for the Attorney to know what course to follow in supporting
arguments before or after a final rejection. How does one attack a fictitious
presence, who is endowed with fictitious knowledge and employs his ficti-
tious knowledge in a fictitious manner and, by fictitious reasoning from this
fictitious knowledge, creates a fictitious concept, and derives therefrom a
fictitious and wholly synthetic reduction to practice.
It is time, therefore, that this phantom, a most distracting chimera, born
out of Deficiency and sired by Doubt, should be relegated promptly and
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Presumably, the patent examiner, who has experience and
expertise in his area of art, should qualify as an "ordinary person
skilled in that art." It seems that when this standard is applied
to a litigated patent, the courts rarely would have the back-
ground, skill, and expertise to be such "ordinary person[s]
skilled in the art." That the standard of invention varies widely
in the different federal circuits is indicative of the courts' struggle
to apply this standard. For example, for the period from 1968 to
1972, the Second and Eighth Circuit Courts of Appeals held less
than 25 percent of the patents valid. 5 The First, Third, Fourth,
and Ninth Circuits held less than 35 percent valid, while the
Fifth, Sixth, Seventh, and Tenth Circuits held approximately 50
percent valid.
From these statistics and the resulting awareness of the high
mortality rate of all patents issued, it is clear that the method of
determining obviousness is crucial to a litigant's ability to sustain
or overturn a verdict upon appeal. From an examination of the
Tenth Circuit's position, one may see why the "clearly erroneous"
standard upon review is favorable to a successful claimant. The
authors herald the Tenth Circuit's stance as that best reflecting
the intent of Congress and the more rational means of
determining obviousness.
II. THE TENTH CIRCUIT VIEW OF NON-OBVIOUSNESS
A. Halliburton and Moore
The recent Tenth Circuit decision in Halliburton involved an
action for declaratory judgment brought by the plaintiff-appellee,
Halliburton Co., who claimed invalidity and non-infringement
of a patent owned by the defendant-appellant, Dow Chemical
Co., who counterclaimed for infringement. Dow appealed from
the district court's holding of a patent invalid and its award of
attorney's fees to Halliburton.
The Dow patent pertained to a one-step process for cleaning,
within a 6-hour period, more than a ton of oxide scale from large
boilers used for steam generation of electricity. The prior art pro-
permanently to the Elysian Fields of long discredited myths by the simple
step of admitting that the peculiar ability and knowledge attributed to him
are, in the end, only the personal beliefs of the tribunal itself.
Id. at 603-04.
1 KoENIG, supra note 22, at App.-172.
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cess required several days and many steps. The downtime of such
a boiler costs more than $40,000 per day due to the necessity of
securing electricity from other sources during that period. The
Dow patent was a vast improvement over the prior method in
terms of time and expense. The Tenth Circuit, with Judge Brei-
tenstein writing the majority opinion, upheld the district court as
to patent invalidity, but reversed the award of attorney's fees.
In Halliburton the circuit court followed its prior ruling in
Moore v. Schultz,2" in which Judge Seth emphatically held the
obviousness tests of Graham v. John Deere Co." to be issues of
fact that are to be determined by the jury. Thus, Moore separated
the Tenth Circuit from the Fourth, 8 Fifth,29 Sixth,30 Seventh,"
and Ninth12 Circuits. The Tenth Circuit in Moore stated:
The Supreme Court has observed that this matter "lends itself to
several basic factual inquiries" and compared it in that respect to
concepts of negligence and scienter .... Although the Fifth and
Ninth Circuits have taken a different view, we have held those ob-
servations to mean that non-obviousness is itself a factual ques-
tion. . . . Thus, within the Tenth Circuit, novelty, utility, and non-
obviousness are held to require factual determinations.3
Judge Seth further stated, however, that "it is clear that the
ultimate question of validity of a patent is one of law."
3'
B. A Critical Analysis of Justice Douglas' Views
Subsequent to Judge Seth's opinion in Moore, Mr. Justice
Douglas had occasion to interpose his comments upon denial of
2- 491 F.2d 294, 180 U.S.P.Q. 548 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q.
385 (1974).
27 383 U.S. 1, 148 U.S.P.Q. 459 (1966). See text accompanying note 20 supra.
2' Tights, Inc. v. Stanley, 441 F.2d 336, 169 U.S.P.Q. 578 (4th Cir. 1971).
11 Swofford v. B & W, Inc., 395 F.2d 362, 158 U.S.P.Q. 72 (5th Cir. 1968).
11 Deyerle v. Wright Mfg. Co., 496 F.2d 45, 181 U.S.P.Q. 685 (6th Cir. 1974); contra
Hieger v. Ford Motor Co., 516 F.2d 1324, 186 U.S.P.Q. 374 (6th Cir. 1975).
11 Gettelman Mfg., Inc. v. Lawn 'N' Sport Power Mower Sales & Serv., Inc., 517 F.2d
1194, 186 U.S.P.Q. 376 (7th Cir. 1975). Senior District Judge Jameson severely criticized
the majority by stating:
In resolving the obviousness issue the district court considered the three
basic factual inquiries outlined in Graham. The findings of fact made by the
district court with respect to those inquiries may not be overturned unless
clearly erroneous.
Id. at 1200, 186 U.S.P.Q. at 380.
12 Hensley Equip. Co. v. Esco Corp., 375 F.2d 432, 152 U.S.P.Q. 781 (9th Cir. 1967).
11 491 F.2d at 300, 180 U.S.P.Q. at 552 (citations omitted).
34 Id.
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certiorari by the Supreme Court. 5 Mr. Justice Douglas dissented
and argued that an obviousness determination is a question of law
for the court to decide. The essential points of his dissent are
summarized below:
(1) Article 1, section 8, clause 8 of the Constitution au-
thorizes Congress to provide for the granting of patents.
This clause was written "against the back-drop of
abuses by the Crown in granting monopolies;" the
framers of the Constitution did not intend these ex-
clusive rights to be granted freely.
(2) Supreme Court cases characterizing the correct
standard of invention are now embodied in section 103
of the Patent Act, which requires non-obvious subject
matter. A court is required in every patent infringement
suit to enforce obedience to this constitutional stan-
dard. Such cannot be delegated to the jury "on the sup-
position that only a question of fact is involved."37
(3) The determination whether a patentee's contribu-
tion justifies the patent monopoly requires "reasoned
elaboration" and, therefore, "treatment as a question of
law.'3
8
(4) "Findings that identify the unique features of the
patented device and explain why they advance the art
are essential, to permit appellate review to insure that
constitutional limitations have not been exceeded. The
responsibility belongs to the courts. It will not do to
leave such matters to unarticulated resolution by the
jury.
'39
(5) "The decision below holding patentability a ques-
tion of fact for the jury represents an abdication which
is likely to produce haphazard application of the statu-
tory and constitutional standard."40
The Douglas dissent reads well on the surface. However, a
critical analysis indicates that the reasoning and arguments used
" 419 U.S. 930, 183 U.S.P.Q. 385 (1974).
N Id. at 930-31, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
" Id. at 931, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
Id. at 932, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
Id.
0 4Id.
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by Mr. Justice Douglas are not unassailable, as matters either of
law or of common sense.
1. The Commerce Clause or Article I, Section 8, Clause 8?
Relying upon article I, section 8, clause 8, the patent and
copyright clause of the Constitution, Justice Douglas first as-
serted that a patent is justified only if it "makes a distinctive
contribution to the advancement of scientific knowledge."' By
such terms, Douglas demanded an extremely high standard of
invention as a constitutional necessity. He stated that this is "a
constitutional restraint on the dispensation of patents."4 Such
statements have been made often in recent years, and, unless
they are challenged in the near future, they will probably become
the law of the land by way of default.
Certainly, the prerogative of the Court includes the right to
set a high standard of invention so long as the Patent Act is based
on the patent and copyright clause of the Constitution. However,
no reason is seen why Congress could not authorize the granting
of patents based on its powers under the commerce clause. Con-
gress in recent years has relied upon the commerce clause to
affect many activities of every day life. Specifically, Congress
could set the level of invention, even if very low, that it considers
appropriate for the granting of patents. 3
2. Law or Fact?
Douglas' third point was that the requisite "reasoned elabo-
ration" in determining the grant of a patent also mandates treat-
ment of the same "as a question of law."44 That argument is not
self-proving and, in fact, is open to serious question. Arguably,
Congress, in enacting section 103 of the Patent Act, provided a
constitutionally acceptable test whereby a jury may determine
obviousness by answering questions of fact. One can respond to
specific interrogatories and articulate why an invention is or is
not obvious-at the time the invention was made-to one having
ordinary skill in the art. This function can be performed by the
" Id. at 930, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
42 Id.
41 A similar position has been advocated by Professor Nimmer regarding copyright
legislation. See NIMMER ON COPYRIGHT § 9.1 at 27 (Supp. 1972).
" 419 U.S. at 932, 183 U.S.P.Q. at 385.
VOL. 53
PATENTS AND TRADEMARKS
jury listening to expert testimony including testimony character-
izing what the ordinary skill in the art is. These factual questions
may be submitted to a jury; the court can then take the jury's
factual determinations regarding the three-part question posed
by section 103 and hold the patent to be valid or invalid, as the
case may be. This line of reasoning is submitted to be as fully
persuasive as Justice Douglas' unproven assertion that a case
cannot be delegated to the jury when a question of law is in-
volved.
3. Nonarticulation or Jury?
Douglas' fourth point, the statement that it will not do to
leave such matters "to unarticulated resolution by the jury,"45 is
also open to serious question. Unfortunately, Mr. Douglas did not
make clear to what he was objecting. Was he objecting to the
nonarticulation of the jury's decision per se, or was he objecting
to the fact that the question of obviousness had been left to the
jury to begin with? If he merely desired improved articulation,
this could easily be accomplished by having the court submit
special charges requiring the jury to specify: (1) The unique fea-
tures of the patented device, and (2) explanations as to why the
advance in the art is not obvious. Such charges should satisfy Mr.
Douglas in the event that his only objection was to nonarticula-
tion. On the other hand, if Justice Douglas were dissatisfied with
the fact that juries are permitted to determine such questions, no
matter how eloquent their articulation, then he should have so
stated.
4. Haphazard or Lacking Uniformity?
With respect to the fifth point, the merits of Justice Douglas'
arguments again are questionable. He stated that "holding
patentability a question of fact for the jury represents an abdica-
tion which is likely to produce haphazard application of the sta-
tutory and constitutional standard.""
This objection fails in the absence of a showing that jury
decisions in patent cases are any more "haphazard" than they are
in any other type of case. Certainly, the defendant in a criminal
case is as concerned over "haphazard" jury decisions as are the
1976
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parties of a patent suit; yet the authors can recall no instance in
which Justice Douglas has complained of "haphazard" results
from jury decisions in criminal cases.
If by "haphazard" Mr. Douglas meant that the decisions of
different juries are not uniform, he is correct. Admittedly, no two
juries will always decide the same set of facts identically. This is
true in patent cases as well as in other types of cases. However,
this does not render their decisions constitutionally haphazard.
The same observation may be made of trials without juries. Are
the decisions of the courts haphazard if they are not in monolithic
uniformity? Obviously, there is nothing constitutionally haphaz-
ard about a jury decision as long as the required instructions are
put to the jury to decide the facts in issue, so that the court can
take the jury's findings and decide the proper issues of law in-
volved.
As a matter of practicality and common sense, it is submit-
ted jurors are fully as capable as courts to determine questions
of obviousness. The members of a jury may not be specialists in
the field of art to which the invention pertains, but neither are
most judges. Further, a judge is neither intrinsically, nor by train-
ing, more qualified than a jury to decide the technical issues
required in patent cases.
If Justice Douglas was concerned with the skill of the person
or persons making determinations of obviousness, then the com-
pelling conclusion is that the ideal jury or the ideal arbiter of the
issues would be either patent attorneys or scientists skilled in a
particular art. Alternatively, a national court to try patent cases,
comparable to the Court of Customs and Patent Appeals per-
haps would satisfy those who argue that the questions of ob-
viousness are so complex in patent cases that they cannot be left
to the "unarticulated" opinions of juries, but rather should be
decided by federal judges who, for some reason, are thought to
be more capable of making such determinations.
5. What of Section 103?
A more fundamental criticism of the Douglas dissent is that
it avoids any reliance on section 103 of the Patent Act in resolving
whether obviousness is a question of fact or law. This section
specifies that obviousness is to be determined by "a person hav-
ing ordinary skill in the art" to which the invention pertains. Any
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serious discussion of the method of determining obviousness is
meaningless without reference to the source of this requirement.
Since the statute explicitly requires that this determination
be made by "a person having ordinary skill in the art," it would
appear:
(1) That the language does not exclusively vest the
powers of determination with federal judges unless one
reaches a prior conclusion that they, and they alone, are
the only ones who can be said to be "ordinary persons
skilled in the art;"
(2) that Congress could have specified federal
judges in section 103 if it had so intended;
(3) that since Congress did not mention federal
judges in section 103, there was no intention to limit to
them the rights of determination. Therefore, this right
of determination can be given to others, including
juries;
(4) that since juries cannot decide questions of law,
a determination of obviousness includes a question of
fact.
CONCLUSION
It is maintained that Judge Seth's opinion in Moore presents
a better treatment of non-obviousness than that espoused by Mr.
Justice Douglas. Certainly, during the course of a trial by jury or
by judge, expert witnesses can be called and testimony can be
entered into the record to establish the level of skill which would
be possessed by one with ordinary skill in the art. An analogous
procedure occurs routinely in negligence cases where, rather than
applying the reasonable person standard, a jury must determine
the duty of care imposed on one having special skills. In such
cases, the jury can articulate judgments concerning the duty of
such skilled persons based on the evidence and testimony. It
seems that in cases like Moore, if special interrogatories are sub-
mitted to the jury covering the three tests established in Graham
v. John Deere Co.," then patent validity or invalidity can be
decided as a matter of law. Determinations of fact should pro-
perly be overturned by an appellate court only if such findings of
1976
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fact are "clearly erroneous" under rule 52(a).
Judge Breitenstein in Halliburton reiterated the Moore view
by stating that "the findings of the issue of obviousness are enti-
tled to the usual respect accorded determinations of fact. . . .An
appellate court does not try factual issues de novo. The clearly
erroneous rule applies."4 Thus, in the Tenth Circuit, the inventor
actually has only two hurdles to overcome in pursuing a constitu-
tionally valid patent. The third level of a de novo situation in the
appellate court has been eliminated.
,1 514 F.2d at 379, 185 U.S.P.Q. at 770-71 (citations omitted).
SECURITIES
During the year covered by this survey the Tenth Circuit
decided eight cases involving the federal securities laws., While
the majority of these cases were dependent on peculiar facts and
did not change established Tenth Circuit law, the court did clar-
ify its position with regard to the treatment of promissory notes
as securities in Barrow v. Ellingson' and Zabriskie v. Lewis,3 and,
in Clegg v. Conk,' it analyzed the requirement of scienter in rule
10b-51 actions. These cases are the subject of the two comments
which follow.
REVIEWING THE SCIENTER REQUIREMENT IN 10b-5
CASES IN THE TENTH CIRCUIT
Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974)
By CATHY S. KRENDL*, JAMES R. KRENDL**
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
The facts of Clegg v. Conk,' presented by a partial record on
appeal, were at best incomplete. The court, for reasons discussed
below, attempted to review issues which were beyond the scope
of the appeal and, therefore, extracted "structural facts" from the
I Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publica-
tion); Resort Car Rental Sys. v. Chuck Ruwart Chevrolet, Inc., 519 F.2d 317 (10th Cir.
1975); Pratt v. First Cal. Co., 517 F.2d 11 (10th Cir. 1975); Crowley v. Montgomery Ward
& Co., No. 74-1476 (10th Cir., May 14, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication); Clegg v. Conk,
507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975); Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507
F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974); Ocrant v. Dean Witter & Co., 502 F.2d 854 (10th Cir. 1974);
Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc., 502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974).
' No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
3 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
4 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
5 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
*Associate Professor of Law, University of Denver College of Law; B.A., 1967, North
Texas State University; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
** Partner, Seawell, Cohen & Sachs, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1963, Harvard Univer-
sity; J.D., 1970, Harvard Law School.
1 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 422 U.S. 1007 (1975).
DENVER LAW JOURNAL
fragmentary information available.' The "structural facts"
which emerged are admittedly vague. Apparently, in August 1968
the defendant-appellant Conk was granted a distributorship for
car wash units by Hanna Enterprises, a non-incorporated, out-of-
state business. Conk arranged a meeting or meetings where an
investment proposal was presented to a group of prospective
investors by Conk and his associate, Stewart. At trial it was de-
termined that Conk made untrue statements or omitted to state
facts necessary to render what he said not misleading, and that
these statements and omissions were material to the investment
judgment of the appellees who relied upon them in making in-
vestments in appellant's business.
Appellees brought an action against Conk, alleging violations
of section 17a of the Securities Act of 19331 (Securities Act), sec-
tion 10b of the Securities Exchange Act of 19341 (Exchange Act),
rule 10b-51 promulgated thereunder, and the Utah Uniform
Securities Act.' The claim under the Utah Act was dropped, and
the case was submitted to the jury on the basis of section 10b and
rule 10b-5.8 The jury awarded $5,000 to each plaintiff, and Conk
appealed.
B. Peculiar Procedural Context
The importance of this case is considerably limited by the
unusual procedural context in which it arose. The issue of
scienter, which was the central question in the appellate court's
view, was not formally or substantially raised at the trial court
level, or even in the respective briefs of the parties. The appellant
did not submit a request to charge on scienter, nor did he take
timely and sufficient exception to any instruction which was rele-
vant to the issue.' At various points during the trial, counsel for
I Id. at 1352. The court noted that formulating the background facts in this case was
not an easy matter. Id. n.1.
I This factual determination was effectively lifted from the appellant's brief. The
appellee's brief suggests that the deception was not so much the result of statements at
these meetings but of manipulation of the capital of the corporation for the personal profit
of Conk and Stewart and to create a false and inflated appearance of actual cash invested
in the corporation. See Brief for Appellees, Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th Cir. 1975).
15 U.S.C. § 77q (1970).
5 Id. § 78j.
6 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1972).
' UTAH CODE ANN. §§ 61-1-1 to -30 (1953).
The court did not refer to the disposition, if any, of the claim under section 17a.
507 F.2d at 1363.
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appellant apparently urged the court to include an instruction on
scienter, but this suggestion was primarily an argument support-
ing appellant's contention that plaintiff's claim should be barred
by the shorter statute of limitations of the Securities Act.' After
appellant lost the statute of limitations argument, he did half-
heartedly pursue his scienter point, but failed to furnish any
request to charge except for a general statement after the instruc-
tions were given that "I would just have a general exception, your
Honor, as I indicated earlier, that I think there should have been
more scienter in the instruction as a whole, and I understand the
Court's position.""
The court, therefore, concluded that, no proper charge nor
timely exception having been taken, the judgment of the trial
court could be reversed only upon a showing of fundamental in-
justice.2
The court finally determined that, for two reasons, there was
no demonstration of fundamental injustice so as to compel rever-
sal of the trial court. First, the defendant must have acted with
some kind of conscious fault, recklessness, or knowledge other
than mere negligence. Second, the trial court's instruction did
include the language of the rule; and laymen, unlike lawyers,
could "sense" from this language, in context of the other instruc-
tions, that some kind of fault beyond mere carelessness must be
established."'
0Id.
I Id.
1 Id. at 1362.
" The instruction from which the jury was to "sense" the requirement of scienter was
as follows:
14. In order for you to find for any of the plaintiffs and against the
defendant Conk upon the federal claim, you must find by a preponderance
of the evidence each of the following enumerated elements:
1. That in connection with or in furtherance of the transaction
involving DeKater Corporation, there was use of some means or in-
strumentality of interstate commerce . ...
2. That the transaction involved the sale or purchase of a security
3. That in connection with the transaction, or in order to effect
or perpetuate it, the defendant Conk did any one or more of the
following:
a. Engaged in any device, scheme, or artifice to defraud
any or all of the plaintiffs, or
b. Made any untrue statements of material fact, or
1976
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C. Questions Presented
Three questions were dealt with in the case: (1) Does the 1-
year statute of limitations of section 13 of the Securities Act 4 or
the 3-year general fraud statute of limitations of Utah 5 apply to
implied rights of action under rule 10b-5 of the Exchange Act; (2)
to what degree, if any, must the plaintiffs demonstrate reliance
on the misrepresentations or omissions; and (3) to what extent,
if any, must the plaintiffs prove "scienter" on the part of the
defendant with respect to the misrepresentations or omissions?
These questions, although raised to some degree in the trial
court and in the briefs, were actually treated as one question by
the parties: What is the applicable statute of limitations? The
primary focus of the arguments with respect to scienter and reli-
ance was that the necessity to prove either of these elements (or
the lack thereof) required the application of one or the other
statutes of limitations."
It is, therefore, curious to find that the court dismissed the
statute of limitations question in one paragraph and spent the
bulk of its opinion on the question of scienter. It would appear
that the court found the issues raised by the parties to be of
negligible importance, but felt this was an opportune time to
attempt to clarify the Tenth Circuit's position on scienter in 10b-
5 cases.
c. Omitted to state any material fact necessary in order to
make any statement made, in light of the circumstances in
which they were made, not misleading.
4. That with regard to the misstatement of a material fact, such
misstatement was a substantial factor in the investment decision.
But with regard to the omission of a material fact, as distin-
guished from a misstatement, it is not necessary to plaintiff's recovery
for you to find that such omission was a substantial factor in plaintiff's
investment decision.
In general instructions the jury was told that "[an undisclosed mate-
rial fact is a fact which would have influenced a reasonable man to act
differently had he not been informed of the fact", that" 'material' or 'mate-
rial fact'" as I have used these terms means "of significance to a person in
exercising his investment judgment", and that "[the fact of reliance by a
plaintiff upon particular statements or omissions, if you find such to be the
fact, is persuasive evidence that the particular statement or omission relied
upon is material."
Id. at 1354-55 n.8 (editorial comments by the court omitted).
" 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
" UTAH CODE ANN. § 78-12-26(3) (1953).
IS 507 F.2d at 1363.
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1. Statute of Limitations
The court summarily disposed of the statute of limitations
question by declaring that the 3-year general fraud statute of
limitations of the state-and not the 1-year statute of limitations
of the Securities Act-governs implied rights of action under the
Exchange Act.
The court gave no reason for its conclusion but pointed out
quite correctly that the Tenth Circuit has, in at least five earlier
cases, 17 applied the state statute and the rule is, therefore, clearly
established in this circuit. It is perhaps unfortunate that the court
did not take the opportunity to elucidate the policy considera-
tions behind this rule by responding to the arguments raised by
the defendant-appellant at trial and in his brief. 8 It is, however,
apparent that the court found none of appellant's arguments suf-
ficiently challenging to encourage it to reconsider the rule on this
subject or even to discuss it. 9
', Richardson v. MacArthur, 451 F.2d 35 (10th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), cert. denied, 405
U.S. 918 (1972) (in consolidated case Reynolds v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co.); Esplin v.
Hirschi, 402 F.2d 94 (10th Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 928 (1969); Chiodo v. General
Waterworks Corp., 380 F.2d 860 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 389 U.S. 1004 (1967). See also
deHass v. Empire Petroleum Co., 435 F.2d 1223 (10th Cir. 1970). For a discussion of the
applicable statute of limitations in other jurisdictions see 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURmES LAW:
FRAUD § 2.5(2) (1967).
" 507 F.2d at 1353. Substantial trial time was consumed by the statute of limitations
and related issues, which included: (1) Had the question of the statute of limitations been
waived; (2) was motion to dismiss on the ground that the claims were barred timely; (3)
could the statute be considered since it was not pleaded as an affirmative defense; (4) was
the defendant guilty of sharp practice by delaying the pressing of this defense until the
opening of trial; (5) on the assumption that a 2-year state statute was applicable, could
plaintiffs successfully claim that they did not discover the alleged fraud until within 2
years of the commencement of their action when the complaint alleged that they had
discovered the fraud 1 month earlier; and (6) does the statute start running with the
discovery of some of the fraud if the greater part of its seriousness and circumstances are
discovered later.
1 Appellants argued that, since the general fraud statute of limitations of the states
within the Tenth Circuit range from 2 years (Kansas and Oklahoma) to 4 years (New
Mexico and Wyoming), the present rule which applies these statutes encourages forum
shopping and may result in unequal relief to federal claimants who bring like claims in
different jurisdictions. See Brief for Appellants at 29, Clegg v. Conk, 507 F.2d 1351 (10th
Cir. 1974).
It might also be argued that a state general fraud statute should not apply to lOb-5
actions since the Tenth Circuit has stated on many occasions that a lob-5 cause of action
will not be subject to common law fraud standards. See Kerbs v. Fall River Indus., Inc.,
502 F.2d 731 (10th Cir. 1974); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.),
cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Stevens v. Vowell, 343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965). But
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2. Reliance
In the trial court, references by counsel to reliance were ap-
parently made only to support their respective arguments relat-
ing to the proper statute of limitations. 0 The appellate court,
however, treated reliance and scienter, in a discussion which
often fails to distinguish between the two, as viable issues on
appeal. The court found that the instructions given by the trial
court on reliance met the rule of Affiliated Ute Citizens v. United
States, ' but the court then stated, in what is at least a
superficially paradoxical conclusion, that section 10b requires
"something more by way of reliance or causation in fact than
some abstract wrong expending its force entirely upon itself
'
1
2
and that this rule is compatible with Affiliated Ute.
The question then is whether the holding of Clegg actually
is consistent with Affiliated Ute. To answer this question, the
language of the court in the instant case must be analyzed and
contrasted with its disposition of the case. In an early part of its
decision, the court quoted with apparent agreement this crucial
language from Affiliated Ute.
"Under the circumstances of this case, involving primarily a
failure to disclose, positive proof of reliance is not a prerequisite to
recovery. All that is necessary is that the facts withheld be material
in the sense that a reasonable investor might have considered them
important in the making of this decision . . . This obligation to
disclose and this withholding of a material fact establish the requi-
site element of causation in fact." '
Commentators and the courts in most of the circuits have
taken this language to create a presumption of reliance in omis-
sion cases; that is, the plaintiff need only prove that a material
see Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 776 (D. Colo. 1964), where
the district court applied the general fraud statute of Colorado because "most acts viola-
tive of § 10(b) would be readily cognizable in Colorado as 'constructive fraud', or, indeed,
as traditional common law fraud."
507 F.2d at 1363.
2 406 U.S. 128 (1972). Affiliated Ute held that (at least on the facts of that case) no
reliance need be shown where there were material omissions by the defendants. The
defendants purchased restricted securities from relatively unsophisticated sellers without
telling them that the purchasers could immediately recall the securities at a substantial
profit. The Supreme Court may therefore have found that the sales surely would not have
occurred absent this crucial omission and that factual evidence of reliance was, therefore,
unnecessary.
507 F.2d at 1361.
507 F.2d at 1358, quoting 406 U.S. at 153-54.
VOL. 53
SECURITIES
omission has been made, and proof of this in itself establishes
reliance." This may suggest a shift to an objective substitute for
reliance. The question would then be whether the misrepresen-
tation or omission would have been significant to a reasonable
investor rather than whether it actually caused the purchase or
sale decision of the instant plaintiff."
The court in Clegg, despite quoting the above language of
Affiliated Ute, then interpreted Affiliated Ute so that an element
of reliance or causation" in some form remains.
Thus, Allen v. H. K. Porter Co. tends to put Stevens v. VoweU
in context by demonstrating that the broad language of the latter
does not mean necessarily that literal fulfillment of the three ele-
ments obviates the necessity of some proof of causation as well as
some species of scienter. It is somewhat ironical that this basic and
sound recognition is somewhat blurred by Affiliated Ute Citizens v.
U.S., supra, in its rejection of the requirement of proof of causation
beyond proof of materiality in the case of omissions to state facts
essential to render what was stated not misleading. But the implica-
tions of the Supreme Court's opinion [were] that the element of
causation in some form remained and that some degree of scienter
is requisite. 7
This interpretation of Affiliated Ute, which seems at odds
with the other interpretations of that case, is not entirely consis-
tent with what the court actually did in Clegg. The jury instruc-
2' See Chelsea Assoc.'s v. Rapanos, No. 74-2114 (6th Cir., Dec. 24, 1975); Shapiro v.
Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & Smith, Inc., 495 F.2d 228 (2d Cir. 1974); Rochez Bros. v.
Rhoades, 491 F.2d 402 (3rd Cir. 1973); SEC v. First Am. Bank & Trust Co., 481 F.2d 673
(8th Cir. 1973); Swanson v. American Consumers Indus. Inc., 475 F.2d 516 (7th Cir. 1973);
For other examples of recent decisions adopting a presumption in nondisclosure cases, see
Sirota v. Econo-Car Int'l, Inc., 61 F.R.D. 604, 606 (S.D.N.Y. 1974); Jenkins v. Fidelity
Bank, 365 F. Supp. 1391, 1398 (E.D. Pa. 1973); Reeder v. Mastercraft Elec. Corp., 363 F.
Supp. 574, 581 (S.D.N.Y. 1973); Hughes v. Dempsey-Tegeler & Co., [1973 Transfer
Binder] CCH FED. SEC. L. REP. 94,133 at 94,542 (C.D. Cal. 1973); Taylor v. Smith,
Barney & Co., 358 F. Supp. 892, 895-96 (D. Utah 1973); Note, The Reliance Requirement
in Private Actions under lOb-5, 88 HARV. L. REV. 584 (1975).
,1 The Tenth Circuit seems to have taken a stronger view on the necessity of reliance
in dictum in earlier cases. See, e.g., Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514, 517 (10th Cir. 1973) where the court said:
In these same decisions, Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulphur Co., 446 F.2d
90 (10th Cir.), and Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir.), we have
expressed the requirement that the plaintiff must also exercise good faith in
its purchase, due diligence, and demonstrate reliance on the acts or inaction
of the defendant.
" Reliance and causation are used interchangeably by most courts, including this
one. See 1 A. BROMBERG, SEcuRrrEs LAw: FRAUD §§ 4.7(555) at 86.13, 4.7(559)(4) at 86.39.
1 507 F.2d at 1359.
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tion on reliance, which was neither criticized nor challenged by
the appellate court and which the appellate court said was in
harmony with Affiliated Ute,25 expressly and clearly did not re-
quire that reliance be established where the conduct in question
was an omission of material fact.2 The problem, perhaps, is that
the Tenth Circuit does not clearly distinguish between misrepre-
sentations, where reliance must be demonstrated, and omissions,
where it may be sufficient to infer reliance or simply dispense
with it altogether provided that the omitted facts were suffi-
ciently material. It is, after all, difficult to prove a hypothetical
negative, i.e., that plaintiff would not have purchased or sold the
securities if defendant had not omitted to tell him all the material
facts.
3. Scienter
Scienter, which was largely ignored by the parties and by the
trial court, was the issue to which the appellate court devoted
virtually its entire opinion. However, instead of analyzing the
reasoning behind its scienter rule, the opinion was devoted to a
not altogether convincing effort to show that the Tenth Circuit
position on scienter has been consistent; the court concluded that
there is a "strong strand of consistency and reason running
through the decisions of this court on the subject under discussion
beginning with Stevens v. VowelU which is readily discerned when
viewed as a whole,"30 and that the "strong strand of consistency"
is that "there is required something additional by way of scienter
or conscious fault than mere negligence." '31
The basic problem with this conclusion is that it was reached
in a factual vacuum.32 The court said that mere negligence is not
enough to establish a case under 10b-5, but negligent conduct was
507 F.2d at 1355.
" For the instruction on reliance, see note 13 supra.
507 F.2d at 1361.
31 Id.
32 The court did not consider the factual settings in its discussions of the other Tenth
Circuit opinions, dismissing them in a footnote with this language:
We have been able to cover only the major thrusts of the opinions with
reference to these limited aspects and with little reference to the circumstan-
ces individually involved . . . . We have not been concerned here with bur-
den of proof, criminal cases, expressly authorized causes of action, enforce-
ment proceedings as distinguished from private civil actions, nor with other
unraised problems in this complicated field.
Id. n.13.
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not the question before it. The court specifically declared that the
conduct of this defendant was "necessarily pursued knowingly
and intentionally and with purpose to mislead. ' 3 This unfortun-
ately is exactly what the Tenth Circuit (and in fairness, be it
noted, many other courts) have done time and again. An attempt
is made to define a 10b-5 scienter rule broad enough to cover all
cases when the case before the court can be decided on a much
narrower and more precise basis. The result is cloudy dictum that
does little to assist either courts or parties in applying the rule to
subsequent cases.
A second problem with the court's conclusion that something
more than mere negligence must be established is that it does not
follow from the language of Gilbert v. Nixon 3 and Mitchell v.
Texas Gulf Sulfur Co. ,5 which the court cited as authority.
The Gilbert court said:
One is not to be held liable, because of his misleading misrepre-
sentation or omission of material fact, the truth of the matter being
unknown to the purchaser, if the party responsible for the misrepre-
sentation or omission sustains the burden of proving that he did not
know, and in the exercise of reasonable care could not have known
that it was a misrepresentation or omission."
The language of the Mitchell court was:
Confronted with the abundance of evidence in the record, we
cannot conclude that TGS sustained its burden of proving that it
did not know of the misrepresentation, nor was it demonstrated that
with due diligence TGS could not have known of the faultiness of
the statement.
37
Two conclusions may be drawn from this language: (1) The
burden of proving scienter is not on the plaintiff since the defen-
dant must prove lack of scienter; and (2) negligent conduct is
actionable under 10b-5, since a defendant cannot sustain his bur-
den of proof if he is negligent, that is, if he cannot demonstrate
the exercise of reasonable care or due diligence.
Opposite conclusions were set forth in dictum by the Clegg
court. The court clearly said that negligent conduct alone is not
actionable; and, although the court did not expressly determine
Id. at 1362.
429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
15 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir. 1971).
429 F.2d at 357.
446 F.2d at 102.
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which party has the burden of proof, it would seem to follow that
scienter must be established by the plaintiff since scienter is an
essential element of a 10b-5 cause of action.
To the writers it appears that the Clegg court unnecessarily
undertook to clarify the Tenth Circuit's position on scienter and
to demonstrate that the emerging rule is compatible with earlier
cases. It is submitted that the Clegg opinion is not altogether
successful in either endeavor and, moreover, that the conclu-
sion-that mere negligence can never create 10b-5 liability-may
not be a satisfactory rule.
The Clegg decision will inevitably require reconsideration or
at least reiteration in a case where the scienter requirement can
be met only if the court considers the negligent conduct of the
defendant. In this event, the writers suggest the issue might most
constructively be viewed from the following perspectives, which
have been used by commentators and other courts. A considera-
tion from these perspectives can give the bar and the courts a
legal framework in which future scienter problems may be more
carefully and usefully analyzed.
II. PERSPECTIVES ON SCIENTER
A. Language Perspective
Section 10(b) of the Exchange Act provides as follows:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly or indirectly, by the
use of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or of the
mails, or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(b) To use or employ, in connection with the purchase or sale
of any security not so registered, any manipulative or deceptive
device or contrivance in contravention of such rules and regulations
as the Commission may prescribe as necessary or appropriate in the
public interest or for the protection of investors. 8
Rule 10b-5 promulgated pursuant to section 10(b) is:
It shall be unlawful for any person, directly, or indirectly, by the use
of any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce, or of the
mails or of any facility of any national securities exchange,
(a) To employ any devise, scheme, or artifice to defraud,
(b) To make any untrue statement of a material fact, or to omit
to state a material fact necessary in order to make the statements
-15 U.S.C. § 78 (1964).
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made, in the light of the circumstances under which they were
made, not misleading, or
(c) To engage in any act, practice or course of business which
operates or would operate as a fraud or deceit upon any person in
connection with the purchase or sale of any security"
The Clegg court, in justifying its refusal to overturn the trial
court's judgment, said that a layman would read the language of
rule 10b-5 to require a showing of some kind of fault beyond mere
carelessness.40 The view of the commentators, who are expressing
a legal analysis rather than a layman's probable reaction, how-
ever, is that the language of rule 10b-5 does not necessarily re-
quire an element of scienter in misrepresentation or partial omis-
sion cases actionable under 10b-5 of the rule." This view suggests
that, while intention may be necessary to demonstrate the fraud-
ulent or deceitful conduct described by 10b-5(a) and (c), it may
not be an essential element of 10b-5(b), which prohibits the mere
making of an untrue statement or the omission to state a material
fact which would make the statement made in light of the cir-
cumstances not misleading.42 Thus, they would reason that, in
the Clegg case, some form of scienter would be required to make
the material omissions actionable under 10b-5(a) and (c), but
would not be essential to make the material misstatements and
half-truths actionable under 10b-5(b). Courts, however, have gen-
erally avoided this language analysis, no doubt because it is not
always clear that any given conduct falls exclusively within any
one of the three categories.
4 3
B. Reconciliation Perspective
The primary reason that courts have had difficulty determin-
17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1968).
, 507 F.2d at 1362.
See I A. JACOBS, THE IMPACT OF RULE 10b-5 § 13, at 1-183 (1st ed. 1974); 3 L. Loss,
SECURITIES REGULATION 1442 (2d ed. 1961); Note, Proof of Scienter Necessary in a Private
Suit Under SEC Anti-Fraud Rule l0b-5, 63 MICH. L. REV. 1070, 1075 (1965); Comment,
Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV. 824, 826 (1965).
'" See note 41 supra. It has been argued, however, that, if the rule does not require
scienter, the rule is broader than the statute, which does require some form of intent. See
1 A. JACOBS, supra note 41, § 13, at 1-183 to -184. The argument was mentioned, but not
dealt with, by the Tenth Circuit in Financial Indus. Fund, Inc. v. McDonnell Douglas
Corp., 474 F.2d 514 (10th Cir. 1973). See also Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228
F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo. 1964).
'" See 1 A. JACOBS, supra note 41, § 63, at 3-138; Comment, Negligent Misrepresen-
tations Under Rule iob-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REv. 824, 827 (1965). A material misstatement,
for example, might come within all three sections.
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ing whether or not scienter is a required element of rule 10b-5 is
their attempt to rationalize the remedy under section 12(2) of the
Securities Act44 with that of rule 10b-5.45 Section 12(2) provides
an express remedy for defrauded buyers as follows:
Any person who offers or sells a security (whether or not ex-
empted by the provisions of section 3, other than paragraph (2) of
subsection (a) thereof), by the use of any means or instruments of
transportation or communication in interstate commerce or of the
mails, by means of a prospectus or oral communication, which in-
cludes an untrue statement of a material fact or omits to state a
material fact necessary in order to make the statements, in the light
of the circumstances under which they were made, not misleading
(the purchaser not knowing of such untruth or omission), and who
shall not sustain the burden of proof that he did not know, and in
the exercise of reasonable care could not have known, of such un-
truth or omission, shall be liable to the person purchasing such
security from him, who may sue either at law or in equity in any
court of competent jurisdiction, to recover the consideration paid for
such security with interest thereon, less the amount of any income
received thereon, upon the tender of such security, or for damages
if he no longer owns the security."
Section 12(2) provides a remedy for conduct which is also
actionable under rule 10b-5, a not remarkable coincidence since
the language of rule 10b-5 is virtually identical to that of section
12(2)."7 Unlike 10b-5 the substantive and procedural elements of
section 12(2) are expressly prescribed. While a buyer need not
prove scienter49 or reliance,o he must be in privity with his seller,"'
must bring his suit within 1 year after the misstatement was or
should have been discovered or in any case 3 years after the sale, 2
and may be required to post a security bond.5 3 Since actions
4 15 U.S.C. § 781 (1970).
" See Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970); Trussell v. United Underwri-
ters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757, 770 (D. Colo. 1964); Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations
Under Rule lOb-5, 32 U. CI. L. REv. 824, 827 (1965).
" 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
17 See text accompanying note 39 supra.
11 Because the civil remedy under 10b-5 arose by implication in Kardon v. National
Gypsum Co., 69 F. Supp. 512 (E.D. Pa. 1946), there are no express elements of the rule
delineated either in the statute or in the rule itself.
ig 15 U.S.C. § 771(2) (1970).
I Id.
Id.
' 48 Stat. 74 (1933), as amended, 15 U.S.C. § 77m (1970).
53 Id.
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under 10b-5 are not subject to the shorter period of limitations54
and since privity need not be established," courts fear that should
they further liberalize 10b-5 by eliminating the requirements of
reliance and scienter, they will effectively write section 12(2) out
of the Securities Act.5" Although this argument is not made by the
Clegg court, the result of the decision is to differentiate the two
remedies by requiring that the plaintiff in a 10b-5 action demon-
strate something more than mere negligence while the plaintiff in
a section 12(2) action need not plead nor prove any degree of
scienter.
C. Policy Prospective
If the sole policy goals of the federal securities laws are-as
some argue-to protect the investor, to maintain integrity and
honesty in the securities market, and to curb unnecessary, un-
wise, and destructive speculation,57 then scienter should be elimi-
nated, because these goals can best be served by punishing all
material misrepresentations and omissions regardless of the in-
tent of the defendant. However, another relevant policy consid-
eration is fairness to the individual investor who innocently
makes a material misrepresentation or omission and, thereby,
with the elimination of privity, is subject to suit from all potential
purchasers and sellers of that stock.59 The policy goals of the
11 1 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 2.5(1), at 41-42 (1974).
5 1 A. JACOBS. supra note 41, § 62, at 3-126 to -128.
' The court in Trussell v. United Underwriters, Ltd., 228 F. Supp. 757 (D. Colo.
1964), quoted the following reasoning of Judge Kirkpatrick in Rosenberg v. Globe Aircraft
Corp., 80 F. Supp. 123, 124-25 (E.D. Pa. 1948):
It cannot be supposed that Congress intended to abolish these regulations
and limitations [coupled to a § 11, § 12(1) or § 12(2) actionl when it enacted
Sec. 10 of the Act of 1934. By any reasonable rule of statutory interpretation,
it would require either an express repeal or an implication of repeal so strong
as to be inescapable. The two Acts are unquestionably in pari materia and
must be construed together to make a consistent whole. Looking at them as
one statute it is simply not possible that Congress, having prescribed in
elaborate detail procedural requirements which must be fulfilled in order to
enforce civil liability attaching to a carefully defined type of violation, would
have casually nullified them all in a later section.
228 F. Supp. at 770.
57 See Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
824, 829 (1965).
:1 Id. at 830.
1 Concern with the potential of tremendous liability under the Securities Exchange
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securities laws can be substantially served, without resulting in
undue unfairness, by requiring that the defendant act with some
degree of fault such as negligence, recklessness, or intent. The
Clegg court never expressly mentioned policy considerations, but
potential unfairness to the defendant was no doubt in the court's
mind when it required some showing of conscious fault greater
than mere negligence. In so doing, it may be argued, the court
gave too much weight to potential unfairness to the investor who
may be sued and not enough to the interest of the investor who
may be misled.
III. BEYOND CLEGG V. CONK
A. Burden of Proof
One result of requiring that something additional by way of
scienter or conscious fault be established in 10(b) actions may be
that the burden of proving scienter or conscious fault is now on
the plaintiff.60 Although this would align the Tenth Circuit with
most of the other courts and the commentators,"' it does represent
a departure from the recent past wherein the burden of proving
lack of scienter was on the defendent.2
B. Reliance or Causation in Fact
Clegg takes a position on reliance which the court said is
compatible with Affiliated Ute and which indeed seems to be
compatible." Based on the instructions given at trial, Clegg
Act may have been an implicit consideration of the Supreme Court in United Housing
Foundation, Inc. v. Forman, 95 S. Ct. 2051 (1975), and Blue Chip Stamps v. Manor Drug
Stores, 95 S. Ct. 1917 (1975), where the application of the securities law was restricted.
See also Comment, Negligent Misrepresentations Under Rule 10b-5, 32 U. CHI. L. REV.
824, 834-35 (1965), which urges that this potential liability might have an in terrorem
effect on the conscientious investor, causing him to refrain from investing, which would
place an unhealthy restriction on the volume of securities transactions.
" But see 507 F.2d at 1362:
The latter [state general fraud statutes of limitations] are more adaptable
to the remedial purposes of implied rights of action under Section 10(b),
despite the seemingly paradoxical adoption in special circumstances of the
burden of proof provisions of the 1933 Act in furtherance of the remedial
purposes of the 1934 Act (footnotes omitted).
" See 2 A. BROMBERG, SECURITIES LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4(506), at 204.109 (1974); E.
GADSBY, BUSINESS ORGANIZATIONS-FEDERAL SECURITIES EXCHANGE ACT OF 1934 §
5.03[1j[dj, at 5-32 (1970).
6 See Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404
U.S. 1004 (1971); Gilbert v. Nixon, 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
' See text accompanying notes 20-29 supra.
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stands for the proposition that actual reliance must be shown by
the plaintiff in a case involving a misstatement, but that in the
case of an omission no reliance is necessary, only a showing of
materiality. Second, the Clegg court suggested in a footnote that
the "over-strained and super-annuated" workhorse, "reliance,"
be put to pasture and succeeded by its more adaptable offspring,
"causation in fact.""4 Hickman v. Groesbeck,5 a recent case in
the Utah District Court, interpreted this language broadly by
stating that Clegg requires not only reliance in making the pur-
chase or sale but a causative relationship between such reliance
and damages suffered."0 It does not appear that any direct lan-
guage in Clegg supports such an interpretation, nor does the lan-
guage of Hickman seem to be more than dictum in that case.
However, if Hickman represents any kind of a trend, the Tenth
Circuit will no doubt soon have occasion to review the concept of
reliance or "causation in fact" in greater depth.
" 507 F.2d at 1361 n.14.
, 389 F. Supp. 769 (D. Utah 1974).
" Causation is an essential element of any tort action. Properly consid-
ered, it has two elements: cause in fact and proximate cause. Cause in fact
embraces both positive acts and passive conditions which have so contrib-
uted to the result that without them it would not have occurred. Cause in
fact is often expressed as the "but for" test, and courts have felt a need to
limit the "but for" test in its application. Materiality has often been a
limiting factor in this test, and, as such, the test can be stated in broader
terms as: "The defendant's conduct is a cause of the event if it was a material
element and a substantial factor in bringing it about." W. Prosser, Law of
Torts 240 (4th ed. 1971). "Under Rule 10b-5, the materiality and reliance
requirements are best classified as cause in fact elements." Cobine, supra
Note 9, at 656.
Proximate cause is a far more complex question because it involves
questions of legal policy. "It has been suggested that the question of proxi-
mate cause is not really a question of causation at all, but rather a question
of whether the defendant was under a duty to the plaintiff, or whether
defendant's duty required him to protect plaintiff from the event which did
in fact occur." Cobine, supra, Note 9 at 653. The proximate cause or duty
question is answered in 10b-5 litigation by the rule itself: The defendant
should not commit any of the acts proscribed in the rule in connection with
the purchase or sale of any security.
Cause in fact and proximate cause (duty) are not new concepts in tort
analysis. Both cause in fact and duty must be determined in each case. A
tort analysis approach which stresses either one cannot properly decide a
case at the total exculsion of the other.
Id. at 778 n.18.
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C. Defining Scienter or Conscious Fault
Albeit by way of dictum, Clegg does clarify the Tenth Cir-
cuit's position on scienter by stating that there must be estab-
lished "something additional by way of scienter or conscious fault
than mere negligence" "-something like "scienter, conscious
fault, intention or recklessness." 8 Prior Tenth Circuit cases cited
with favor by the Clegg court and further dictum in the Clegg
opinion give some helpful definitional interpretation to this oth-
erwise vague requirement. First, one consistent declaration of the
Tenth Circuit cases, 9 which is reaffirmed by Clegg, is that 10b-5
is not the equivalent of common law fraud.
The emphasis in Stevens v. Vowell of the necessity of a flexible
interpretation of the security laws to cover all conduct, schemes and
contrivances within its scope independently of the rigid require-
ments of common law fraud has been often quoted. We reaffirm that
essential principle as it constitutes the hallmark, genius and
strength of modern securities legislation."'
Therefore, conscious fault includes something less than the intent
requirement described in common law fraud cases.
Further, dicta in the Clegg opinion may be read as indicating
that the conscious fault standard will vary depending upon the
circumstances of particular cases.
In determining how much more, or the existence of other required
elements in view of the circumstances of particular cases, there must
be kept constantly in mind the teaching of Stevens v. Vowell that
the federal securities acts are not frozen into the old common law
patterns; and that they must be interpreted flexibly and progres-
sively, not technically nor grudgingly, to fairly effectuate their reme-
dial purpose. Thus this court has consistently resisted and sur-
mounted common law obstacles against relief from schemes, artif-
ices, and courses of conduct where conscious fault designed to cause
damages to either buyers or sellers of securities has been perceiva-
ble. "Nor has this court attempted to specify what forms of decep-
tion are prohibited; rather we have held that 'all fraudulent schemes
in connection with the purchase and sale of securities are prohib-
ited.' " Allen v. Porter, 452 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971), supra. But this
court has repeatedly declined to extend the acts to cases of simple
7 507 F.2d at 1361.
' Id. at 1362.
Allen v. H.K. Porter Co., 452 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1971); Mitchell v. Texas Gulf
Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d 90 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971); Stevens v. Vowell,
343 F.2d 374 (10th Cir. 1965).
10 507 F.2d at 1355.
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negligence not involving some fraudulent purpose or species of scien-
ter within their scope and purpose.
7 '
Assuming that the Tenth Circuit is receptive to a shifting
scienter standard, the problem would be to define the factors
which will vary the degree of scienter required in a particular
case. The Ninth Circuit in White v. Abrams,7" in substituting a
duty analysis for the scienter requirement, outlined five elements
to be taken into account in determining the degree of duty that
a defendant might have to a potential plaintiff:
(1) The relationship of the defendant to the plaintiff;
(2) the defendant's access to the information as compared to the
plaintiff;
(3) the benefit that the defendant derives from the relationship;
(4) the defendant's awareness of whether the plaintiff was relying
upon their relationship in making his investment decision and;
(5) the defendant's activity in initiating the securities transaction
in question."
Professor Bromberg suggested other possible considerations:
A comprehensive scienter standard would have to fit the enormous
variation of 10b-5 private suits, including
(1) Whether the violation is misrepresentation, nondisclosure or
some more complex scheme or manipulation;
(2) Whether there is privity, a lesser relationship (such as aiding-
abetting or conspiracy) or no privity. at all (as in insider trading
cases); in the parlance of this text, whether the transactions are
direct or indirect, personal or impersonal;
(3) Whether there is one plaintiff or thousands;
(4) Whether there is some special relationship between the parties,
such as fiduciary-beneficiary or broker-customer;
(5) Whether the relief sought is damages, rescission, injunction or
something else.74
Although Clegg can, of course, not be interpreted as adopting
any version of the duty analysis suggested by White v. Abrams,75
that court's approach could be useful in defining the varying
standard of scienter that may now be law in the Tenth Circuit.
That is, the type of scienter required to establish liability could
71 Id. at 1361-62.
72 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974).
7' Id. at 735-36.
7, 2 A. BROMBERG, SECU~rrEs LAW: FRAUD, § 8.4 (513) at 204.115 (1974).
" 495 F.2d 724 (9th Cir. 1974). But cf. Mitchell v. Texas Gulf Sulfur Co., 446 F.2d
90, 100 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 404 U.S. 1004 (1971), where the court seemed to be
suggesting a duty analysis.
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vary depending on certain relevant factors such as those identi-
fied in White and by Professor Bromberg. For example, to meet
such a flexible scienter standard, a plaintiff in an agency relation
to the defendant need only prove gross negligence, while a plain-
tiff dealing with the defendant in an arm's length transaction
must establish actual knowledge.76
However, the Clegg court, while urging flexibility in inter-
preting the securities laws,77 significantly limited its flexibility by
expressly requiring something more than simple negligence for a
finding of liability-a requirement which is at variance with both
dicta and holdings in earlier cases, regardless of the court's insist-
ence on its underlying "strand of consistency."" For example, in
Gilbert v. Nixon79 the defendant was dealing with the plaintiff-
buyers through an intermediary. Plaintiffs sued on the theory
that the defendant violated 10b-5 because he failed to discover
the correct depth of a dry hole when he should have known that
the reported depth was incorrect but did not. Although the trial
court found that the defendant had in general met his burden of
proving that he exercised due care, the appellate court remanded
for a specific finding that the defendant exercised due care in this
specific representation even though he had no reason to doubt the
accuracy of the information on which the representation was
made. Under the new standard of scienter, the court would not
have the flexibility to make this decision.
Further, it is not clear from the Clegg opinion that a court
might find scienter where there is recklessness or gross negligence.
Although the court seemed to refer in passing to recklessness as
a species of scienter, 0 in a prior footnote" the court had suggested
, See generally Mann, Rule 10b-5: Evolution of a Continuum of Conduct to Replace
the Catch Phrases of Negligence and Scienter, 45 N.Y.U.L. REV. 1206 (1970). For a recent
case which applies the flexible duty standard, see Eichen v. E.F. Hutton & Co., (S.D. Cal.,
Sept. 2, 1975), BNA SEC. L. REP., No. 319 at A-8 to A-9.
" 507 F.2d at 1361.
" Id. See text accompanying notes 34-37 supra.
79 429 F.2d 348 (10th Cir. 1970).
See 507 F.2d at 1362.
9 Perhaps part of the difficulty with the elements of "scienter" and "reli-
ance" in application stems from the words themselves rather than broad
concepts. From the common law these words have been transported by name
into an environment inhospitable to at least part of what they meant in their
old one. It may be that "reliance" and "scienter" at length will have carried
the load long enough in the securities context so that as faithful but over-
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that scienter should be put to rest and succeeded by "conscious
fault." Does "conscious fault" include recklessness or does it sug-
gest actual knowledge? The better view is that the court's strong
predeliction for flexibility would define conscious fault as includ-
ing the kind of constructive knowledge present in cases of reck-
lessness or gross negligence.
In clarifying whether scienter includes gross or simple negli-
gence, a court must face close and difficult questions: Should the
securities laws provide a remedy against an agent or other fidu-
ciary who fails to meet a high duty of care, or should the securities
laws be limited to legitimate areas of federal concern, prescribing
sanctions for deceptive behavior and leaving violations of trust to
state common law principles?
The Tenth Circuit may well find that it is brash to attempt
to answer such questions adequately in a factual vacuum. It may
be soon enough to answer when a proper case requires a holding
on simple negligence. Until then we suspect that Clegg may not
be the final word on scienter in the Tenth Circuit.
CONCLUSION
In summary, Clegg adds nothing new to Tenth Circuit law
on the applicable statute of limitations or on reliance in 10b-5
cases. It does seem to change the burden of proof from the de-
fendant to the plaintiff, requiring the plaintiff to prove that the
defendant acted with scienter. Finally, Clegg does attempt to
explain, justify, and clarify at some length the scienter standard
in the Tenth Circuit. Its conclusion is that such standard must
stop some place short of simple negligence. This statement is,
however, only dictum and may prove to be no more final than the
gratuitous dictum set forth in so many other 10b-5 cases.
strained and superannuated work horses they may be put out to pasture
while their more adaptable offspring "causation in fact", Affiliated Ute Citi-
zens v. United States, 406 U.S. 128, 154 (1972), and "conscious fault", take
up the burden except for limited services in more suitable fields.
Id. at 1361 n.14.
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PROMISSORY NOTES AND THE SECURITIES ACTS
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974)
Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July
30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication)
By JOHN L. TRAYLOR*
For a number of years, federal courts have extended the ap-
plication of the federal securities laws and the remedies afforded
thereunder to an increasing number of subtle and innovative in-
vestment schemes.' Most recently the federal courts have con-
fronted the issue of whether promissory notes are securities within
the meaning and purpose of the Securities Act of 1933 and the
Securities Exchange Act of 1934.1 Most of these courts have con-
cluded that the application of the acts depends upon a characteri-
zation of the instrument as commercial or investment-a distinc-
tion which is often difficult to make in the varied transactional
facts encountered in securities litigation. The Tenth Circuit
Court of Appeals has now joined in the effort to define when a
promissory note is or is not a security. In one case the court
concluded that the promissory notes were indeed securities sub-
ject to the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act;4 in another
case the court found that the note was not a security.'
The plaintiff in Zabriskie v. Lewis6 alleged violations of rule
10b-57 and the Utah Blue Sky Law8 in connection with an invest-
ment and financing arrangement involving the defendant's prom-
issory notes. The plaintiff had engaged a real estate agent to
locate investment properties. The agent's supervisor arranged a
* Associate, Rovira, Demuth & Eiberger, Denver, Colorado; B.A., 1968, Northwest-
ern University; M.A., 1972, Northwestern University; J.D., 1974, University of Denver
College of Law.
See, e.g., SEC v. W.J. Howey Co., 328 U.S. 293 (1946); SEC v. Glenn W. Turner
Enterprises, Inc., 474 F.2d 476 (9th Cir. 1973); Hart & Homer, Some Credit Aspects of
Unconventional Securities, 25 MERCER L. REV. 395 (1974).
2 15 U.S.C. § 77a-77aa (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Securities Act].
Id. §§ 78a-78jj (1970) [hereinafter cited as the Exchange Act].
Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publica-
tion).
a 507 F.2d 546 (10th Cir. 1974).
7 17 C.F.R. § 240.10b-5 (1975).
' UTAH CODE ANN. § 61-1-1 (1968).
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meeting with the plaintiff to discuss a proposal of loaning money
to a John Worthen to be used to promote Dax Corporation, which,
according to the supervisor, "was to be one of the greatest stock
developments that he had ever heard of."9 The plaintiff agreed
to the proposal and loaned $15,000 to Worthen in exchange for a
short-term 2-month promissory note signed by Worthen for
$17,250 including interest. As security for the note, plaintiff was
given a stock certificate of 1,000,000 shares of Computer Parking
Systems, Inc. and a hypothecation agreement covering the
shares. Ten days later, the plaintiff loaned Worthen an additional
$7,000 and received a short-term promissory note for $8,400 from
J.E.W., Inc., Worthen's closely-held corporation. This note was
secured by the assignment of another note of $12,500 issued by
Pacific Flight Support, Inc. to J.E.W., Inc.
The notes were not paid when due, although the plaintiff did
receive $3,500 in part payment. The plaintiff then attempted to
collect on the collateral, but she discovered that the Computer
stock was non-negotiable and that Pacific Flight was no longer in
business. She, therefore, filed suit against the real estate agent
and his supervisor, contending that they had induced her to loan
money to J.E.W., Inc. through fraud and misrepresentations;,"
she recovered judgment in the amount of $26,373.39. On appeal
the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
The appellants contended that the notes should not be
deemed to be securities for two reasons. In the first place, they
argued that the definition of a security in the Exchange Act ex-
cludes short-term notes" and that the notes in issue were, there-
fore, statutorily excepted from rule 10b-5. The Tenth Circuit con-
cluded, as have other circuits, that the exclusion applies only to
"prime quality negotiable commercial paper' '1 3 and not to invest-
ment paper such as the notes in issue. The appellants also argued
that the notes should not be deemed to be securities by definition
"because they are not the type of notes Congress intended federal
securities law to regulate."' 4 Citing decisions from the Second,'"
507 F.2d at 548.
Id. at 549.
§ 3(a)(10), 15 U.S.C. § 78c(a)(10) (1970).
" See notes 41-46 and accompanying text infra.
' 507 F.2d at 550.
Id.
' Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S. 908
(1973).
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Third, 6 and Fifth" Circuits, the court acknowledged that "not all
notes are included within the protection of the anti-fraud provi-
sions""8 of the securities laws and implicitly adopted the now-
familiar test of placing notes of a commercial character beyond
the definition of a security while placing notes of an investment
character within the definition." On the basis of this distinction
and aided by the fact that shares of stock had been pledged as
security in one transaction, the court concluded that the defen-
dant's promissory notes had been given to obtain investment cap-
ital to promote a corporation and that they were, therefore, secur-
ities. Furthermore, these notes were sold within the meaning of
rule 10b-5 since they were "disposed of" for value.'" "[T]he issu-
ance of a note which is the formal equivalent of the issuance of
shares of stock would be covered by the Act."'"
In the second case, Barrow v. Ellingson,22 the plaintiffs, as
owners of stock in American Western Life Insurance Company
(American), brought consolidated class and derivative actions
against American, American Western Marketing Company (Mar-
keting), and others asserting violations of section 10b and rule
10b-5 of the Exchange Act on the basis that the promissory note
involved in this transaction constituted a security.
American, a company engaged in the life insurance business,
had entered into an agreement with Marketing, a company en-
gaged in recruiting, training, and management of insurance
agents. Marketing agreed to furnish insurance agents to Ameri-
can, who in return agreed to compensate Marketing for its serv-
ices. Marketing also agreed to guarantee to pay American any
advances due it from agents who defaulted and who had been
provided by Marketing. This agreement was subsequently
amended after American had advanced funds to some agents who
were later terminated before repaying these funds to American.
Because American claimed that Marketing was the guarantor of
such advances, Marketing agreed, inter alia, to execute a note in
" Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973).
" McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975).
507 F.2d at 550.
"Id. at 551.
Id. at 552.
21 Id., quoting McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 352 F. Supp. 454, 460 (N.D. Tex. 1973).
No. 74-1735 (10th Cir., July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication).
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favor of American in the amount of $195,620 which represented
those funds advanced to agents which were uncollectable. Ameri-
can also waived any claim it had against Marketing for repay-
ment of the advances.
The plaintiff shareholders contended that their stock suf-
fered a diminution in value as a result of these transactions and
that the "single integrated transaction" of the agreement, the
amendment, and the note constituted the sale and purchase of a
security. The District Court for the District of Utah dismissed
their action, holding that the note was not a security based upon
the distinction between the commercial and investment charac-
ter of instruments." On appeal, the Tenth Circuit affirmed.
In adopting a context-over-text approach to the issue, the
court found that "[tihis transaction, although possibly within
the 'letter' of the statute, was not within the statute because it
was not within its 'spirit' or 'the intention of its makers.' ",24 The
financial and business context of this transaction demonstrated
that the amendment and note had been executed to settle an
obligation "arising out of a continuing business relationship over
a number of years." 5 The transaction, therefore, represented a
commercial rather than an investment venture.
The decisions in Zabriskie and Barrow provide useful coun-
terpoints to illustrate the distinction other circuits have been
attempting to make in defining when a promissory note is or is
not a security. The critical factor in analyzing the application of
the securities acts is the factual context of the transaction as
opposed to the seemingly literal meaning of the federal statutes. 6
Promissory notes are treated somewhat differently in the
Securities Act than in the Exchange Act. Section 2(1) of the
Securities Act provides: "When used in this subchapter, unless
the context otherwise requires, the term 'security' means any
note." But section 3(a)(3) of that Act provides the following
exemption from registration and prospectus requirements for
some short-term notes:
I d. at 5.
24 Id. at 12.
,5 Id. at 5.
26 See, Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of 'Security' Under Securities
Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note? 52 NEB. L. REV. 478 (1973).
-15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970).
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Except as hereinafter expressly provided, the provisions of this
title shall not apply to any of the following classes of secutities:
Any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which
arises out of a current transaction or the proceeds of which have been
or are to be used for current transactions, and which has a maturity
at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months, exclusive of
days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of which is like-
wise limited.28
However, section 12(2) provides that this exemption is in-
applicable with respect to the anti-fraud provisions of the Securi-
ties Act.2
On the other hand, the Exchange Act by definition rather
than by separate exemption excludes similar short-term notes
from application of its provisions, principally by the anti-fraud
constraints of section 10b and rule 10b-5:
When used in this chapter, unless the context otherwise requires:
The term "security" means any note ... but shall not include...
any note, draft, bill of exchange, or banker's acceptance which has
a maturity at the time of issuance of not exceeding nine months,
exclusive of days of grace, or any renewal thereof the maturity of
which is likewise limited."
Based upon this configuration of language, the Second and Sev-
enth Circuits recognized that, while such notes may be excluded
by definition from the anti-fraud provisions of the Exchange Act,
they would not be similarly exempted from the anti-fraud provi-
sions of the Securities Act.
3'
In attempting to provide some guidelines for application of
the exemption provisions for short-term notes in the Securities
Act, the SEC issued the following interpretative release in 1961:
The legislative history of the act makes it clear that section
3(a)(3) applies only to prime quality negotiable paper of a type not
28 Id. § 77c(a)(3).
11 Id. § 771(2).
3 Id. § 78c(a)(10). In addition to section 10b and rule lOb-5, such notes would also
be excluded from the anti-fraud provisions of section 15(c)(i), id. § 78o(c)(1), and section
20, id. § 78t; from the provision in section 15(a)(1) for registration of brokers and dealers,
id. § 78o(aJ(1); from section 18, id. § 78r, imposing liability for misleading statements;
and from sections 17 and 21, id. §§ 78q, 78u, conferring investigative and prosecutorial
powers on the Commission.
31 Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1078 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972). See, Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued
by Bank Holding Companies, 29 Bus. LAW. 207, 212-14 (1973).
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ordinarily purchased by the general public, that is, paper used to
facilitate well recognized types of current operational business re-
quirements and of a type eligible for discounting by Federal Reserve
Banks."
One aspect of that legislative history further clarifies the
purpose and intent of the short-term note exemption:
The [Federal Reserve] Board had urged the exemption under sec-
tion 3(a)(3) because it believed that the proposed act was intended
to apply only to stocks, bonds, debentures, and other similar securi-
ties of the kind commonly known as investment securities, which are
issued for the purpose of obtaining capital funds for business enter-
prises and are purchased by persons for investment . . . . [The
Act] was not intended to apply . . . to short-term paper issued for
the purpose of obtaining funds for current transactions in commerce,
industry, or agriculture and purchased by banks and corporations
as a means of employing temporarily idle funds.
3
1
It has been suggested that this interpretation of the exemption in
the Securities Act is equally applicable to the exclusion contained
in the Exchange Act. 4
3 SEC Release No. 33-4412, 17 C.F.R. § 231.4412 (1961). The justification for recog-
nizing an exemption in the Securities Act and an exclusion in the Exchange Act for short-
term commercial paper is suggested by the commercial context in which this paper was
historically used at the time the Acts were drafted:
Funds received from the issuance of commercial paper have traditionally
been used to finance current operational business expenditures of a well-
defined seasonal or periodic nature. The underlying theory is that during the
short period from the date of the paper's issuance to its maturity [1-9
months], the borrower will complete a cycle in which the cash obtained at
the beginning of the transaction is transformed into commodities through the
process of manufacture and sale and then converted back into cash at the
end of the transaction through the collection of the proceeds of the sale. In a
successful cycle, the completion of the operation that gave rise to the loan
provides the funds for retiring the paper, thus rendering it self-liquidating.
Note, The Commercial Paper Market and the Securities Acts, 39 U. Cm. L. REV. 362, 364
(1972) (footnote omitted). However, it has been suggested that "a significant proportion
of the commercial paper currently in existence [today] does not conform to [the] cri-
teria" contained in the SEC Release. Id. at 386.
11 Letter from Chester Morrill, Secretary, Federal Reserve Board to Senator Duncan
U. Fletcher, April 3, 1933, in Hearings on S. 875 Before the Senate Comm. on Banking
and Currency, 73d Cong., 1st Sess. 120 (1933). See also Comment, Securities Regulation
-Commercial Paper-Promissory Notes with Maturity Not Exceeding Nine Months
but Offered to Public as Investment Are "Securities" Within Section 3(a)(10) of the 1934
Act, 26 VAND. L. REv. 874 (1973).
11 Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 800 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973); Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1079-80 (7th Cir.), cert. denied,
409 U.S. 1009 (1972); Anderson v. Francis I. du Pont & Co., 291 F. Supp. 705, 708 (D.
Minn. 1968).
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Nevertheless, some courts have favored a literal reading of
the definition of a security and have tended to ignore the statu-
tory proscription that the context should furnish the guide to
applicability or nonapplicability of the securities acts.3 As one
court observed:
From the plain language of the statute [section 3(a)(10)] a promis-
sory note is a "security" unless the context otherwise requires, and
in general, the definition of security has been literally read by
courts, the result being that almost all notes are held to be securi-
ties.'
Most of the more recent cases have involved alleged viola-
tions of section 10b and rule 10b-5, as did both of the Tenth
Circuit cases. The courts have focused their attention less on the
literal text of the statutes and more on the economic context of
the transactions complained of. 37 This analytical approach has
facilitated the development of the distinction between commer-
cial and investment paper first as it affects short-term notes, and,
more recently, as it applies to all notes in seeming disregard of
the explicit language of the statute. However, as the Tenth Cir-
cuit appropriately observed in Zabriskie: "Making the distinction
between commercial and investment notes . . . is often diffi-
cult.""8
11 See, e.g., Lino v. City Investing Co., 487 F.2d 689 (3d Cir. 1973) (alleged lOb-5
violations); Llanos v. United States, 206 F.2d 852, 854 (9th Cir. 1953), cert. denied, 346
U.S. 923 (1954) (criminal fraud under section 17(a)(1) of the Securities Act); SEC v.
Addison, 194 F. Supp. 709, 721 (N.D. Tex. 1961) (selling unregistered securities in viola-
tion of section 5 of the Securities Act); Comment, Commercial Notes and Definition of
'Security' Under Securities Exchange Act of 1934: A Note Is a Note Is a Note? 52 NEB. L.
REV. 478 (1973).
11 Joseph v. Norman's Health Club, Inc., 336 F. Supp. 307, 313 (E.D. Mo. 1971). See
also Lipton & Katz, "Notes" Are (Are Not?) Always Securities-A Review, 29 Bus. LAW.
861 (1974).
7 The court in Davis v. Avco Corp., 371 F. Supp. 782 (N.D. Ohio 1974), acknowledged
that
the literal definitions [of a security] begin with the word "note." Plaintiff
. . . argues that the words "any note" mean exactly that-any note-and
that this Court should adopt a literal interpretation of those definitional
sections. Defendants argue that while notes are literally covered by the acts,
the Congress intended, and the courts have usually required, some showing
of the commercial setting in which the alleged transactions took place. ...
Id. at 786. In adopting the defendants' argument but concluding nevertheless that the
notes were securities, the court held that "the commercial setting, or economic realities,
of the transaction is relevant in interpreting the term 'security' even where the device at
issue is a note." Id. at 787.
11 507 F.2d at 551. See also, Kerby v. Commodity Resources, Inc., 395 F. Supp. 786,
791 (D. Colo. 1975).
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In construing the application of the securities laws to promis-
sory notes, more courts are implicitly recognizing the statutory
caveat that "[tihe term 'security' means any note," "unless the
context otherwise requires."39 To a large extent, the context is
dictated by the statutory purpose of the Acts. Anti-fraud securi-
ties legislation is to be read "not technically and restrictively, but
flexibly to effectuate its remedial purposes"' 0 to protect investors.
The Acts generally do not contemplate protection for consumer
or commercial loan transactions. The commercial-investment
dichotomy has been important with respect to short-term notes
and the anti-fraud provisions of section 10b and rule 10b-5. The
Seventh Circuit was one of the first to hold that the exclusion in
section 3(a)(10) for short-term notes from the remedial sanctions
of the Exchange Act applied to "commercial paper, not invest-
ment securities."" Similarly, the Second," Fifth, and Tenth"
Circuits have held that the exclusion of short-term notes from the
Act is inapplicable to investment paper. To the extent that short-
term investment paper is not within the exclusion of section
3(a)(10), therefore, the focus on context restricts the mechanical
application of that provision. The Fifth Circuit stated in Bellah
3, This language is contained in the definitional sections of both Acts; in the Securi-
ties Act of 1933 at 15 U.S.C. § 77b(1) (1970), and in the Securities Exchange Act of 1934
at id. § 78c(a)(10). As the court suggested in United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp.
310, 312 (S.D. Cal. 1975): "A literal construction of the [Exchange] Act should not be
employed to expand the scope of the securities legislation to encompass transactions and
instruments that are not of an investment nature."
,0 SEC v. Capital Gains Research Bureau, Inc., 375 U.S. 180,195 (1963); see Zabriskie
v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 550 (10th Cir. 1974); Barrow v. Ellingson, No. 74-1735 (10th Cir.,
July 30, 1975) (Not for Routine Publication) at 6-7.
[A security should be viewed as] a transaction whose characteristics distin-
guish it from the generality of transactions so as to create a need for the
special fraud procedures, protections, and remedies provided by the securi-
ties law.
Coffey, The Economic Realities of a "Security": Is There a More Meaningful Formula?
18 WESTERN RES. L. REV. 367, 373 (1967).
" Sanders v. John Nuveen & Co., 463 F.2d 1075, 1080 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 409
U.S. 1009 (1972).
" Zeller v. Bogue Elec. Mfg. Corp., 476 F.2d 795, 799 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 414 U.S.
908 (1973).
It does not follow. . . that every transaction .. which involves promissory
notes, whether of less or more than nine months maturity, is within Rule lOb-
5. The Act is for the protection of investors, and its provisions must be read
accordingly.
Id. at 800.
," Bellah v. First Nat'l Bank, 495 F.2d 1109, 1112 (5th Cir. 1974).
" Zabriskie v. Lewis, 507 F.2d 546, 551 (10th Cir. 1974).
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v. First National Bank45 that "exclusive reliance on the maturity
date of the note [is] misplaced" after noting that "the exemp-
tion for short-term paper under the Securities Exchange Act of
1934 applies only to commercial paper and not investment
paper."'46
More recently, however, the Fifth Circuit has eroded the sig-
nificance of the exclusion even further by holding the remedies
in the Exchange Act inapplicable to long-term commercial paper
as well. 7
We realize that our holding today that the Act does not apply
to commercial notes of a longer duration than nine months, taken
with the decisions voiding the short-term exemption as to invest-
ment paper, virtually writes that exemption out of the law. On
[the] one hand, the Act covers all investment notes, no matter how
short their maturity, because they are not encompassed by the "any
note" language of the exemption. On the other hand, the Act does
not cover any commercial notes, no matter how long their maturity,
because they fall outside the "any note" definition of a security.
Thus, the investment or commercial nature of a note entirely con-
trols the applicability of the Act, depriving of all utility the exemp-
tion based on maturity-length. The original scrivener of the defini-
tional section may well wonder what happened to his carefully
drawn exemption on the way to the courthouse, but if the judicial
decisions do not properly reflect the intent of Congress as to the
coverage of the Act, only that body can properly rectify the situation
at this point, if stare decisis is to apply and the Supreme Court does
not make some definitive decision contrary to the presently decided
cases. 48
Following the Fifth Circuit, the Seventh Circuit has also
placed principal reliance upon the characterization of the trans-
action as commercial or investment in disregard of the exclusion
provision:
45 495 F.2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1974).
,1 Id. at 1112. See also, City Nat'l Bank v. Vanderboom, 290 F. Supp. 592 (W.D. Ark.
1968), aff'd, 422 F.2d 221 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 905 (1970) (10b-5 is inapplica-
ble to commercial notes).
The nature of the offering and the use of the proceeds are useful considera-
tions in determining the "investment" character of the notes. Where the
notes are nothing more than part and parcel of a commercial financing
venture . . . the notes are not securities within the ambit of the statutes.
United Sportfishers v. Buffo, 396 F. Supp. 310, 313 (S.D. Cal. 1975).
41 McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 420 U.S.
930 (1975) (1-year note). See also Comment, Definition of a Security: Long-Term Promis-
sory Notes, 35 LA. L. REV. 570 (1975).
1 497 F.2d at 494-95.
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The ultimate question is whether the plaintiffs are simply bor-
rowers in a commercial transaction who are not protected by the
1934 Act or investors in a securities transaction who are protected.
In one sense every lender of money is an investor since he places
his money at risk in anticipation of a profit in the form of interest.
Also in a broad sense every investor lends his money to a borrower
who uses it for a price and is expected to return it one day.
On the other hand, the polarized extremes are conceptually
identifiable: buying shares of a common stock of a publicly-held
corporation, where the impetus for the transaction comes from the
person with the money, is an investment; borrowing money from a
bank to finance the purchase of an automobile, where the impetus
for the transaction comes from the person who needs the money, is
a loan. In between is a gray area which . . . has been and must be
in the future subjected to case-by-case treatment."9
By virtue of these decisions, the exclusion in section 3(a)(10) from
the definition of a security for some short-term notes seems to
have been eroded to insignificance.
A similar trend may also be evident with respect to registra-
tion and prospectus requirements and the exemption therefrom
for some short-term notes under section 3(a)(3) of the Securities
Act. Applying the commercial-investment dichotomy to the
transactional context, it has been recognized that a failure to
register investment paper violates section 5.50 Similarly it has
been held that the exemption of short-term notes from registra-
tion requirements applies only to commercial notes and not to
investment notes." Furthermore, the exemption in the Securities
Act may have been eroded to the same insignificance as the exclu-
sion in the Exchange Act:
[I]t is the character of the note, not its maturity date, which deter-
mines coverage under both the registration provisions of the Securi-
ties Act of 1933, and the Securities Exchange Act of 1934.52
C.N.S. Enterprises, Inc. v. G. & G. Enterprises, Inc., 508 F.2d 1354, 1359 (7th Cir.
1975), cert. denied, 44 U.S.L.W. 3201 (U.S. Oct. 6, 1975) (No. 74-1283).
10 Hall v. Security Planning Serv., Inc., 371 F. Supp. 7 (D. Ariz. 1974); SEC v.
Thunderbird Valley, Inc., 356 F. Supp. 184 (D.S.D. 1973); SEC v. Addison, 194 F. Supp.
709 (N.D. Tex. 1961); Schamber v. Aaberg, 186 F. Supp. 52 (D. Colo. 1960).
" United States v. Rachal, 473 F.2d 1338 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 412 U.S. 927 (1973).
See generally Harrington, Use of the Proceeds of Commercial Paper Issued by Bank
Holding Companies, 29 Bus. LAw. 207, 209-12 (1973).
11 SEC v. Continental Commodities Corp., 497 F.2d 516, 525 (5th Cir. 1974). The SEC
is presently reviewing its position with respect to the availability of the section 3(a)(3)
exemption for the sale of commercial paper where the proceeds will be used to finance
equipment leasing. No Action Letter, Connecticut Financial Services Corp. (June 16,
1975).
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To the extent that the securities laws are designed to protect
investors from fraudulent schemes and manipulative investment
devices, the commercial-investment distinction with respect to
notes in the context of the transaction is based upon a reasonable
justification. Furthermore, it would be desirable to harmonize the
applicability of the anti-fraud provisions under the Exchange Act
with those under the Securities Act, particularly as they relate to
notes. If it be conceded that "the definitions of 'security' in the
two Acts are functionally equivalent, 53 and if commercial paper
is not a security by definition under the Exchange Act, commer-
cial notes should similarly not be deemed to be securities by
definition within the registration, prospectus, and anti-fraud pro-
visions of the Securities Act. But until that anomaly is finally
resolved either by the courts or by the SEC, a commercial note
may yet be excluded by definition from one act while not being
similarly excluded by definition from the other.
11 McClure v. First Nat'l Bank, 497 F.2d 490, 493 n.1 (5th Cir. 1974), cert. denied,
420 U.S. 930 (1975).
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The 1974-75 term provided no surprises in the federal taxa-
tion area. Generally, Tenth Circuit decisions were in agreement
with those of other circuits. Four of the more interesting tax opin-
ions have been selected for brief comment.
I. Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States, 521 F.2d 160
(10th Cir. 1975)
In Wortham Machinery Co. v. United States' a corporation's
payment of a note which two of its major stockholders had per-
sonally guaranteed was held to constitute an economic benefit,
taxable to the stockholders as a constructive dividend. The stock-
holders, two brothers, owned 63 percent in Wortham Machinery
Co. (Wortham). One of the brothers joined with others to form a
second corporation, Madera Manufacturing Co. (Madera). The
new business was not prospering, so a bank loan of $85,000 was
arranged, secured by a pledge of all outstanding stock in Madera
and by the Norris brothers' personal guarantees. The personal
guarantees were required because the bank did not permit one
corporation (Wortham) to guarantee a loan made to another
(Madera).' Wortham made payments of $3,000 per month on the
note for over 2 years and eventually took over all of Madera's
assets and liabilities.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the trial court's holding that
Wortham's payments on the loan to Madera were constructive
dividends paid to Wortham's stockholders.' Citing United States
v. Smith,4 the court defined a constructive dividend as a
corporation's conferring of "an economic benefit on a stockholder
without expectation of repayment."5 Because the company's pay-
ments reduced the amount of the brothers' liability on their guar-
antee, they had clearly enjoyed an economic benefit. The individ-
521 F.2d 160 (10th Cir. 1975).
2 Wortham Mach. Co. v. United States, 375 F.Supp. 835, 837 (D. Wyo. 1974).
521 F.2d at 164.
418 F.2d 589 (5th Cir. 1969). For similar holdings from other circuits, see, e.g., Sachs
v. Commissioner, 277 F.2d 879 (8th Cir.), cert. denied, 364 U.S. 383 (1960); Ferro v.
Commissioner, 242 F.2d 838 (3d Cir. 1957); Wall v. United States, 164 F.2d 462 (4th Cir.
1947).
521 F.2d at 164.
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ual taxpayers' failure to prove an intention to repay Wortham was
held to constitute the requisite lack of expectation of repayment.'
II. Kelson v. United States, 503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974)
The Internal Revenue Code delineates the statute of limita-
tions applicable to tax refund claims, barring suits instituted
more than 2 years after statutory notice of a disallowance of re-
fund.' In Kelson v. United States8 taxpayer Kelson filed two suc-
cessive claims for the refund of his 1964 tax. The basis of the first
claim, filed in 1967, was a carryback arising from a stock loss. In
March 1968 the second claim was filed, *based on the same loss
carryback and, additionally, losses on two promissory notes.
In May 1968, pursuant to statute,' Mr. Kelson was mailed
notification of the disallowance of the first claim. The second was
disallowed on December 31, 1969. In 1971 Kelson filed the instant
suit for the refund of taxes paid in 1964. Because this was more
than 2 years after the first notice of disallowance, the suit would
be barred as to the stock loss unless the second claim for refund
extended the 2-year limit.
The court held that a second claim neither interrupts nor
extends the time limitation when it merely reasserts a prior
claim. Allowing such repetitive claims would indefinitely extend
the statute and defeat its purpose.'0 The court further held that
such claims are divisible. That portion of Kelson's second claim
which had not been stated in the prior claim was timely, and,
therefore, the court examined the merits of the claim as to the
promissory notes."
III. Hayutin v. Commissioner, 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974)
Hayutin v. Commissioner 2 involved a dispute over the cor-
rect treatment of installment payments made pursuant to a di-
Id.
'INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a)(1).
503 F.2d 1291 (10th Cir. 1974).
' INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 6532(a)(1).
' 503 F.2d at 1293. This decision is consistent with those of the Second, Fourth, and
Seventh Circuits. See, e.g., Union Bleachery v. United States, 176 F.2d 517 (4th Cir. 1949),
cert. denied, 339 U.S. 964 (1950); 18th Street Leader Stores, Inc. v. United States, 142
F.2d 113 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 323 U.S. 725 (1944); Einson-Freeman Co. v. Corwin, 112
F.2d 683 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 693 (1940).
" 503 F.2d at 1293-94.
" 508 F.2d 462 (10th Cir. 1974).
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vorce property settlement agreement. The agreement provided
for a lump-sum settlement, part of which was to be paid in
monthly installments over an 18-year period. The right of prepay-
ment was granted, and all claims to alimony were waived.
The former husband claimed that the payments were made
in satisfaction of an obligation incurred by reason of the marital
relationship and, therefore, deductible by him. The ex-wife main-
tained that the payments were a division of property, nontaxable
to her.
The Tenth Circuit had previously ruled that under Colorado
law a wife has no vested rights in her husband's property, and
such payments are in the nature of a personal obligation.'" The
Colorado Supreme Court, in In re Questions Submitted by
United States District Court,'4 attempted to create an exception
to this rule, holding that property rights vest at the time of filing
the divorce action. Thus, transfers under a property settlement
agreement would be a division of property between coowners.
In Hayutin the Tenth Circuit held that the Colorado Su-
preme Court's characterization was not controlling for tax pur-
poses. Looking at the "true nature of the transfer under Colorado
law," the court ruled that, although a burden was placed upon
the husband's property, the wife did not become a part owner. '
Therefore, only payments made by a spouse in acquiring individ-
ual ownership of specific property represent a division of prop-
erty. Other payments are made in satisfaction of a marital obliga-
tion and are taxable to the wife and deductible by the husband.
IV. Wagner v. Commissioner, 518 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1975)
Wagner v. Commissioner'6 dealt with the issue of when the
sale of real estate is complete for purposes of determining who
may take a depreciation deduction. An installment contract pro-
vided that the property was purchased in the condition existing
on the contract date. As of that date, the property was subject to
," Pullman v. Commissioner, 329 F.2d 97 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 836
(1964).
"4 517 P.2d 1331 (Colo. 1974). For a discussion of this and other state court opinions,
see Note, Federal Taxation of Divorce Property Settlements and the Amiable Fictions of
State Law, 52 DENVER L.J. 799 (1975).
," 508 F.2d at 468.
Is 518 F.2d 655 (10th Cir. 1975).
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a lease, and the contract provided that the seller would retain all
rents until expiration of the lease in exchange for his paying the
taxes and insurance during that period. Even so, the Tenth Cir-
cuit held that the buyer was the owner for purposes of deduction
of depreciation.
In discussing the facts emphasized by the Tax Court, the
Tenth Circuit considered the trade of rent for the payment of
taxes and insurance to be irrelevant to ownership, because the
trade was only a dollar exchange. The circuit court further noted
that where property is sold subject to an existing lease, possession
is not a necessary element of ownership, entitling one to a depre-
ciation deduction.
According to the Tax Court, the buyer had bargained for the
taxes, insurance, and rent terms for the purpose of receiving fin-
ancial benefit, and such benefit precluded entitlement to a depre-
ciation deduction. The Tenth Circuit, basing its decision on
Fribourg Navigation Co. v. Commissioner," reversed, holding
that a "dollar loss" was not a prerequisite to an allowance of the
deduction.'"
Wagner seems to be a reasonable extension of Fribourg.
Nonetheless, in Kem v. Commissioner," the Ninth Circuit com-
pletely ignored Fribourg and stated that "if no loss is suffered, no
allowance for depreciation is reasonable."20 A clarification of
Fribourg by the Supreme Court, answering the question whether
some form of "economic loss" must be found before a deprecia-
tion deduction is allowed, would be helpful. Wagner and Kern
have left that question open.
17 383 U.S. 272 (1966), cited in 518 F.2d at 658.
18 Fribourg involved a great increase in the value of a ship due to the closing of the
Suez Canal. The Supreme Court held that the sale of an asset in excess of its adjusted
basis was not in itself grounds for redetermining depreciation allowances. Id. at 277.
i' 432 F.2d 961 (9th Cir. 1970).
Id. at 963.
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